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ABSTRACT	  	  	   Recent developments in globally connected financial markets have heightened 
the need for an effective flow of information between market players. In particular, 
the ‘devil side of corporations’, such as the scandals of Lehman Brothers, Parmalat 
and Imar Bank, has stimulated the debate on the core role of a high level of 
transparency in corporate governance structures as well as in financial markets. The 
main reason for the essentiality of a high level of transparency in financial markets is 
that it, similar to a shop window, not only increases the attractiveness of financial 
markets, but also, as an ‘invisible guard’, plays a preventative role for the unexpected 
events. Therefore, any opaqueness is unlikely to be tolerated in these highly 
competitive financial markets.  
 
 The research of this thesis shows that transparency is one of the main elements 
for effective functioning of financial markets and a significant factor to the success of 
corporations. However, the creation of well- functioning transparency rules is not an 
easy process because it requires considerable and on-going efforts from policy-
makers. In this respect, the aim of this research is to investigate how a high level of 
transparency plays a strategic role in corporate governance and financial markets 
despite its difficulties.  
     
 However, to what extent has its importance been realised by policy-makers in 
their respective legal frameworks? In order to understand the practicability of 
transparency rules, this thesis presents and compares the EU and Turkish transparency 
laws as case studies. Hence, it designs a theoretical framework for the importance of 
transparency both in corporate governance and financial markets, and assesses how 
idea of transparency has been converted into practice. 
 
 
In order to make a comparative analysis between EU and Turkish transparency 
laws, this research develops the following key elements of better transparency law: a) 
The dual nature of transparency laws; b) The right modalities of transparency 
requirements; c) The key information to be made available; d) Effective bodies and 
institutions; e) The adaptability of relevant legal rules with recent innovations. Hence, 
this thesis examines the strengths and weaknesses of EU and Turkish transparency 
laws, and makes further recommendations based on the availability of these key 
elements in their respective legislative frameworks.  
 
Thus, overall, this research aims to critically examine the discussion about the 
relationship between a high level of transparency, the financial scandals and recent 
reforms in EU and Turkish transparency laws from a comparative perspective, and to 
identify key elements of better transparency law for financial markets. 
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INTRODUCTION	  	  	   This thesis aims to build a theoretical framework for the main impact of 
transparency in both corporate governance and financial markets, and to evaluate how 
the theory of transparency has been converted into practice within EU and Turkish 
transparency laws. For these purposes, the overall structure of introduction has been 
organised as follows: motivation; contributions to the relevant literature; aims, 
objectives and research questions; methodology; and overview of the research.   
1.	  MOTIVATION	  	  
‘Today’s winners increasingly undress for success.’1 	  
 Transparency, as one of the main principles of corporate governance, plays a 
central role in the business and corporate world. As ‘the x-ray’ 2  of financial 
environment, it not only helps to improve the effective functioning of financial 
markets by giving a warning of ‘the devil side’ of corporations, but it also helps to 
create a well-organised corporation by providing better top-down communication 
between corporate bodies. Therefore, any financial market, irrespective of its size, 
which fails to encompass or ignores its role, will lose in this highly competitive race 
of the global world.  
 
 Transparency, similar to a shop window, aims to increase the attractiveness of 
companies to both domestic and foreign investors by displaying the essential details 
for information users. Thus, it builds trust and provides confidence between investor 
communities. Trust is a crucial element for the effective functioning of financial 
markets because the ‘death of trust’ lowers the number of investors and triggers 
economic crises by increasing the risks and dropping the demand for financial 
instruments.3 Therefore, transparency can be accepted as key to the success of 
corporations and financial markets.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Don Tapscott and David Ticoll, The Naked Corporation: How the Age of Transparency Will 
Revolutionize Business (Simon and Schuster 2003) p.xii  
2 John Elkington’s review about the book cited in Don Tapscott and David Ticoll (n 1) 
3 For details see 2.2 below 
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 But what exactly is transparency? It is not solely making information about 
companies available to the public. Rather, it provides market players the right to 
access essential information that has a positive impact on their decision-making 
process regarding performance, operations and financial positions of corporations. 
However, balance is the key for transparency because disclosing too much 
information may negatively affect the level of transparency in financial markets. 
Therefore, policy-makers should look for an optimal level of transparency to avoid 
‘information pollution’.4 
 
 In today’s information age, it is easier than previously to have companies that 
are more transparent. Particularly, the widespread use of the Internet regularly puts 
firms under the active monitoring system of financial markets by providing an optical 
zoom for information users. The importance of this can be explained by considering 
market players separately. For example, investors may evaluate the performance of 
corporations by understanding the potential risks and threats. Hence, they can make 
rational decisions for their investments. Corporate bodies, such as employees, 
managers and members of the board of directors may interact among each other by 
accessing all kinds of information regarding the operations and the performance of a 
company. In doing so, they may create the best strategies for the management and the 
challenges of the company. In this respect, a high level of transparency may have a 
positive impact on the success of financial markets and corporate governance.5   
  
There is a large volume of published studies describing the role of 
transparency in corporate governance and financial markets. In light of ‘the x-ray’6 
effect of transparency, the main advantages can be listed as follows: ‘increased 
management credibility, higher trading volume and more long term investors, 
decreased volatility and more liquidity, better relations with the investment 
community and higher share price, better monitoring systems and fewer illegal 
activities’ and as a result, a well-functioning financial market and corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For details see 5.1.3 below 
5 For details see 1.1.3.1 below  
6 John Elkington (n 2) 
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governance structure.7 In short, a high level of transparency initiates a positive chain 
reaction by making financial markets more attractive for all players.  
 
 However, despite its advantages in the financial markets and corporate 
governance, there may also be several major drawbacks of transparency. The most 
important one is its cost because information disclosure is not free.8 Secondly, the 
problem may be whether published information is really reliable. This problem (as 
well as other forms of poor quality reporting) may negatively affect the decision-
making mechanism of information users. Particularly, the negative behaviour of 
CEOs and other top executives, such as ‘exaggerating effort, obscuring effort and 
concealing information’, misinforms the market by suggesting that the corporate 
performance is better than it actually is.9 Thirdly, a high level of transparency may 
increase confusion for information users due to its complex language.10 If information 
users have a lack of knowledge about the published information, then having a 
transparent market may not mean anything for the decision-making process of market 
players.  
 
 Thus, it may be doubted why there may be a general tendency in favour of 
improving the level of transparency in legislative frameworks. Consider the situation 
where financial markets are opaque.11 A lack of transparency could give market 
players the opportunity to give in to their greed and encourage them to commit illegal 
activities, such as fraud or embezzlement in financial markets. History has witnessed 
a great number of financial scandals caused by the opacity of financial markets. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bill Witherell, ‘The Roles of Market Discipline and Transparency in Corporate Governance Policy’, 
[2003] vol. 16, the Banque de France International Monetary Seminar pp.1-2, Tara Vishwanath and 
Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Toward Transparency: New Approaches and Their Application to Financial 
Markets’, (2001) 16 The World Bank Research Observer, pp.41-57 p.47, Beng Wee Goh, Jeffrey Ng 
and Kevin Ow Yong, ‘The Effect of Corporate Governance on Liquidity: Voluntary Disclosure, 
Analyst Coverage, and Adverse Selection as Mediating Mechanisms’ (2008, Institutional Knowledge 
at Singapore Management University), Benjamin E Hermalin and Michael S Weisbach, Information 
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, (2012) 67 The Journal of Finance pp.195-233, p.196, Elif 
Gonencer, Development of Corporate Governance in the European Union and Turkey as a Candidate 
Country, (2008) CIDFE, http://www.iehei.org/bibliotheque/memoires2008/GONENCER.pdf, accessed 
10 April 2014 
8  Benjamin E Hermalin and Michael S Weisbach, Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 
(2012) 67 The Journal of Finance pp.195-233, p.195  
9 ibid, p.12 
10 Caroline Bradley, ‘Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation after the 
Crisis’, (2011), 1 American University Business Law Review, p.7 
11 For details see 2.2 below 
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the most recent one, Lehman Brothers is as an example of the negative influences of 
intransparent financial markets on economies. In that case, due to the widespread use 
of new complex financial instruments, the financial markets failed to keep pace with 
innovations. This failure also reduced the level of transparency in the financial 
markets because there were no transparency requirements for the new financial 
instruments. The opacity of these new tools caused their misuse and negatively 
affected the operations of Lehman Brothers. Hence, the company went bankrupt and 
the US market lost around $11.9 trillion.12 This case is a good example of why the 
cost of opacity is higher than the cost of transparency. Although transparency leads to 
some costs in financial markets, its expected benefit will be higher than its potential 
cost. Therefore, in general, it is essential to improve the level of transparency in 
financial markets.     
 
 However, a major problem with such improvement of transparency laws is 
that it is not an easy process due to some of the aforementioned obstacles and 
limitations. Therefore, it requires considerable and on-going efforts from policy-
makers. As mentioned above, the definition and costs of transparency are two 
examples of these obstacles. In addition to these, the absence of effective rules, legal 
bodies and enforcement mechanism, privacy of information and problem of 
measuring transparency are other examples.13  
 
 The main criterion for efficiency of transparency legislations is that they 
should have a positive impact on the decision-making process of information users. 
As Fung et al. emphasise, transparency rules are effective as long as they play a role 
in altering the choices of market players by creating a business environment that 
makes the essential information available at the right time, in the right place and 
format.14 Besides the rules, it is essential to create legal bodies and institutions, and to 
improve the enforcement mechanism. Legal bodies and enforcement mechanisms are 
supplementary elements of better transparency rules for the legislative architecture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Sun W, Stewart J and Pollard D, Corporate governance and the global financial crisis: international 
perspectives, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011), p.2 
13 For details see 2.1.1 below  
14 Fung A, Et. Al, The political economy of transparency: what makes disclosure policies effective? 
(2004) (Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University), pp.3-4 
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and watchdog authorities of financial markets. They play a key role in better 
transparency rules by monitoring financial markets pursuant to enacted rules and 
providing guidance for complex requirements. The enforcement mechanism refers to 
sanctions, which dissuade illegal activities in financial markets. It plays a preventative 
role for market players. Therefore, these obstacles are one of the main criteria for 
better transparency laws in the financial markets.   
 
 Privacy of information could be seen as a limitation to a high level of 
transparency. Thus, in some cases, it may be essential to have some exemptions for 
transparency of financial markets. For example, trade secrets or personal information 
should be kept confidential and should not be made available to the public. This 
information does not have any impact on the decision-making process of investors, 
but it could have a negative effect on corporations’ performance by giving rivals a 
competitive advantage. In order to protect the intellectual property rights of 
corporations and personal data, opacity has an important role in market efficiency. 
Therefore, transparency should build a bridge between the market’s right to know and 
the corporation’s right to conceal.15 Therefore, only limited transparency should be 
required in the case of information privacy.  
 
 The final potential difficulty for transparency laws is the problem of 
measuring transparency, about which a considerable amount of literature has been 
published. These studies imply that the measurement of transparency reflects the 
quality and relevance of disclosed information. In other words, in order to determine 
the quality of disclosed information, policy-makers should improve relevancy, 
comprehensiveness, accuracy, reliability and timeliness of required information in the 
financial markets.16  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Borgia F, ‘Corporate governance & Transparency: The role of disclosure in preventing new 
financial scandals and crimes’ (Editoriale scientifica 2007), p.20 
16 Vishwanath T and Kaufmann D, ‘Toward Transparency: New Approaches and Their Application to 
Financial Markets’, (2001) 16 The World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press 41, p.43 
and Andrew Schnackenberg, ‘Measuring Transparency: Towards a Greater Understanding of Systemic 
Transparency and Accountability’, (2002) working paper of Weatherhead School of Management (wp-
09-02), p.14, https://weatherhead.case.edu/departments/organizational-behavior/workingPapers/WP-
09-02.pdf, accessed at 14.04.2014 and see Chapter 2 at 2.1.4, Problem of Measuring Transparency 
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 As seen above, it is not easy to create well-transparency rules because; it 
requires a continuing improvement process from policy-makers. However, it is one of 
the main elements required for financial markets to function effectively and a 
significant factor for corporations’ success. Therefore, legal systems that lag behind in 
the transparency race fail to survive in the global competitive financial markets. After 
examining the theoretical framework of the role of transparency, further research 
investigating examples of transparency implementations in legislative frameworks 
may provide a better understanding of to what extent policy-makers have successfully 
adopted and implemented essential transparency laws. In this respect, European and 
Turkish transparency laws will be considered from a comparative perspective to 
evaluate the success of their implementations.17      
 
 One reason for examining these two transparency legislations is that the EU is 
seen as a pioneer in the race to make the corporations ‘naked’18 for information users. 
As in the US, following some financial scandals, such as Enron and Parmalat, the 
importance of transparency has been recognised by policy-makers and between 1999 
and 2014, great effort has been made to improve transparency laws in the EU.19 
Another reason is that the EU consists of 28 Member States and in order to create a 
common transparency culture throughout these Member States, it has to create more 
global transparency legislations in order to take into consideration the differences 
between 28 countries. Hence, such a comparison may help to draw a clear picture 
about creating a transparency framework for globally connected financial markets.  
  
On the other hand, Turkey, as a developing (or emerging) country20 and a 
candidate for EU membership, has also taken some major steps towards improving its 
transparency laws in the financial market.21 The Turkish legislative framework has 
been deprived of international corporate governance standards and essential 
transparency requirements for a long time. It is argued that the financial market was in 
its ‘dark age’ for potential investors. However, during the period between 2003 and 
2014, in order to accelerate the negotiation process of EU membership and to make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For details see 3, 4 and 5.2 below 
18 Don Tapscott and David Ticoll (n 1) 
19 For details see 3.1 and 3.2 below 
20 The World Bank, Data: Country and Lending Groups, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups, accessed 24/4/2014 
21 For details see 4.2 below 
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the financial market more attractive for investors, most of the EU norms have been 
implemented and international financial standards have also been considered in order 
to improve Turkey’s financial markets. Hence, Turkey provides a good case study in 
order to understand the positive or negative impacts of the modernisation process on 
financial markets and to evaluate the practicability of global transparency rules for 
developing countries.  
 
Thus, overall, this research aims to examine the main mission of transparency 
in corporate governance and financial markets by investigating its advantages and 
potential problems; and to evaluate the negative impact of opacity by considering the 
recent financial scandals in financial markets. In doing so, it builds the theoretical 
framework for the emerging role of transparency in financial markets. In addition, in 
order to indicate the practicability of this theory in practice, this study examines EU 
and Turkish transparency laws in a comparative perspective. In this respect, the major 
objective of this research is to investigate the key elements of better transparency law 
and to give further recommendations to the EU and Turkey according to the 
availability of these elements in their respective legislative frameworks.     
 
2.	  CONTRIBUTIONS	  TO	  THE	  RELEVANT	  LITERATURE	    
 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the role of a high level of 
transparency in corporate governance and financial markets. A large and growing 
body of literature has been published on this issue. Yet, there is also a lot of diversity 
as each scholar approaches this field in terms of his/her interests. Therefore, it is not 
possible to present a comprehensive review of the literature at this stage.22 However, 
it is useful to outline how the key arguments, presented in the previous section, have 
been discussed in the literature – and how this thesis aims to develop its own position.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Bill Witherell, ‘The Roles of Market Discipline and Transparency in Corporate Governance Policy’, 
[2003] vol. 16, the Banque de France International Monetary Seminar pp.1-2, Tara Vishwanath and 
Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Toward Transparency: New Approaches and Their Application to Financial 
Markets’, (2001) 16 The World Bank Research Observer, pp.41-57 p.47, Beng Wee Goh, Jeffrey Ng 
and Kevin Ow Yong, ‘The Effect of Corporate Governance on Liquidity: Voluntary Disclosure, 
Analyst Coverage, and Adverse Selection as Mediating Mechanisms’ (2008, Institutional Knowledge 
at Singapore Management University), Benjamin E Hermalin and Michael S Weisbach, Information 
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, (2012) 67 The Journal of Finance pp.195-233 and for details 
see also Chapters 1 and 2 below 
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For example, Charlotte Villiers is a pioneer in the legal literature on 
transparency and corporate reporting with numerous publications in this field. In 
particular, her book ‘Corporate Reporting and Company Law’23, presents the main 
arguments regarding the role of transparency in corporate governance and financial 
markets. Thus, her ideas also contribute to the framework of this research. However, 
some of her arguments are also challenged in the present thesis. For instance, Villiers 
accepts the concept of transparency and disclosure as the main requirement of 
company law.24 However, this thesis investigates whether effective transparency 
legislations require a modernisation effort both in company and securities laws. 
Therefore, it implies the dual nature of transparency laws for the success of 
transparency jurisdictions and accepts it as one of the key elements for better 
transparency laws.25  
 
In addition to this, Villiers examines the practicability of her theories only by 
focusing on examples in the regulatory framework of the UK. It is claimed that, in 
order to determine the main standards for better transparency laws, considering only 
one developed country only provides a very limited picture. Therefore, in order to 
examine the issue in a broader sense and to determine the key principles of better 
transparency laws in a more comprehensive manner, a comparative study between the 
EU (as a region of developed countries) and Turkey (as a developing or emerging 
country) is applied in this research. The main purpose of the present comparative 
analysis is therefore to provide a clear picture of the main common standards of better 
transparency laws in ‘legislative architectures’ by considering cultural and economic 
differences between countries.   
 
In this respect, this research also challenges with some research dissertations 
in Turkey. For example, Canbaloglu clearly highlights the importance of a high level 
of transparency in corporate governance in her dissertation.26 However, as Villiers did 
for the examples of transparency laws in the UK, in order to indicate the practicability 
of her theories, Canbaloglu only focuses on transparency laws of Turkey. Hence, her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Charlotte Villiers, Corporate Reporting and Company Law, (Cambridge University Press 2006) 
24 ibid, pp.1-13 
25 For details see 5.1.1 below 
26 Ayse Nur Canbaloglu, `Finans Sektorunde Kamunun Aydinlatilmasi ve Turkiyedeki 
Uygulamasi (Transparency in Financial Markets and It`s implementation in Turkey)`, [2011] Published 
Dissertation in Ankara University, translated by myself 
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research fails to provide a clear picture regarding the common standards of 
transparency laws and the harmonisation level of Turkish transparency laws with EU 
laws.   
 
The present research examines the emerging role of transparency in the 
context of corporate governance. Although extensive research has been carried out on 
corporate governance,27 there is not enough study in the literature that adequately 
covers the main mission of better transparency in the corporate governance structure. 
In this respect, this study, begins by identifying the common standards in order to 
establish the main definition of corporate governance 28 , and then brings the 
transparency principle to the fore, aiming to show why it is a container for each 
corporate governance pillar (fairness, accountability and responsibility). 29 
Additionally, it examines the role of transparency in each corporate body and draws a 
clear picture with regard to the main advantages of better transparency in creating 
well-organised corporate governance structures.  
 
This study also critically discusses the main negative impact, in particular its 
cost, of a high level of transparency in financial markets. Some studies have 
attempted to focus on the side effects of transparency in financial markets because of 
this reason.30 However, the present research will suggest that these effects should not 
be overemphasised. Notably, it will investigate why the cost of transparency may be 
reasonable by analysing the destructive influences of some financial scandals, such as 
Imar Bank, Parmalat and Lehman Brothers and in this respect, aims to prove why the 
cost of opacity will be higher than the cost of transparency in financial markets.31  
 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, this research provides a comparative study 
between the EU and Turkey, focusing on transparency laws as they apply to listed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ahmed Naciri, Corporate governance around the world, (Routledge 2008), Thomas Clarke and 
Marie dela Roma, Fundamentals of Corporate Governance: The Fundamental Dimensions and 
Dilemmas of Corporate Governance, (London, SAGE Publication 2008), Stijn Claessens, `Corporate 
Governance and Development`, (2006) 21 The World Bank Research Observer and see also 1.2.1 
below 
28 For details see 1.1 below 
29 V. Balachandran and V. Chandrasekaran, Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, (New 
Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited 2009), p.88 
30 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, (n 8), G. M. von Furstenberg, `Hopes and 
delusions of transparency`, (2001) 12 North American Journal of Economics and Finance pp.105-120 
31 For details see 2.2 below 
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companies. The main aim of this investigation is not only to indicate the practicability 
of theoretical arguments in legislative structures, but also to draw a broader 
framework for commonly accepted global standards by considering the differences 
between financial markets. In addition, this research examines and critiques the latest 
modernisation activities in the EU and Turkey. It also presents empirical work on the 
transparency level of selected listed companies in Turkey.  
 
A further contribution of the present research is that it aims to shine a new 
light on the debate constituting the key principles of better transparency laws through 
an examination of the above-mentioned analysis. It intends to develop a general 
framework for the essential elements of better transparency laws. This is important 
because these elements can be used as an indicator to show the success of the enacted 
rules in legislative frameworks, in particular, for comparative analysis. Hence, 
pursuant to the potential elements of better transparency legislations, EU and Turkish 
transparency laws can be examined and their strengths and weaknesses can be 
evaluated in a more appropriate manner, and subsequently further recommendations 
can be provided.    
   
3.	  AIMS,	  OBJECTIVES	  AND	  RESEARCH	  QUESTION	  
As mentioned in the ‘motivation’ section, this research aims to explore the 
essentiality of a high level of information transparency in corporate governance, and 
to indicate the negative effect of its absence on listed companies in financial markets. 
Its purpose is therefore to offer a different perspective on the debate of being 
‘naked’32 for information users through an examination of definition, advantages, 
drawbacks and potential problems of better transparency in financial markets. In order 
to fulfil the determined aims, this research examines the practicability of transparency 
legislations through various dimensions by considering European and Turkish 
transparency laws from a comparative perspective. In this respect, the first part of the 
thesis provides a conceptual theoretical framework about the main mission of 
transparency in financial markets and corporate governance by considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of it for every single market player. The second part 
evaluates the convertibility of these theories into practice by examining the respective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Don Tapscott and David Ticoll (n 1) 
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laws of the EU and Turkey. In addition, this research provides an important 
opportunity to advance the understanding of the key principles of better transparency 
legislations for legislative frameworks. In doing so, it underpins the comparative 
analysis between EU and Turkish transparency laws, and offers further 
recommendations by considering the availability of these key elements in their 
jurisdictions. 
 
The emphasis of the present thesis is on-going financial disclosure 
requirements (i.e. the Transparency Directive in the EU) rather than disclosure for 
initial public offerings (i.e. the Prospectus Directive in the EU). Additionally, it is 
beyond the scope of this research to examine the details of transparency rules in 
accounting law and the requirements of non-financial disclosure in the financial 
markets.33      
 
Consequently, this study has the following aims and objectives:  
i) To show how transparency plays a key role in the improvement of corporate 
governance. 
ii) To define transparency by considering the recent needs of the financial 
markets and to evaluate its advantages and disadvantages in the light of ‘the 
devil side of corporations’. 
iii) To underline the potential obstacles and limitations to creating optimal 
transparency legislations. 
iv) To evaluate the recent modernisation activities in EU transparency laws 
and to discuss legal and institutional efforts to improve transparency 
requirements in the Turkish legislative framework. 
v) To develop key principles for better transparency laws based on the main 
findings of this research and to understand the success of policy-makers in 
building well-organised transparency rules in the EU and Turkish legal 
systems. 
vi) To provide a comparative approach between the EU and Turkey regarding 
the main strengths and weaknesses of both transparency jurisdictions and to 
make further recommendations to accommodate their shortcomings.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For details see 3.2.9 below 
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In order to carry out these aims and objectives, the key questions that will be 
investigated in this study are as follows: 
 
i) What defines good corporate governance, what are the roles of financial 
disclosure and transparency in corporate governance, and why is the 
transparency principle important among other corporate governance 
principles? 
 
ii) What are the advantages of a high level of transparency, and what possible 
side effects may it have for financial markets?  
 
iii) Is the cost of opacity higher than the cost of transparency in financial 
markets and if so why? 
 
iv) What are the main obstacles and limitations to building well-organised 
transparency legislations and what are the key principles for creating better 
transparency legislations in financial markets?  
  
v) What are the recent reforms in EU and Turkish transparency laws and what 
triggered these modernisation activities regarding transparency laws in both 
jurisdictions? 
 
vi) What are the strengths and weaknesses of both EU and Turkish 
transparency legislations, and how could Turkey and the EU manage to create 
better transparency laws in their legislative frameworks? 
 
4.	  METHODOLOGY	  
 
This study is based on a combination of qualitative, quantitative, comparative 
and interdisciplinary approaches. It can be divided into two parts. The first part 
(Chapters 1 and 2) provides a theoretical framework of the main issues of 
transparency in financial markets and corporate governance. The second part 
(Chapters 3 to 5), analyses the practicability of these theories by examining European 
and Turkish transparency laws.  
Introduction	  
	   13	  
The first part of this research primarily uses library-based information, such as 
books, articles, online journals and web sources. By employing qualitative modes of 
enquiry, it attempts to highlight the main roles and importance of a high level of 
transparency in financial markets and corporate governance. In order to underline the 
main arguments in the theoretical framework, it discusses the key points of 
transparency in law, economics and business studies. Additionally, a case study 
design was used for an in-depth analysis of the financial scandals of Imar Bank, 
Parmalat and Lehman Brothers.  
 
For the second part of this research, as well as library-based information, an 
empirical approach was adopted. In order to clarify EU and Turkish transparency 
laws, the research data in this part is drawn from the following main sources: EU 
company and securities laws, directives, expert reports, EU working papers, opinions 
of supervisory authorities and second-order institutions, Turkish company and capital 
markets laws, communiqués and declarations of the Capital Markets Board. In 
addition to these, in order to understand the success of Turkish listed companies in 
carrying out the main requirements of the enacted transparency rules, it was examined 
to what extent the recent modernisation activities on the new Turkish Commercial 
Code have managed to improve the level of transparency for companies listed on 
Borsa-Istanbul.  
 
Finally, in order to highlight the potential strengths and weaknesses of 
European and Turkish transparency laws, to evaluate the harmonisation process of 
Turkey regarding the EU norms, and to present further recommendations, a 
comparative analysis between both legislative architectures has been carried out. A 
comparative approach, as ‘logic of inquiry’, may provide useful information for 
research where the experimental or statistical techniques are not possible to apply.34 
In this respect, in order to answer the question of how the EU and Turkey manage to 
create optimal transparency requirements for listed companies a comparative 
approach based on the promising elements of better transparency laws has been used 
in this investigation.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Cited in Paul Pennings, Hans Keman and Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Research in Political Science: 
An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics, (Sage Publication, London 2006), p.22      
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5.	  OVERVIEW	  OF	  THE	  RESEARCH	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This study is structured according to the key questions of this investigation as 
explained in the previous section. In the following, a brief overview of each chapter 
will be provided.   
 
After this introduction, Chapter 1 sets up the theoretical framework by 
explaining corporate governance and the role of transparency in the corporate 
governance structure and financial markets in general. In this respect, the main 
definition, advantages and disadvantages of a high level of transparency in financial 
markets are examined through primary and secondary sources. Additionally, the well-
known corporate governance models are considered and the fundamental problems in 
these models are evaluated from the transparency perspective. Finally, it gives brief 
information about the corporate governance frameworks of the EU and Turkey.   
  
Chapter 2 continues the discussion about the theoretical structure for a high 
level of transparency by focussing on the potential problems in creating transparency 
legislations. It underlines the problem of the definition of transparency, the absence of 
effective requirements, legal bodies and enforcement mechanism, privacy of 
information, the measurement problem of transparency and the cost of transparency 
as the main problems that aggravate creating better transparency laws in the 
legislative frameworks. However, the main aim of this chapter is to explain why the 
transparency principle is so important despite the potential problems in preparing it as 
a jurisdiction. In this sense, it considers ‘the devil side of corporations’ by examining 
recent financial scandals, such as Imar Bank, Parmalat and the Lehman Brothers case. 
Hence, it seeks to address why the cost of opacity is higher than the cost of 
transparency in financial markets.  
 
After examining the role of transparency from a theoretical perspective, 
Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate its practicability in the legislative frameworks by assessing 
European and Turkish transparency laws as the examples. Chapter 3 considers recent 
modernisation activities regarding EU transparency laws. In this respect, the most 
outstanding innovations and reforms in EU company and securities law are 
highlighted, and potential shortcomings and further recommendations are underlined. 
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In particular, it focuses on the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC, as revised by 
Directive 2013/50/EU). 
 
Chapter 4, like the previous chapter, investigates the transparency 
developments in Turkish legislative framework. In particular, it assesses the main 
transparency innovations in the new Turkish commercial code. Additionally, it 
examines the harmonisation level of EU transparency laws with new Turkish 
transparency jurisdictions and gives a summary of the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of transparency laws in the new code. Furthermore, it evaluates the 
transparency level of a sample of thirty companies empirically.  
 
Chapter 5 aims to determine the potential key principles for better 
transparency legislations in the light of the previous chapters. According to the 
findings of this chapter, the dual nature of transparency laws, the right modalities of 
transparency requirements, the key information to be disclosed, effective bodies and 
institutions and the adaptability of the relevant legal rules with the relevant 
innovations can be adopted as the key elements for better transparency laws. In this 
respect, it provides a comparative analysis between the EU and Turkey in order to 
understand whether the two have managed to include these potential principles in 
their legislative frameworks and compare their weaknesses and strengths pursuant to 
the existence of these principles in their transparency laws.   
 
Finally, the concluding chapter provides a brief summary and reflects the key 
points of this research. Additionally, it explains the limitations of the study and makes 
further recommendations.    
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1.	  MAIN	  ISSUES	  IN	  CORPORATE	  GOVERNANCE	  AND	  THE	  ROLE	  
OF	  TRANSPARENCY 	  
INTRODUCTION	  
 
Corporate governance has recently become an important issue for the business 
environment in both developed and developing countries. This is especially so in the 
wake of a number of financial scandals and crises, such as Enron, Imar Bank, 
Parmalat and Lehman Brothers. In fact, this is a controversial issue because some may 
argue that although in recent times the corporate governance framework in most 
countries has been improved, economic crises and financial scandals,	  such as the 2008 
global financial crisis, are still taking place in the financial markets. In this respect, 
the role of the corporate governance framework in this crisis can be explained with 
the ‘iceberg theory’. If a significant decrease of company shares in stock markets is 
taken as the primary source in examining the reasons for the 2008 crisis, then the role 
of corporate governance explains just the tip of the iceberg.35 The key reasons for the 
2008 economic problem were hidden under the surface. According to Professor 
Cheffins, the main reasons underlying this crisis can be listed as follows: the failure of 
oversight at all level in companies; high risks taken by corporate executives and the 
passive behaviour of company players, such as directors or shareholders in 
companies.36 However, these reasons are also open to discussion because in a well-
organised corporate governance structure, companies should not face such problems 
in markets. Therefore, in this part, what constitutes a well-organised corporate 
governance framework will be analysed and the main advantages of having such a 
structure in financial markets will be evaluated.    
 
A large volume of studies has been published describing the relation between 
a well-organised corporate governance structure and a company’s performance. For 
example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick stress that a well-established corporate 
governance framework increases a firm’s value, provides a better operating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 B. R. Cheffins, `Did Corporate Governance Fail During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case 
of the S&P 500`, (2009) 65 Business Lawyer, p.12 
36 Ibid, pp.2-13 
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performance and ensures high investment returns.37 In particular, the results of their 
research indicate that the performance of corporations under consideration that had 
weak shareholder rights was worse than those companies, which had a strong 
corporate governance framework during the period between 1990 and 1999. 38 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell explain this issue in terms of the shareholders’ rights. 
According to them, voting powers, poison pills and golden parachute agreements play 
an important role in increasing the performance of corporations.39  
 
In general, corporate governance is a system or a strategy that coordinates the 
relations between all players, such as shareholders, stakeholders, boards and managers 
in a company; it determines the objectives, rights and responsibilities; protects and 
develops the welfare of companies; and finally it serves the wider communities in 
corporations. 40  In this respect, two groups of definitions may facilitate our 
understanding. The first group indicates the effects of corporate governance on 
organisational behaviour in terms of efficiency, economic growth, performance and 
relations between participants in a company. The second group emphasises the legal 
frameworks of corporate governance, such as the constitutions of companies.41  
 
The question that needs to be asked here is how corporate governance 
structure could be improved and strengthened in corporations. First of all, it is 
essential to understand the main objectives of corporate governance. Hence, it may 
help to set out a framework, which indicates the aims of better corporate governance 
for corporations. These potential aims can be highlighted as follows: to provide better 
relationships between all participants; to ensure better resource and capital allocation; 
to increase accountability and protect the distributed rights among players; to increase 
transparency and create a strong monitoring system; and to intervene in potential 
conflict of interest immediately.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 P. A. Gompers, J. L. Ishii and A. Metrick, `Corporate Governance and Equity Prices`, (2003) 118 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.107-155, pp.111-128 
38 Ibid, p.20 
39 L. A. Bebchuk, A. Cohen and A. Ferrell, `What Matters in Corporate Governance?`, (2009) 22 
Review of Financial Studies 2, pp. 783-827, p.784 
40 Thomas Clarke and Marie dela Roma (n 27), p.1 
41 Stijn Claessens, `Corporate Governance and Development`, (2006) 21 The World Bank Research 
Observer, pp.91-122, p.94 
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From this point of view, transparency and financial disclosure can be stressed 
in many ways as being key to improving the structure of corporate governance. 
Firstly, they give a general right to access every kind of information regarding the 
company. Secondly, by virtue of publicising true information, companies may 
increase the confidence market participants and information users have in them. This 
is important, because the perception of a trust in a company plays a key role in the 
success of corporate governance.42  Thirdly, effective transparency and financial 
disclosure increase and improve coordination in a company, thereby providing a 
better communication system. Fourthly, they disclose information regarding 
ownership structure, such as major shareholders and voting agreements, executive 
compensation, board composition and their functions that are the most required 
information by market participants, which helps to increase the attractiveness of 
companies.43 Fifthly, a high level of transparency and information disclosure prevents 
fraud, reduces speculation and provides better investor protection in the market.44  
 
In short, ‘when everyone knows the truth, no one can speculate it’. 45 
Therefore, a high level of transparency and financial disclosure can be associated with 
good corporate governance due to high contributions in quality of corporate 
governance standards and good corporate governance can be linked to better 
corporate performance due to the positive impacts on the attractiveness of companies 
in financial markets. However, it should be kept in mind that a high level of 
transparency may lead to some disadvantages for companies, such as high costs and 
competitive disadvantages. Hence, information published should be worthwhile for 
investors and carefully chosen for market players. In addition to these, transparency 
requirements should be strengthened by effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
enforcement mechanisms in the case of false or misleading information and non-
disclosure situations.46    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ibid, p.7 
43 Reinier Kraakman and et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach, (2th Edition, Oxford 2009), p.81 
44 F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, (Cambridge, Mass. 
1991), p.277 
45 Ibid, p.288 
46 M. Gelter and M. M. Siems, `Judicial Federalism in the ECJ's Berlusconi Case: Towards More 
Credible Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting?`, (2005) 46 Harvard International Law 
Journal, pp. 487-506, p.492 
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This chapter seeks to remedy the problem of having better corporate 
governance by analysing the role of a high level of information transparency in 
financial markets. In this respect, this chapter has been organised in the following 
way. The first section of this chapter will provide a definition of corporate 
governance. The second section will focus on the identification of transparency and 
its role in the corporate governance structure by analysing the advantages and 
disadvantages of high levels of transparency in both financial markets and corporate 
structure. The third section will evaluate the relationships between the foremost 
corporate governance models and transparency, and will also highlight the 
fundamental problems in the corporate governance systems in terms of transparency. 
Finally, corporate governance frameworks of the EU and Turkey will be analysed and 
assessed.   
1.	  Definition	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	  
Corporate governance is a term frequently used in the business literature, but 
to date there is no consensus on its meaning. The definition of corporate governance 
seems to be a controversial subject because it is a system, which can vary from 
country to country due to different historic, cultural and academic backgrounds. 
Therefore, it is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by corporate 
governance in financial markets.  
 
 It would be useful to ask why we need a governance system in a free-market 
economy; in other words, why Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand principle’ does not 
automatically create a solution for the financial markets. In order to answer this 
question, first, we need to understand the structure of today’s market. In modern 
times, there has been an impressive development in financial markets. The twentieth 
century ‘owner-operated business’ has been replaced with large-scale joint-stock 
corporations.47 In previous decades, there was very little competition, the amount and 
type of products was limited and transaction between parties was very easy. However, 
in the highly improved markets, there is greater competition between parties, there are 
lots of buyers and sellers, and transactions are generally based on complex 
agreements between parties. Hence, in order to be able to survive and become 
successful in such a financial market, a strong authority can be accepted as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Don Tapscott and David Ticoll, (n 1), p.129 
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framework for the success of corporations. Hence, corporate governance plays a key 
role in financial markets.48 
 
The term of corporate governance is generally understood as a form of 
governmental regime in companies. More specifically, corporate governance 
organises the ownership and control mechanism in corporations, protects the 
participants’ rights and responsibilities, carries out the main objectives and serves 
wider societies in financial markets.49 Corporate governance has differing definitions 
in the literature as numerous studies have attempted to explain it. Therefore, it would 
be useful to consider a few definitions rather than just touch on one meaning.  
  
Firstly, the definition of Sir Adrian Cadbury, who is accepted as a pioneer in 
increasing awareness of the importance of corporate governance by creating the 
Cadbury Report is a good starting point for the general meaning and the main aims of 
corporate governance. According to him: 
 
‘Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal 
goals. The corporate governance framework is there to encourage the 
efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as 
possible the interest of individuals, corporations and society’.50   
 
In this definition, Adrian Cadbury highlights the potential aims of corporate 
governance and accepts it as a framework for aligning resources efficiently between 
all participants in financial markets. However, this definition seems to be too narrow 
to provide a clear understanding of the core meaning of corporate governance because 
it does not include any information about quality structure and specific advantages of 
corporate governance.  
  
From this point of view, Cuneyt Yuksel`s definition may be more illustrative 
in terms of the meaning of quality status of corporate governance. Yuksel provides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Luigi Zingales, `Corporate Governance: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law`, 
(1998) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=46906 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.46906, p.2 
49 Thomas Clarke and Marie dela Roma, (n 27), p.1 
50 Sir Adrian Cadbury, in: “Global Corporate Governance Forum”, Worldbank (2000) cited in Elif 
Gonencer, Development of Corporate Governance in the European Union and Turkey as a Candidate 
Country, (2008) CIDFE, http://www.iehei.org/bibliotheque/memoires2008/GONENCER.pdf, accessed 
24/05/2014, p.3  
Main	  Issues	  in	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Transparency	  
	   21	  
more specific details about the potential advantages of good corporate governance 
stating that: 
 
 ‘High quality status of corporate governance means low capital cost, 
increase in financial capabilities and liquidity, ability of overcoming 
crises more easily and prevention of the exclusion of soundly 
managed companies from the capital markets’.51       
 
Yuksel emphasises the main advantages of good corporate governance in his 
definition. He believes that better corporate governance reduces the cost of capital, 
increases liquidity and helps to overcome financial crises more easily. However, it 
seems that Yuksel`s definition of corporate governance is questionable. He points out 
the essential economic contributions of good corporate governance, but he ignores its 
legal perspective. In this respect, Adrian Cadbury`s and Cuneyt Yuksel`s definitions 
can complement each other when they are evaluated together; however, each may fail 
to give a comprehensive definition for today`s market needs when they are examined 
individually in the literature.  
  
A definition of corporate governance should include both the legal and the 
economic aspects of a firm. From this point of view, corporate governance can be 
defined under two headings: First, it is a body of legal, institutional and cultural rules 
that determines the way of exercising the aims of a company in accordance with the 
political regime;52 and second, it deals with disclosing true information and increasing 
the opportunities to monitor corporate performance in order to increase economic 
growth and foreign investment by preventing fraud or manipulation in a company.53 
In this respect, as the final definition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)’s description can be highlighted. The OECD points out 
that: 
 
‘Corporate governance is one key element in improving economic 
efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence. 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationship between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Cuneyt Yuksel, `Recent Developments of Corporate Governance in the Global Economy and the 
New Turkish Commercial Draft Law Reforms`, (2008) 3 JICLT pp.101-111, p.1 
52 Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance For The Twenty-First 
Century, (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1995), p.19 cited in Cuneyt Yuksel (n 51), 
p.102 
53 Cuneyt Yuksel (n 51), p.102 
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stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined’.54   
  
There are many definitions of corporate governance in the literature and to 
some extent all of them have helped to describe it over the years. However, this is an 
era in which everything is rapidly changing in the financial markets. Therefore, some 
old cliché definitions are no longer enough to emphasise the key factors of corporate 
governance for today`s market. Another issue is that a ‘one size fits all’ definition is 
not possible due to the differences between companies.55 Moreover, different cultural, 
legal and academic backgrounds also increase the differences in corporate governance 
structures. Hence, in identifying corporate governance, it is necessary to focus on the 
common concepts of corporate governance that are universally accepted. In this 
respect, the main principles of corporate governance, ‘transparency, responsibility, 
fairness and accountability’, can be accepted as common concepts that should be 
covered by all the definitions.56 
 
In the light of this information, corporate governance is a system that 
constitutes a set of rules, which will create a smooth working environment for the 
management, welfare, and interest of the players in financial markets by ensuring 
transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility in corporations.  
 
1.1	  Definition	  of	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure,	  and	  Their	  Roles	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in	  Corporate	  Governance 
Transparency, as one of the main pillars of corporate governance, plays an 
important role in the success of both corporations and financial markets. In fact, it is 
argued that transparency is perhaps the most important one because the other three 
pillars ‘fairness, accountability and responsibility’ 57  depend on a high level of 
information disclosure and cannot be effectively provided where there is a lack of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, (Steering Group on Corporate, Paris 2004), 
p.11 cited in Elif Gonencer (n 50), p.4 
55 Ben Pettet, Company Law, (2th Edition, Harlow: Longman 2001), pp.145-146 
56 V. Balachandran and V. Chandrasekaran, Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, (New 
Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited 2009), p.88 
57 ibid 
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transparency. Therefore, transparency and financial disclosure may be claimed as the 
first step toward successful corporate governance. 
 
This shows a need to be explicit about exactly what is meant by transparency. 
Historically, it was accepted as ‘hearing was believing’, but in today’s highly visible 
information age, this can no longer be claimed for the markets.58	  Hence, today’s 
definition of transparency is ‘seeing is believing’.59    
 
Transparency and financial disclosure give the public a general right of access 
to all kinds of recorded information with regard to a company. It means that they 
make the truth available for others in corporations.60 However, today`s transparency 
is not simply a case of corporations publishing information; it is ensuring that every 
single person in the company can access published information at the right time, in 
the right format and in the right place. 
 
Fundamentally, the main aim of transparency and public disclosure is to 
ensure accurate, complete, comprehensive and understandable information for 
shareholders and investors at a low cost and in a timely manner.61 Thus, disclosed 
information is important and essential as long as it helps in the decision-making 
process of investors.  
 
Bernard Black also considers this subject in his article and comes to a similar 
conclusion. According to him, it is not important to access information unless the 
information is reliable.62 Therefore, publishing of random information cannot be 
accepted as increasing transparency in corporations. The key problem with this 
explanation is that it may be difficult to understand the quality of information. 
Therefore, in order to improve the quality of disclosed information, the published 
information should have some features, such as ‘clarity, accuracy, trueness and 
authenticity, impartiality, comparativeness, continuousness, audited and updated’.63    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Richard W. Oliver, What is Transparency? (McGraw-Hill, New York 2004), p.11 
59 ibid 
60 Richard B. Smith, ‘Role of Disclosure in Corporate Governance’, (2004) US Sec Commission, p.3 
61 Cuneyt Yuksel, (n 51), p.4 
62 Bernard Black, `The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets`, (2001) 48 
UCLA LR pp.781-849, at p.786   
63 Ayşe Nur Canbaloglu (n 26), p.7 
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In fact, recently there has been an increasing interest in providing better 
information for markets at an international level. For example, after the financial 
crises, many countries increased their use of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in order to improve their accounting standards and to regain the 
investors’ confidence in the market.64 In this respect, it seems to be essential to 
determine the main standards for a high level of information transparency for 
information users.  
 
In general, qualified corporate transparency pays attention to three categories 
in companies. First, it examines the quality of reporting in terms of consistency, 
credibility, timeliness, audit quality and determined principles by law, by international 
organisations or even by their own regulations; secondly, it evaluates and monitors 
private information with regard to investment strategies or insider trading options; 
thirdly, it measures the quality of storage and dissemination of information and the 
degree of understanding of disseminated information by information users.65   
 
In this respect, it may be useful to draw attention to the main advantages of 
better transparency requirements in corporate governance issues. A large and growing 
body of literature has investigated the relation between transparency and corporate 
governance. For instance, Ferrell claims that better transparency plays a key role in 
companies, especially within concentrated ownership structures.66 According to him: 
firstly, in the event of the lack of transparency in corporations major shareholders 
tend to use corporate resources for their own benefits by transferring corporate assets 
at very low prices to other firms with which they have a connection. Hence, a high 
level of transparency is in conflict with the ‘devil side of corporations’;67 secondly, 
better transparency provides better stock returns performance and facilitates finding 
external capital. Thus, companies may withstand economic downturns or may even 
overcome a financial crisis with little damage; and thirdly, an effective disclosure 
regime reduces capital cost by reducing agency cost, adverse selection, the level of 
unpublished information, and diversion of resources in corporations. Therefore, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ibid, p.76 and see also IFRS webpage, 
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm, accessed 01/04/2014 
65 Robert M. Bushman & Abbie J. Smith, `Transparency, financial accounting information, and 
corporate governance`, (2003), 9 Economic Policy Review 65-87, pp.2-3 
66 A. Ferrell, `The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World`, (2007), 
2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. pp.81-131, p.82 
67 For details see 2.2 below 
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provides a cost advantage for the corporate governance mechanism.68 Apart from 
these advantages, the well-regulated disclosure requirements may decrease volatility, 
increase efficiency and positively affect the attractiveness of companies in financial 
markets.69 These relations between better transparency and well-organised corporate 
governance frameworks will be analysed and assessed in the following parts of this 
chapter. 
	  1.1.1	  Types	  of	  Information	  and	  the	  Information	  to	  be	  Disclosed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   A high level of transparency has some positive effects on both financial 
markets and corporate governance. However, better transparency should not be 
considered as simply making all kinds of information available to the public. The key 
aspect of transparency lies in the type of information on financial markets because 
some information may need to be published as a priority. Therefore, if policymakers 
determine and prioritise this privileged information for information users, they may 
improve the quality of disclosed information by reducing ‘information pollution’ in 
financial markets. 
   
According to Botosan, five types of information may have a positive impact 
on the decision-making process of information users.70 This information will be 
examined as follows: 
  
First, ‘background information’ is paramount because it provides detailed 
information with relation to the corporation. The main elements of background 
information are corporate goals and aims, managements` objectives and strategies, 
competitive environments and entry barriers, and basic information regarding the 
business. Background information offers brief information regarding the vision and 
mission of a corporation and draws a general picture of the specific sector in financial 
markets. Therefore, in creating optimal transparency, it may be useful to disclose 
background information to financial markets.  
 
Second, ‘historical summaries’ provide useful information to financial 
markets. Historical summaries refer to financial reports that generally consist of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 A. Ferrell (n 66), pp.93-99 
69 E. D. Prohs,`Periodic Financial Reporting-A Relic of the Past?`, (2002) 27 Journal of Corporation 
Law, pp. 481-497, p.492 
70 Christine A. Botosan, `Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital`, (1997) 72 Accounting Review 
3 pp.323-349, p.331 
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annual reports, half-yearly reports, quarterly financial reports or interim management 
statements. 71  Financial reports can be highlighted as an indicator to the real 
performance of corporations. Information users may draw a general perspective by 
constituting the trend analysis of the performance of corporations. Historical results 
generally give detailed information regarding the ‘return-on-assets’, such as net 
income, tax rate, total assets, net profit margin, assets turnover, return on equity and 
summary of sales and net income. This information also plays a key role in optimal 
transparency because market participants can easily analyse the performance of a 
corporation and predict any potential threats and risks.  
 
Third, key non-financial statistics can be accepted as another type of 
information, which disclose more detailed information with regard to employees and 
products in the company, such as number of employees, average compensation for 
employees or growth in units sold including the disclosure of corporate social 
responsibility projects. What is known about non-financial reporting is largely based 
upon empirical studies that investigate the advantages of non-financial information to 
companies. For example, according to the final report of DG Internal Market and 
Services of the EU, the advantages of disclosure of non-financial information can be 
listed as follows:72 
 
First, it helps to improve reliability between players in a company. In 
particular, it increases the confidence of institutional investors: Second, it improves 
the credibility of a business by enhancing its positive image to market players: Third, 
it reduces risks and in doing so, makes a company more attractive in terms of long-
term investors: Fourth, it increases social projects in the markets and helps to improve 
societies in terms of economic, legal and moral perspectives: Fifth, it helps to create a 
working environment which complies with Human Rights.  
 
It may be useful to highlight that in this thesis the role and importance of 
transparency requirements will be examined and evaluated based on the disclosure of 
financial information. Therefore, the current study is limited by the lack of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 EU Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC), `Periodic Information`, 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/TD__2004_109_CE_.pdf, accessed 02.05.2014 
72 DG Internal Market and Services, Disclosure of non-financial information by Companies-Final 
Report, (2011) Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, p.27, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/non-financial-reporting/com_2013_207-
study_en.pdf, accessed at 11/03/2014 
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information on the purpose of non-financial information in transparency requirements 
as the main argument of this thesis. Further studies on non-financial information 
disclosure are recommended.   
 
Fourth, ‘forward-looking or projected information’ plays an important role in 
disclosing effective information to the market. Forward-looking information gives 
detailed information with regard to forecasted market share, expected profit and sales, 
and potential cash flow. Such information may be highlighted as an important type of 
information because investors and financial analysts generally examine projected 
information of companies first. With this information investors can evaluate the 
opportunities and future risks and then make their investment decision. Hence, if 
companies want to increase their attractiveness to potential investors, it may be better 
to give weight to forward looking information.  
 
Fifth, the final type of information is management discussion and analysis. 
This kind of information is generally published as a sub-section of annual reports and 
indicates year to year changes in firms, such as changes in sales, goods, gross profits, 
net income or market share.73  
  
Taken together, this information provides an important insight into the 
advantages of key information for financial markets. Therefore, it is necessary to 
determine key information by understanding its role in corporations or in corporate 
governance frameworks. For example, according to Botosan, forward-looking 
information, key-non-financial statistics and historical summary of information may 
help to reduce the cost of capital by increasing the credibility of corporations.74 In 
terms of the effective functioning of corporate governance frameworks, annual reports 
draw a clear picture for information users. Hence, which information will be disclosed 
in these reports should be clearly determined by policymakers. According to Richard 
B. Smith, annual reports should include accounting standards and policies, directors` 
responsibilities, profits and losses for particular time periods, auditors` 
responsibilities, general information about the board and its members, and a 
comprehensive report regarding stock option activities.75 Additionally, an outstanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Christine A. Botosan, (n 70), pp.331-333 
74 ibid, p.347 
75 Richard B. Smith, (n 60), p.9 
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change in management, external auditors or board structure, foreseeable risk factors 
and related party transactions can also be taken into account as requiring immediate 
disclosure for information users. 
  
In summary, this investigation indicates that in increasing transparency and 
disclosure, the above-mentioned types of information plays a key role for financial 
markets.  Therefore, instead of ‘wasting money’ with ‘information pollution’, it may 
be more sensitive to focus on the key information that will have a positive impact on 
the decision-making process of information users in order to obtain the expected 
benefit from transparency.  
1.1.2	  Corporate	  Structure	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Transparency	  	   Transparency, as a principle of corporate governance, is an important 
component for the effective functioning of corporations. Therefore, a strong relation 
should be built between corporate bodies and a high level of transparency. In this part, 
the main corporate governance bodies will be analysed and the positive impact of 
transparency on corporate governance frameworks will be evaluated.  
1.1.2.1 Board of Directors 	   The board of directors is accepted as the central body of corporations. 
Although, some differences can be seen in terms of structures, practices or skills, the 
board generally hires, fires, monitors and conducts the main tasks in companies so as 
to increase the value of shareholders.76 In terms of board structures, some differences 
can be observed between countries. For example, in some countries, such as the UK 
or the US, one-tier boards are preferred; in other countries, such as Germany, two-tier 
boards are more widespread in companies` structures. This issue will be closely 
examined in the corporate governance models of this chapter. However, regardless of 
their differences, it should be kept in mind that a strong board of directors plays a key 
role in companies` operating functions, in particular in increasing the interest of all 
participants in companies.77    
  
Recently, there has been an increased interest in developing board structures 
as one of the main issues of corporate governance reforms in many countries. In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell, `International Corporate Governance`, (2003), 38 Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1, p.2  
77 The OECD (n 54), pp.45-46 
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regard, increasing accountability and responsibility of the board towards all 
participants in firms, strengthening the power of the board across companies, and 
enhancing the abilities of individual board members can be seen as the most important 
expectations worldwide.78 
  
In general, all company laws ensure and try to create an effective power for 
the board in corporations. In this respect, efficiency of this power may depend on the 
level of transparency in firms. In other words, as long as board members have access 
to true, appropriate and timely information regarding the company, they can 
effectively exercise their powers and play a key role in companies` strategies.79 
Hence, it may be useful to improve the effective flow of information in the board. 
Thus, the question that needs to be answered, however, is how information rights of 
the board can be increased.  
 
First of all, law-makers should oblige companies to disclose true, 
comprehensive and timely information regarding corporate performance by providing 
a sufficient enforcement mechanism; second, law-makers, especially in developing 
countries, should regulate disclosure standards in accordance with international 
standards, such as OECD Principles and International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS); third, law-makers should require disclosure of essential information with 
regard to the ownership structure of corporations, such as initial threshold of major 
shareholdings, voting rights or names of world-wide known shareholders; and fourth, 
law-makers should keep pace with new disclosure techniques, such as publishing 
information on webpages or improving electronic storage and dissemination. 80 
Furthermore, it could also be useful to provide the board with special rights to access 
published and non-published information before the general meeting.   
 
On the other hand, it is also the duty of the board of directors to take some 
responsibility for accessing essential information. They should request information 
from the management or the executive board, depending on the board model, before 
the general meeting. Board members should not be passive and general meetings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid, p.45 
79 Ibid, p.55 
80 Ira M. Millstein, Michael Albert, Sir Adrian Cadbury and others, Corporate Governance: Improving 
Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets: A Report to the OECD by the Business 
Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, [OECD, 1998], pp.21-22      
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should not be just a formality in corporations.81 So as to be able to prevent this, board 
members` skills can be enhanced. In other words, members’ ability can also play a 
key role in the efficiency of the board’s performance. Hence, members of the board 
should have enough legal and financial knowledge, and the ability to think 
analytically. In a nutshell, they should be able to effectively represent the company.82    
 
A strong correlation between the activities of the board and the level of 
transparency can be observed in corporations. The board, as the management body, 
plays an active role in corporate performance by dealing with the issues of hiring, 
firing, monitoring and managing the company. In this respect, it is claimed that the 
performance of the board plays an essential part in accessing relevant, comprehensive, 
true and timely information. Fundamentally, this allows the board to make worldwide 
strategic decisions concerning the management of a company in an effective way. As 
long as the board members access essential information in a timely manner, they can 
increase their active participation in the main issues of corporations. Hence, a high 
level of transparency can play an important role in the performance of the board 
structure.   
1.1.2.2 Shareholders  	   Shareholders are an important component of companies and play a key role in 
corporate governance. Although it was mentioned in the previous part that the board 
takes the most strategic decisions in large companies, shareholders` decisions still 
play a crucial role in corporate governance. For example, in UK companies, 
shareholders have a right to evaluate the performance of the board and to make 
essential decisions, such as removing existing directors or creating a new board in the 
event of the existing performance not being at the desired level.83  
 
Principally, a shareholder can be any natural person or legal entity that holds 
at least one full share of a corporation. In this respect, one question that needs to be 
asked is, how important is the role of shareholders in a company? According to 
Dennis and McConnell, in past decades, corporations were owned by widely spread 
shareholders and managed by professional directors who had none equity in the firms, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The OECD, (n 54), p.56 
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in particular in the US corporations; however recently, besides shareholders, directors 
and officers have increasingly started to have considerable equity ownership in 
companies.84 In light of this information, the major shareholders can be accepted as 
owners of the company because in most countries they generally manage a company. 
Therefore, ownership depends on the percentage of shares, which are held by 
shareholders. 
  
Major shareholders can be individuals, families or even states. They can have 
special rights to monitor companies. On the other hand, in return for investing in a 
company, every shareholder gains some rights in acknowledgement of the type of 
shares they have. For example, the most common shareholders rights` are: to receive a 
dividend from corporate profits; to attend the general meeting and vote; to request a 
copy of the firm’s annual accounts; to inspect the register of members; to sue the 
company in the event of unlawful behaviour and the right of preference in the case of 
winding up.85 
  
In some corporations, especially in the US and to some extent in the UK, the 
first priority is to increase the maximisation of shareholders` value.86 It is interesting 
to highlight that there is a corporate governance problem based on the separation of 
ownership and control in companies. Therefore, conflict of interest between 
shareholders and other participants in companies can be accepted as the main reason 
for corporate governance problems. 
 
For this problem, there are three aspects to the role of transparency. Firstly, 
transparency may help to prevent misbehaviour among shareholders. In many 
countries shareholders tend to abuse their rights in favour of their own pockets instead 
of for the benefit of the firm. In this respect, it would be useful to show how 
shareholders can misuse their rights in companies. For instance, the most widespread 
way is basically stealing profits from the company. Other examples are: buying the 
assets or securities of firms below the market price for other companies they control, 
or providing good opportunities for their incompetent family members on the 	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85 Shareholder Rights, The Complete List of Rights, 
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86Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in shareholder law, (Cambridge, UK; New York 2008), p.176  
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executive committee of the company and overpaying them.87 Therefore, in order to 
prevent these kinds of illicit activities, a high level of transparency seems to be 
essential in corporations. Better transparency not only provides an effective flow of 
information, but also improves monitoring systems. Hence, to some extent, 
misbehaviour of shareholders can be reduced.   
  
 Secondly, ownership disclosure provides many advantages to the market. For 
example, it increases market efficiency, reduces agency cost and makes the necessary 
information available to the public so as to help in estimating the value of company. It 
also prevents insider dealing in corporations.88  
   
Thirdly, a high level of transparency increases shareholders` performance in 
corporations. A weak flow of information to shareholders can be expected to decrease 
the effective use of corporate governance mechanisms in corporations.89 In this 
respect, the advantage of transparency can be examined from the financial market 
perspective and the internal corporate governance perspective. In terms of financial 
markets, a high level of transparency and disclosure provides useful information to 
shareholders with regard to buying, selling and holding securities in the market. From 
the internal corporate governance perspective, adequate disclosure increases the 
decision-making powers of shareholders and helps to provide better communication 
between participants in firms.90 Hence, it ensures an effective corporate governance 
mechanism in corporations.  
1.1.2.3 Stakeholders 	   Stakeholders are other players in the corporate governance structure who also 
play a key role in corporations, especially in long-term investments. According to 
Oliver, stakeholders consist of; ‘employees; unions; the public (both local and 
national); governments at various levels; media; customers; suppliers; financial 
institutions; civic, cultural, ethnic/racial, and religious groups; citizen action groups; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance’, [1999], 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3, p.1 
88 Michael C. Schouten and Mathias M. Siems, `The Evolution of Ownership Disclosure Rules Across 
Countries`, (2010) 10 Journal of corporate law studies pp.451-483 Part 2, at p.452    
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and various nongovernment organizations with broad or narrow agendas’. 91 
Stakeholders are general market players; hence, the long-term performance of 
companies depends on the number of stakeholders. Therefore, good corporate 
governance should be able to provide a better relationship between stakeholders and 
companies in order to encourage them to increase their investments in corporations. 
  
Thus, it could be useful to grant stakeholders certain rights in companies. In 
terms of these rights, the OECD Principles draw a clear picture. According to one of 
the main principles of the OECD:92 
        
   ‘The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises.’    
 
 These OECD principles may be used to understand what kind of rights should be 
provided to stakeholders.  Firstly, stakeholders` rights and interests should be 
determined and protected by the law. Secondly, active participation of stakeholders 
should be provided, thirdly, stakeholders should be able to access relevant, 
comprehensive and true information in a timely manner, fourthly, stakeholders should 
be able to articulate their main concerns with regard to the company, the board or their 
rights, and finally an effective creditor’s rights should be considered in order to create 
an efficient insolvency framework.93 
  
 One question that needs to be asked, however, is what are the roles of 
stakeholders in companies and why is a high level of transparency important for 
them? In order to understand the basic role of stakeholders and the importance of 
transparency, it would be useful to analyse the functions of employees and creditors in 
companies.  
  
 Employees should be seen as an important component of the corporate 
governance framework at a basic level. Principally, employees are appointed to 
accomplish specific duties in firms; therefore, a good relationship between employees 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Richard W. Oliver, (n 58), p.14 
92 Robert W.McGee, Corporate governance in developing economies country studies of Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America, (Springer, 2009) <http://www.myilibrary.com?id=183087>, p.37  
93 The OECD, (n 54), p.21  
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and firms is useful for productivity and quality of corporations. Numerous studies, 
such as OECD researches, have attempted to show that behind the success of most 
companies, a strong connection between employees and corporate governance can be 
observed. 94  Therefore, it would be useful to provide certain requirements and 
standards in order to protect employees. However, generally in practice, employees in 
most countries do not have enough protection in claiming their rights, in particular 
when rules, laws or internal agreements are infringed.95 The main problem lies in the 
lack of enforcement in national legislations. Therefore, in order to provide dispute 
settlements, an improvement in judicial systems, such as increasing penalties in the 
event of infringement of employees` rights, is essential.  
  
 It can be presumed from the abovementioned information that employees just 
play a basic role. However, their contribution can be very remarkable for companies` 
profits because the success of the companies` earnings at least depends on employees` 
productivity and quality. In other words, as long as corporate governance manages to 
make employees feel they are an important part of the company, then employees will 
reflect these good relations in their performance. Therefore, sound employees` 
protection may have a positive impact on the corporate governance mechanism.  
  
 In this respect, the importance of transparency can be evaluated. In fact, there 
is a strong relation between a high level of transparency and employees. On the one 
hand, a high level of transparency helps to increase employees` protection and 
performance; on the other hand, employees can also help to provide a high level of 
transparency for companies.  For example in some countries, such as China, Croatia, 
Brazil and Russia, employees have the right to appoint some members to the board or 
to choose work councils in order to participate in the decision-making process of 
firms.96 This means that employees have representatives in the corporate governance 
mechanisms. For such systems, accessing the relevant information in a timely manner 
may help employees and their representatives to make an effective contribution to the 
decision-making process. In other words, as long as employees have enough 
information regarding the current situation of companies in terms of performance, 
debt equity ratio or delegated rights for workers, they will have more opportunity to 	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express their main concerns in corporate governance. Additionally, greater 
transparency can also provide better protection for them. For instance, a high level of 
transparency can create an automatic watchdog system to reveal abuse of 
stakeholders` rights in companies. 
  
 On the other hand, employees may also have a positive impact on increasing 
transparency. Although employees may only carry out basic duties in firms, they may 
be aware of most of the transactions that lead to infringing on the rights of 
stakeholders in corporations before anyone else. In that case, employees can undertake 
the role of ‘whistle-blowers’ who disclose abusive actions in corporate governance.97 
These whistle-blowers can increase the internal flow of information and provide a 
critical source of information in corporate governance by acting as a spy. However, 
there should be enough protection and certain rights for whistle-blowers; otherwise, 
nobody would dare to act as a spy for corporate management.  
  
 In terms of creditors, a high level of transparency with regard to corporate 
performance can be accepted as a sine qua non element. In many cases, creditors can 
be accepted as lifesavers or primary source of capital in the event of emergency 
situations, such as financial crises.  However, creditors are risk bearers because there 
is always the possibility that a firm may go bankrupt or become insolvent. Therefore, 
before providing a high amount of credit to a firm, creditors generally want to access 
reliable, comprehensive, accurate and up-to-date information with regard to corporate 
performance in order to analyse the potential risks. Thus, the reliability of financial 
reports plays an important role for them. Hence, it may be useful to provide greater 
transparency in corporations so as to be able to access external sources when it is 
needed.            
  
 These findings indicate that, in general, a high level of transparency plays a 
key role in the main corporate governance bodies. Greater transparency draws a clear 
picture of the management of corporations and provides a top-down analysis in order 
to show the whole picture of the on-going governance mechanisms of a firm. So, in 
order to create an automatic monitoring system, to increase the accountability level, to 
ensure a strong communication system between all participants in companies and to 	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increase the efficiency of corporate governance, a high level of transparency seems to 
be an essential competent of corporate performance. The results of this study indicate 
that a strong level of transparency provides many advantages in corporate governance. 
In addition, greater transparency also provides some advantages for financial markets. 
In fact, there is a strong discussion in the literature with regard to the benefits and 
drawbacks of increasing transparency and public disclosure in markets because 
making information available to the public is not free. This means that greater 
transparency can increase firms’ costs. Therefore, there should be a balance between 
the benefits of transparency and the cost of publishing information. In the following 
part, the main advantages and disadvantages of transparency will be evaluated and 
whether or not the level of transparency should be increased will be analysed and 
assessed. 
1.1.3	  The	  Main	  Advantages	  and	  Disadvantages	  of	  Transparency	  
     ‘The Devil is indeed in details.’98 
  
 The current study suggests that there is a strong correlation between corporate 
governance and the level of transparency in corporations. In other words, efficiency of 
corporate governance depends on reliable, comprehensive and timely information and 
a high level of transparency depends on better corporate governance structure. A 
possible explanation for this might be that effective transparency provides a strong 
communication between all participants in firms and increases harmony between 
corporate bodies; so, it creates an efficient operating environment in companies. At 
the same time, better corporate governance can increase the level of transparency by 
improving the monitoring system and reducing the manipulation of information in the 
preparation of regulated information.99  
 
 However, the advantages of transparency are not only limited to the corporate 
governance framework because it also plays a key role in financial markets. 
Fundamentally, a high level of transparency indicates the possibility of analysing 
every single detail with regard to corporate performance and so it provides a chance to 
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expose and prevent the evil intentions of companies by making detailed information 
available to the public. Effective transparency can undertake a preventive role in 
financial crises because it strengthens the confidence between market participants. 
Confidence can be underlined as one of the most important components in financial 
markets because it increases liquidity and decreases volatility by making the market 
more attractive. Apart from this, better transparency prevents adverse selection, helps 
to forecast risks and so creates an effective environment for market players.  
  
 However, a high level of transparency can have some side effects in financial 
markets. The main disadvantage of transparency is its cost. A high level of 
transparency increases costs because disclosure of information is not free. Therefore, 
there should be a balance between the information to be published and the cost. In 
other words, the expected benefits of a high level of transparency should outweigh its 
potential costs; otherwise, disclosure of information will lead to additional burdens 
being placed on companies. As explained earlier,100 disclosure of true and market-
relevant information may improve the level of transparency in financial markets. 
Therefore, policy-makers should increase the benefits of transparency by requiring the 
disclosure of key information for information users instead of increasing costs by 
requiring every kind of information. 
  
 In this part the main advantages and drawbacks of transparency will be 
examined and whether or not better transparency is essential for corporations will be 
evaluated. 
1.1.3.1 The Main Advantages of Transparency  
Since the recent financial scandals and economic crises, the importance of 
better transparency has been understood by both developed and developing countries 
and nowadays a great variety of reform activities can be observed in these countries, 
including the European Union and Turkey.     
 
Therefore, it may be useful to evaluate the main advantages of transparency in 
financial markets. These can be listed as follows:    
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First, disclosure of background information and a summary of historical and 
current financial results provide crucial information for predicting and evaluating 
potential risks, the value of assets and corporate performance.101 In fact, disclosure of 
this information mainly relates to strengthening the trust between participants in 
financial markets. Trust plays a key role in the effective functioning of financial 
markets because loss of confidence means the failure of the financial system. Lack of 
trust may reduce the reputation of financial markets or corporations, which will lead 
to fatal results for economies. For example, lack of confidence increases risks and the 
uncertainties, and accordingly decreases the attractiveness of firms and makes the 
liquidity in financial markets volatile. Therefore, transparency is a crucial factor in 
increasing efficiency in financial markets.  
 
Second, a high level of transparency reduces asymmetric information between 
market participants. Lack of information may cause external costs in capital markets 
in two ways. Firstly, information asymmetries lead to adverse selection for 
investors.102  Adverse selection can be defined as the selection of bad products, 
services or investment decisions due to lack of information in financial markets. 
Adverse selection can be emphasised as an obstruction to the effective functioning of 
financial systems because due to lack of information investors or market participants 
cannot see the whole picture in the markets: therefore, they make the wrong 
investment decisions and so miss many great opportunities in financial markets. On 
the other hand, in well-informed developed markets, investors always have the 
possibility of being aware of these great opportunities, such as finding risk-free return 
investments or taking low credit risks. In this respect, this negative impact of 
information asymmetries may explain the dilemma of why poor countries remain poor 
and why rich countries remain rich.103 Secondly, due to lack of information, investors 
and other market participants have to make more effort to access unpublished 
information, which may lead to greater costs and to spending a lot of time on doing 
so. Therefore, in terms of reducing adverse selection and together with reducing 
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external costs, well-informed markets provide an important advantage for information 
users.  
 
Third, apart from the amount of capital, the level of accessing of information 
in the right place, in the right format and at the right time can be accepted as another 
component in financial markets.104 A possible explanation for this might be that 
investors need information to evaluate corporate performance for their decision-
making process. Therefore, they prefer to pay higher premiums to companies that 
have a better and more effective disclosure system.105 This result indicates that 
investors or market participants tend to prefer well-informed financial markets. 
Therefore, these preferences may increase liquidity and decrease volatility in financial 
markets.  
 
Fourth, better transparency provides a better monitoring system in 
corporations. Hence, it may have a positive impact on decreasing illicit activities in 
financial markets and protecting market integrity.106 Additionally, a better monitoring 
system can increase the management credibility and the accountability of companies. 
Thus, corporate responsibility can be increased in the corporate governance progress 
of firms, which also helps to increase the attractiveness of companies in financial 
markets.107 This advantage of transparency can also build confidence in financial 
markets. 
 
Fifth, a high level of transparency can play an important role in preventing 
financial crises in markets. A lack of transparency can lead to asymmetric information 
between market participants. In this respect, a strong correlation can be observed 
between lack of information and financial crises because asymmetric information 
leads to unlawful profits, damages the equity of opportunities and increases 
transaction costs in financial markets. Additionally, due to lack of information, 
adverse selection may occur and borrowers may face some difficulties in finding 	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enough credit, even if they are prepared to pay higher interest for it.108 It can be seen 
that all the negative effects of asymmetric information aggravates the efficiency of the 
market mechanism and leads to financial crises in economies. Therefore, better 
transparency may be accepted as a preventive action against financial crises. 
 
The results of this part indicate that increased management credibility and 
accountability, better monitoring mechanisms, more long term investors, high trading 
volume, increased liquidity and decreased volatility, better options to access 
securities, good relations with the investment community and advanced institutional 
investors are some of the main advantages of information transparency in financial 
markets. As Naciri said: ‘Truth exists, only a lie has to be invented’.109 In this respect, 
better transparency may also play a preventative role against illegal activities. 
However, it should be kept in mind that it can also have some negative influences. 
Therefore, it seems to be essential to focus on optimal instead of a maximum level of 
transparency. In the following part, the negative effects or disadvantages of 
transparency will be examined. In light of this information, the importance of 
transparency in financial markets will be discussed.  
1.1.3.2 Disadvantages of Improving the Level of Transparency in both Firms and 
Financial Markets 	   As explained earlier,110 better transparency can be accepted as an essential tool 
in improving efficiency in both financial markets and firms. It converts darkness into 
clarity for market players by making essential and relevant information available to 
the public in a timely manner. In this case, a high level of transparency allows the 
market progress to be analysed clearly by showing all potential risks and allowing 
corporate performance in financial markets to be evaluated.  
  
However, although improving transparency grants benefits to markets or 
firms, the negative effects of it should not be ignored. The main negative consequence 
of better transparency is its cost. Publishing essential information is not free. 
Unfortunately, corporations may incur very high costs when they make this relevant 
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information available. These costs can be analysed from two points of view: ‘Direct 
costs of disclosure and competitive costs.’111  
 
Information can be disclosed with different kinds of transparency tools in 
financial markets. The most popular transparency tools are: the media, such as the 
press or newspapers; the Internet, especially corporations’ web-sites; email; 
communication via mobile phones; financial reports, such as annual reports, half-
yearly reports, quarterly financial reports or interim management reports; letters 
between shareholders, lenders or creditors; and finally general and annual 
meetings.112 These transparency tools are accepted as the easiest way of making 
essential information available to the public. However,	   all these transparency tools 
increase direct disclosure costs for corporations. In terms of competitive costs, 
corporations may disclose useful information to their rivals, which may lead to a 
competitive disadvantage for them. These disadvantages cause competitive costs to 
companies. 113  Therefore, the first negative effect of improving the level of 
transparency is high costs.   
  
Secondly, there is the problem of reliability, which can be a difficulty arising 
from transparency. Information transparency should be defined as a requirement of 
relevant and true information in a timely manner.114 Therefore, it is important to 
disclose ‘semantic information’, which covers ‘meaningful, veridical, 
comprehensible, accessible and useful data’, rather than disclosure of every kind of 
information in financial markets.115 The question that needs to be asked, however, is 
how the reliability problem can occur in published information. This problem can 
generally be seen in relations between the principal and the agent, which is known as 
‘the principal-agent model’ in the literature. The principal can be accepted as a market 
participant who may need a service, due to time constraints or a lack of understanding 
to manage such issues in financial markets; and the agent is the service provider in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, ‘Transparency and Corporate Governance’, 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007) http://www.nber.org/papers/w12875, p.1  
112 Ayse Nur Canbaloglu, (n 26), p.30 
113 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, (n 111), p.1 
114 Matteo Turilli and Luciano Floridi, `The ethics of information transparency`, (2009) 11 Ethics and 
information technology 105-112, p.108 
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markets.116 A principal refers to shareholders and for an agent the CEOs can be 
examined in firms in order to understand the principal-agent problem. In this relation, 
more transparency can be beneficial for the principal because he/she can easily 
monitor the agent, and may also reduce the monetary payments to the agents, since 
high transparency will reduce to the effort of the agent.117 On the other hand, more 
transparency will be harmful in terms of CEOs illegal activities because CEOs could 
use information asymmetries in their own favour. Via the asymmetric information, 
they could hide their actions and make it appear as if they were spending a great deal 
of effort on it so as to gain the high payments in corporations.118 This is because, 
generally, CEOs earn their wage pursuant to the company`s performance. In this case, 
if corporate performance does not go well, they can mislead the principals by 
‘cooking the books’ to get their payments.  
 
From this point of view, it would be useful to understand how CEOs’ efforts 
can have a negative effect on levels of transparency. Three kinds of negative 
behaviour can be observed in financial markets: ‘Exaggerating effort, obscuring effort 
and concealing information.’119 Exaggerating effort refers to ‘cooking the books’.120 
Sometimes CEOs can swell the numbers in financial reports to show corporate 
performance to be better than it actually is. Obscuring effort can be seen as 
‘information pollution’ in financial reports or investments in volatile assets or taking 
high risks in corporations. Concealing information refers to hiding information from 
others or not making all the information available to the public.121 All these efforts 
may negatively affect the level of transparency, even if the information is accessible. 
Therefore, the second disadvantage of transparency is low quality of reporting and the 
problem of reliability of information.   
  
Thirdly, complexity and inadequacy may make it more difficult to understand 
the role of transparency in financial markets. Today’s problem of transparency is that 
disclosed information is both poor and there is too much of it in financial markets.122 	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This dilemma can be analysed by dividing it into two parts. In the first part we need to 
understand how information can be insufficient even though there are lots of 
transparency rules in the legislative frameworks. Firstly, transparency can lead to 
obscurity, due to its complex language. In other words, sometimes adopting a number 
of transparency rules may not work, if market participants or information users do not 
understand it. In general, complex and technical language may make it difficult for 
the public to understand the rules and standards. Hence, this may negatively affect the 
level of transparency in financial markets.123  Secondly, due to language differences, 
the level of transparency is limited in global financial markets because information is 
generally made available to the public only in English or a very small number of other 
languages.124 Therefore, some information users may have difficulty in understanding 
the published information due to the language barrier. In this respect, disclosed 
information can be poor in financial markets.   
 
On the other hand, the level of transparency can also be so excessive due to 
the new technological developments in financial markets. Communication systems 
have been improved with a great number of transparency tools. However, these new 
communication technologies have increased the number of new financial regulations, 
standards or rules, leading to complexities or ‘information pollution’ for information 
users.125 Therefore, even if there is a lot of disclosed information in financial markets, 
the level of transparency can still be low because complexity may distort the 
efficiency of transparency.  
  
In a nutshell, as Gilotta mentions in his article, a high level of transparency 
may have a negative impact on business organisations.126 In particular, he emphasises 
that making some information available to the public, such as production costs and 
profits of a certain line of business may lead players in the company to require higher 
wages for their work, customers to ask for lower prices and the company to lose its 
bargaining power in the market. In addition to this, he also highlights the fact that the 
high level of transparency makes useful information available to the rivals, which 	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distorts the company`s competitive position, and also reduces the company`s profits 
in the market by making a certain line of business more attractive for the new 
entrants.  
 1.1.3.3 Analysis and Discussion 	   The results of this study indicate that transparency is a supplementary element 
of the effective functioning of corporate governance and financial markets. On the 
one hand, it provides some advantages for financial markets; on the other hand, it has 
some side effects. In this respect, to understand the efficiency of better transparency, 
it may be useful to concentrate on the problems of a high level of transparency and 
potential remedies.  
 
Firstly, there is no possibility of making the relevant information available in 
financial markets without incurring some costs because publishing information is not 
free. However, due to technological developments, especially via the Internet, it is at 
least possible to reduce costs and easy to disclose information worldwide. 
Additionally, it is claimed that the expected cost of transparency is never larger than 
its expected benefit. Moreover, the absence of transparency may have a distractive 
impact on financial markets by increasing the number of illegal activities. Therefore, 
in terms of costs and benefits, better transparency may be more reasonable for 
financial markets. 
 
Secondly, problems of reliability or low-quality reporting of transparency is 
another problematic issue that needs to be considered by policymakers. As mentioned 
earlier, ‘the devil is indeed in details.’127 In this respect, better transparency may 
provide a chance to evaluate every detail in the decision-making progress. However, 
without accessing reliable information, it does not mean anything for information 
users. Therefore, it seems to be essential to focus on the ‘semantic information’ in 
financial markets. In order to improve reliability, two essential criteria play a key role 
in legislative frameworks: better audit systems and dissuasive sanctions. These two 
criteria help to improve the trustworthiness of disclosed information, which ensures 
confidence in financial markets. A possible explanation for this might be that lack of 
confidence can be the main reason for economic crises and financial scandals. 	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Therefore, in order to increase the level of transparency and so the effective 
functioning of the financial markets, better audit systems and adequate sanctions 
when the law is breached would seem to be essential in legislative frameworks.    
  
Thirdly, apart from the rules, it is necessary to have a clear legal terminology 
for market players. It is useful to note that it does not matter how many rules or new 
reforms have been adopted, the important thing is to what extent these new 
transparency requirements have been understood and implemented by market 
participants. In fact, this is a general problem of law because the language of law 
generally consists of some technical terminology, which may increase the complexity 
for all players. In this respect, the public may not be aware of their rights to access 
‘semantic information’ with relation to companies, although there are a number of 
requirements in the legislative frameworks. Therefore, to create better transparency 
rules, it seems useful to have more simple and purer language in writing of law. 
Moreover, language barriers can also limit the level of transparency. It is widely 
accepted that English is the common language of the world; however, it may not be 
enough to make financial markets more attractive for all international investors. 
Therefore, it may be advantageous to disclose relevant information in more than one 
language, such as Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, German and French, in order to increase 
the number of investors in the financial markets.   
  
Fourthly, corporations have the right to hide some information in financial 
markets. For example, technological information, chemical formulas or trade secrets 
should be kept and not made available to the public for competitive and strategic 
reasons. In fact, in many countries, such as in Turkey and the EU Member States, this 
information is already protected within copyrights, trademarks and patent system in 
intellectual property rights.128 Therefore, a certain level of confidentiality has been 
protected and enhanced within the legislative frameworks.  
  
The necessity and advantage of full information disclosure by all listed 
companies on financial markets may be explained by considering the ‘Prisoner 
Dilemma Game Theory Model’ of Albert B. Tuckers, as explained for the relation 	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between transparency and systemic performance by Andrew Schnackenberg in his 
research. In this respect, Table 1 was prepared by considering the research of 
Schnackenberg on this.129 In this study, only the transparency level of corporations 
was considered, and other features, such as profitability or market share of 
corporations were ignored. Additionally, it is based on the hypothesis of the 
preference of investors in favour of transparent corporations in their decision-making 
process.  
  
Table	  1:	  Companies	  Dilemma	  for	  the	  Information	  Disclosure	  in	  the	  Financial	  
Markets	  
Companies: Company Y: Disclosure of 
expected information 
Company Y: Non-information 
disclosure 
Company X: Disclosure 
of expected information 
1 to Company X, 1 to Company 
Y, and 2 to financial market 
2 to Company X, -2 to 
Company Y, and 0 to financial 
market 
Company X: Non-
information disclosure  
-2 to Company X, 2 to Company 
Y, and 0 to financial market 
-1 to Company X, -1 to 
Company Y, and -2 to financial 
market 
  
 In this study, Table 1 presents an overview of the role of information 
disclosure in financial markets and corporations. As seen from Table 1 (above), when 
Companies X and Y refrain from information disclosure, not only companies but also 
the financial market loses. Whereas, when both disclose the information, all players 
and the financial market win. On the other hand, when companies asynchronously 
publish information, only the transparent company wins; the intransparent company 
loses, and the financial market is neutral. Therefore, the results of this study show that 
to improve the attractiveness of corporations and to increase the effective functioning 
of financial markets, all information senders, in other words, all listed companies, 
should cooperate with each other in disclosing information. In this respect, the key 
duty of policymakers is to determine the minimum transparency standards for 
financial markets. This issue will be discussed in the following chapters.     
 
To sum up, this study confirms that transparency has some positive effects on 
financial markets and performance of corporations. In terms of financial markets, it 	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provides: long term investors; better monitoring systems;	   better options to access 
securities;	   good relations with the investment community; increased liquidity and 
decreased volatility, and doing so, ensures higher trading volume. In terms of 
companies, it creates an effective corporate governance system, which helps to 
increase the performance of firms in the financial markets. 
  
In this respect, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer prove the relationship 
between better disclosure rules and high market capitalisation or better GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) ratio in markets with an empirical research in their article.130 
According to them, increasing transparency requirements in terms of at least two 
standards, such as prospectus, inside ownership, compensation, or shareholders, have 
provided 27% growths in GDP of inspected nations for that time period. Although 
their research is controversial in the literature, their findings can be considered as 
empirical evidence to prove the real positive effect of better transparency in economic 
growths. However, in order to utilise these advantages of transparency, policymakers 
should focus on creating optimal transparency in financial markets. There should be a 
balance between the costs and the benefits and also between essential information and 
confidential information. Otherwise, the potential drawbacks of transparency can 
outweigh its expected benefits.  
 
1.2.	  Approaches	  to	  Corporate	  Governance	  Problems	  and	  How	  They	  
Relate	  to	  Transparency 
 In the new global economy, corporate governance has become a central issue 
for the effective functioning of financial markets. However, due to cultural and 
economical differences between the countries, different corporate governance systems 
can be observed in financial markets. In this respect, every different system leads to 
different problems in financial markets.  
  
 Inter alia, separation of ownership and control, disagreement between 
shareholders and stakeholders in terms of interest and expectations, directors’ 
remuneration, risk management and honesty in corporate bodies can be highlighted as 
fundamental problems, which companies may face in financial markets. As mentioned 	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before,131 transparency has a positive impact on the corporate governance mechanism. 
But can transparency be a remedy for the main problems of corporate governance as 
an automatic problem-solving mechanism for companies? In this part: firstly, well-
known corporate governance models will be examined; secondly, fundamental 
problems of corporate governance will be analysed; thirdly, the role of transparency in 
these main problems will be evaluated and finally, the corporate governance 
framework in the EU and Turkey will be assessed.  
1.2.1	  Well-­‐known	  Models	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	  
In the legal literature, two kinds of corporate governance models are dominant 
in the structure of corporations: the Anglo-American Model and the German Model. 
There are some significant differences between these models and due to these 
distinctions different problems have occurred in financial markets. In the pages that 
follow, these models will be analysed and evaluated. 
1.2.1.1 Anglo-American Model 
The Anglo-American Model is preferred and influenced by great deals of 
countries, such as South Korea, Chine and Japan,132 because both the US and the UK 
have a strong capital market in the world.133 In this model, ownership and control are 
divorced and shareholders are one of the important participants in corporations, since 
the main aim of this model is to increase the interest of shareholders. In theory, 
shareholders are the owner of the company. They invest a great deal of money; 
therefore, they are accepted as the risk bearers.134  
 
Shareholders have some key rights in corporations, such as the right to change 
and adopt the rules, the right to obtain dividend income from the profits, inspection 
rights, the right to take key decisions like mergers and so on. However, generally they 
need an external agent (such as CEO) in order to fulfil the running of the company in 
a professional manner. Therefore, they delegate a CEO for the management of 
companies. On the other hand, they continue to monitor them in order to ensure that 	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133 Thomas Clarke, International corporate governance: A comparative approach, (1th edn Taylor& 
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everything goes well.135  However, these relationships between shareholders and 
CEOs lead to one of the most important problems of the Anglo-American Model, 
which is known as the ‘agency problem’ in the literature. The agency-problem or the 
principal-agent problem refers to the conflict of interest between inexperienced 
shareholders and professional managers in corporate governance.136 This problem 
will be examined in the following parts. 
 
In this model, the board of directors also plays a key role. This model has a 
single board of directors system.137 The members of the board are selected by 
shareholders and their main rights are: firstly, they control the performance of the 
company, secondly they select, oversee and remove the CEOs, and finally they 
approve shared payments, annual financial statements and equity.138 Additionally, the 
board of directors may delegate	  some committees. The audit committee, for example, 
is liable for checking the financial affairs of corporations in order to provide 
recommendations and evaluations to the board with regard to the financial process.139   
 
The last important participant in this model is the CEO. CEOs play an 
important role in American corporations. According to the Americans, CEOs are 
everything in the company: they adopt policies, monitor investments, and increase 
shareholders’ interest.140 There are some differences between the Anglo-American 
Model CEOs and the German Model CEOs.	   In the American Model, CEOs work 
individually, whereas in the German Model, group work is much more important.  
Additionally, in American corporations, CEOs may earn exaggerated money, which is 
almost twice the salary of CEOs of OECD countries.141   
 
Although both US and UK companies implement this model, there are some 
differences in their approach to corporate governance. For example, rules of corporate 	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137Jeswald W. Salacuse, `Corporate Governance in the New Century`, (2004) 25 Company Lawyer 3, 
pp.69-83, p.10    
138 Russell Muir and Joseph P. Saba, Improving State Enterprise Performance: The Role of Internal 
and External Incentices, (1th edn The World Bank, Washington 1995), p.67  
139 Ibid, p.69 
140 Jeswald W. Salacuse, (n 137), p.12 
141 ibid 
Main	  Issues	  in	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Transparency	  
	   50	  
governance in the US were adopted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which 
represents the ‘regulation-based approach’ for corporate governance standards.142 On 
the other hand, corporate governance in the UK has been adopted with the Combined 
Code and developed by some committees, such as Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel, 
which based on the ‘comply or explain approach’.143 In this respect, it is claimed that 
CEOs in the US have more managerial power in corporations. However, in UK 
companies, shareholder participation is also important. In addition to this, with recent 
developments in the EU in favour of stakeholders’ interest, stakeholders’ interests 
have recently become an important issue in UK corporate governance approach.144  
 
To sum up, the outstanding features of the Anglo-American Model are: 
ownership and control are separated, interests of shareholders are the primary aim, in 
particular in US and UK firms and CEOs have a key role in American companies. In 
light of this information, the figure below aims to illustrate this model: 
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(2010) Current Legal Problems, 63 Oxford University Press, pp.315-374, p.4  
144 ibid, p.12 and see also European Commission, ‘Corporate governance in financial institutions and 
remuneration policies: green paper’, (Publications Office 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf, p.2, accessed at 
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Figure	  1:	  The	  Anglo-­‐American	  Model	  of	  Corporate	  Governance145	  
   
1.2.1.2 German Model 
This model is also known as the ‘Continental European approach’ because 
the German Model is implemented by many European States, such as Germany, the 
Netherlands and to some extent France.146 The German Model, as different from the 
Anglo-American Model in that it has a two-tier board structure. A two-tier board 
structure has an upper or supervisory board, and an executive/management board.147 
In this model, shareholders are accepted as the owner of the company, but the 
difference is that they cannot completely select the supervisory board. Half of the 
members of the supervisory board are elected by shareholders, and the other half are 
selected by stakeholders.148 This means that the German Model not only focuses on 
the interests of the shareholders, but also pays attention to the benefits of stakeholders 
in a company. However, in order to have 50% stakeholder representation on the 
company’s board, the firm has to have more than 2000 employees.149 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 This figure was prepared by evaluating the following book: Russell Muir and Joseph P. Saba, (n 
138), p.62 
146 A.C. Fernando, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices, (3th edn Dorling 
Kinderslay Ltd, Delhi 2009), p.54 
147 ibid 
148 ibid 
149 Larry Fauver and Michael E. Fuerst, ‘Does good corporate governance include employee 
representation? Evidence from German corporate boards’, (2006) 82 Journal of Financial Economics, 
pp.673-710, pp.674-675 
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As for the roles of players in this model, supervisory boards are selected by 
the shareholders and the stakeholders in the company. The supervisory board elects 
and supervises the management board, and the management board directs and runs the 
affairs and day-to-day activities of companies.150  The German Model is explained by 
the figure below. 
 
	  
Figure	  2:	  The	  German	  Model	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	  151	  
 
1.2.1.3 Analysis and Discussion  
The Anglo-American Model and the German Model are the most common 
corporate governance models discussed in the literature. Although there are 
considerable differences between these two, they both try to analyse the same 
problem from a different perspective, which is to improve the effective functioning of 
corporations. Transparency is one of the key principles of good corporate governance 
practice. In this respect, these models can be compared based on their contributions to 
the transparency level of corporations. 
 
It maybe suggested evaluating how differences in corporate governance 
models can help to increase the level of transparency from a different point of view. 
In the Anglo-American Model, shareholders are accepted as both owners and 
investors in corporations. Since its main aim is to increase the interest of shareholders, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Russell Muir and Joseph P. Saba, (n 138), p.77 
151 This figure was prepared by evaluating the following paper: A.C. Fernando, (n 146), p.55    
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the Anglo-American Model provides some certain rights to shareholders with relation 
to accessing relevant information. For instance, in the UK and the US shareholders 
have been guaranteed ‘the best level of information’ in both company and securities 
laws.152 In general, therefore, both the UK and the US adopt ‘the principle of fair 
disclosure and investor protection’. 153  In this respect, inspection rights of 
shareholders can be seen as an important transparency right in this model. According 
to inspection rights, shareholders have the right to examine a company`s financial 
reports and books whenever they need to on the condition of good intention.154 
Additionally, they can also check corporations’ articles and bylaws: inspect board of 
directors’ resolutions, request names and addresses of the current managers and the 
most current annual reports.155 Hence, inspection rights provide a chance to analyse 
corporate performance and to estimate the expected risks. Therefore, the Anglo-
American Model helps to increase the level of transparency in corporations.  
 
The German Model is different from the Anglo-American Model in a number 
of respects. The most distinctive is that the German Model not only focuses on the 
interest of shareholders, but also pays attention to the benefits of stakeholders. The 
relationship between stakeholders and the company may improve the working 
environment in terms of ‘negotiations, compromise, cooperation and consensus’ 
between corporate bodies, which also helps to provide better transparency in firms.156 
Stakeholders generally consist of employees, customers, institutional investors and 
creditors. Thus, better relations between these players can play a role in increasing the 
level of transparency of corporations. In other words, better relations will provide a 
better monitoring system in the company and so all participants know what is going 
on in the company.  
 
The second distinctive feature of the German Model is that it has a two-tier 
board structure, the supervisory board and the management board. This dual board 
structure can also help to increase the level of transparency in terms of reliability of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Mathias M. Siems, (n 86), p.120 
153 ibid 
154 Russell Muir and Joseph P. Saba, (n 138), p.65  
155 ibid 
156 John W. Cioffi, `Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of 
Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany`, (2006), 7 German Law Journal (GLJ) 6, 
pp.533-562, p.542  
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information. For example, the duties of the management board are: dealing with day-
to-day issues of corporations, chasing and protecting the interest of the company and 
providing information to the supervisory board via financial reports regarding 
corporate performance.157  The supervisory board also monitors the management 
board and approves the accuracy of financial reports.158 The main advantage of this 
dual board structure is that it creates an internal monitoring mechanism for corporate 
governance issues. Hence, with this internal monitoring system, the German Model 
can prevent or reduce misleading information in financial reports and help to increase 
the reliability of information.  
 
To conclude, the preceding had to aim to understand the main corporate 
governance models in financial markets and their role in improving the level of 
transparency in corporations. The results indicate that the Anglo- American Model 
seems to provide more transparency than the German Model. With its delegated 
inspection rights, the Anglo American Model aims to directly improve the level of 
transparency in corporations. On the other hand, there is no direct right in the German 
Model to increase the level of transparency for investors. The German Model, due to 
the strong relationships between players in the company, provides transparency in an 
indirect way. It improves transparency by creating an internal monitoring system 
between the dual board structures. In this respect, transparency and disclosure 
requirements can be thought of as weak in the German Model.  
 
However, nowadays this kind of comparison between corporate governance 
models can be meaningless because due to the financial scandals, corporate 
governance systems have been enhanced with certain legal standards in financial 
markets. For example, with the Transparency Directive, the level of transparency has 
been improved in all EU Member States regardless of their corporate governance 
models.159 Hence, in order to understand the level of transparency, it may be better to 
analyse both securities and company law of legislative frameworks, instead of what 
kind of corporate governance model they have. As a final note, it is suggested that the 
Anglo American Model could be more effective for stock equity corporations, such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Russell Muir and Joseph P. Saba, (n 138), p.81  
158 Ibid, p.80 
159  For details see 3.2 below 
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banks and mortgage firms, and the German Model could be more suitable for 
industrial corporations. A possible explanation for this might be that the Anglo-
American Model provides investors with essential rights, which increases the 
attractiveness of companies, whereas the German Model increases the productivity 
and quality of corporations via the good relations between all participants within the 
companies.    
1.2.2	  Fundamental	  Problems	  in	  the	  Corporate	  Governance	  Systems	  	  
In the light of the current research, it is claimed that there is no ‘one size fits 
all’ corporate governance system in the world. However, the absence of a unique 
corporate governance mechanism leads to different problems in financial markets. 
Separation of ownership and control (agency problem), and conflict of interest 
between shareholders and stakeholders (stakeholder theory), for example, can be 
emphasised as the primary problems in corporate governance systems. In this part, 
these problems will be analysed and the role of transparency on these problems will 
be evaluated. 
1.2.2.1 Agency Theory 
As mentioned before,160 separation of ownership and control leads to a 
fundamental problem in corporate governance systems. Due to time limits or lack of 
ability of the management of a company, shareholders may need an agent to control 
the daily running of company issues. However, this divorce between ownership and 
control may cause conflict of interest between the shareholders and the agent. This 
problem is defined as the ‘agency problem’ in the literature.161 The problem occurs as 
a result of the unwillingness of agents to increase the wealth maximisation of 
shareholders and working for their own interest in the company. In other words, 
instead of long-term value maximisation, agents may tend to focus on short-term 
profit, since their payment depends on the short-term performance of corporations.162 
In this relationship, because the agent is better informed than the principal regarding 
company data, the principal may not realise whether or not the agent’s performance is 
indeed what was determined.163  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 For details see 1.2 above 
161 Jill F. Solomon and Aris Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, (John Wiley& Sons 
Ltd, Chichester 2004), p.17 
162 ibid 
163 Reinier Kraakman et al, (n 43), p.35 
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There are several possible solutions to this problem in the literature. However, 
their efficiency must be interpreted with caution. These solutions are discussed as 
follows: 
 
First, because agents are better informed than shareholders, shareholders may 
have information asymmetries regarding the company.164 Therefore, agents can easily 
influence shareholders and work for their own benefits. To deal with this problem, 
shareholders may prefer to monitor agents. However, monitoring agents increases the 
agency cost for individual shareholders in companies.165   Therefore, monitoring 
agents may not provide the expected results for this problem. Second, shareholders 
can use their voting rights in annual general meetings to trump agents. In other words, 
shareholders can determine certain rules for managers in the company, and if they are 
not satisfied with the performance of agents, they can fire them by using their voting 
rights in the annual meetings.166 However, this is not a proper solution either because 
in order to remove agents from a company, shareholders should be able to understand 
that agents are working for their own benefits instead of the wealth maximisation of 
shareholders. However, due to the information asymmetries in the company, it will 
take time to realise the illegal activities of agents and even if shareholders remove 
them from the company, it may lead to additional losses for the company. Third, and 
the worst suggestion, is not to do anything in the belief that competition in financial 
markets will force companies to adopt the essential rules automatically.167  This 
solution is an old cliché because the ‘invisible hand principle’ of Adam Smith is no 
longer completely effective in the global financial markets. Sometimes it is essential 
to intervene in the financial markets in order to create better corporate governance 
systems. Therefore, in order to deal with the agency problem, policy-makers should 
determine the essential steps required to provide investor protection in companies.    
 
In this respect, better transparency may play a key role in dealing with this 
problem. First, a high level of transparency reduces information asymmetries in a 
company and makes essential information available for shareholders. Therefore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Robert Wearing, Cases in Corporate Governance, (1th edn Sage Publications, London 2005) pp. 7 
165 Ibid and see also Reinier Kraakman et al, (n 43), p.36 
166 Jill F. Solomon and Aris Solomon, (n 161), p.19 
167 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, `A survey of corporate governance`, (1997) 52 Journal of 
Finance 2 pp.737-783, p.738 
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agents cannot fool around in the company as they wish. Second, better transparency 
provides a better monitoring system for shareholders. Hence, shareholders can easily 
identify agents` illicit activities and remove them from the management body in a 
timely manner.  
 
Reinier Kraakman et al. highlight three advantages of disclosure in this agency 
problem. According to them, mandatory disclosure: first, provides essential 
information to principals in order to help their understanding in evaluating the 
strategic tactics; second, disclosing of the essential information regarding the 
transactions in a company improves the decision rights of principals regarding these 
transactions; thirdly, a high level of transparency creates an automatic monitoring 
system in a company. Therefore, shareholders can watch the agents by reducing the 
agency costs.168 From this point of view, in order to solve or at least reduce the 
negative effects of the agency problem, better transparency seems to play an 
important role in financial markets.     
1.2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory highlights another important problem in corporate 
governance issues, which is the situation of stakeholders in the structure of corporate 
governance. In the Anglo-American Model, in general, value maximisation of 
shareholders is determined as the primary objective of a company.169 However, 
recently, there has been a debate about it in the literature. For example, Lele and 
Siems emphasise that the UK corporate governance not only focuses on shareholders 
primacy but also considers stakeholders’ interest.170 In particular, Siems highlights in 
his book that firms are not just the institutions that provide capital in the financial 
markets, but also they help to create a community where all stakeholders may have a 
stake.171 In this respect, Siems emphasises that the interests of company is more 
important than shareholders’ interests in the UK.172 Additionally, Mukwiri also claims 
in his research that in English company law, ‘shareholders primacy is a myth’.173  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Reinier Kraakman et al, (n 43), p.49 
169 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance in the new century, (2004) 69 Company Lawyer, p.15   
170 P Lele and M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection Index for the UK, the US, Germany, France, and 
India’ (Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Cambridge 2007) 
171 Mathias Siems (n 86), pp.178-179 
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Therefore, these researches indicate that types of corporate governance models do not 
matter in financial markets because policy-makers may enhance any shortcomings in 
the corporate governance frameworks with the latest reforms, as the UK did within its 
English company law.  
 
Stakeholder theory organises the relationships between a corporation and its 
stakeholders. It would be better to consider the wealth maximisation of stakeholders 
in companies as well as shareholders. In fact, this theory uses an interdisciplinary 
approach in order to provide a smooth working environment and to increase 
efficiency in corporate governance framework. Therefore, it harbours numerous other 
scientific disciplines in itself, such as philosophy, ethics, politics, economics and 
law.174 In this theory, the main idea is to accept stakeholders` contributions in the 
company and also to determine the wealth maximisation of stakeholders in the agenda 
of corporate objectives.  
 
As mentioned before, 175  stakeholders play a key role in the corporate 
governance structure of the German Model because this model provides	  them with the 
right to elect a supervisory board to represent them in the corporate governance 
framework. One question that needs to be asked is why stakeholders are important in 
the corporate governance framework. This question can be analysed from different 
perspectives. First of all, it is essential to consider the sectorial differences in financial 
markets. In this respect, the stakeholder approach can be more effective for industrial 
companies because in these companies a strong network of relations between all 
players can increase the quality and the productivity of the company. Therefore, it 
also helps to increase the performance of corporations. Additionally, stakeholder 
theory may provide a competitive advantage to companies because by being given 
certain rights, stakeholders feel themselves to be family members of the company, 
and this may cause them to work more efficiently and care more about the success of 
the company. Secondly, as explained earlier, corporate social responsibility is a 
required specification within the context of corporate governance by both investors 
and policy-makers. It is claimed that increasing the interest of all stakeholders in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Jill F. Solomon and Aris Solomon (n 161), p.23 
175 For details see 1.2.1.2 above 
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company can be a way of acting in a socially responsible manner.176 Hence, with the 
stakeholder approach, due to smooth working areas and a better network of relations 
between all players, the company may be more attractive in the eyes of both internal 
and external investors, which may also have a positive impact on the long-term 
performance of corporations. 
 
However, there are also some problems in the stakeholder theory. For 
example, sometimes it can be difficult to define who the stakeholders are in a 
company. This problem may increase scandals and corruption, because agents may 
cite children, homeless, prisoners and even dogs as stakeholders in order to increase 
their own interest in the company.177 Therefore, a better monitoring system seems to 
be essential for this theory. 
 
In this respect, better transparency may also play an important role in this 
approach. An effective flow of information to all players in the company improves 
trust and indicates the behaviour of a corporation towards customers, shareholders 
and stakeholders by providing a top-down analysis.178 In general, better transparency 
helps to create an effective working environment in accordance with the human right 
perspective in the company. Therefore, for the success of the stakeholder approach, a 
high level of transparency may draw a clear picture.   
 
To sum up, stakeholders can have a positive effect on corporate performance 
and in parallel with the value maximisation of shareholders. In general, the 
stakeholder approach provides a smooth working environment and a well-organised 
network of relations between all players in a company. Thus, it helps to increase the 
efficiency of the corporate governance structure and the performance of companies in 
financial markets. 
1.2.2.3 Analysis and Discussion 
In this part, the fundamental problems of corporate governance that exist in 
the literature have been discussed. In agency theory, the main problems between the 
principal and the agent in the company were indicated and how external agents tend 	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177 A.C. Fernando, (n 146), p.50 
178 Don Tapscott and David Ticoll (n 1), p.97 
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to work for their own interests rather than value maximisation of shareholders was 
analysed. In the stakeholder theory, the potential benefits of stakeholders in corporate 
performance were highlighted and also the reason why their interests should be 
considered was examined. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
This Chapter set out with the aim of assessing the role of transparency 
regarding the main problems of corporate governance. The findings of this part 
indicate that better transparency may have a positive impact on the problems of 
agency and stakeholder theory. In terms of agency problems, a high level of 
transparency helps to reduce information asymmetries for shareholders by making 
essential information available. Hence, it provides the chance to monitor agents so as 
to show whether or not they are working for the wealth maximisation of shareholders. 
Additionally, when faced with illegal activities of agents, shareholders can easily 
recognise it and remove them from the company in a timely manner without losing 
significant profits in the market. Moreover, better transparency can also play an 
important role in decreasing the agency cost for shareholders by providing a better 
monitoring system. Therefore, a high level of transparency in corporate governance 
may make a contribution to solving the main problems in agency theory.   
 
In terms of stakeholder theory, better transparency may help to strengthen the 
network of relations between all players in a company. It aims to draw a clear picture 
by creating an effective flow of information between all the players. Hence, it 
increases reliability between all participants in corporations and creates a working 
environment. Additionally, since better transparency will provide a better monitoring 
system, it facilitates the identification of stakeholders in a company and prevents 
agents from showing irrelevant people as stakeholders. Therefore, better transparency 
can be accepted as one of the main potential solutions in solving the fundamental 
problems in corporate governance.  
 
1.3.	  Introduction	  to	  Corporate	  Governance	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  Turkey	  
 
In the previous sections, corporate governance and transparency have been 
analysed and evaluated as a theory. In order to understand the validity of these 
theoretical approaches, it would be useful to examine the reflections of these theories 
Main	  Issues	  in	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Transparency	  
	   61	  
in practice. From this point of view, the EU and Turkey will be considered as the case 
studies. The EU can be seen as a pioneer in corporate governance issues. This is 
because the EU recently has made some essential reforms and improved the corporate 
governance structure between the Member States. Therefore, the EU has a strong 
corporate governance framework in the world. In addition to the EU, Turkey can also 
play a role in helping us to understand the advantages of having better corporate 
governance. Turkey is a developing or emerging country, still in progress in terms of 
corporate governance. Since 2003, Turkish corporate governance has been enhanced 
and improved by recent reforms and developments. In this part, to set to scene, the 
main characteristics in the corporate governance structure of both the EU and Turkey 
will be analysed and evaluated, and in the following chapters, (Chapters 3 and 4), 
recent transparency and disclosure developments in EU and Turkish corporate 
governance will be examined and assessed.  
 
1.3.1	  Corporate	  Governance	  Approach	  in	  the	  EU	  
In the EU, contrary to ‘the rule-based approach’ to corporate governance in 
the US, ‘the principle-based approach’ and ‘comply or explain’ basis are preferred as 
the legal perspective on corporate governance.179  
 
It is not possible to mention just a single corporate governance model in the 
EU. In particular ‘comply or explain’ principle provides the Member States with the 
right to choose their own corporate governance models for their listed companies. 
Hence, different corporate governance models such as the German Model and the 
Anglo-American Model can be seen among the Member States.180 However, it could 
be said that there is a general tendency in favour of the labour (stakeholder)-oriented 
corporate governance approach	   in the EU. For example, the 5th Company Law 
Directive proposed worker participation in the decision-making process of companies, 
although it was never implemented, and in addition to this, in the Lisbon Agenda, a 
more stakeholder-friendly approach in the corporate governance frameworks of all 
Member States was determined as social policy.181 Nevertheless, the EU proves that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Frits Bolkestein, `Corporate Governance in the EU`, (2004, speech in European Corporate 
Governance Conference), p.4 and see also Arad Reisberg, (n 143), p.4 
180 A.C. Fernando, (n 146), p.54 and Thomas Clarke and Jean Francois Chanlat, European Corporate 
Governance: Readings and Perspectives, (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY, Routledge 2009), p.146 
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there is no unique corporate governance mechanism in financial markets because 
corporate governance models depend on the type of company. In other words, the 
Anglo-American Model will be more suitable for ‘capital-related’ companies, such as 
stock-equity companies, whereas the German Model will be more appropriate for 
‘labour-related’ companies, such as industrial companies.182  
 
In terms of ownership structures and levels of transparency, some differences 
can be observed between the corporate governance models of the EU. For instance, in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, dispersed institutional ownership is more common, whereas 
in Continental Europe, concentrated ownership is widespread. 183  In terms of 
controlling the devices, ‘multiple shares classes, pyramids and cross-shareholdings’ 
are mainly implemented among the Member States.184 In addition to these devices: 
partnerships limited by shares, corporate charter provisions, such as voting caps or 
staggered boards, and embedded defences, such as leases, licenses or joint ventures 
can be observed as other examples of controlling tools in the EU.185   
 
The transparency level of the EU has been improved and enhanced by radical 
reforms, which took place between 1999 and 2013, and are still on going today. The 
current modernisation activities started with the Financial Service Action Plan (the 
FSAP) in the EU. Then it was improved with the Lamfalussy Process, High Level of 
Company Law Expert Report, the Commission Action Plan on Modernising 
Corporate Governance (2003) and finally with the Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC-2013/50/EU). These reforms and laws will be mainly analysed and 
evaluated in Chapter 3.  
1.3.2	  Corporate	  Governance	  Approach	  in	  Turkey	  	    Since a number of financial scandals in Turkey, such as the Imar Bank 
scandal, corporate governance has also become an important issue in Turkey. 
However, improving corporate governance should not be thought of as just a response 
to these financial scandals because having good corporate governance provides many 	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advantages to nations. For example, McGee highlights in his research that 
international investors may hesitate to take investment decisions in a country where 
the corporate governance framework is very weak.186 In other words, most investors 
prefer to pay	   higher premiums to companies, which have a better, more effective 
corporate governance structure	  when investing their assets.187   
   
  Fundamentally, the Turkish corporate governance framework is an ‘insider 
system’, which is mainly owned by individual family members.188 In the Turkish 
corporate governance system, families are the major shareholders in companies with 
between 47 and 75 per cent of shares.189 In this respect, companies are controlled by a 
form of family-controlled group that is based on a pyramidal structure.190 Therefore, 
Turkish companies have highly-concentrated and centralised ownership structures. 
Additionally, foreign investors have recently improved the impact on the ownership 
structure of companies. According to OECD research, foreign investors had a great 
majority of the free float at the end of 2012.191     
   
  In terms of its legal framework, Turkey is a civil law country. The former 
Turkish Commercial Code was originally adopted from the French tradition in 1850 
and has been amended with the provisions that were mainly taken from German and 
Swiss Law at various revisions.192 Finally, the new Turkish Commercial Code was 
adopted in 2011 and entered into force on the 1st July 2012. The new Commercial 
Code seems to provide more European Union legal standards in Turkish commercial 
legislation; in particular, it improves the level of transparency in parallel with EU 	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developments.193  Apart from the Turkish Commercial Law, the Turkish Capital 
Markets Law and the Capital Markets Board of Turkey also have a key role in dealing 
with corporate governance issues. This will be analysed and evaluated in Chapter 4. 
   
  In terms of board structure, Turkish companies consist of single-tier board 
structure and board members are appointed by shareholders at a company’s annual 
general meeting for three years.194 There has not been enough research into the board 
composition of Turkish companies; however, in general, executive boards are usually 
made up of family members.195 As for the main functions of the board: first, it takes 
strategic decisions for the company and constitutes the representative body of the 
company; second, it monitors and revises the performance and operations of the 
company in achieving its goals and complying with the market rules; and third, it 
plays a key role in settling disputes between companies and their shareholders.196 
   
  Shareholders are a key factor in Turkish companies. Since they are the 
owners, they are granted with certain rights. The most significant shareholder rights 
can be listed as follows: first, shareholders have the right to effectively attend and 
vote in general meetings;197 second, they can force the company or auditors to take 
legal actions in the case of breaches of in-house regulations or laws against board 
members;198 third, they have the right to access relevant, accurate and essential 
information with regard to the company in a timely manner;199 fourth, they have 
dividend rights;200 and finally they have the right to transfer their shares.201 In terms 
of stakeholders, some aspects of the previous code were weak, in particular, in 
relation to their recognition in the company, to obtain redresses in case of violation of 
their rights and to access the relevant information.202 However, with the new Turkish 	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Commercial Code, to some extent these deficiencies were resolved and certain rights 
were granted to stakeholders, such as accessing relevant information with regard to a 
company and a more stakeholder-oriented governance mechanism was 
recommended.203 
   
  With regard to disclosure requirements and level of transparency some 
important reforms have been made so far and are still on going today. For instance, 
International Financial Reporting Standards were adopted in 2005 and most of the EU 
rules were harmonised with the new Commercial Code. In this respect, Turkey seems 
to provide the international standards in the financial markets. However, recent 
corruption scandal led to some disappointments because Turkey failed to take the 
essential legal actions against this crime. This scandal had a negative impact on the 
success of the new Commercial Code. Therefore, it would seem to be essential to 
improve the enforcement mechanism in the Turkish legislative framework. This issue 
will be analysed and evaluated in Chapter 4.    
 
  To sum up, Turkey has realised the importance of having better corporate 
governance in financial markets and has started to take some essential steps to 
improve it. Transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility have been 
determined as sine qua non elements of the corporate governance mechanism in 
Turkey. However, these harmonised rules should not be just an imitation of better 
jurisdictions. Their positive impact should also be reflected in practice.  
 
1.4.	  Conclusion	  and	  Chapter	  Summary	  
  In this chapter, the aim was to assess the role of transparency in the corporate 
governance structure. In this respect, the necessity of transparency was examined and 
evaluated by considering the advantages and the disadvantages of transparency in 
financial markets and the positive impact of transparency on the fundamental 
problems of corporate governance.  
   
  This chapter has given an account of, and the reasons for, the importance of 
better corporate governance in the business environment. Therefore, a clear definition 	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of corporate governance has been seen to be essential. Although, there are numerous 
definitions in the literature, it is still complicated and there are some difficulties in 
general understanding. The evidence from this chapter suggests that, to make a clear 
definition, the legal and economic essences of corporations should be considered, and 
the common concepts of corporate governance for all should be highlighted in the 
definition.  
   
  This chapter has found that better corporate governance may play a key role in 
the performance of companies in financial markets. In this respect, the role of 
transparency, as an important component and key elements of having a good 
corporate governance framework, has been assessed. The results of this chapter 
indicate that better transparency can be accepted in many ways as key to the success 
of corporations because it deals with the problems of financial markets and corporate 
governance. In general, transparency creates an efficient operating environment in 
companies by providing an effective flow of information and a harmony between all 
the players in a company.  
   
  However, it also has some drawbacks that need to be considered. The main 
problem of transparency is the cost. Firstly, disclosing of information is not free; 
therefore, disclosed information should be chosen very carefully. In other words, 
improving transparency should not be thought of as just making all information 
available to the public. In this respect, the types of information that play a key role in 
the decision-making process of information users should be considered instead of 
making all information available to the public. The results of this investigation 
suggest that forward-looking information, key-non-financial statistics and historical 
summary of information are most preferred information by information users in 
financial markets. Hence, by publishing only this essential information, firms can 
reduce their costs. In fact, it should be kept in mind that the expected cost of 
transparency is never greater than its expected benefit because the cost of opacity will 
be detrimental to the cost of transparency.204  
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  Secondly, language may lead to some problems for the level of transparency 
in financial markets. These problems can be considered from two points of view. 
First, due to the complex and technical language of legal rules, even if there are many 
transparency rules in the legal systems, they may not be clearly understood by the 
public or market participants. Therefore, all rules may not be applied to financial 
markets, which will lead to a low level of transparency in practices. Second, the 
language barrier will also reduce the level of transparency in financial markets. Due 
to language differences, the transparency level may be low because information is 
generally made available in English or in a very small number of other languages. For 
these problems, more simple and pure language may be preferred in writing laws. 
Additionally, information could be disclosed in more than one language, which would 
help to increase the number of potential investors in financial markets.  
 
  Thirdly, the reliability problem may reduce the efficiency of transparency. 
Hence, a better audit system and some dissuasive sanctions, such as penalties, fines or 
even prison sentences could be accepted as other essential pillars of better 
transparency. With these improvements, a reduction in the abovementioned 
drawbacks of transparency could be expected. 
 
  Additionally, it was shown that better transparency also plays a key role in 
solving the fundamental problems of corporate governance. In terms of agency 
theory, better transparency reduces information asymmetries for shareholders, makes 
essential information available for them and in doing so, provides a chance to monitor 
agents to show whether or not they are working for the wealth maximisation of 
shareholders. Principally, better transparency provides a better monitoring system, 
which helps to reduce agency problem in a company. In terms of stakeholder theory, 
better transparency may help to strength the network of relations between all players 
in a company and so increase the reliability between all the players in the firm. 
  
  After examining the role of corporate governance and the importance of 
transparency in corporate governance structures, the corporate governance of Europe 
and Turkey was evaluated as the background information for this chapter. In this 
investigation, the aim was to assess the general structure of corporate governance in 
the EU and Turkey and to understand the level of transparency in these corporate 
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governance structures. This chapter has shown that some significant modernisation 
activities have been undertaken so far in order to improve it, in particular in terms of 
transparency. For example, between 1999 and 2014 the EU took some major steps to 
increase the level of transparency. As a candidate country, Turkey has also managed 
to increase its modernisation activities and to harmonise most of the EU legal 
standards. These reform activities will be analysed and evaluated in Chapters 3 and 4. 
  
  To sum up, these findings suggest several courses of action for better 
corporate governance to have a positive impact on firms’ corporate performance. In 
light of the above-mentioned advantages, better corporate governance can be accepted 
as many ways the key to the success of corporations. In this respect, the essential 
pillars should be determined to increase corporate governance frameworks. These 
findings have indicated that transparency is a sine qua non pillar of good corporate 
governance because it seeks a solution for the reliability problem of financial markets 
by providing an effective flow of information and ensuring a clear macro outlook on 
financial markets. Although, it has some side effects for financial markets and 
companies, the cost of opacity would be higher than the cost of transparency. What is 
now needed is to analyse the negative impact of the absence of transparency in 
financial markets. Thus, the next chapter will examine the negative results of the lack 
of transparency in light of the ‘devil side of corporations’.  
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2.	  MAIN	  TRANSPARENCY	  PROBLEMS	  AND	  EXAMPLES	  OF	  
INTRANSPARENT	  FINANCIAL	  MARKETS	  	  
INTRODUCTION	  
 
‘Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants’.205	  	   	  
In the previous chapter, a possible positive relation between better corporate 
governance structures, the level of information transparency and companies’ 
performance in the financial markets were discussed. A possible explanation for this 
relation might be that accurate, comprehensive, relevant and timely information may 
help to provide resource allocation between market participants, increase efficiency 
and economic growth, build mutual trust between parties, and make financial markets 
more attractive in the global business environment.  
 
A high level of transparency helps to analyse financial markets from a 
different perspective. Hence, it aims to indicate the potential threats and benefits in a 
certain market for investors or in a certain company for corporate managers. In this 
respect, it plays a facilitating role in the decision-making process of market 
participants. In order to clearly demonstrate the real benefits of information 
transparency, it is essential to analyse the ‘devil side’ of corporations during the past 
decades. The devil side of corporations refers to the illegal activities in financial 
markets, such as fraud, bribery, insider dealing or embezzlement.  
 
During the late 20th and 21st century, there were examples of a lack of honesty 
in financial markets worldwide. The Asian financial crises, and the more recent 
corporate scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom, Anderson, Parmalat and Imar Bank 
are examples that reflect the devil side of corporations. Evidence from these and other 
scandals has shown that one of the main reasons for these crimes was improper 
accounting and lack of transparency.206 While, transparency may not always prevent 
such illicit activities, there is no denying that its absence can contribute to such 
failures and have a destructive impact on financial markets. Due to these scandals, the 	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highly sensitive financial markets may lose their attraction for investors, which may 
also reduce the market value of stocks and negatively affect economic growth by 
leading to a chain reaction in financial markets. In this respect, the expected cost of 
opacity will be higher than the cost of transparency in financial markets.  
 
However, having sufficiently high levels of transparency is not an easy 
process due to some limitations and obstacles in the markets. For example, the 
problem of defining transparency, the absence of effective requirements, effective 
bodies and enforcement mechanism, privacy of information, the measurement 
problem and the cost of transparency are some of the obstacles that aggravate the 
creation of better transparency laws in the legislative frameworks. Therefore, policy-
makers should consider these problems and create optimal transparency requirements 
by providing a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of transparency.  
  
This chapter is organised in the following way: First, it underlines the 
abovementioned possible difficulties in transparency requirements. Second, it 
evaluates ‘the devil side’ of corporations and explains the negative effects of the lack 
of transparency in the light of current financial scandals. Finally, it analyses and 
evaluates why there should be a high level of transparency in financial markets. The 
main aim of this chapter is to underline the importance of transparency in the event of 
opacity in financial markets.    
 
Three scandals have been chosen for the following reasons: First of all, this 
thesis is a comparative analysis between the European Union and Turkey. Therefore, 
one case from Italy (Parmalat), and one case from Turkey (Imar Bank) have been 
chosen to compare the main reasons for these scandals. The reason for Lehman 
Brothers also being analysed can be explained from two points of view: first, the US 
market is the centre of finance in the world. It may be argued that it has well 
functioning rules and better transparency laws; however, Lehman Brothers have 
shown that even the US has some shortcomings in its legislative framework; and 
second, a strong relation between all financial markets around the world can be 
observed due to globalisation. Therefore, any negative impact in one market can 
rapidly spread to other financial markets, unless essential precautions are taken in 
time. Hence, in order to learn these essential lessons before a new economic 
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downturn, Lehman Brothers may also help us to understand the main problems in the 
current financial markets.  
 
2.1.	  Possible	  Difficulties	  in	  Transparency	  Legislations	  	   It seems that greater availability of reliable and timely information may play 
an important role in financial markets because its absence may lead to more problems 
and negative economic effects. Therefore, it may be useful to create an effective flow 
of information between participants in financial markets.	  
  
However, it may not always be easy to make the essential information 
available to the market due to certain problems and limitations. These problems can 
be categorised under five headings as follows and will be thoroughly examined in the 
following parts: 
 
a) Definition of transparency; b) The lack of effective transparency requirements, 
efficient legal bodies or institutions and adequate enforcement mechanisms in 
financial markets; c) Privacy of information; d) The problem of measuring 
transparency; e) The cost of transparency.    
2.1.1	  Potential	  Problems	  in	  the	  Definition	  of	  Transparency	  	  	  
A clear definition could determine the key factors of any problems. Thus, with 
regard to the possible difficulties in the transparency legislations, a clear and 
comprehensive definition would help to create effective transparency requirements in 
the market.  
It is claimed that transparency plays a key role in financial markets. In 
particular, its absence has been indicated as one of the main elements that either has 
an influence on or contributes to the continued economic downturns in financial 
markets by many scholars, such as Tara Vishwanath and Daniel Kaufmann.207 
Therefore, it would be better to give priority to transparency rules in order to sustain 
efficiency in financial markets.  
The definition of transparency can be highlighted as a problem for effective 
transparency legislations. In order to address this problem, transparency should be 	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clearly and comprehensively defined in the legal or financial literature.208 It should 
not be simply understood as making all information available for market participants 
because providing unclear, irrelevant, out of date or misleading and inaccessible 
information still amounts to a lack of transparency.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, transparency makes essential, reliable, 
economic, quality and comprehensive information available to the market in a timely 
manner. 209  According to this basic definition, the principles or key factors of 
transparency should be accessibility, reliability, comprehensiveness, quality and 
relevance. 210   In this respect, the potential difficulties for better transparency 
legislations can be discussed by considering these key factors that are included in the 
definition. 
  For example, accessibility is one of the key elements of transparency 
requirements. Hence, policymakers should make certain that essential information is 
accessible for all in the market through the Internet, newspapers or any other mass 
media tools. However, accessibility may lead to two kinds of problem in the market. 
Firstly, although in this day and age, in particular via the Internet, it is very easy to 
distribute any kind of information worldwide, it is not free. This means that making 
information available to the market can increase costs. Secondly, it is argued that 
there is a strong correlation between the efficiency of transparency and the level of 
education of information users. To put it simply, it does not matter that people can 
access information if information users have a problem understanding published 
information. Therefore, even if there is a high level of transparency in the market, due 
to their lack of knowledge, information users may have a problem in interpreting and 
responding to the available information.211  
Secondly, as can be seen from the definition, relevancy is another essential 
factor for transparency legislations. However, it may not always be easy to provide 
relevant information to the market because its importance may vary from person to 
person. While some information may be very important to one person, it may not 
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make any sense to others. For instance, primary market information212, which makes 
all material information available with regard to the financial condition and 
performance of a company, including expected risks, may be more important to 
potential investors and creditors. On the other hand, managers or boards of directors 
may also require some additional information regarding the internal policies of the 
corporation, such as the responsibility of the board of directors or the rights of 
minority or majority shareholders. Therefore, it may be difficult to determine the 
relevant information for everybody in the market. This problem can be defined as the 
different interest problem of information users.  
Thirdly, quality and reliability can be highlighted as the sine qua non element 
of transparency requirements. In order to create effective transparency rules, the 
information to be disclosed should be reliable, up to date, comprehensive, accurate 
and consistent because these factors can be accepted as the key to investor confidence 
in financial markets. If the disclosed information is not reliable or is of low quality, it 
may be incomprehensible for any information users. Bernard Black examines this 
problem in his study and emphasises that it does not matter whether people can access 
information unless the information is reliable.213 The markets are expected to possess 
reliable and high quality disclosed information; however, these expectations may lead 
to some burdensome requirements for policymakers. Firstly, so as to strengthen the 
quality of information, the quality standards should be determined and observed by 
external supervisors or auditors. Secondly, in order to increase the reliability of 
information, new independent audit or watchdog authorities and institutions should be 
established.214 It is argued that these encumbrances, however, may result in further 
problems for all actors in financial market, as they will require additional labour, time 
and financial investment. 
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2.1.2	  The	  Absence	  of	  Effective	  Transparency	  Requirements,	  Efficient	  Legal	  Bodies	  or	  
Institutions	  and	  Adequate	  Enforcement	  Mechanisms	  
There is a general tendency to create effective transparency legislations all 
around the world.215 When today’s financial markets are analysed, it can be observed 
from recent economic crises and financial scandals that the state-of-the-art mode of 
legal systems regarding transparency laws is still not at the expected levels. For 
example, the Imar Bank Scandal, the Parmalat case and the financial crises of 2008 
have shown that financial markets from developed to developing markets, have failed 
to create an effective flow of information between market participants. 
  
The lack of effective transparency legislations, efficient legal bodies or 
institutions and adequate enforcement mechanisms seem to be the ostensible 
problems of the legal systems. In the following, these will be examined separately. 
  
The absence of effective transparency requirements is one of the fundamental 
barriers to increasing the efficiency of transparency legislations. But what makes 
disclosures policies more effective? According to Archon Fung et al., transparency 
rules are effective: if they have a positive impact on altering choices in potential 
policy objectives; if they provide an alteration to the behaviour of both users and 
disclosures; if they create an environment which makes essential information 
available at the right place, in the right format and in a timely manner.216 Moreover, 
‘Transparency Action Cycle’217, which was set by Archon Fung et al. in their 
research, may also play a key role in understanding the effectiveness of transparency 
requirements. According to them, the transparency action cycle has six steps: 
‘Transparency system, New information, User’s perception/calculation, User’s 
action, Discloser’s perception/calculation, Discloser’s response.’218 In this respect, it 
is claimed that transparency is a system which should enforce companies or issuers to 
make essential information that has a positive impact on market participants’ 
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decision-making process and alters their actions in the financial markets, available in 
the right place, in the right format and in a timely manner.  
  
Secondly, the lack of efficient legal bodies or institutions can be highlighted as 
another obstacle to having effective transparency laws in financial markets. Before 
enacting any transparency rules, policy-makers should ensure that their legal systems, 
bodies and institutions are ready to carry out this increased responsibility in financial 
markets. In order to understand the importance of having effective legal bodies and 
institutions, it would be useful to make a comparative analysis of developed and 
developing countries. A tendency can be observed amongst developing countries 
whereby they attempt to adopt the more effective rules of developed countries in their 
own legal systems. These rules, however, may not always provide a feasible option 
for developing countries. In this respect, Turkey and the European Union can be cited 
as an example.  
 
For example, the government of Turkey, as a candidate country to the EU, is 
attempting to harmonise their legal system with the various EU measures, such as 
transparency laws. This subject will be analysed in more detail in the following 
chapters, but it would be useful to touch on some of the EU transparency 
implementations here. For instance, in 2004, transparency rules were strengthened 
with the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) in the EU. Directive (2004/109/EC) 
improved the level of transparency in EU financial markets by creating certain rules 
on preparing financial periodic reports and disclosure of major shareholdings for 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the EU.219 
Additionally, these transparency rules have been supported by the European 
Securities Market Authority (ESMA), which is an independent EU Supervisory 
Authority that ensures the stability of the European Financial Systems by providing 
‘the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of securities markets, 
as well as enhancing investor protection.’220 In this respect, the EU creates a legal 
environment regarding transparency legislations, which consists of not only 
transparency rules, but also certain legal bodies or institutions, such as ESMA. 	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Therefore, for some countries, such as Turkey, harmonising merely the rules may not 
provide the expected effective results. In addition to the rules, the establishment of 
these legal institutions is also required in order to increase the efficiency of the 
harmonised rules in financial markets.   
  
The legal institutions can be examined by dividing them from two points of 
view. Firstly, formal legal bodies or supervisory authorities can be cited as an 
example regarding the sine qua non condition of effective transparency requirements. 
Principally, supervisory authorities monitor financial markets, determine technical 
standards and mandatory rules, oversee to what extent listed companies manage to 
impose the obligations of transparency requirements and provide guidance for the 
complex requirements. 221  Fundamentally, their main role is to provide market 
discipline in financial markets. Secondly, ‘second-order institution’222 may constitute 
another element of effective transparency legislations. Investment bankers, financial 
analysts, lawyers, accountants, auditors and capital managers can be given as 
examples of second-order institutions.223 Their main role is to monitor the market, to 
interpret disclosed information with regard to companies’ and financial markets’ 
performance, and to give advice to information users. Fundamentally, they play a 
supplementary role for the disclosed information in financial markets. Therefore, in 
order to create effective transparency requirements, transparency rules may not be 
enough on their own to increase efficiency. In addition to rules, these aforementioned 
legal bodies or institutions seem to play an important role in financial markets. 
  
Thirdly, a lack of adequate enforcement mechanism in financial markets is the 
last obstacle to having effective transparency rules. Due to the lack of an adequate 
enforcement mechanism, transparency rules have certain limitations in financial 
markets.224 From this perspective, the implementation of the Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC) into the national laws of the Member States of the EU may be 
investigated.225 For example, the punctual completion of the requirements of the 
Transparency Directive was a problematic issue in the EU. The transposition deadline 	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of the Transparency Directive was determined as 20 January 2007 in Article 31 of the 
Directive 2004/109/EC by the European Commission. 226  However, only a few 
Member States were able to take the necessary measures to comply with the 
provisions before or shortly after the deadline. Therefore, the transposition of the 
Directive was delayed in most of the other Member States’ national laws. This 
indicates that there are some weaknesses in the enforcement system of EU 
legislations.227 However, this situation is not anticipated in financial markets because 
any differences between nations or listed companies indicate that there is not an 
adequate transparency level in the market. Specifically, if one party becomes more 
transparent than the others, financial markets may fail to improve the maximisation of 
transparency.228  Hence, to have effective transparency legislations, the transparency 
level should be regularly rebalanced between information issuers; 229  otherwise, 
transparency laws just remain a guideline in the legislative frameworks for market 
players.         
2.1.3	  Privacy	  of	  Information	  	  	   Transparency aims to lay a bridge between the market`s right to know and the 
corporations` right to confidentiality.230 This means that although the public has the 
right to require some essential information with regard to the performance of a 
corporation, the corporation has a right not to publish some private information to the 
market, such as its trade secrets or management strategies of the corporation.231 For 
example in the EU, information covered by professional secrecy has been identified in 
the Commission Communication C (2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on professional 
secrecy in state aid decisions (2003/C 297/03).232 
 In fact, this is a limitation for transparency implementations because 
corporations can control disclosed information in the market. However, these 	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limitations on some information are essential in the competitive market; otherwise, 
companies or firms could lose their competitive advantage against their rivals. For 
example, private information, such as trade secrets or management strategies, is not 
essential information for information users to understand the real performance of 
companies. Therefore, the absence of this private information does not have a 
negative impact on the decision-making process of market participants, but 
availability of this information has a harmful effect on the competitive advantages of 
firms.  
 Hence, transparency should be limited only for the confidentiality and secrecy 
of corporations. However, this essential limitation may have a serious effect on the 
efficiency of transparency rules or could be abused by some managers of companies if 
the privacy of information is not clearly defined by laws or regulations. In this 
respect, it would be useful to clearly classify the key factors of privacy of information 
to prevent the misuse of the right to privacy.  
2.1.4	  Problem	  of	  Measuring	  Transparency	  
 It would be interesting to ask how efficiency of transparency can be 
determined as a mathematical or statistical measure and what the possible obstacles 
are to measuring transparency. According to Tara Vishwanath and Daniel Kaufmann, 
the measurement of transparency refers to its quality and relevance.233 This means 
that as long as policy-makers manage to request relevant, comprehensive, accurate, 
reliable, and up-to-date information, the measurement of transparency with regard to 
the quality standard of disclosed information could be easily determined.  
Andrew Schnackenberg tries to explain the measurement of transparency with 
a conceptual model. According to him, the measurement of transparency may be 
determined by examining whether it has three essential principles; ‘disclosure, clarity 
and accuracy’, which can also be accepted as the essential elements of efficient 
transparency legislations.234 Schnackenberg extensively examines these principles and 
states that disclosure refers to the quantity of information in the market and its 
availability for information users; clarity reflects well organised information 	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dissemination tools, information sensitivity, and simple and clear jargon; and 
accuracy refers to the degree of accuracy in the perceived information in the market, 
which is provided by the information sender.235  
The availability of the above-mentioned transparency principles in disclosed 
information may help to analyse the measurement of transparency. However, there 
can be some obstacles to measuring transparency. These problems can be listed as 
follows:236 
 Firstly, low-level quality in disclosed information may be accepted as one 
example because poor data quality may negatively affect the clarity and accuracy of 
information: 
 Secondly, unclear or lack of essential and comprehensive information on 
disclosed information may be detrimental for the perceived information by 
information users: 
 Thirdly, a great number of transparency and disclosure standards in the 
market may increase the complexity of transparency laws and have a negative impact 
on the measurement of transparency. 
 Finally, the availability level of information can play a key role in the 
measurement of transparency. In today’s high visible information era, information 
users should not face any problems in accessing essential information in the market 
due to technological development, especially via the Internet. Additionally, this 
essential information should not be made available for only particular persons or 
groups in the market.  
In the light of this information, it is claimed that the main conditions of the 
measurement of transparency are disclosure, clarity, accuracy and availability of 
information in the market. However, these abovementioned fundamental obstacles 
may have some negative effects on the statistical measurement of transparency. 
Therefore, it seems to be essential for policy-makers to deal with these potential 
obstacles so as to understand the efficiency of transparency legislations. 	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2.1.5	  Cost	  of	  Transparency	  	   It is argued that making accurate, reliable and comprehensive information 
available in a timely manner to the public provides some advantages in the financial 
markets. Therefore, it may be reasonable to increase the level of information 
transparency for information users. However, this distribution of information is not 
free. A high level of transparency may directly or indirectly lead to increase costs for 
companies. For example, according to Hermalin and Weisbach, a high level of 
transparency may increase costs for companies in financial markets by reducing the 
profits of the firm, increasing the executive compensations and raising the rate of 
CEO turnovers.237  
  
The cost of transparency, as explained at Section 1.1.3.2 above, can take one 
of two forms: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs of corporate disclosure principally 
consist of preparation, certification and dissemination of financial information in 
financial markets.238 These costs are also known as fixed disclosure costs in the 
literature and they can be particularly burdensome for small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs). 239  The negative impact of these direct costs of corporate 
disclosure can be clearly seen in the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) 
requirements. For example, Directive (2004/109/EC) requires listed companies to 
publish their periodic information, which consists of their annual report, half-yearly 
report, quarterly financial report and interim management statement in a timely 
manner. However, a small minority of issuers (26%) in the EU, in particular SMEs 
complain about their dissatisfaction regarding the publication of half-yearly and 
quarterly financial reports in a timely manner, due to inadequate equipment and high 
direct costs of these accounting reports.240  Therefore, many SMEs in the EU have 
failed to publish their periodic information on time, which has led to increased 
invisibility problems for them. 	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Corporate disclosures may also lead to indirect costs in financial markets. 
Indirect costs may occur when disclosed information in the markets is used by others, 
such as competitors, trade unions or regulators.241 Corporate disclosures may give 
useful information to the market, such as profitability of certain industries or 
performance of companies in these industries, which may make the markets more 
attractive for new entrants. New entrants may lead to two kinds of negative impact on 
existing companies. First, established companies may lose their competitive 
advantages to their rivals in the market, and second, new entrants may reduce the 
profit of these industries.  
  
To sum up, corporate disclosures may directly or indirectly increase costs for 
firms in the market. In this respect, ‘more is better’ cannot be accepted as the best 
policy in increasing transparency laws. It can be suggested that policy-makers should 
always create optimal transparency in financial markets and consider cost and benefit 
before requesting any information from companies in financial markets.    
 
2.1.6	  Analysis	  and	  Discussion	  
‘Transparency is a journey, not a destination’.242	  
 
The foregoing shows that it is not easy to create efficient transparency 
requirements due to some potential problems in transparency legislations. It requires a 
great effort from policy-makers. In this respect, in the rapidly changing financial 
markets, effective transparency legislation always requires improvement and being 
up-to-date.  
  
Although it is not an easy process, fundamentally transparency matters 
because it is an indicator of how corporations provide accurate, consistent, 
comprehensive, reliable and timely information to market participants in financial 
markets in general.243 Additionally, transparency is the key element of mutual trust 
between participants in financial markets. Better transparency can play a preventative 
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role against corruption in financial markets, reduce risks and increase attractiveness of 
the markets. It creates an automatic self-controlling mechanism for market 
participants by ensuring an effective flow of information between parties. In a 
nutshell, effective transparency and disclosure requirements lay a bridge between the 
accountability of issuers, decisions or choices of information users, and active 
participants of market players; so, it helps to create a well-organised corporate 
governance structure by improving behaviour and relations in corporations. 244 
Although, information transparency may not be accepted as the only reason for 
success in the financial markets, its absence may lead to a systemic disaster or 
aggravate financial crises in the markets.245 Therefore, in order to have successful 
transparency requirements, it seems to be vital to overcome these potential 
transparency problems in financial markets.  
  
In this respect, it is necessary to determine the optimal transparency standards. 
The main challenge is how optimal transparency can be provided. This problem may 
be explained in the light of the above-mentioned transparency problems. Optimal 
transparency can be achieved by: 
   
Firstly, increasing the accessibility of information provided, using clear 
jargon, decreasing the usage of complex technical terms, considering the common 
interests of information users, and assuring the high quality and reliability of the 
information disclosed. 
 
 Secondly, providing the appropriate quantity of information about 
performance, profitability, and the foreseeable risks to both the company and the 
market using well-organised dissemination-tools. 
 
Thirdly, assuring confidentiality rights (however, it would be useful to clearly 
identify key factors of privacy of information in the legislations in order to prevent 
the misuse of the right to privacy).  
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Fourthly, developing a structure that is ready to shoulder the requirements of 
these increased responsibilities. Specifically, optimal transparency should be able to 
have a positive impact on the decision-making process of information users; to create 
an environment in which essential information is available in the right place, in the 
right format and in a timely manner; to provide harmony between the responses of 
information users, which are obtained with transparency requirements and objectives 
of transparency policies; to strengthen the efficient legal supervisory institutions or 
bodies; and to support the adequate enforcement mechanism and dissuasive sanctions. 
 
Fifthly, creating a balance between the costs and benefits, and the risks and 
returns of the standards.  
 
It is argued that optimal transparency is a responsibility in creating a legal 
environment, which provides a cohesive body of rules in corporations from top to 
bottom, and encourages ethical behaviour. ‘More is better’ cannot be accepted as the 
best policy for effective transparency legislations. Too much information increases 
costs and complexities, which makes it harder to extract the important information.246 
As Borgia said, ‘if you really want to hide information, the best thing to do is to bury 
it in a flood of data’.247 Therefore, provision of more information alone does not mean 
the implementation of effective transparency laws.  
 
In a nutshell, the setting of optimal transparency standards can be outlined as a 
mechanism of provision of appropriate information in the right format, in the right 
place and at the right time.   
 
2.2.	  ‘The	  Devil	  Side’	  of	  Market	  Players	  and	  Their	  Main	  Common	  
Characteristics	  	  
 So far, the potential difficulties in effective transparency laws have been 
analysed and the ways in which optimal transparency standards can be provided to 
financial markets have been evaluated. In this part, the reasons why effective 
transparency laws are essential in financial markets will be explored by examining the 
‘devil side of corporations’ in financial markets. 	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The devil side of corporations refers to the illicit activities of market players, 
such as fraud, embezzlement, bribery or insider dealing.248 These illegal activities 
generally lead to destructive financial scandals and have a negative impact on the 
efficiency and performance of financial markets. In fact, it is interesting to note that 
financial scandals, such as Enron or Parmalat, have broken taboos with regard to the 
committing of crimes because the devil side of market players has proven that crimes 
are not only committed by uneducated or poor persons, but that somehow even well-
educated persons may be part of some crimes. These crimes are called ‘white collar 
crimes’ in the literature.249 Perhaps, it would also be useful to mention why even well 
educated persons commit crimes. According to Zabihollah Rezaee, people may 
commit crimes, when four conditions occur in the markets: first, ‘pressing financial 
need’; second, ‘opportunity’; third, ‘reasonable justification’; and fourth, ‘lack of 
moral principle’.250 In addition to these conditions, lack of effective rules and 
dissuasive punishments can be also emphasised.   
 
It also has to be examined whether white-collar crimes amount to an offence 
under criminal law. This is a controversial subject in the legal literature. For example, 
according to Hazel Croall, white-collar crimes are different from ordinary crimes; 
therefore, this kind of crime is not considered under criminal justice, but financial 
jurisdictions, such as company law or securities law.251 On the other hand, Black et al. 
explain the criminal liability of companies by examining a great number of nations’ 
legislative frameworks, such as Canada, France, Germany, Korea, Russia, the UK and 
the US, and indicate that criminal liability for violations of company law regulations 
has been prosecuted under the criminal law of all these nations.252 In fact, it is argued 
that these implementations depend on the operation system in the legislative 
framework. However, an adequate distinction with regard to criminal liability can be 
provided in both criminal law and company law. For example, as can be seen in the 	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Transparency Directive253, administrative fines generating from accounting failures or 
inadequate financial disclosure can be adopted under the company or securities 
market laws; on the other hand, for more extreme cases, such as fraud and 
embezzlement, determining dissuasive penalties in criminal law can be more effective 
in preventing financial scandals or illicit activities in financial markets. 
  
Historically, economic crises, such as the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1999 
or financial scandals, such as Enron, Parmalat and the Imar Bank have highlighted the 
necessity of effective rules and ethical behaviour in the business environment 
throughout the world. In recent decades, financial markets have witnessed the 
destructive impacts of these illegal activities on the markets. Due to globalisation, the 
negative impacts of these devil sides of corporations have spread like a virus and led 
to a systematic failure all around the world. The economic downturn in Greece can be 
given as a case study in order to prove the domino effect of the financial crises. The 
Lehman Brothers problem, which occurred in the US spread to Europe and negatively 
affected Greece, Spain and Portugal. As negative common results, these illegal 
activities caused both economic and physical costs. For example, a huge amount of 
money was siphoned off from the economies, most of the companies closed or went 
bankrupt, many people were made unemployed, and social problem, such as robbery, 
homicide and suicide increased. In general, it is argued that financial scandals 
decrease the market value of shares, lead to the erosion of national values and a loss 
in financial resources, which finally turns into a low level of growth and a high level 
of poverty in economies.254 Therefore, corporate scandals are an important problem 
for financial markets that need to be solved by creating an ethical business 
environment.   
 
Financial scandals refer to the ‘dark and hidden figure’ and due to their 
invisibility, it is difficult to statistically measure them in the markets.255 However, if 
previous financial scandals are considered, fraud and embezzlement take the leading 
position as the devil side of corporations in the markets. Fraud can be defined as 
cheating in the business environment. There are many ways of committing fraud in 	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the markets, but ‘false accounting’ or ‘cooking the books’ can be seen as the most 
prevalent one.256 This consists of merely making the incorrect information available 
to the markets and interestingly it does not even require an absolute actual theft from 
the corporation.257 Sometimes, agents may publish false reports in a corporation with 
the purpose of obtaining high bonus payments and hiding their poor performance. 
Embezzlement is another indicator of the devil side of a corporation and can be 
defined as a white-collar crime, where a person illegally usurps any assets in the 
company that is put under his/her control but of which he or she is not the legal 
proprietor.258 These assets, which are embezzled by a person, may be money, trade 
secrets or goods belonging to a company.259  
  
In this part, in order to show the negative impacts of intransparent financial 
markets and the costs of opacity, some financial scandals, such as Imar Bank 
(Turkey), Parmalat (Italy) and Lehman-Brothers (the US) that had a destructive 
impact on economies will be further examined. Additionally, the importance of 
effective transparency laws in preventing financial scandals and crimes will be 
intensively analysed.  
2.2.1	  Imar	  Bank	  	  	   The Imar Bank scandal is as an example of the devil side of the corporations 
in Turkey. It occurred in 2001 and had a negative impact on the Turkish Financial 
Market, leading to enormous damage in the economy and costing more than US$20 
billion. 260  Some of the dangers to the stability of the financial market are: 
‘speculation, recklessness, greed, arrogance and excess’.261 All of these negative 
elements were present in Turkish market in 2001 and the Imar Bank case can be seen 
as a result of the existence of these harmful factors at that time due to the lack of 
effective legislations, in particular the lack of effective transparency laws.  
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 The time prior to 2001 can be defined as the ‘dark age’ of the Turkish market 
in terms of the legislative framework. This is because there was a lack of effective 
rules and enforcement mechanisms, as well as weak supervision and poor 
management in the market.262 Thus, the transparency level of the Turkish market at 
that time was very low. In order to understand the transparency level of the Turkish 
financial market, total government expenditure between 1981 and 2000 can be 
highlighted. According to Levent Koch, M.A. Chaudhary and Faiz Bilquees, during 
that time period, $116 billion was wasted on unknown sources without being 
investigated by any authority in Turkey.263 Additionally, Transparency International, 
which is a global coalition against corruption, placed Turkey 54th out of 100 on its 
corruption list in 1999. 264  Moreover, due to the lack of adequate regulations, 
supervision and enforcement mechanism, unethical behaviour occurred in the 
business environment, such as bribery, manipulations in financial reports, kickbacks, 
misrepresentation of companies and fraud.265  
 
In general, there was a moral hazard problem in the market. Although the 
liberalisation movement had been initiated in the Turkish Market, government 
intervention was still imposing its weight in the financial market by making final 
decisions: for instance, the government was still controlling the central bank and 
operating some commercial banks and entities, such as Halk Bank and Turkish 
Airlines.266 The reason why government intervention is not always welcome in 
markets is that state intervention may lead to increased corruption and reduced 
efficiency in financial markets.267 For example, in order to gain votes for re-election, 
politicians may use national resources carelessly for their own use.  Therefore, less 
government intervention would seem to be better for the efficiency and stability of 
financial markets. On the other hand, government intervention may be essential to 	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increase the efficiency of financial markets, when required because with adequate 
rescue policies, political interference may help to increase the economic welfare, to 
rebuild the financial structures in the markets after financial crises and to improve the 
performance of economies. In particular, Lehman Brothers indicated the necessity for 
government intervention when everything goes wrong in the market.  
 
As a result of this situation, it can be claimed that it was inevitable for Turkey 
at that time to face a problem in the market. Thus, the Imar Bank came to light in the 
financial market.  The problems that need to be examined are: the reasons for the Imar 
Bank scandal; how this scandal had so much negative impact on the Turkish 
economy; and why it remained invisible for so long.  
 
The Imar Bank case was an important organised fraud scandal in Turkey’s 
history. As for the underlying reasons of this scandal, ‘shareholders’ fraud, poor 
management, insufficient regulations’ and audit failure can be highlighted.268 The 
owners of the bank committed organised crime by benefitting from inadequate 
legislations in the market, siphoned off a large amount of money and then fled the 
country. This had a destructive impact on the Turkish market because of Turkey’s 
bank-based economy. Banks can be accepted as the engine or core element of 
economies. In bank-based economies, it is essential to have effective banking 
regulations in order for the financial markets to be efficient and stable. Otherwise, just 
one banking scandal could have an enormous negative effect on the market. Gunay 
and Hortacsu make an important point when they say that if one bank in the market 
faces any illegal activities, such as fraud or corruption, it threatens the whole banking 
systems and has a domino effect in terms of its destructive impact on the other 
banks.269 Therefore, the threat, which occurred with the Imar Bank case had a 
negative impact on other Turkish banks, such as Demir Bank and Ege Bank, and was 
subsequently followed by an economic crisis. But why it remained invisible for so 
long.  The key reasons can be listed as follows:270  	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First, there was poor management in the governance structure of the bank. The 
corporate governance structure of the bank was only designed to serve for the interest 
of its owners, not its creditors or other stakeholders in the bank. 
 
Second, there was inadequate and weak internal and external supervision in 
the market. In particular, external supervisors relied on manipulated information, 
which was prepared by the owners of the banks. Hence, they failed to understand the 
real performance of the bank in the market. 
 
Third, as the owners and managers of the bank were part of its misreporting, it 
became more difficult to detect false accounting in its financial reports. In a nutshell, 
there were many deficiencies in the Turkish legislative framework in terms of 
inadequate legislations, ineffective legal bodies and poor enforcement mechanisms. 
Therefore, Turkey was not able to easily overcome this scandal and prevent it from 
becoming an economic crisis in the market.    
  
The Imar Bank can be defined as a scandal that included various types of 
fraudulent act in order to increase benefits to the owners in illegal ways through the 
bank.271 In fact, the Imar Bank failure consisted of very interesting and complicated 
illicit activities. Therefore, understanding the underlying reasons for this scandal may 
help to prevent new ones in the future.  
 
Some of the outstanding fraudulent activities can be listed as follows:272 First 
of all, the top executives and the owners of the bank (the Uzan family) created a 
special coded computer control program that served their own interests and purposes. 
Therefore, they were able to hide their illegal activities in financial reports for a long 
time. According to the Banking Regulatory and Supervision Agency (BRSA), which 
is a governmental supervisory authority in Turkey, the bank managed to hide more 
than 90% of the collected deposits without indicating them in its financial reports and 
official documents that it published.273 Second, according to investigations and audit 	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reports after the failure of the bank, controlling shareholders or the owners of the bank 
had collected unregistered deposits.274 Thus, the government authorities were not able 
to see the real deposits of the bank. Third, the bank’s headquarters reduced great 
amounts of the net income of its branches, which was interest earned from deposits 
and general banking practices during the period from 1999-2003 in order to avoid 
income tax and fund deduction. Fourth, in order to collect illegal deposits and to 
extend credit facilities, the Uzan family established an offshore bank in Northern 
Cyprus. This offshore bank had a special legal status in that area. Therefore, it had to 
carry out its business practices, such as collecting deposits outside of Northern 
Cyprus. In this respect, the Imar Bank in Turkey was used as the corresponding bank 
for the Imar Offshore Bank in Northern Cyprus. The Uzan family transferred a huge 
amount of credits from the Imar Bank to the Imar Offshore Bank. However, in reality 
much of these credits were transferred to the Uzan family’s own account without trace 
in the books, and only a small amount was transferred to the Imar Offshore Bank as 
‘Imar Offshore Credits’. Finally, when the Uzan family realised that the Saving 
Deposit Insurance Fund, which is another governmental supervisory authority in 
Turkey, was going to sequestrate the Imar Bank, they immediately destroyed all its 
legal books and records in the bank. 
  
To sum up, the Imar Bank case can be evaluated as a chain of every fraudulent 
activity. False reporting, embezzlement, fraud, bribery, manipulation and establishing 
bubble companies were some of the outstanding crimes committed in the Imar Bank 
case. Additionally, the lack of adequate regulations, transparency, efficient corporate 
governance structures, effective legal bodies and enforcement mechanisms in the 
Turkish legislative framework for that time period, assisted in increasing the negative 
impacts of the scandal. In particular, the lack of adequate transparency requirements 
made this scandal more destructive and invisible for a long time.  
 
On the question of the role of transparency in the financial market, the Imar 
Bank indicates that effective transparency laws might play both a preventive and a 	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protective role in financial markets. Specifically, with the essential information, risk 
management of financial markets can be improved and potential threats can be 
realised early; hence, possible crises or scandals can be prevented and market 
participants can be protected. Thus, it is claimed that better transparency rules could 
be a solution for all the above-mentioned deficiencies in the Turkish legislative 
framework. However, it is not certain that if these legal improvements had been 
carried out, the Imar Bank case would not have occurred; still, if these legal 
improvements had been regulated before the scandal, it would have been possible to 
reduce the length of time such fraudulent activities were able to go undetected and the 
extent of the destructive impact on the Turkish market.      
 
2.2.2	  Parmalat	  	  	   The Parmalat case is another example that can help us to understand the 
importance of financial transparency. Like the Imar Bank case, the ‘war on greed’ 
was lost, which led to enormous damages in the financial market. Parmalat may be 
given as proof that there is no perfect financial market in the world. For instance, it 
can be claimed that the Imar Bank scandal was likely to occur because the Turkish 
financial market was a developing market and there was a lack of adequate legislative 
framework at that time. Hence, the development level of nations or financial markets 
could have been claimed to be the main reason for the financial scandals. However, 
the Parmalat scandal, which occurred in Italy, which on the one hand, according to 
Transparency International, has a bad reputation with regard to corruption in the 
market,275 on the other hand, it can be defined as a developed financial market by 
taking into account its G20, OECD and EU Membership. This shows that the devil 
side of corporation is not just about the development level of nations. It can affect any 
state irrespective of its development level. Hence, any financial market can face 
financial scandal in this rapidly changing world. 	  
   
  Thus, it is claimed that there is a strong relationship between financial 
scandals and morality, and ethics and adequate legislative frameworks in financial 
markets. A lack of adequate rules may trigger the dark side of human beings who are 
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deprived of moral principles or ethics, and may also lead to increased illegal activities 
in the market. Therefore, it is essential to create an effective legislative framework in 
the market, which determines adequate standards for transparency, business ethics, 
legal bodies and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The question that needs to be asked is did the Parmalat case occur due to lack 
of effective rules in the Italian financial market at that time? According to Guido 
Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici, the fundamental rules, which existed in the Italian 
legislation, were adequate and even as effective as those in the US. In theory, the 
regulated legislations, especially regarding auditors were good enough and sufficient 
for the efficiency of the financial market.276 Therefore, a lack of basic rules cannot be 
claimed as the reason for the Parmalat scandal. It may be argued that perhaps the 
Italian rules were adequate and comprehensive enough to provide efficiency in the 
financial market, but there was a lack of effective transparency requirements and 
enforcement regime in the market.277 Additionally, as a whole, the Italian legislative 
framework fell short of sufficient standards and conditions. Therefore, the Parmalat 
scandal went unnoticed for a long time and this had a destructive impact on the 
market. 
 
 Like the Imar Bank scandal, the Parmalat case is a good example of most 
white-collar crimes because almost all kinds of fraudulent activity can be observed in 
the Parmalat scandal. Again, the leading actors were the owners of the company. 
Fraud, money laundering, cooking the books and misreporting were the main illegal 
activities in this case; however, unlike the Imar Bank case, the main reason behind the 
scandal was the cooperation between the owners and the gatekeepers of the 
company.278  
  
In order to clearly understand the Parmalat scandal, it is helpful to analyse the 
historical development of the company. Parmalat was founded in 1961 as a small 
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company by Calisto Tanzi.279 Within two decades, it had started to take the leading 
position in the market by creating ultra high temperature milk (UHT), which has a 
shelf life of several months without needing refrigeration, and had increased its 
growth rate by 50% annually.280 Owing to the success of UHT milk, Parmalat 
expanded its operation in most European countries and Latin America and became a 
multinational dairy and food company by the mid-1970s.281  
 
However, these high profits and increased popularity of the company 
intensified Mr Tanzi’s greed and led him to enter too many other markets in addition 
to the dairy and food markets between 1970 and 1990. For example, in the 1980s, 
Tanzi entered the television market by purchasing Odeon TV, then Parmalat 
sponsored most of the sport events in the world, such as ski events, baseball games, 
football teams and even Formula 1 cars, and then, in 1990, Mr Tanzi bought a football 
team in Italy.282  Perhaps, expanding business into other markets or all these new 
markets could be considered as a sign of the global success of Parmalat. However, 
despite the fact that all this incredible growth, wealth, and glory seem impressive, it 
was just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, in reality, these new markets had a destructive 
impact on the real success of the company due to high competition and low profits in 
the markets. So, all these lower parameters and high expenditures to improve the 
company undermined the success of Parmalat and reduced its profitability. 283 
Additionally, in some of these new markets, Mr. Tanzi failed and fizzled out in the 
market.  For instance, Odeon TV, the TV channel he bought, went bankrupt and Mr. 
Tanzi was obliged to pay billions of Euros as he had guaranteed Odeon TV’s debts.284    
 
It can be seen that entering too many new markets without making a cost-
benefit analysis of the markets was a big mistake for Mr. Tanzi. However, this 
mistake was not enough to halt his greed. Instead of selling the company, he chose to 
maintain his business by borrowing a huge amount of money from investors and 	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paying back the company’s short-term debts.285 However, the effort of maintaining 
the company with huge borrowings was a ‘golden shot’ for Parmalat because Mr 
Tanzi could never have paid back this money and proceeded to commit almost all 
kinds of white-collar crimes in order to hide his illegal activities in the market. In 
2003, the Bank of America was finally able to expose Parmalat by accessing the true 
information regarding the existing situation of the company from its previous auditor 
(Grant Thornton) and terminated Parmalat’s activities.286  When the actual situation of 
the company was realised in 2003, the company collapsed with a €14.2billion deficit 
in its accounts as the biggest corruption case in European history.287  
 
The questions that need to be asked, however, are: first, how could this 
scandal have gone undetected for so long; and second, how could Mr Tanzi have 
managed to borrow such a huge amount of money despite the high level of debt in the 
company’s financial reports. First of all, as explained in the Imar Bank scandal, when 
owners or managers are part of any illegal activities in a company, it becomes more 
difficult to detect any false accounting in its financial reports. In the Parmalat case, 
there was cooperation between the owner, Mr Tanzi, and the gatekeeper of the 
company. Mr Tanzi was committing fraudulent activities in the market and the audit 
company, Grant Thornton, collaborated with him.288 Due to the strong cooperation 
between Mr. Tanzi and Grant Thornton, these illegal activities were able to go 
undetected for a long time. It seems that in order to keep their illegal activities 
invisible, like in the Imar Bank scandal, firstly, they created several wholly owned 
small offshore subsidiaries, such as Bonlat and the Cayman Island, and then, they 
used these entities’ financial accounts to carry out huge transactions from the main 
company to these entities by hiding their existing values.289 In short, to hide the real 
values of these small offshore entities, they generally cooked the books or falsely 
reported or even did not record some transactions in the financial reports by virtue of 
the low level of transparency and the opacity of corporate management. Hence, they 
were able to borrow a huge amount of money from investors or creditors, such as the 
Bank of America, by representing their company better than it actually was in the 	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financial reports. It is interesting to note that with this strategy, Mr Tanzi was able to 
siphon off a total of $2.82 billion to his personal account between 1990 and 2003.290   
 
In terms of Mr Tanzi, it seems incomprehensible he was able to borrow huge 
amounts of money despite the high level of debt in his company’s financial reports. In 
fact, the Parmalat scandal indicates a systemic failure in the market. As explained in 
section 2.1.2 above, the absence of just one of the abovementioned legal tools can 
damage the efficiency of the legislative framework in the market. In the Parmalat 
case, despite the fact that there were adequate substantial rules, the Italian legislative 
framework lacked an effective enforcement mechanism, legal bodies and 
transparency requirements. Hence, Mr Tanzi and Grant Thornton were able to use 
these deficits to their own benefit. What they did was simply to draw a rosy picture 
with regard to the company’s performance; hence, credit rating agencies increased the 
level of the company’s investment grade by relying on Parmalat’s false financial 
reports. Thus, with a high investment grade, Mr Tanzi was able to present his 
company as if all was well and so received billions of Euros from both investors and 
creditors for a long time.291  
 
In a nutshell, Mr Tanzi was able to indicate just the tip of the iceberg and to 
hide the devil side of the corporation under the surface. In this respect, three 
important key points emerged from the Parmalat Scandal: 
 
First, the Parmalat scandal shows that there is no perfect market in the world. 
Every nation, developed or developing, may face the devil side of corporations in the 
business environment and can be subject to financial scandals at any time in the 
market.  
 
Second, there is no unique or perfect legislative framework, which can be 
completely harmonised from better markets. In short, one rule may be essential for 
one market, but the same rule may not mean anything in others. For example, some 
similarities can be observed between the Enron and Parmalat scandals with regard to 
causes, techniques or results of these scandals. In both there was gatekeeper failure. 	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However, an effective rule for gatekeepers in the US may not provide a solution for 
other nations or it may even make the situation worse due to certain differences in 
financial markets. For instance, US corporate governance consists of dispersed 
ownership structure; therefore, in the US, it can be expected that auditors will be 
selected by shareholders in a company. This is reasonable because in order to reduce 
the principle-agent problem, shareholders want to choose reliable auditors. However, 
in concentrated ownership structures, such as in Italy or Turkey, this could damage 
the efficiency of the financial markets because in this kind of system, gatekeepers 
may cooperate with owners and may hide the company’s illegal activities, as 
happened with Parmalat.292 Hence, it would be useful for policy-makers to analyse the 
differences between nations, in terms of culture or legislative frameworks, before 
harmonising every single rule of better legislation in the world.   
 
Third, the Parmalat scandal demonstrated the negative or destructive impacts 
of lack of transparency on financial markets again and highlighted the importance of 
two essential elements for effective transparency laws in the legislative frameworks. 
The first is an effective audit system. Effective supervisory bodies can play a key role 
in the transparency levels of financial markets because true and reliable information 
can only be provided after the supervision of a reliable audit company on disclosed 
information. Despite the fact that there was information in the market with regard to 
the company, it negatively affected the efficiency of the market and led to a scandal 
due to its untrustworthiness. Therefore, reliable gatekeepers can be accepted as an 
essential element of effective transparency requirements. The second important 
element is that whistle-blowers can also play an important role in the efficiency of 
transparency requirements. For example, in the Parmalat case, if there had been any 
whistle-blowers in the company, this scandal may not have gone undetected for so 
long. Therefore, policy-makers can encourage employees to behave as spies in a 
company by offering them protection and satisfactory compensation. 
2.2.3	  Lehman	  Brothers	  	  
 Lehman Brothers will be examined as the final example of the negative impact 
of lack of information transparency in the financial markets. This case was different 
from the Imar Bank and the Parmalat scandal which can both can be seen as 	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reflections of the devil side of corporations in the economies; whereas, the Lehman 
Brothers scandal indicates a systemic failure of the financial markets in the 
institutional context. To be sure, this distinction is a matter of controversy. According 
to OECD, it was systemic failure of the corporate governance mechanism due to the 
inadequate implementations of the executive remunerations, risk management, board 
practices and shareholder rights;293 on the other hand, some scholars, such as Brian 
Cheffins and Renee Birgit Adams state that the financial crisis of 2008 was mainly 
unrelated to corporate governance issues because corporate governance of institutions 
was strengthened by new reforms and regulations in terms of management, 
shareholder protections, risk and audit committees, and monitoring mechanism.294 
Whether or not the credit crisis of 2008 was caused by the systemic failure of 
corporate governance, there was an obvious problem in the financial markets. In the 
light of the Lehman Brothers case, it is claimed that the out-dated legislative 
frameworks failed to keep up with innovations on the securitisation process of the 
financial markets. Therefore, the largest bankruptcy since the Great Depression 
occurred and its destructive impacts spread all around the world in a domino effect.  
  
In the Lehman Brothers case, financial innovations played the main role. Due 
to globalisation activities, some new complex financial instruments had been created 
and initiated to be implemented between market players, such as cash settled 
derivatives, securitisation or auction rate securities. 295 However, the lack of 
jurisdictions with regard to the new financial instruments in the legislative 
frameworks led to the misuse of these complex financial tools and to a failure in 
investors interpreting the real performance of companies. Hence, Lehman Brothers 
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went bankrupt with a destructive impact on the economy by volatilising around $11.9 
trillion in the US market.296  
 
Lehman Brothers can be perceived as a good example to demonstrate the 
shortcomings regarding essential legislations in the changing financial markets. In 
particular, the negative effects of this credit crisis have heightened the need for 
effective and upgraded transparency requirements in financial markets. In fact, the 
Lehman Brothers case highlights two important points. First, like the Parmalat 
scandal, it indicates that there is no perfect market in the world. As seen in the US, 
any country, developed or developing can face economic crisis at anytime in the 
market. Second, it stresses the role of effective transparency laws in preventing 
financial crises and shows why ‘transparency is a journey, not a destination’.297 This 
expression can be evaluated as one of the key elements of having essential 
transparency rules in the market.  
 
For example, before the Lehman Brothers case, the US’s financial market was 
strengthened and improved by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. In Title IV of 
the SOX, financial disclosures were enhanced and new transparency requirements 
were implemented.298 Hence, it may be argued that although the corporate governance 
framework, in particular transparency requirements, have been improved in the US 
recently, economic crises or financial scandals	  such as the 2008 global financial crisis 
are still taking place in the financial market. This dilemma can be explained by the 
abovementioned expression: ‘transparency is not a destination’, which means that, in 
the rapidly changing world, if policy-makers fail to keep up with innovations or new 
financial instruments the out-dated jurisdictions may no longer be as effective as 
expected. In this respect, effective transparency conditions can only be provided by 
keeping pace with innovations in the market. In the following part, the general factors 
that triggered the financial crisis in the US will be analysed and evaluated.  
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There is a large volume of published studies that explain the reasons for the 
credit crisis of 2008 in the literature, such as Emilios Avgouleas, George Soros, Anna 
J. Schwartz or Richard Swedberg. In this part, the main causes underlying the credit 
crisis of 2008 will be evaluated by examining the key points of the abovementioned 
scholars.  
 
As the first trigger of the crisis, expansive, relaxed or inadequate monetary 
policies have been argued by many scholars, such as Emilios Avgouleas, George 
Soros, Anna J. Schwartz or Gary Gorton.299 One of the outstanding inadequacies was 
the implementation of low-level interest rates, which encouraged irrational 
borrowings, in particular mortgage credits, from investment banks (shadow 
banking).300 From 2001 until 2004, the Federal Reserve reduced the interest rates to 
one percent. After that, due to low-level funds rates, most people preferred to buy a 
house with mortgage credits, which led to a sharp decrease in markets’ saving rates, a 
gradual increase in real house prices, such as 12.4% average increase per year 
between 1997 and 2006,301 which caused a housing bubble in the US.302 In short, the 
main problem was that policy-makers put too much trust in the ‘invisible hand’ or 
‘the markets know best’ principle;303 therefore, they did not intervene in economies on 
time when it was essential. For example, according to George Soros, ‘towards the end 
houses could be bought with no money down, no question asked’.304 However, these 
relaxed monetary policies were a huge mistake because they caused a global 
economic crisis by underpinning and propagating enormous asset bubbles.305 Gary 
Gorton also examines this issue and beautifully summarises the situation saying that 
the market was ‘slapped in the face by the invisible hand’.306    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of global financial markets: the law, the economics, the politics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012), p.89 see also, George Soros, The new paradigm for 
financial markets: the credit crisis of 2008 and what it means, (PublicAffairs, London 2008), pp.82-90 
and Anna J. Schwartz (n 295), p.19 
300 Anna J. Schwartz (n 295), p.19 
301 Luigi Zingales, ‘Testimony of Luigi Zingales on the causes and effects of the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, October 6, 2008’ (U.S. G.P.O., 2010) 
<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS124744>, p.3   
302 George Soros, (n 299), pp.82-83 
303 Emilios Avgouleas (n 299), p.91 
304 George Soros, (n 299), p.83 
305 Emilios Avgouleas (n 299), p.89 
306 Gary Gorton, “Slapped by the invisible hand: the panic of 2007”, (Oxford University Press. New 
York 2010), p.13 
Main	  Transparency	  Problems	  and	  Examples	  of	  Intransparent	  Financial	  Markets	  	  
	   100	  
The second cause of the crisis was the careless use of complex and flawed 
new financial tools, such as cash settled derivatives, securitisation and auction rate 
securities.307 In fact, these new financial innovations may be seen as the main reason 
for the credit crisis of 2008 because these flawed and complex new financial tools had 
a great destructive influence on the market. Due to technological developments and 
increasing liberalisation activities, financial markets have interconnected with each 
other. Thus, great amounts of money can be transferred anywhere in the world within 
seconds, cross-border capital flow has increased and free access to external financial 
markets has been provided. 308  However, this interconnection between financial 
markets played a key role in the destructive impact of the credit crisis of 2008. The 
question that needs to be asked here, however, is how these new financial instruments 
led to an economic crisis in the market. Firstly, one of the main problems of these 
complex financial tools was the struggle to determine their price.309 There was a 
general belief in the market that rating agencies were going to decide the price of 
these securities; however, due to lack of knowledge and the complex structure of 
these flawed financial innovations, the value of securities was overstated in the 
market.310 Secondly, because of the sophisticated structure of the newly invented 
instruments, regulatory authorities and credit rating agencies failed to calculate the 
creditworthiness of these financial instruments; therefore, they were unable to assess 
how much risk market players had involved.311 Principally, they failed to examine the 
warning signals given by these financial tools. It was a dangerous situation for the 
markets because investors had trusted the information provided regarding these newly 
invented financial tools and increased their investments by using these securities, in 
particular sub-prime mortgage credits. However, the increasing number of these 
miscalculated new invented financial tools led to an unstable credit expansion and so 
to hidden losses in the companies.312    
 
The third reason was the monopoly in issuing a great number of securities in 
the market. According to Luigi Zingales, a vast number of securities were issued by 
just a few players in the market, such as Lehman Brothers, which negatively affected 	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the ethical relationship between the credit rating agencies and those investment banks, 
who issued those securities.313 Due to the lack of competition in the financial markets, 
those investment banks obtained a great market power. They bought a massive 
amount of rating services, and so credit rating agencies were used to qualify the 
riskiest securities for AAA ratings.314 Hence, these risky securities were easily able to 
find a buyer in the market.      
 
Last, but not least, lack of transparency can be seen as a reason for the credit 
crisis of 2008. This is an important factor because it indicates why ‘transparency is a 
journey not a destination’315 for policy-makers. As mentioned before, some may 
argue that although transparency rules were strengthened by SOX in 2002, the US 
financial market faced a credit crisis in 2008. In this respect, it could be thought that 
transparency laws may not have an impact on preventing financial scandals as 
expected. However, it would be a misjudgement of transparency rules because in 
order to understand the role of transparency in preventing financial crises, first of all, 
it is essential to examine the level of transparency in the financial markets. In 2008, 
there was a lack of transparency due to wide use of the abovementioned flawed 
financial innovations. For example, Luigi Zingales clearly highlights how new 
complex financial tools cause opaqueness in the financial markets and indicates, as an 
example, the fact that during the last decade, approximate $44 trillion was used in 
unregistered credit default swaps (CDS) in the market.316 Additionally, most of the 
other securities, such as sub-prime mortgage or cash settled derivatives, had limited 
disclosure requirements. This is a problem because, due to the opaque structure of 
these financial tools, it was difficult to analyse ‘who owns what’ in a company.317 
Therefore, asymmetric information in the financial markets caused warning signs to 
be ignored and hence, emergency exit policies could not be implemented in time to 
avoid the crisis. Thus, although SOX provided increased transparency requirements in 
the market, there were no adequate requirements with regard to new financial 
innovations. For these reasons, it is argued that the level of transparency in the 
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financial market in 2008 was not as high as was thought. On the contrary, there was a 
lack of transparency in the financial market.   
 
To sum up, the abovementioned reasons have ‘woken up the sleeping giant’, 
which refers to ‘panic’ in the financial markets. A panic can be arguably evaluated as 
the most dangerous underlying factor of financial crises because it can damage any 
company in the market by initiating a negative chain reaction, even if these 
companies are in a good position. For example, according to Swedberg, if a panic 
occurs, it reduces the confidence of investors in the market; if the confidence of 
investors is reduced, depositors or investors in the market may demand their deposits 
back and if all depositors require their investment back, then the market may be at 
risk of becoming insolvent due to the lack of liquid sources.318 Hence, if a chain 
reaction begins due to panic, then economic crises or depression can occur all around 
the world.     
 
In the Lehman Brothers collapse, the negative impact of these chain reactions 
in the market can be observed. Lehman Brothers Holding was one of the major 
investment banks in the US, providing global financial services in the financial 
markets. Fundamentally, its financial system was based on a massive amount of 
borrowings on a day-to-day basis in the short-dated repo market.319  Therefore, 
investors’ confidence played an exhilarating role in the company. However, when a 
chain reaction was initiated due to adverse economic conditions, Lehman Brothers 
was subjected to large losses, which had fatal results for the company. Specifically, 
the underlying reasons for Lehman Brothers collapse can be analysed as follows:320       
 
Firstly, there was a management problem in the company. In particular, the 
financial management lacked the ability to detect, monitor and prevent the upcoming 
crisis in the market; secondly, the corporate governance structure of the company was 	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not adequate to detect both internal and external threats on day-to-day issues. The 
future plan of the company was based on growing economic conditions; on the other 
hand, there were no preliminary preparations for the black days of the company. 
Hence, Lehman Brothers failed to analyse the warning signs in the market, which 
prevented them from taking adequate precautions against potential threats; thirdly, the 
arrogance of Lehman Brothers also played a negative role in acting upon these 
warning signs in the market. They simply believed that their company was ‘too big to 
fail’.321 Therefore, they preferred to ignore tell tale signals in the market and did not 
feel the need to make any major modifications in their day-to-day business; and 
finally, due to the inadequate corporate governance mechanism, there was a lack of 
communication and transparency in the company. These negative conditions also 
prevented the company from having an effective early warning system. Hence, 
Lehman Brothers were unable to reduce the negative effects of the crisis or to convert 
the threats into opportunities. Thus, as a major holder and provider of sub-prime 
mortgage credits, it faced collapse with enormous losses in the market.  
2.2.4	  Analysis	  and	  Discussion	  	  	   It is argued that the devil side of corporations and its destructive influence on 
financial markets indicates the necessity for effective transparency rules in the 
financial market. In particular, the three cases discussed here have given an indication 
of what can lead to accounting scandals and economic crises in the stock markets. The 
collapse of these high-profile companies in both developed and developing nations 
requires us to reconsider our legislative frameworks in terms of the efficiency of 
corporate governance structure, quality of flow of information and the accountability 
of audit mechanisms.  	  
In order to examine the devil side of corporations, three cases from different 
countries have been analysed in this chapter. A common lesson can be taken from 
these that there is no perfect financial market in the worldwide context in the 21st 
century. Regardless of the development level of nations, any financial market can face 
the devil side of corporations at anytime. Hence, it is essential to have a legislative 
framework that can deal with any unexpected situation in the market.  
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In the light of these financial scandals and crises, the following commonalities 
can be highlighted: 
  
First, as can be seen in both Lehman Brothers and Parmalat, the arrogance and 
greed of these companies seems to have had a disastrous impact on the financial 
markets. Due to large egos, the corporations ignored forthcoming dangers and were 
unable to take adequate preventive measures when necessary. So, ‘their smugness’ 
was not tolerated in the financial markets322 and led to their collapse. 
  
Second, improper and inadequate audit mechanisms, oversight functions and 
the point scoring system by credit rating agencies were a triggering factor in the devil 
side of these corporations. All three cases discussed show that in the event of a lack of 
oversight mechanism and misleading methods of scoring, top executives may conduct 
unethical behaviour in the markets, such as ‘cooking the books’ or committing fraud 
and may use these illegal activities to their own benefit. 
  
Third, a lack of transparency and information asymmetry can be seen as a key 
cause of economic troubles that needs to be considered in the financial markets. The 
negative impact of lack of transparency can be evaluated both from the corporate 
governance aspect and the financial market aspect. In terms of corporate governance, 
it can be seen from all the abovementioned cases that lack of transparency in those 
institutions gave their top executives the chance to run the company as they wished. 
Due to their opacity, corporate managers were able to behave in an inappropriate 
manner and so huge amounts of money were spirited away from the companies. 
Additionally, lack of transparency led to a lack of communication between players, 
which also reduced the contribution of the main participants to the company. In terms 
of financial markets, because of information asymmetry and lack of transparency or 
information complexity, the real value and performance of the companies was hidden, 
‘who owned what’ in the market could not be determined and the warning signs were 
ignored. This led to a chain reaction (reducing of investors’ confidence, triggering 
panic and contributing to a global financial crisis). Therefore, absence of an adequate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 President Barrack Obama, Wall Street Arrogance and Greed Won’t be Tolerated, (2009) cited in 
abcNEWS by John Hendren, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/CEOProfiles/story?id=6778419&page=1#.UM5fDpOLJF8, accessed at 
16.06.2014  
Main	  Transparency	  Problems	  and	  Examples	  of	  Intransparent	  Financial	  Markets	  	  
	   105	  
and accurate flow of information between market participants can be claimed as a 
main underlying reason for both failure of corporate governance mechanisms and 
market efficiency. 
  
In cannot be claimed that effective transparency rules will prevent all financial 
scandals, but adequate, comprehensive, accurate and upgraded transparency 
requirements may at least reduce the negative or destructive effects of this devil side 
of corporations. In terms of helping to analyse the future performance of companies, 
one lesson that could be taken from past financial scandals and economic crises is that 
an effective flow of information could help to assess and predict potential risks and 
expected situations before companies are subjected to destructive influences in the 
financial markets. Obviously, it is not possible to detect all kinds of financial scandal 
by analysing corporations’ financial statements; however, some key information or 
‘tell-tale signs’ may provide early warning signs with regard to a company or the 
financial market.323 Thus, it may be useful to highlight such clues in financial 
statements:324 
 
First, a company’s ‘revenue growth’ may be evaluated in the market. In 
particular, this may be very helpful in comparative analysis. For example, 
corporations in the same industry generally have the same or similar revenue growth 
in the market. Therefore, if there is an enormous difference in the revenue growth rate 
of one company, it may be accepted as a warning signal. Secondly, a company’s 
profits may help us to analyse a company’s current situation. For example, the profit 
rate and the cash-flow rate of a company, which are obtained from its operations 
should simultaneously increase or decrease. Any disproportional differences between 
these two rates may also act as a warning sign. Thirdly, a company’s debt may be a 
useful sign. A huge amount of debts or none at all on financial statements may warn 
us to be careful about a company.   
  
To sum up, the results of these case studies indicate why the cost of opacity 
will be higher than the cost of transparency in the financial markets. Due to the lack 	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of expected transparency requirements, the abovementioned scandals occurred and 
the financial markets lost billions of dollars. Furthermore, unemployment rates 
increased and economic growth decreased in many countries. Thus, it is claimed that 
the cost of transparency is more reasonable than the cost of opacity.  
 
Moreover, successful transparency laws can also have the following positive 
effects: first, they lead market participants to take accurate investment decisions on 
whether to buy, sell or hold securities by reducing the information asymmetries in the 
financial markets; second, true information provides a clear picture with regard to the 
real performance of companies and financial markets; third, honest information helps 
to create quality financial markets by allowing market participants to analyse the real 
price of a particular security to trade; fourth, well-organised transparency 
requirements assist information users in the detection of potential foreseeable risks in 
financial markets with high-quality financial reports; and fifth, competent 
transparency rules make it difficult for market players to execute bad intentions by 
casting a light on what is actually going on in financial markets.325 However, the 
abovementioned scandals show that the financial markets failed to disclose essential 
information; failed to improve gatekeepers’ functions; failed to create an effective 
business environment and failed to enforce determined requirements.326 Although, 
implementing effective transparency rules can be burdensome, it should not be seen 
as an extra requirement; instead it should be accepted as an essential element of 
genuine financial markets.327  
 
2.3.	  Chapter	  Summary	  	  	   This chapter has investigated the possible difficulties in creating transparency 
rules and highlighted why, despite these difficulties, the financial markets need a high 
level of information transparency by indicating the costs of opacity that occur because 
of ‘the devil side of corporations’ in the financial markets.  
  
The evidence regarding the potential problems suggests that effective 
transparency rules require a great effort from policy-makers because, in the rapidly 	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changing financial markets, effective transparency regulations always need to be 
improved and kept up-to-date. One important finding of this chapter is that optimal 
transparency standards are essential in order to reach the expected transparency level 
in the financial markets.  Despite this ever-changing nature, the findings of this 
chapter can be used to identify the following core standards for the optimal 
transparency legislations: 
  
(a) High level of accessibility of information in the right place, in the right 
format and in a timely manner, including clear jargon, fewer complex technical terms, 
being based on the common interest of information users, and being high quality and 
reliable; (b) sufficient quantity of information, well-organised dissemination tools, 
and essential information with regard to corporate and market performance, 
profitability and foreseeable risks of the markets; (c) efficient legal institutions and 
adequate enforcement mechanism to ensure that the legislative frameworks are ready 
to shoulder this increased responsibility; (d) a legal environment, which provides a 
harmonised body of rules from bottom to top, determines ethical behaviour and 
enforces doing the essential and determined thing. 
  
The results of this research support the idea that effective transparency laws 
may play an essential role in stabilising the financial markets. While, effective 
transparency rules are not the only element of success in preventing financial 
scandals, their absence is one of the main reasons for the devil side of corporations. In 
particular, tell tale signs in financial reports may help to detect early warning signals 
with regard to a company or to the financial market. Therefore, despite the onerous 
nature of having efficient transparency requirements, it can be highlighted as the core 
element of open financial markets. 
 
To conclude, well-drafted transparency rules are the key to well-functioning 
financial markets. In particular, recent financial scandals have indicated that their 
absence can have a disastrous impact on the global economy. Hence, policy-makers 
should put great effort into providing optimal transparency standards in the financial 
markets. However, the implementing of effective transparency jurisdictions in the 
legislative framework is not straightforward, due to the abovementioned limitations. 
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that efforts to create better transparency rules are 
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an on-going process in the rapidly changing financial markets. It is always essential to 
keep pace with innovations in the financial markets; otherwise, out of date regulations 
just remain theoretical and do not change anything in the markets. Therefore, 
‘transparency is a journey, not a destination’. 328  This can also be seen for 
developments in the EU and in Turkey, as the following two chapters will discuss.    
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3. IMPROVING	  TRANSPARENCY	  AND	  DISCLOSURE	  IN	  EU	  
COMPANY	  AND	  SECURITIES	  LAW	  	  
	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
Up to this point, the main issues in corporate governance structures and the 
role of transparency have been analysed, and the potential problems in transparency 
laws have been examined as a theory. In this chapter, the extent to which policy-
makers have been able to convert these theories into practice by evaluating recent 
transparency requirements in the EU will be assessed. 
 
In the previous chapters, the importance of a high level of transparency, in 
particular the key role of optimal transparency in financial markets has been 
highlighted. Additionally, in light of current financial scandals, the reason why the 
costs of opacity will be higher than the costs of transparency has been evaluated.  
 
However, the findings of Chapter 2 indicate that due to the numbers of 
financial crises, corporate scandals, creation of the new financial tools, and increasing 
worldwide globalisation activities in financial markets, the existing legislative 
frameworks of the financial markets have failed to provide expected rules so as to 
sustain the market efficiency. Hence, in order to keep up with the new shape of the 
financial market’s needs, it was necessary to take further action by making new rules 
and developments in corporate governance regarding the level of transparency in the 
financial market.  
 
How exactly would effective transparency laws be adopted in the legal 
systems? In Chapter 2, the kind of transparency rules that should be concentrated on 
has been analysed by examining potential problems in transparency requirements. 
However, it seems also to be essential to determine in which areas of law policy-
makers should increase the reforms and developments in order to regulate successful 
transparency rules in the financial markets. It may be assumed that transparency is 
one of the key elements of corporate governance structures. Therefore, it may be 
suggested that simply reforming company law may be good enough. Yet, there is a 
strong relation between a high level of transparency, corporate governance and 
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financial markets. Optimal transparency and financial disclosure are key factors in 
both company and securities law.329 Hence, enhancing securities law may also help to 
provide better results. In this chapter, so as to understand transparency laws in the EU, 
both current company law and securities law will be examined.  
 
The EU did not pay significant attention to having sound corporate 
governance rule in the market until 2000 because new developments in corporate 
governance were not seen as essential and were dealt with at national level.330 
Moreover, there was a debate in the EU about corporate governance. On the one hand, 
the vast majority in the EU, as well the European Commission, believed that the 
corporate governance code was not necessary at EU level; on the other hand, the 
European Commission emphasised that with non-binding rules, it is difficult to 
provide comprehensive, adequate and effective corporate governance in the market.331 
However, after the financial scandals, the importance and benefit of having dynamic 
and sound corporate governance in the market were realised and some important steps 
have been taken so far to increase the level of transparency and financial disclosure in 
the EU.  
 
In terms of securities law, this chapter discusses the Financial Service Action 
Plan (the FSAP), the Lamfalussy Report, and the Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC), which was revised with the Transparency Directive (2013/50/EU). In 
terms of company law, the Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
(HLG Report) and the Commission Action Plan may take the lead in modernisation 
activities of transparency innovations in the EU. It is argued that increasing the level 
of transparency in the EU was a long process and it was enhanced step by step mainly 
with the above-mentioned laws. Hence, to some extent, the EU has managed to 
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introduce some successful requirements regarding the transparency and disclosure 
reforms into both the company and the securities law.  
 
In this chapter, in order to understand the EU reforms in transparency laws, 
the previous history of the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC-2013/50/EU) will 
be evaluated in the first part; and in the second part, the most outstanding innovations 
and recent reforms in EU Transparency Directive will be analysed; the prominent 
strengths and weaknesses of the directive will also be examined.   
  
3.1	  Recent	  Reforms	  in	  Securities	  and	  Company	  Law	  with	  Relevance	  to	  
Transparency	  
3.1.1	  Developments	  of	  EU	  Securities	  Law	  	  
Effective transparency and disclosure rules require a modernisation effort both 
in company and securities law. In this part, transparency reforms in EU securities law 
will be examined. First of all, it is useful to understand what it is and what the 
relationship between disclosure rules and securities law is.   
 
Securities law deals with matters relating to the financial markets, such as 
issuing and trading of the listed companies` securities, and providing the collaboration 
between the interested parties in the financial markets. 332  The main difference 
between securities and company law is that the former just deals with listed 
companies, but also that it covers some rules for market participants to provide 
investor protection and efficiency in the financial markets. 333  Improving the 
functioning of the internal market is one of the main missions of the EU adopted in 
Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Therefore, EU 
securities law plays an important role in the EU financial market. 
 
In order to fulfil the objectives of Article 114 of the TFEU, it has three key 
sections, the disclosure obligations, fraud and manipulation obligations and the 
insider trading obligations. 334  In terms of disclosure laws, decreasing costs of 	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information in the finding and collecting of data are aimed at securities law. This is 
because the securities law is a guarantee for interested parties in the financial markets. 
Therefore, securities law should reduce the cost of information by increasing 
disclosure requirements to provide a chance to market participants to access, to verify 
and to analyse the information about the situation of both the market and listed 
companies.335 The main aim of transparency rules in securities law is to inform the 
entire market with the essential information in a timely manner.336        
 
It is argued that securities law not only increases transparency in listed 
companies; but also ensures disclosure rules in the financial markets. Therefore, 
enhancing disclosure obligations in securities law can provide more reliable, 
comprehensive and effective transparency rules for market participants. The EU 
started its modernisation activities in the securities law as a first step, and during the 
modernisation history of EU securities law several important measurements have 
been enacted. In this part, current securities law developments regarding transparency 
and financial disclosure will be examined; their strengths and weaknesses will be 
evaluated. This part of the chapter provides the background information for historical 
developments of transparency requirements in the EU, which will then be discussed in 
part 3.2, below.  
 3.1.1.1 The Financial Services Action Plan 
When the historical development of EU financial market is examined, it can 
be seen that the modernisation of EU legislative framework for the financial markets 
was a very controversial process due to some factors in the EU. For example, the 
Member States generally tended to protect their national market; they were unwilling 
to enhance dialogue in the global financial services; and the EU officials and 
legislators lacked the ability to understand the importance and necessity of having a 
modern financial integrated market in the EU.337 Therefore, there was a fear or 
prejudice against initiating the modernisation activities in the European market.338 
However, as a result of technological developments, particularly significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Ibid, p.737 
336 Jaap Winter, EU Company Law on the Move, (2004) 31 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
(Kluwer Law International) 2 pp.97-114, at p.105 
337 Emilios Avgouleas, EC Securities Regulation, a Single Regime for an Integrated Securities Market: 
Harmonised We Stand, Harmonised We Fail? (2007) 22 JIBLR, Part 1, pp. 79-87, at p.1  
338 ibid 
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improvement in the Internet, international investment services and cross-border 
trading have increased and become easier between nations. With these new 
developments, markets have become more attractive for both domestic and external 
investors by reducing transaction costs, increasing competition and making cross-
border investment easy.339 Hence, fears and prejudices started to change in favour of 
creating a modern single market in the EU and the European Commission published 
the FSAP in May 1999. 340 The FSAP has four key objectives: 
‘Developing a single European market in wholesale financial 
services; creating open and secure retail markets; ensuring 
financial stability through establishing adequate prudential 
rules and supervision; and setting wider conditions for an 
optimal single financial market.’341 
        
The financial markets play a very important role in improving economic 
wealth, job creation and fulfilling the Lisbon Strategy Objectives.342 Therefore, the 
EU initiated modernisation activities in the financial markets to carry out the 
objectives of Article 114 of the TFEU. In the FSAP, establishment of a single 
regulated market for all financial services, which depends on setting up deep and 
liquid securities markets, increasing the interest of both issuers and investors, 
reducing the entry barriers of cross-border trading, increasing competition and 
providing a healthy and strong level of investor protection, was specified as the main 
target.343 Additionally, the financial markets were accepted as a source of finance and 
hence the main financial rules for listed companies were also determined in the 
FSAP.344  
 
The FSAP was built between 1999 and 2005345 and in terms of transparency 
requirements it may be accepted as the backbone of modernisation activities in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Niamh Moloney, EC securities regulation, (Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2008), 
p.16 
340 Simon Gleeson and Glenda Davies, EU Financial Service Directives Update, [2003] COB, p.1   
341 John Armour and Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis, 
(2011) 48 CMLR pp.125-174, at p.152 
342  Patrick Birkinshaw and Mike Varney, EU Legal Order After Lisbon Strategy (European 
Monographs), (KLI, The Netherlands 2010), p.119, please also see the European Commission: `The 
Lisbon Strategy`, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en//FTU_4.1.pdf, accessed 6/5/2014 p.1  
343 ibid, and Luca Enriques and Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law after the Financial 
Services Action Plan? (2008-2009) 14 SJL Bus &Fin 1, pp. 43-82, at p. 53 
344 Alma Pekmezovic, Gordon Walker and Mark A. Fox, Reorganisation of market segments and 
transparency standards at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange: Part 1, (2010) 25 JIBLR 05, pp. 214-226, p.2 
345 Ibid and Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document: Single 
Market in Financial Services Progress Report 2004-2005, 
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EU. The necessity of increasing the level of transparency was realised for the first 
time in the EU and as the most important transparency development, the 
Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) was planned as a piece of legislation in the 
FSAP. In addition, besides the Transparency Directive, some other key measures, 
which increased transparency requirements in the EU, were included as well, such as 
the Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC), the Markets in Financial Instrument 
Directive (2004/39/EC), the Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC) and the Prospectus 
Directive (2003/71/EC).346 The main aims of these directives in general were to 
reduce entry barriers, to create a widespread legal framework for integrated securities 
and derivatives markets, and to provide a high level of information transparency for 
listed companies in the EU.347  
 
The FSAP provided many advantages over the modernisation process of the 
EU in general and as a plan of action, the main positive effects of the FSAP can be 
listed as follows: 
  
Firstly, it increased the average speed of the adaption process of measures. So, 
EU directives could be adopted in a very short time period.348 For instance, ‘the 
Directives on the Reorganisation and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions and 
Insurance Undertakings’ were proposed in 1985 and 1986 respectively and could not 
have been adopted until the FSAP. Once contained in the FSAP, they were adopted in 
six months.349  
 
Secondly, the foundation of the consultation approach in the EU was set with 
the FSAP. 350  It is argued that with the consultation approach, higher quality 
legislative proposals were submitted, because interested parties, such as financial 
institutions, consumers and end users had the chance to involve the entire process at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/progress-report/report2004-2005_en.pdf, accessed 
17/05/2014, p.3 and Jean-Pierre Casey and Karel Lannoo, EU Financial Regulation and Supervision 
Beyond 2005, [2005] CEPS Task Force Report No: 54, p.6  
346 John Armour and Wolf-Georg Ringe, (n 341), at p.153 
347 Simon Gleeson and Glenda Davies, (n 340), p.2  
348 European Commission, FSAP Evaluation: Part 1: Process and Implementation, (European 
Commission Internal Market and Services DG), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/070124_part1_en.pdf, accessed 
5/5/2014, p.6 
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an early stage. However, the consultation approach was a problematic issue in the EU 
because there was disagreement between interested parties. For instance, mainly, it 
was underlined that intervention in the process at several stages could be very 
troublesome and lead to some obstacles to the progress. Moreover, preparing and 
drawing a conclusion from the entire process would increase the time it would take 
and cause resources to be consumed negatively.351 On the other hand, the European 
Commission accepted this method as a sine qua non in many cases.352 It is claimed 
that preparing any draft of legislative proposals by discussing with the interested 
parties and allowing them to monitor and intervene in the whole process at an early 
stage can help to increase quality. However, policy-makers should not spend too 
much time on the consultation process; otherwise, in the rapidly-changing world they 
would be too late to recover the negative impact of the unexpected issues in the 
financial markets.   
   
Thirdly, a quick response to the unpredictable events may be seen as another 
advantage of the FSAP. It seems that the FSAP played an important role after some 
financial scandals, such as Enron or Parmalat, by proposing preventive measures in 
the markets. These measures and plans that were adopted in the wake of financial 
scandals can be listed as follows: Commission Recommendation on statutory 
auditors` independence in the EU in 2002; Commission Communication reinforcing 
statutory audit in the EU in 2003; The Commission`s Action Plan: Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance at the EU in 2003; The Market 
Abuse Directive in 2004; Directive on statutory audit (8th Company Law Directive) in 
2005.353 Thus, it helped to reduce the negative effects of the ‘devil side’ of the 
corporations in the financial markets. 
  
However, the FSAP was not perfect. Despite these advantages, the FSAP 
suffered from several major deficiencies. Its main problems in the FSAP can be 
summarised as follows:354 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 ibid, pp.16-17, see also Jean-Pierre Casey and Karel Lannoo, (n 345), p.7 
352 European Commission (n 348), p.17 
353 Ibid, pp.18-19 
354 Pierre-Marie Boury, Does the European Union need a securities and exchange commission? (2006) 
1 CMLJ 2 pp.184-194, at p.190  
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First, the FSAP was unclear. Due to having a poor regulatory system in the 
EU, it failed to provide consistent, useful and meaningful obligations to the market: 
Second, there were divergences between the Member States due to the lack of 
guidance regarding the new requirements. This problem left room for options for the 
Member States. By the virtue of the fact that the Member States preferred to use their 
discretion rights, differences in the national legislative framework increased: Third, 
the FSAP were unable to provide a consistent enforcement mechanism for the 
Member States to ensure that all obligations were implemented in a timely manner. 
Therefore, most of the Member States failed to implement the obligations of the 
FSAP directives into their legal framework by the expected deadlines.   
                        
In the light of these shortcomings, the shape of the capital markets was 
enhanced within the post-FSAP period after 2005. The EU published a White Paper, 
which highlights the priorities of the EU regarding the financial services for the time 
period of 2005-2010.355 In the post-FSAP period, the EU concentrated on the main 
deficiencies in the FSAP and sought a solution to improve it. For example, greater 
transparency and the market consultation, a new structure for the supervisory 
authorities, more joined up securities law rules with a cost-benefit analysis, and lesser 
legislative intervention were determined as the key policies in the post-FSAP 
period.356   
 
The FSAP made an effort to deal with a great number of issues in the 
modernisation history of EU law. As a programme of action, together with the FSAP, 
the EU laid the foundation of a single regulatory framework and at least managed to 
plan which obligations should be adopted in the market. Therefore, as a trigger and 
framework of the recent reforms and developments in terms of the financial 
disclosure and transparency, it is worth evaluating the FSAP in the pole position. In 
this respect, it should be asked why the corporate governance issues were considered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 The EU, Summaries of EU Legislation: White Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010), 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_gen
eral_framework/l33225_en.htm, accessed 27/05/2014 
356 Niamh Moloney, III. Financial Market Regulation in the Post-Financial Services Action Plan Era, 
(2006) 55 ICLQ, pp. 982-992, p.985 and European Commission, The EU Single Market: Financial 
Services Policy, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/policy/index_en.htm#Financial_Services_Action_Plan, 
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in the FSAP instead of harmonisation in company law.357 This question was clearly 
answered by Alexander Schaub, former General Director of the EC`s Internal Market 
Directorate. According to Schaub, realising the importance of the corporate 
governance is not just a reaction against the negative effects of the scandals both in 
the US and the EU, corporate governance is the key element fulfilling the strategy of 
creating a modern economy by enhancing the competition and increasing the 
efficiency.358  
3.1.1.2 The Lamfalussy Process 
After the FSAP, further reforms and developments were accelerated in EU 
financial markets. To this aim, a new procedure, ‘The Lamfalussy Approach’ was 
introduced by the EU as a part of another work in securities law. The Lamfalussy 
Report was launched in February 2001 by Alexandre Lamfalussy (the Committee of 
Wise Men) and provided for an increase in the modernisation of the policy-making 
framework in the EU.359 The main aims of this process were: To increase flexibility in 
Community legislation to quickly respond to and adopt the new changes in the 
financial markets; to provide better participation of external stakeholders and to carry 
out the implementation and the enforcement of Community law between Member 
States.360 However, between 2001 and 2013, due to the rapidly changing conditions in 
the financial markets, the Lamfalussy Process was subjected to some modernisations 
in the EU. Therefore, so as to facilitate our understanding, the Lamfalussy Process 
will be explained by dividing it into two sections: ‘Before the Financial Crisis and 
After the Financial Crisis’.  
3.1.1.3 Before the Financial Crisis 
As highlighted above, the Lamfalussy Process created a new policy-making 
structure in the EU. Hence, the EU managed to constitute the way or the strategy of 
the decision-making process. The Lamfalussy Process contains four levels of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 For details see 3.1.2 below 
358 Alexander Schaub (2004) as cited in Gonencer (n 50), p.42 
359 Peter Snowdon and Simon Lovegrove, The New European Supervisory Structure, [2011] COB, 
pp.1-2  
360 Commissions of the European Communities, The Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU 
Securities Markets Legislations: A preliminary assessment by the Commission Services, [Brussels 
2004], p.3  
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regulatory approach and before the financial crisis and the entry of the Lisbon Treaty 
its original levels were regulated as follows:361 
 
The first level of the process covered the framework or the general principles 
proposed by the Commission and adopted by the European Council and European 
Parliament after a wide consultation and co-decision procedure.362 In more detail, the 
decision-making process was carried out by dividing it into two different readings. 
Additionally, it was also essential to have the conformation of both the Council and 
the EP on a common text proposed by the European Commission.363 It may be useful 
to stress that this process required two readings; however, if the Council and the EP 
were unable to confirm the common text after the second reading, the process could 
require a consultation procedure (carried out by the consultation committee which 
consists of the Council members and representatives of the EP) and a third reading.364 
If the consultation committee failed to agree on the common text or the Council or the 
EP did not adopt the agreed text of the consultation committee, the legislation 
failed.365 For example, the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) was adopted under 
the first level of the Lamfalussy Process. Besides the Transparency Directive, the 
Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC), the Markets in Financial Instrument Directive 
(2004/39/EC) and the Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC) were also adopted under the 
first level of the process (Lamfalussy level-1 directives). 
 
The second level of the process was known as the ‘comitology decision-
making system’ before the entry of the Lisbon Treaty.366 At Level 2, the European 
Commission prepared more comprehensive, technical and implementing measures by 
consulting the European Securities Committee (ESC) and requesting advice from the 
Committee of European Securities Authority (CESR) to sustain and achieve the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Julia Lemonia Raptis, ‘European Financial Regulation: ESMA and The Lamfalussy Process, the 
Renewed European Legislative Process in the Field of Securities Regulation’, (2012) 18 Colombia 
Journal of European Law Online, pp.61-68, p.61, http://www.cjel.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Raptis_61-68.pdf, accessed 17/06/2014   
362 Alexander Schaub, The Lamfalussy process four years on, (2005) 13 JFRC pp.110-120, at p.2 and 
the FSA, ‘Lisbon: The Framework for the post-Lisbon Procedure’, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/post-lisbon-procedure.pdf, accessed at 4/6/2014 
363 Pierre Schammo, EU Prospectus Law: New Perspectives on Regulatory Competition in Securities 
Market, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011), p.9 
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framework principles of the first level (Article 202 EC).367  The ESC was created by 
the European Commission as the ‘comitology committee’ for the financial markets in 
2001 (2001/528/EC).368 The ESC consisted of the representatives of the Member 
States and was chaired by the European Commission. At this level, after preparation 
of the technical and implementing measures, the European Commission requested an 
advice from the CESR. The CESR prepared a technical advice by consulting with the 
market participants, end users and consumers and then sent it to the Commission. On 
the basis of the advice of the CESR, the European Commission prepared the 
implementing measures and sent them to the ESC for a vote. After the voting process, 
the Commission adopted the measures.369        
 
This level may be underlined as the most important level of the process, 
because with the technical implementing measures, a strong investor protection, the 
market efficiency and a high level of transparency and disclosure in the financial 
markets may be enhanced.370 However, it may be useful to note that there is a strong 
relation between the Level 1 and the Level 2 of the Lamfalussy because the second 
level stems from the first level. There are some directives in the European legal 
system, which were enacted under the second level. For instance, in terms of 
enhancing transparency, Directive 2007/14/EC, which covers implementing 
obligations of the Transparency Directive, was enacted under the second level of the 
Lamfalussy Process.  
 
The third level of the process aimed to create the ‘cooperation and networking 
between national regulators’ to implement the EU law consistently at the Member 
State level.371 Before the financial crisis, in order to ensure the implementation and 
the application of the regulatory practices throughout the Member States, the Level 3 
Committees (the CESR, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors and the 	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accessed at 24/06/2014, p. 6  
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Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisor) had an 
important role. CESR, for example, was created by a Commission decision in 2001 
(2001/527/EC).372 Interestingly, these supervisory committees did not have power to 
implement, but they prepared the guidelines and non-binding recommendations for 
the uncovered areas in the EU legislations.373 Before the recent modifications in the 
enforcement system in the EU, the main objective of this level was to ensure the 
consistent implementation of the level 1 and the level 2 measures between the 
Member States (in fact, it is still the main purpose). 
 
The fourth level of the process addressed the enforcement mechanism in the 
EU legislative framework. The Commission (the EU), as the guardian of the Treaties, 
checked and controlled the Member States` national regulations according to whether 
or not their implementations were compliant with EU legislations (Level 1 and Level 
2).374 If necessary, the Commission (the EU) had the right to take legal action before 
the Court of Justice, if the Member States breached or failed to implement the 
Community law.375 
 
The Lamfalussy Process may be underlined as a major step forward in 
regulating an integrated market in the EU for that time period. In particular, with the 
new policy-making framework, it helped to examine the current situation of the 
integration process of the financial markets; to observe the harmonisation structure of 
the EU; to facilitate the adoption process of an integrated market; and to create an 
open, transparent and common securities market in the EU.376 Additionally, the 
Lamfalussy Process could accelerate the decision-making procedure; hence, it helped 
to take rapid and flexible actions towards the recent novelties in financial markets. 377  
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Therefore, Moloney identifies this process as a milestone in the history of EC 
regulations.378 
 
However, there were some drawbacks that need to be considered in the 
Lamfalussy Process. The main shortcomings can be summarised in the two categories 
as follows:  
 
Firstly, the Lamfalussy procedure was complicated, time-consuming, onerous, 
and led to the inefficient use of resources among authorities and the private sector. 
Additionally, there was not enough detailed information about the differences 
between the framework measures. Therefore, the process could cause ‘the regulatory 
capture’ in EU legislations.379 
 
Secondly, the level three committees lacked legal powers to take and apply the 
common decisions in EU financial markets. The main problem was that their 
existence was not specifically regulated under the EU Treaties or the Financial 
Regulation.380 Chatzimanoli defines the Lamfalussy Process as informal in general or 
as a guideline in the way of creating only the non-legally binding principles in her 
article.381 As a consequence, the supervisory authorities just provided advice to the 
process, which led to a lack of enforcement mechanisms in the EU.  
 
For example, the problems with the CESR may be summarised as follows: 
Due to the absence of legally binding powers, the CESR failed to play a critical role 
in providing cooperation and encouraging the best practice in the EU. As the CESR 
did not have the legal authority, any decision taken by the CESR, was not binding on 
the CESR members. Therefore, the CESR’s authority was restricted in dealing with 
the problems between the Member States at the EU level (no action) and 
implementing level 3 recommendations and standards at the national level 
(defection).382  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Niamh Moloney, (n 339), p.21 
379 Jean Pierre Casey and Karel Lannoo, (n 345), p.12 
380 Despina Chatzimanoli, A Crisis of Governance? From Lamfalussy to de Larosière or Bridgingthe 
Gap between Law and New Governance in the EU Financial Services Sector, (2011), 2 European 
Journal of Risk Regulation 3, pp.322-339, p.335  
381  ibid 
382 Pierre Schammo (n 363), pp. 21-27 
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In order to deal with these abovementioned problems, the EU launched some 
modernisation activities to improve the original Lamfalussy Process. These reforms 
will be analysed in the following part.  
3.1.1.4 After the Financial Crisis 
In light of this information, there was a need for reform in the architecture of 
the Lamfalussy Process. In particular, the ineffectiveness of the process became more 
apparent in the wake of the 2007 and 2008 financial crises because the EU failed to 
respond in a comprehensive and accurate way. 383   To this aim, the European 
Commission requested a high level expert’s group report for the potential 
modifications to the Lamfalussy Process from Jacques de Larosiere, (the former 
president of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development).384 In the de 
Larosiere Report, the main shortcomings of the supervisory authorities in terms of 
cooperation, convergence, ineffective early-warning systems and decision-making 
power were highlighted, and a deep and immediate reform for the supervisory 
structure was emphasised as essential changes that needed to be immediately 
considered.385   
  
As a result of the necessity for further reforms to the supervisory structure, a 
new European System of Financial Supervision, which reflects the recommendations 
of the De Larosiere Report, was created by the proposal of the European Commission 
on 4 March 2009, the confirmation of the European Council on 19 June 2009 and the 
adoption of the European Parliament in January 2011.386 All of this aimed to establish 
‘a European single rule book applicable to all’ and to create three new European 
Supervisory Authorities, one for the securities sectors (European Securities and 
Market Authority-ESMA), one for the banking sector (European Banking Authority-
EBA), and one for the insurance and the occupational pension sector (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority-EIOPA) may be underlined.387 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Eilis Ferran and Kern Alexander, Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? The special case of the 
European Systemic Risk Board, (2010) 35 ELR –Monthly Edition 6, pp. 751-776, at p.757 
384 Julia Lemonia Raptis (n 361), p.62 
385 ibid and Jacques de Larosiere, The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU-Report, 
(2009), pp.39-41, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf, 
accessed 21/06/2014 
386 Regulation 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), recital 8, 
2010 O.J. (L331/84) (EU) [hereinafter ESMA Regulation], Official Journal of the EU.   
387 ibid 
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addition, a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was set up to provide  ‘macro-
prudential supervision’ throughout the EU financial markets.388 
 
It is worth noting that with the new regulation, the Lamfalussy Process was 
not eliminated or abolished; instead, it was amended and strengthened with the new 
abovementioned supervisory structures. With the entry of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, 
the implementation system of Lamfalussy was changed to reflect the amendments in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the ESMA was 
established under Article 114 of the TFEU.389 Additionally, its own legislative act 
(the ESMA Regulation) was adopted on 24 November 2010.390 In the following 
section, the novelties on the Lamfalussy Process after the financial crisis will be 
examined by only focusing on the supervisory powers of the ESMA. After the 
financial crisis, the new four level approaches of the Lamfalussy can be analysed as 
follows: 
 
At the first level, the same implementation or procedure was left unchanged in 
the process. As before the financial crisis or the pre-Lisbon Procedure, the framework 
or general principles are jointly adopted by the EP and the Council after the proposal 
of the EC/EU in accordance with Article 294 of the TFEU.391 
 
At the second level, a slight difference may be observed due to the changing 
supervisory authority structures in the EU. At this stage, the European Securities 
Authorities (ESAs) prepare the drafts for the technical standards by consulting and 
making a cost-benefit analysis of the new potential standards. Then, the Commission 
evaluates these standards and within three months, decides whether to adopt or reject 
them as legally binding rules. If the Commission does not adopt them, or partly 
rejects them or requires some amendments, it sends them back to the ESAs explaining 
the reasons. After that, the ESAs prepare the new draft regulation and resubmit it to 
the Commission within six weeks. When the Commission receives the new draft, it 
explains which rules are accepted as law, but it cannot make any amendments to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Sigort Vitos and Norbert Kluge, The Sustainable Company: A New Approach to Corporate 
Governance, (European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 2011), p.230   
389 Julia Lemonia Raptis, (n 361), p.63 and European Securities and Market Authority, 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/index_new.php, accessed 11/06/2014 
390 ESMA Regulation, (n 386) 
391 Julia Lemonia Raptis, (n 361), p.63, and Article 294 of the TFEU  
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content without the cooperation of the ESAs. In addition to these, if there is a time 
limitation on the level 1 principles, which determines the binding technical standards 
or the ESAs cannot submit the drafts on time, then the Commission has the right to 
prepare the draft standards by consulting and making the cost-benefit analysis with 
one of the ESAs, such as ESMA. Only the European Parliament or the Council can 
reject the regulatory technical standards that are adopted by the Commission within 
three months.392  
 
As the most important innovation at level 2, the reshaping of the comitology 
system, which creates different types of subordinate measures on the new Treaties 
after the Lisbon Treaty can be underlined. According to the latest reforms to level 2, 
the EU has determined a formal hierarchical order on the European norms by dividing 
them into two sections; on the one hand, legislative acts; on the other hand, 
delegated/implementing acts and implementing technical standards/regulatory 
technical standards.393 It may be useful to touch on the role of this hierarchical order 
in EU legislative framework. 
 
Legislative acts are a substance for the European legislature, which are 
adopted by the legislative procedure.394 According to the Treaty of Lisbon, five types 
of act may be adopted by the European institutions; a regulation; a directive; a 
decision; a recommendation and an opinion.395 Regulations, directives and decisions 
are binding acts, whereas recommendations and opinions are not legally binding.396  
 
Delegated acts are defined as non-legislative acts for general application. They 
are adopted by the European Commission for the purpose of strengthening or 
changing only ‘the non-essential elements’ of the legislative acts.397 This means that 
the essential parts of legislative acts cannot be delegated. The question that needs to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 The FSA, ‘Lamfalussy: The Framework for the post-Lisbon Procedure’, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/post-lisbon-procedure.pdf, accessed at 21/06/2014 
393 Pierre Schammo (n 363), p. 14 
394 ibid 
395 Europa, European Union Legal Acts, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0032_en.htm, 
accessed at 2.1.2014 
396  Article 288 of the TFEU, and Europa, European Union Legal Acts, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0032_en.htm, 
accessed at 2.1.2014 
397  Article 290 of TFEU and Pierre Schammo (n 363), p.14 
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be asked is how the power is delegated. The delegation of power takes place through 
legislative acts. In other words, within legislative acts, the European Commission may 
be authorised by the EP and the Council. The objective, content, scope and duration 
of the delegation of powers are defined by the EP and the Council for each legislative 
act.398    
 
Implementing acts are different from the delegated acts. The main purpose of 
the implementing acts is to provide a uniform implementation for European Acts.399 
Certain European measures require uniform implementation throughout the Member 
States. In these situations, according to Article 291 of the TFEU, the Commission is 
delegated to adopt implementing acts for such measures. Therefore, Article 291 is 
underlined as the ‘competence of principle of the Commission’ to directly delegate the 
Commission in adopting the implementing acts.400     
 
It is argued that after the Treaty of Lisbon, some radical changes may be 
observed at the third level. Firstly, as mentioned before, in order to enhance the 
powers of existing supervisory authorities, a new European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) was proposed by the European Commission/EU and adopted by 
the European Parliament in 2011.401 So, new supervisors - European Securities and 
Market Authority (ESMA), European Banking Authority, and European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority - have replaced the former supervisory 
authorities. In this part, only ESMA will be examined.  
 
With the latest reform of the supervisory authorities, ESMA was officially 
created to replace the former Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in 
2011. The main aim of ESMA is to ensure the effective functioning of securities 
markets throughout the EU by safeguarding the transparency, efficiency and integrity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 European Parliament, Legislating more efficiently: Questions & Answers on new delegated acts, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20100323BKG71187, accessed 28/06/2014    
399 Pierre Schammo (n 363), p. 17 
400 Europa (n 395), European Union Legal Acts 
401 The European Commission, ‘The EU Single Market: Overview’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm#package, accessed 11/06/2014, 
and Pierre Schammo, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the veil on the 
allocation of powers’  (2011) (London; South Hackensack, N.J.) [Stevens; F.B. Rothman & Co.] 48 
Common market law review pp.1879-1914, p.1879 
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in financial markets.402  Additionally, it enhances the supervisory structure of the 
financial systems by collaborating with other supervisory authorities in the markets.   
 
ESMA is important in the policy-making strategy of the EU because it plays a 
role at each level of the Lamfalussy process. In order to understand how ESMA 
works, it can be analysed within the four level legislative procedure of the Lamfalussy 
process below:403 
 
 At level 1, ESMA provides a technical advice to the Commission for its 
legislative proposals; at level 2, it prepares drafts for subordinate acts; at level 3, it 
plays a greater role by carrying out its’ supervisory practices within the European 
System of Financial Supervision. As the most significant innovation, the preparation 
for implementing technical standards for the guidelines and recommendations may be 
highlighted. In more detail, according to Article 10 and 15 of ESMA regulations, 
ESMA shall develop the ‘regulatory and implementing technical standards’ in 
accordance with Article 290 and 291 of TFEU that specifically set out areas where the 
EP and the Council delegate power to the Commission to adopt them by examining 
the consistency of the standards specifically set out in the legislative acts.404  These 
recommendations can be complied by competent authorities or they have a right not 
to comply with these recommendations if they explain why; at level 4, either at the 
request of the national authorities, the EP, the Council and the Commission or on its 
own initiative, ESMA may launch an investigation where the law has been breached. 
In addition to these, in some emergency cases or ‘in very specific circumstances’ such 
as financial crises, in order to sustain the financial stability and to prevent the negative 
impact of these unpredicted problems ESMA may adopt legally binding emergency 
measures in financial markets in accordance with Article 114 of TFEU.405 Therefore, 
just for the emergency issues or for very specific situations, ESMA may be 
highlighted as a policy-making entity.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 ESMA, About: ESMA in short, http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/esma-short, accessed 2/01/2014 403	  ibid, and Directive 2006/46/EC, Article 46a 
404 Julia Lemonia Raptis, (n 361), p.63, and Article 290-291 TFEU and ESMA Regulations (n 386), 
Article 10 and 15 
405 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release, The power of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority to adopt emergency measures on the financial markets of the Member States in 
order to regulate or prohibit short selling is compatible with EU law, (2014) No: 7/14, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-01/cp140007en.pdf, accessed at 
22/01/2014 
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The main aims of the ESMA are to protect the stability of the financial system 
by enhancing investor protection, transparency, integrity, efficiency and the proper 
functioning of the securities market, and to develop binding technical standards that 
are confirmed by the EC/EU in financial markets.406 With the renewed structure, 
ESMA is accepted as a ‘Union Body’ instead of a ‘single securities authority’ in the 
EU.407 It not only prepares the draft legally binding technical standards for level 2, but 
also examines how the Member States impose the obligations into their national 
legislative frameworks. For example, in terms of the Transparency Directive 
according to its 2011 review reports (ESMA/2011/194), the Member States are 
successful: in compliance with the deadline of the disclosure requirements; the 
majority of them have one officially appointed mechanism (OAM) to store regulated 
information in accordance with the Transparency Directive; and most of them provide 
the multi-language disclosure regime pursuant to the predominant international 
finance.408  
 
At the fourth level, the same procedures as in the original Lamfalussy Process 
are maintained. At this stage, the Commission/EU, as the statutory agent, checks and 
monitors whether the directives or other EU legal requirements are properly 
transposed and implemented by the Member States.409 To this aim, the ESAs are 
provided with additional power to inspect the alleged infringements of EU law. In 
case of any breach, the ESAs require legal action from the adequate competent 
authorities in the Member States. If the competent authorities are unsuccessful in 
taking legal action, then the Commission (the EU) takes the decisions for the financial 
institutions even before the European Court of Justice.410    
 
The Lamfalussy Process plays a key role in EU legislative framework. Its main 
advantages are: Firstly, it helps to increase the level of transparency from two points 
of view: a) On the one hand, with the first level Lamfalussy Directives, such as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 European Commission, The Review of the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC: Emerging Issues, 
[COM-2010] 243 Commission Staff Working Document, (Brussels 27.05.2010), p.25 
407 Pierre Schammo (n 401), p.1880 
408 ESMA, Press release - ESMA investigates how Member States have implemented the Transparency 
Directive (ESMA/2011/194), http://www.esma.europa.eu/popup2.php?id=7620, accessed 09/06/2014, 
pp.1-2 
409 The FSA, ‘Lamfalussy: Table that sets out the Lamfalussy Framework, As currently Applicable’, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/pre-lisbon-procedure.pdf, accessed at 22/06/2014 
410 Simon Gleeson and Glenda Davies (n 340), p.2 
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Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC), the Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC), the 
Markets in Financial Instrument Directive (2004/39/EC) or the Prospectus Directive 
(2003/71/EC), it increased the adoption process of transparency requirements in the 
EU: b) On the other hand, with the consultation process or by including the interested 
parties in the decision-making process at an early stage, it also provided more 
transparency regarding the entire process of the new legislations. Secondly, it 
provided a balance between the institutional bodies in the EU. Hence, more effective 
rules were able to be adopted under the securities law in the EU.411 Thirdly, the 
supervisory structure of the EU was improved with the new supervisory authorities 
and their power was legally strengthened with their own regulations, i.e. ESMA 
regulations and TFEU. Herewith, one of the abovementioned main problems of the 
original Lamfalussy could be solved with these improvements.   
 
As a result, with the updated Lamfalussy Process, the EU managed to create a 
new well-organised policy-making strategy. After the FSAP, the EU determined how 
new rules should be regulated in addition to what should be regulated in the securities 
market.  
  
3.1.2.	  Developments	  of	  EU	  Company	  Law	  	  
As mentioned before 412 , high-level requirements for transparency and 
disclosure should be considered in both securities and company law in order to 
provide efficiency in the market. The modernisation of transparency and disclosure 
were initiated with the securities law in the EU. So, to some extent, transparency and 
disclosure requirements in EU financial markets were accomplished. However, these 
developments were not enough to increase the level of transparency because the 
certain disclosure requirements, especially in terms of the listed companies in the 
market were still missing. Therefore, the EU decided to improve the transparency and 
disclosure rules in company law in addition to securities law.  
 
Company law deals with the issues of the legal persons and listed companies, 
and organises the relationships between the actors in a company, such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Zdenek Kudrna, The EU Financial Market Policy: Evolution, Innovation and Research Outlook, 
[2009] IEIR Working Paper Series No:04/2009, p.17    
412 For details see 3.1.1 above 
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shareholders, stakeholders, the board or the managers.413 It determines the criteria for 
companies, such as the main rules for general meetings, voting rights, compensation 
of the management or pricing of shares.414 In this respect, some correlations can be 
seen between these two segments of law. The main aim of company law regarding 
disclosure obligations is to provide useful information by increasing financial 
reporting standards to interested parties to help their decision-making process about 
the performance of listed companies.415  On the other hand, as mentioned earlier416, 
the role of disclosure in securities law is to provide true information in a timely 
manner. Therefore, modernisation activities in both company and securities law play 
an important role in guaranteeing effective transparency and disclosure obligations in 
the legislative frameworks. In this part, recent EU company law reforms regarding 
transparency and disclosure requirements will be examined and evaluated. 
3.1.2.1 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
The High Level Group of Company Law Experts was created in 2001 by the 
European Commission. In 2002, they published their report, which is known as the 
HLG Report II or the Winter Report in the literature to make recommendations on the 
‘modernisation of the regulatory framework for company law in Europe’.417 This 
report plays an important role in designing EU company law because it deals with a 
great number of issues regarding corporate governance practices in Europe, such as: 
shareholders’ regulations in terms of their rights and minority protection; duties of the 
board and non-executive directors; disclosure policies in terms of managerial 
remuneration and responsibilities for financial statements; audit regulations and 
finally EU coordination and cooperation system.418 Interestingly, this report was not 
well supported by the media or other corporate governance experts; however, it 
constituted the main framework for the forthcoming EU Action Plan for corporate 
governance, which was regulated in 2003.419    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Nis Jul Clausen (n 332), p.173 
414 ibid 
415 Jaap Winter (n 336), p.105 
416 For details see 3.1.1 above 
417 Elif Gonencer, (n 50), pp. 46-47   
418 Karel Lannoo and Arman Khachaturyan, `Reform of Corporate Governance in the EU` (2004) 5 
EBOLR pp.37-60, at p.8 
419 Gregory F. Maassen, Frans A. J. Van den Bosh, Henk Volberda, `The Importance of disclosure in 
corporate governance self-regulation across Europe:  A review of the Winter Report and the EU Action 
Plan`, (2003), 1 IJDG 2, pp. 146-159, at p.147 
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The Winter Report did not create any legally binding rules for the EU. It just 
provided some recommendations to improve the legislative framework of EU 
company law. However, it helped to initiate a modernisation activity with regard to 
corporate governance rules and standards. As explained before, the Report introduced 
some new ideas on a great number of issues regarding corporate governance standards 
in the EU. In this part, only the suggestions related to disclosure requirements will be 
examined. 
 
 In the Report, the importance of effective transparency and disclosure was 
realised and it was highlighted that disclosure requirements play a significant role ‘in 
company law structure in general and in corporate governance in practical’.420 
Additionally, the disclosure regime was also indicated to be more efficient, more 
flexible and easier to enforce.421 
  
However, information would be likely to have a positive impact on 
companies, if used by investors for their investments’ decision.422 Therefore, the 
group of experts recommended disclosing key, useful and attractive information 
regarding the company in an annual corporate governance statement as mandatory or 
voluntarily laws.423  
 
The following table indicates some of the significant themes and suggestions 
of the Winter Report with regard to disclosure requirements. Information in the tables 
was based on the HLG of Company Law Experts Report and the study of Gregory F. 
Maassen et al:424 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 Karel Lannoo and Arman Khachaturyan, (n 418), p.11  
421 Jaap Winter, Jan S. Christensen, Jose M. Garrido Garcia, Klaus J. Hopt, Jonathan Rickford, Guido 
Rossi and Joelle Simon, `Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related 
to Takeover Bids in the European Union`, 
[2002],http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf, 
accessed 30/05/2014, p.4 
422 Brian McDonnell, `Handling and disclosing inside information: a guide to the disclosure rules`, 
[2011] COB, p.5 
423 Karel Lannoo and Arman Khachaturyan, (n 418), p.11 
424 The HLG of Company Law Experts Report (n 421) and Gregory F. Maassen, Frans A. J. Van den 
Bosh, Henk Volberda (n 419), p.149 
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Table	  2:	  Themes	  and	  Recommendations	  of	   the	  Winter	  Report	  with	   regard	  
to	  Disclosure	  Obligations	  
Sections: Themes and Recommendations: 
II.3	   Disclosure of information as a regulatory tool: Disclosure 
obligations should enforce listed companies to make ‘fair, 
relevant and meaningful information’ available to the public;425	  
II.6 Modern technology: Listed companies should provide up-to-date 
information on their websites and set up a strong correlation with 
both public registers and other relevant authorities; 
 
III.1 Annual corporate governance statement: Every listed company 
should prepare a logical and comprehensive statement, which 
should include the main factors of corporate governance 
regulations and practices they apply, in both their annual report 
and annual accounts. Also, they should separately publish this 
information on their website;  
III.2 Notice a pre-mating communication-Use of websites: The listed 
companies can regulate a special part in their websites so as to 
publish all information with regard to their shareholders. 
Moreover, listed companies should also provide some rights, such 
as ‘giving proxies or voting instructions as online and 
downloading and electronic transmission of proxy or instruction 
forms’;426 
III.3 Right to ask questions and to submit proposals for resolution: 
This section recommends that listed companies provide reliable, 
clear and comprehensive information to shareholders in order to 
help them to understand the methods of asking questions, 
companies` intentions in answering these questions and the way of 
sending proposals to shareholders meeting. These issues should be 
the key factors in the listed companies` obligatory annual 
corporate governance statement; 
III.10 Independence, Composition and Interlocks: Listed companies 
should provide information with regard to their independent 
directors, board composition and the role of the non-executive or 
supervisory directors in other companies. Additionally, the 
underlying reasons for the independence of the directors and the 
appointments in the board composition should be made available 
as well; 
III.11 Remuneration of Directors: ‘The remuneration policy of the 
directors should be disclosed in the financial statement of the 
company’ and also this issue should be determined on the annual 
meeting agenda with a clear heading in order for it to be 
discussed. Moreover, the personal remuneration of directors, 
executive, non-executive or supervisory directors of the company 
should be explicitly revealed in the financial statement of the 
company;427 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 The HLG of Company Law Experts Report, (n 421), section II.3, p.5 
426 ibid, section III.2, p.10 
427 Gregory F. Maassen, Frans A. J. Van den Bosh, Henk Volberda (n 419), p.149  
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III.14 Sanctions-Director`s disqualification: According to the report, 
there should be a proper enforcement mechanism in case of 
‘misleading of financial and other key non-financial 
statements’;428 
III.16 Corporate governance codes-co-ordination: Finally, every 
Member State should determine a special corporate governance 
code, which their companies subject to comply with or they 
should explain the reasons why and on what grounds their 
corporate governance codes are different from the other Member 
States` practices.  	  
To sum up, the Winter Report provided some important recommendations 
with regard to the modernisation of the key disclosure obligations. At least the HLG 
Company Law Experts managed to increase the awareness of the essentiality of the 
effective transparency and disclosure requirements in EU company law. The key 
principle that needs to be considered is disclosure is ‘a moving target’; therefore, it 
needs to keep pace with the recent changes and innovations in the companies.429  
 
From this point of view, Karel Lannoo, Arman Khachaturyan and the HLG of 
Company Law Experts recommend that on the one hand, the Member States should 
provide more flexible and efficiently adaptable secondary regulations; on the other 
hand, the European Commission/EU should play a coordination role between the 
Member States.430 Additionally, Gonencer suggests that instead of adopting some 
fixed rules within the framework and organization of the both company and board 
members at EU level, providing the Member States with ‘the freedom of choice’ in 
terms of corporate governance code could be more useful.431  
 
However, as seen in the previous chapter, in particular with regard to Lehman 
Brothers, the ‘invisible hand or market knows the best principle’ did not work very 
well to prevent the financial crisis in the market.432 Therefore, it is argued that 
government intervention may also be helpful in reducing the negative effects of the 
unexpected issues in the financial markets, as long as it is not based on political 
reasons. Moreover, giving twenty-eight Member States a chance to independently 
choose their own corporate governance code could lead to increasing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 The HLG of Company Law Experts Report (n 421), section, III.14, p.12  
429 Karel Lannoo and Arman Khachaturyan, (n 418), p.11 
430 ibid and The HLG of Company Law Experts Report (n 421) 
431 Elif Gonencer, (n 50), p.49   
432 For details see 2.2 above 
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complexities. Hence, it would be better to provide a balance between the ‘markets 
know best principle’ and government intervention, and fixed rules at EU level and 
‘freedom of choice’.      
3.1.2.2. Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
EU-A Plan to Move Forward 
The Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance was issued by the European Commission in May 2003 as a response to 
the HLG of Company Law Experts` recommendations. In terms of a real action to 
improve transparency and disclosure requirements, the Action Plan may be seen as 
the main framework of EU company law modernisation activities. The Plan was built 
to foster the process of creating the European single market and also to help to reduce 
concerns arising from some corporate governance issues, such as Enron, Parmalat and 
other corporate scandals.433 The main aims of the Action Plan were to improve the 
effectiveness and the competitiveness of the market, to increase shareholders’ rights 
and to provide an effective protection for third parties.434 
 
It is interesting to note that the EU tends to act in the area of company law in a 
more sensitive manner than with securities law.435 Therefore, although the Action 
Plan was comprehensive and dealt with a number of issues of company law, it did not 
follow an interventionist policy in the legislative framework of the EU like the FSAP. 
 
In the Action Plan, a great number of issues were revised and prepared in 
terms of shareholders’ regulations, duties of the board and non-executive directors or 
disclosure policies and audit regulations. However, in this part, only the 
modernisation activities relating to corporate governance structures and transparency 
and disclosure requirements will be examined and evaluated.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 The Great Britain Department of Trade and Industry (the DTI), `The UK Approach to EU Company 
Law and Corporate Governance`, http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file10707.pdf, accessed 06/06/2014, p.3  
434 Roberta S. Karmel, `Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe`, (2005), University of 
Pennsylvania, 26 journal of international economic law 3, pp.379-407, p.10 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=799344, and European Commission, `Directorate General for Internal Market 
and Services: Consultation on Future Priorities for the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union`, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/consultation/consultation_en.pdf, accessed 
06/06/2014, p.2 
435 Niamh Moloney, `Time to Take Stock on the Markets: The Financial Services Action Plan 
Concludes As the Company Law Action Plan Rolls Out`, (2004) 53 ICLQ pp.999-1023, p.1010 
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Transparency and disclosure requirements were adopted at EU level in the 
Action Plan.436 The most significant transparency and disclosure rules in the Action 
Plan can be listed as follows: 
 
Firstly, Directive 78/660/EEC, which concerned the annual accounts of certain 
types of company, was re-adopted as Directive 2006/46/EC in 2006.437 With the new 
directive, a separate, reliable and descriptive annual corporate governance statement 
became compulsory in the annual reports of listed companies.438 Additionally, what 
information should be published in the annual corporate governance statement was 
clearly determined. For instance, a comprehensive and clear definition of shareholder 
rights, the function of the shareholder meeting and its main influence, the 
identification of board members; the description of major shareholders, their voting 
rights, their powers and their direct and indirect relations with the company, material 
relations with other related parties, the clarification of the key factors of both the risk-
management systems and the internal control mechanism in the company with regard 
to the financial reporting process are some of the examples that should be made 
available to the public as mandatory information.439  
 
Secondly, the role of institutional investors was determined and the 
information that they shall publish to their beneficial holders was indicated in the 
Action Plan. Their intention and the way of applying their investment policy and 
voting rights were adopted as the main information they have to disclose to the 
public.440  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 For the reasons why there was a need to improve transparency and disclosure requirements at EU 
level, see Jaap Winter (n 336), p.108, and Communication of European Communities, `Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU- A Plan Move to Forward`, [COM-2003] 284 Final of 21 
May 2003`, http://www.ecgi.org/commission/documents/com2003_0284en01.pdf, accessed 
08/06/2014, pp.6-11 and the European Union, `Information and Notices`, (2010) 53 OJOEU, p.70, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF, accessed 
08/06/2014  
437 Elif Gonencer, (n 50), p.53  
438 ibid 
439 Directive 2006/46/EC, Article 10 
440 Communication of European Communities, `Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
EU- A Plan Move to Forward`, [COM-2003] 284 Final of 21 May 2003`, 
http://www.ecgi.org/commission/documents/com2003_0284en01.pdf, accessed 08/06/2014, p.13 
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Thirdly, the shareholders’ rights were improved in terms of transparency and 
disclosure requirements following the Action Plan. For example, Directive 
2007/36/EC regarding certain rights of shareholders in the listed companies was 
adopted: Shareholders of listed companies shall access comprehensive and reliable 
information with the electronic facilities of the company and they shall vote at a 
distance before the general meeting; voting results shall be made available to the 
public on the Internet; and shareholders shall ask questions in relation to company and 
the company shall answer them.441   
 
To sum up, the measures adopted following the Action Plan aimed to improve 
the financial reporting, in particular the annual reports and the corporate governance 
statements of listed companies, the duties of the institutional investors, and the 
shareholders’ rights by keeping pace with the new electronic technologies in the 
companies. Additionally, two expert groups were set up by the Commission. Firstly, 
in order to provide comprehensive technical advice on company law and corporate 
governance, the ‘Expert Advisory Group’, composed of twenty non-governmental 
specialists, such as investors, issuers and academics was set up.442 Secondly, ‘the 
European Corporate Governance Forum’ was created in 2004 to increase integration 
between national codes of Member States and to offer suggestions to the European 
Commission.443   
 
The Action Plan was submitted for public consultation in 2003 and it was 
supported by the vast majority of respondents in the EU.444 The contribution of the 
Action Plan to providing market efficiency and confidence was welcomed by a very 
large number of interested parties, such as auditors, accountants or lawyers.445  
 
However, a small minority of respondents voiced some disagreements 
regarding the Action Plan. The main counter-arguments were:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the 
exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies  
442 The EU Single Market, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/advisory/index_en.htm, 
accessed 13/06/2011 cited in Elif Gonencer (n 50), p.59 
443 The EU, `European Corporate Governance Forum`, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm, accessed 13/06/2014 cited in 
Elif Gonencer (n 50), p.59 
444 ibid 
445 European Commission (n 331), p.3  
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Firstly, the aim of simplifying the regulations process and reducing some 
unnecessary rules was not clearly considered in the Action Plan. It led to some 
additional requirements, which were already in force: Secondly, the Action Plan paid 
more attention to shareholders whereas stakeholders and wider society in general 
became of secondary importance: Finally, in terms of transparency and disclosure 
requirements, the Action Plan was unable to succeed in creating innovations that were 
different from the existing requirements under the national legislations of the Member 
States.446 
 
In this respect, the EU realised the essentiality of initiating a further 
modernisation activity in the area of company law. Hence, on 12th December 2012, 
the Commission proposed a new Action Plan for European Company Law and 
Corporate Governance in order to modernise and enhance company law and corporate 
governance structures in the EU. In the following part, the new Action Plan (2012) 
will be analysed and the new transparency and disclosure innovations will be 
evaluated.   
3.1.2.3 New Proposals in EU Company Law and Corporate Governance  	   As mentioned in the previous chapter, ‘Transparency is a journey not a 
destination’.447 The meaning of this expression can be observed in EU legislations 
because the Commission repeatedly calls for modernisation in the business 
environment of Europe. Therefore, on 12th December 2012 the Commission proposed 
a new Action Plan for European Company Law and Corporate Governance to 
modernise and enhance the company law and the corporate governance structures in 
the EU by dealing with the existing shortcomings in these areas.448  
  
The rapidly changing world has indicated some significant weaknesses in 
these areas during the past decade. For example, the lack of shareholders’ interest in 
the management or ‘short termism’ in holding the shares; the weaknesses in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 ibid pp.8-9 
447 Fiammetta Borgia (15), p.23 
448 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action 
Plan: European Company and Corporate Governance- a modern legal framework for more engaged 
shareholders and sustainable companies’, COM (2012) 740 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0740:FIN:EN:PDF, accessed at 6/2/2014, 
pp.1-2 
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application of comply or explain approach; the lack of transparency in the corporate 
governance structures; the lack of effective rules at EU level in some specific fields; 
and the disadvantages of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in the 
competitive market can be identified as some of the problems that need to be 
considered.449  
 
In order to deal with these problems, the new Action Plan 2012 was launched 
to improve three main issues in EU company law and corporate governance 
framework: ‘Enhancing Transparency, Engaging Shareholders and Supporting 
Companies’ Growth and their Competitiveness’.450 In this section, only transparency 
initiatives in the proposed 2012 Action Plan will be examined and highlighted. These 
new proposals on transparency and disclosure requirements can be indicated as 
follows:451  
  
Firstly, the new transparency requirements on board diversity policies and 
non-financial risk management can be evaluated. As mentioned before452, different 
kinds of board structure, such as the single board system or the two-tier system can be 
observed in the EU. The Commission, regardless of the differences in board 
structures, highlights the importance of board composition in the success of 
companies in financial markets. This is important because sufficient diversity may 
provide an effective oversight mechanism on the management body and hence, it may 
create a smooth working environment. Moreover, it may increase group or individual 
creativity techniques between members, which would provide effective debates, ideas 
and challenges in board meetings. Therefore, it is argued that greater diversity may 
help to create an efficient corporate governance mechanism. As for the role of 
transparency in board diversity, it assists companies to realise the main weaknesses in 
board composition, to choose better diversity on boards, to increase awareness of the 
entire risk a company has faced and to take strategic decisions at the right time and in 
the right format.453 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 ibid, p.3 
450 ibid, pp.4-5 
451 ibid, pp.5-8 and EUbusiness, ‘Action Plan on European company law and corporate governance’, 
http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/single-market/governance-3, accessed at 7/2/2014  
452 For details see 1.3.1 above 
453 European Commission (n 348), p.6 
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Secondly, the new corporate governance reporting standards can be 
highlighted. The corporate governance codes of the Member States are based on the 
‘comply or explain’ model. However, the implementation of this model was criticised 
in the market because the information given by listed companies in the case of not 
complying with the particular EU recommendations was generally found inadequate 
and insufficient by the majority respondents in the EU 2011 Green Paper.454 This 
information is used in the investment decisions by investors. Therefore, inadequate 
information regarding the explanations can negatively affect the efficiency of 
financial markets. For this reason, the Commission proposed to increase the quality 
standards of reporting in the case of choosing ‘the explain approach’. 
  
Thirdly, ‘shareholder identification’ is to be improved. Due to the high level 
thresholds for the notification of major shareholdings (determined 5% in the 
transparency directive-2004/109/EC)455, it may be difficult to understand who the 
shareholders are in a company. The visibility of shareholders matters because it can 
provide two main advantages: First, it provides better communication between the 
company and shareholders: Secondly, it increases the shareholder engagement in the 
companies’ affairs. Therefore, it was proposed by the Commission that the invisibility 
problem of shareholders in listed companies be solved.  
  
Finally, improvement in transparency rules for institutional investors can be 
identified as the final proposal. The lack of information in the exercise of ownership, 
responsibilities, voting policies and engagement has been stressed as the main 
problems in the new Action Plan. Providing information with regard to the voting 
policies and engagement of institutional investors is of crucial importance. Having 
such information in financial markets may provide an analysis of to what extent 
institutional investors seriously fulfil their responsibilities in companies for the long-
term interest of their beneficiaries.456 Therefore, it may be useful to increase the flow 
of information between listed companies and institutional investors.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 European Commission, ‘Green Paper, The EU Corporate Governance Framework’, Brussels, 
5.4.2011, COM (2011), 164 Final, p.18 
455 For details see 3.2.4 below 
456 EUbusiness (n 451) 
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The Action Plan was adopted by the Commission on 12th December 2012. 
With the new Action Plan, the EU determined and listed the future plans regarding the 
problematic areas of company law and corporate governance. The main aim of the 
Action Plan is to increase the competitiveness and sustainability of companies in 
financial markets by enhancing transparency requirements, the long-term shareholder 
engagement, and the cross-border operations in the EU. Hence, with these new 
reforms and modernisation activities of the business environment in Europe, the EU 
will be one step closer to ‘The Commission’s Europe 2020’ Strategy’.457  
3.1.3.	  Analysis	  and	  Discussion	  
‘We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we 
used when we created them.’458	  
 
Both securities and company law draw a clear picture in increasing the level of 
transparency and disclosure in the EU. With the securities law, the EU tried to 
provide accurate and comprehensive information to all market participants in a timely 
manner and with the company law it tried to ensure useful information regarding 
listed companies’ performance by determining the essential information to be 
published in the periodic financial reports. Therefore, these two segments of law can 
be underlined as the main providers of consistent, detailed, effective and timely 
information.459 In the development of securities law, the FSAP and the Lamfalussy 
Process played an important role in the modernisation of the EU market. Both can be 
highlighted as the framework of the recent reforms because they triggered innovations 
in the EU, increased the efficiency of securities law and raised the attention of policy-
makers towards corporate governance.  In the FSAP, for example, the average speed 
of the adoption process of new measures was improved; the consultation approach 
between all market participants was enhanced; and a quick response to unpredictable 
events was accomplished. With the Lamfalussy Process; the current situation of the 
EU market was examined; the main deficiencies of the market were determined; and 
the new four level policy-making approaches were set up. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 European Commission (IP/10/225), Europe 2020: Commission Proposes New Economic Strategy in 
Europe, Brussels (2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-225_en.htm?locale=en, accessed at 
25/06/2014  
458 Chief Executive Boards International (CEBI), CEBI Briefing, 
http://www.chiefexecutiveboards.com/briefings/briefing059.htm, accessed 23/06/2014  
459 Mathias M. Siems (86), p.120  
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However, the FSAP and the Lamfalussy Process were not perfect. Both had 
some shortcomings in terms of increasing the level of transparency and determining 
the key disclosure obligations, such as the enforcement problem of directives and less 
guidance at level 3 of the Lamfalussy. Both only focused on the securities law in 
general and were unable to pay too much attention to transparency issues. They failed 
to keep pace with the changing needs of the financial markets. For this reason, the 
FSAP and Lamfalussy Process have been improved with further modernisation 
activities in the EU. For example, the FSAP was improved with the post-FSAP period 
after 2005 (the White Paper) and the shape of the Lamfalussy Process was enhanced 
with the De Larosiere Report after the 2008 financial crisis. Hence, more guidance 
was provided to financial markets, the level of transparency was increased, the level 
of host country barriers was decreased and a new European System of Financial 
Supervision was created.  
 
All of those provided a road map for the future developments in EU securities 
law as well as in company law. They granted the EU an ability to use different 
problem-solving strategies when the market had a problem. For example, with the 
FSAP, the essential rules for future developments were planned and with the 
Lamfalussy Process, the policy-making strategy and the enforcement mechanism 
were determined in EU legislative framework.  
 
In terms of EU company law, the Winter Report and the EC Action Plan were 
the main drivers in recent modernisation history of the EU. Both provided key, clear 
and essential disclosure obligations for market participants. Hence, what information 
should be disclosed and where it should be disclosed were determined for EU listed 
companies. In the Winter Report, the key disclosure obligations were highlighted for 
listed companies and in the EC Action Plan the theory of the Winter Report was 
converted into non-binding practices. For example, in terms of transparency 
requirements, it aimed to enhance disclosure obligations within the annual corporate 
governance statement by increasing financial reporting standards.460    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Michael Kort, `Standardization of Company Law in Germany, other EU Member States and Turkey 
by Corporate Governance Rules`, (2008) 5 ECFR pp. 379-421, at p.402 
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The main discussion in company law was about whether or not it is necessary 
to adopt the new rules at EU level. As mentioned before, one-size-fits all solutions461 
cannot be claimed as an essential solution for all Member States in the EU due to 
differences between the legislative frameworks, i.e. cultural differences. Therefore, 
instead of adopting some strict rules at all levels, it may be better to have a balance 
between more flexible criteria and the new rules at EU level. This issue will be 
critically analysed in the next part regarding the minimum or maximum 
harmonisation approach of the Directive. 
 
To sum up, with modernisation activities in both securities and company law, 
the level of transparency and disclosure have been improved and certain 
measurements have been adopted in the EU. Therefore, all of these improvements can 
be considered as evidence to understand the EU`s efforts to increase the level of 
transparency and disclosure in the market. In the previous parts, a general framework 
for modernisation activities on EU transparency laws was evaluated as background 
information. In the following parts, the Transparency Directive that is central to EU 
transparency law will be analysed by considering its advantages, drawbacks, strengths 
and weaknesses.  
    
3.2	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  of	  EU	  Transparency	  Directives 
EU Directives are at the heart of the understanding of improving the 
infrastructure of EU jurisdictions because with its Directives the EU has succeeded in 
ensuring an effective legislative framework and taking a major step forward for 
further developments throughout the Member States.462 Therefore, it is claimed that 
EU directives may have an impact on structuring the shape of EU securities law.  
 
In terms of transparency laws, the Transparency Directive may take the 
leading position. With the Transparency Directive, to some extent463 the EU has 
succeeded in constituting an efficient flow of information throughout the Member 
States. The main advantage of the Transparency Directive has been to aggregate the 
key transparency rules in a single directive. In this respect, it provides a clear picture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 Jaap Winter (n 336), p.109 
462 European Commission, ‘Application of EU Law: What are EU Directives?’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm, accessed at 30/06/2014 
463 For details see 3.2.2.1 below 
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of transparency requirements in the EU. Apart from the Transparency Directive, 
transparency requirements were also strengthened by other elements of EU Law such 
as, the Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC), the Fourth Company Law Directive, the 
Seventh Company Law Directive, the Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC) and the 
Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC), as the following will explain.  
 
In this part, firstly, the main reasons for adopting a detailed regime in regular 
reporting will be analysed; secondly, the original Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC) will be critically examined by considering the potential shortcomings; 
thirdly, the revised and amended Transparency Directive (2013/50/EU) will be 
evaluated in terms of the objective of the modification, and innovations; fourthly, the 
minimum/maximum harmonisation approach of the directive will be assessed; and 
fifthly, transparency requirements in other elements of EU law will be considered. 
	  3.2.1	  The	  Reasons	  for	  a	  Change	  in	  Regular	  Reporting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
During the history of the EEA/EC/EU market regulations, some outstanding 
rules and legislations have already been addressed in terms of enhancing 
transparency, i.e. the 1979 Admission Directive (79/279/EEC), the 1982 Interim 
Report Directive (Disclosure Directive-82/121/EEC) and the 1988 Substantial 
Shareholdings Directive (88/627/EEC).464 However, according to Moloney, these 
directives just remained at the basic level of the on-going disclosure regime and could 
not provide adequate improvement for both market transparency and cross-border 
investments. 465  Therefore, in order to provide investor protection and market 
confidence, and also to increase the attractiveness of financial markets, 
comprehensive and consistent disclosure standards were seen as essential in the EU. 
More specifically, the main reason for regulating further transparency laws on regular 
reporting can be summarised as follows:466  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Niamh Moloney (n 339), p.170, and The Council Directive 79/279/EEC (1979 Admission 
Directive), SECTION I-II-III, and European Commission, `ESME Report on MIFID and Admission of 
Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing`, [2007], 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/05122007_mifid_report_en.pdf, accessed 
20/06/2014, p.2 
465 Ibid, p.173 
466 European Commission, `Towards an EU Regime on Transparency Obligations of Issuers Whose 
Securities are Admitted to Trading on Regulated Market`, [2001] Consultation Document of the 
Services of the Internal Market Directorate General MARKT/11.07.2001, pp.6-14 
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First, ‘consolidation of all disclosure requirements’: It is argued that the level 
of consolidation approach in the EU was insufficient with regards to scope of 
application, regulations on disclosing information, the competent authority, the 
enforcement mechanism, and the language regime. Therefore, in order to facilitate the 
creating of a single European Market, making the Community Law easy to understand 
for interested parties, a consolidated approach has been advised for EU legislative 
framework. 
 
Second, ‘upgrading the regular reporting requirement’: The abovementioned 
directives failed to provide adequate and timely information to global modern 
investors due to the low frequency of these reports. For example, the deadline for the 
half yearly reports was too long. It was published ‘four months after the end of six 
months period covered’.467 Additionally, former provisions on the content of the 
report were insufficient and not at the expected level of accounting practices. It was 
underlined in the consultation document of the EC that the publication of quarterly 
financial reports would be more appropriate than half yearly reports by virtue of their 
frequency. Therefore, stricter deadlines and the mandatory disclosure of quarterly 
financial reports were highlighted. 
 
Third, ‘publication of information in electronic form’: With the recent 
development in information technologies, in particular with the widespread use of the 
Internet, it has become easy to access every kind of information in the global modern 
world. Therefore, the old techniques, such as disclosing information in newspapers 
can be accepted as out of date in today`s information age.468 For this reason, on-going 
and periodic information should be made freely available on companies’ websites 
without any delay. This is important because publishing the regulated information on 
the Internet may provide some advantages to both issuers and investors. For issuers, it 
reduces the cost of disclosure and dissemination. In terms of investors, it increases the 
accessibility of comprehensive and timely information and thus positively affects 
their decision-making process as well. Hence, publication of information in an 
electronic form has been suggested as one of the key requirements that should be 
included in transparency laws. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 ibid, p.11 
468 Ibid, p.12 
Improving	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  in	  EU	  Company	  and	  Securities	  Law	  
	   144	  
Fourth, ‘the competent authority’: In order to ensure the smooth running of 
the new laws in the market, a competent authority which will be responsible for 
monitoring and supervising the market, providing the investor protection and 
increasing the market transparency for each of the Member States, is an essential 
factor in EU legislative framework. However, without enough power, the competent 
authorities may fail to monitor ‘the devil side of corporations’ in the financial 
markets. Hence, certain powers, such as independency, the right to monitor/supervise 
to the market and the right to implement sanctions in the case of breaching the 
transparency obligations were seen to be essential in transparency regulations. 
 
Fifth, ‘implementing measures’. So as to be in line with the new reforms and 
to regulate the upgraded standards, it was necessary to consider the implementing 
measures for transparency requirements, which accelerates the adoption of technical 
standards and clarifies the definitions.469 
 
Due to the lack of abovementioned standards in the existing EU legislative 
framework, the EU saw some further disclosure and transparency requirements as an 
essential modernisation activity for that time period. Hence, to create an effective 
flow of information for market participants, the above-mentioned EU Directives were 
enacted, revised and updated with recent developments in the financial markets.    
 
	  3.2.2	  The	  Transparency	  Directive	  (2004/109/EC)	  
The Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) was enacted in 2004 and came 
into force in 2005, to be implemented into the national laws of all Member States no 
later than 2007 in order to improve the availability of recorded information about a 
company for the public or investors, such as performance, financial and economic 
position of the company or substantial changes in major shareholdings. It was revised 
by Directive (2013/50/EU) on 12 June 2013 by the European Council and 
Parliament.470  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 ibid, p.14 
470 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 Jun. 2013 on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC (COM (2011) 0683 – C7-
0380/2011 – 2011/0307(COD)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
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While the Transparency Directive belongs to EU securities law, it is also very 
relevant to company law.  On the one hand, the creation of the Transparency 
Directive is based on the Financial Service Action Plan (the FSAP).471 Additionally, it 
is a main directive under the Lamfalussy Process, which provides more 
comprehensive rules (level 2) and guidance (level 3) in order to simplify its 
requirements and to create an equivalent system between Member States.472 On the 
other hand, it also covers some company law issues, such as disclosing periodic 
information of listed companies, i.e. yearly and half-yearly financial information, 
their deadlines, the initial thresholds for major shareholdings and disclosed 
information, which is also determined in the Market Abuse Directive.473 
 
The original Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC aimed to provide an 
efficient flow of information within the European Community by determining the 
essential rules on regular reporting and it is still the main purpose of the amended 
Directive 2013/50/EU.474 The original directive was complemented with Directive 
2007/14/EC. 475  Directive 2007/14/EC covers detailed rules (level 2) for the 
implementation of certain obligations of the Directive 2004/109/EC to facilitate the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements regarding the information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market.476  
 
It is argued that the Transparency Directive played a key role in shaping the 
structure of EU legislative framework and would be underlined as the sine qua non 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0262+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN#title2, (accessed 
20/06/2014), and Melih Sonmez, The Role of Transparency in Corporate Governance and Its 
Regulation in the EU, (2013) 10 European Company Law 4/5, pp.137-146, p.141   
471 PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, `Periodic reporting requirements: The Transparency Directive`, 
[2007], http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ifrs-reporting/pdf/transparency.pdf, accessed 20/06/2014, at p.1 
472 Dorothee Fischer-Appealt, `Implementation of the Transparency Directive-room for variations 
across the EEA`, (2007) 2 SMLJ pp. 133-154, at p.134  
473 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003, on insider 
dealing and market manipulation OJL, 12/06/2003, p 16, and European Commission (2012), Report 
From the Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, (COM 2011) 683 
Final, (SEC 2011) 1280 Final, p.7, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:1279:FIN:EN:PDF, accessed 28/06/2014   
474 The Great Britain Department of Trade and Industry, “Company Law Reform”, (London 2005) 
Crown Copyright, p.52 and, European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Michael Barnier 
Welcoming the Agreement Reached on the Revision of the Transparency Directive, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-483_en.htm, accessed 30/06/2014 
475 Practical Law Company, `Transparency Directive: materials`, http://corporate.practicallaw.com/3-
205-8035, accessed 19/07/2011 
476 The Directive 2007/14/EC, p.3 
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element in the modernisation of both EU company law and EU financial market. 
However, as the main challenge of having effective transparency requirements, it 
needed to be updated and to keep pace with innovations in the financial market as 
well. To this aim, the Transparency Directive was revised and amended in 2013 by 
the European Council and Parliament. In the following part, the potential 
shortcomings of the former Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) will be analysed 
and the reasons for adopting the amended Transparency Directive (2013/50/EU) will 
be evaluated.  
3.2.2.1. The Critical Analysis of Directive 2004/109/EC and the Existing Problems 	   The original Transparency Directive provided many innovations to EU market 
in terms of ensuring an appropriate level of transparency for investors. It aimed to 
provide a true, comprehensive, timely and regular flow of information to the public. 
Therefore, in order to achieve these objectives, many new rules were enacted in 
Directive 2004/109/EC by considering the inadequacies of former EU transparency 
laws. 
 
However, due to innovations in the financial markets, its requirements failed 
to keep pace with the new financial tools, which led to an increase in the opacity of 
EU financial markets.477 It is argued that transparency requirements do not work well 
unless they provide an up-to-date flow of information to all market participants. 
Therefore, one of the main conditions of effective transparency laws is being up-to-
date with the tools and the needs of the financial markets. The original Transparency 
Directive was not perfect; hence, it needed to be modernised. In this part, the potential 
shortcomings of Directive 2004/109/EC will be analysed. 
  
The main problems of Directive 2004/109/EC may be examined under the 
headlines of the disclosure of periodic information, the notification of major 
shareholdings, the storage of regulated information and supervision as follows:   
 
Firstly, the strict deadlines for periodic information and mandatory 
requirements to quarterly financial reports are a problematic issue in financial 
markets, in particular for the Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (SMEs) that need to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 For details see 2.2.3 above 
Improving	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  in	  EU	  Company	  and	  Securities	  Law	  
	   147	  
be considered. Due to the lack of capacity of SMEs in the financial instruments and 
the high costs of preparing the periodic information, SMEs failed to disclose the 
periodic information, which led to increasing their invisibility problem in financial 
markets. 478  To this aim, more flexible deadlines and exemption from certain 
disclosure obligations, such as mandatory requirements of quarterly financial reports 
were suggested in the Mazars Report.479   
 
In order to solve the strict deadline problems, the creation of an alternative 
market, such as the junior market in the UK480 or the Emerging Companies Market 
(ECM) in Turkey, 481  where more flexible rules are provided for small listed 
companies, would be suggested. Hence, all SMEs could easily compete with each 
other and when they grew to compete with listed companies, they could mitigate to 
the regulated market. For the problem of mandatory requirements for quarterly 
financial reports, it is claimed that these reports may play an important role because 
they may bring about an increase in the frequency of the disclosure of information. 
However, the existing transparency directive does not regulate any requirements for 
the quarterly financial information to be prepared according to accounting 
standards. 482  In creating effective transparency rules, besides the frequency of 
information, honesty and reliability of information may be underlined as backbone 
elements. Without accounting standards, any periodic information may lose its 
trustworthiness for information users. Additionally, the information that is published 
with quarterly financial reports is already covered in half yearly and annual reports. 
Therefore, the abolishment of mandatory requirements for quarterly financial reports 
would be a good option for EU financial markets, because it seems an unnecessary 
burden for listed companies, in particular for SMEs.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 Fabrica Demarigny and Christophe Clerc, “The Transparency Directive Assessment Report”, (Paris 
2010), Mazars, Group Communication-Broch 57-EN-04/10, pp.92-99 
479 Fabrica Demarigny and Christophe Clerc, “Transparency Directive Assessment Report: Executive 
Summary and Possible Improvements”, (Paris 2010), Mazars, Group Communication-Broch 57-EN-
04/10, p.18 
480 London Stock Exchange, ‘Alternative Investment Market (AIM)’, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/aim/aim.htm, accessed at 
31/5/2014 
481 Borsa Istanbul, ‘Companies’, http://borsaistanbul.com/en/companies/listed-companies, accessed at 
31/5/2014 
482 Directive (2004/109/EC), Article 6 
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Secondly, there was a problem in terms of the notification of major 
shareholdings. The reason for the problem was the different implementation in some 
Member States. In the original Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC), the 
notification of major shareholders was determined as ‘the proportion of voting rights 
of the issuer held by the shareholder as a result of the acquisition or disposal where 
that proportion reaches, exceeds, or falls below the thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%’. 483  However, some Member States, such as 
Germany, France and the UK, were imposing lower initial threshold (3%), which 
caused confusion between the Member States in cross-border operations (gold-
plating).484  
 
Thirdly, a single EU access regime to financial information is one of the main 
points missing in the EU to increase transparency and to access every kind of 
information regarding listed companies. The original Transparency Directive only 
required Member States to ensure that investors should access the regulated 
information rapidly, on a non-discriminatory basis and freely.485 However, it did not 
include any obligation regarding the regulation of a central storage mechanism in the 
EU and did not determine minimum standards either. Hence, after evaluating costs 
and benefit of this kind of system, it would be useful to adopt a single EU access 
point at EU level with a direct Internet link which stores the regulated information of 
all listed companies in the EU.   
 
Fourthly, there were some different implementations on the supervisory 
activities between the Member States. In particular, in terms of the supervisory 
landscape, powers and sanctioning, and enforcement regimes, there were certain 
differences between the Member States. For example, in 2009 CESR Members in 
twenty-two Member States were determined as ‘the designated central competent 
authorities’, which supervise and monitor listed companies pursuant to all parts of the 
Transparency Directive; on the other hand, in five Member States (Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland, Iceland and the UK), instead of the central competent authority, another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 ibid, Article 9 
484 Holger Fleischer and Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, `The Reform of the Transparency Directive: 
Minimum or Full Harmonisation of Ownership Disclosure? ` (2011) 12 EBOR pp.121-145, p.126 
485 Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) and the Financial Services Authority, `Implementing of 
Transparency Directive: Investment Entities Listing Review`, [London 2006] Consultation Paper, at 
p.45   
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competent authority was established in order to fulfil Article 24-4-h of the 
Directive.486  
 
Additionally, the enforcement mechanism of the Directive was also 
problematic because the Member States had difficulty in implementing the 
requirements into their national legislative framework by the expected deadline; for 
instance, the original Transparency Directive required from the issuers to make their 
annual financial reports, half-yearly financial reports and interim management reports 
available to the public within the determined timeframes. However, according to the 
CESR Report, there was a difference between the Member States with regard to 
applying the supervisory powers. In Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden and the UK, CESR (ESMA) 
Members did not have direct powers with respect to making the periodic information 
available within the determined framework, whereas in the rest of the Member States, 
the competent authorities did.487  Therefore, the existence of a strong enforcement and 
supervision mechanism in the EU would have played a key role in increasing the 
efficiency of the new laws. In fact, with the recent developments in the European 
Securities Authorities (ESAs) in 2011, the supervision activities have been improved 
in the EU. Hence, instead of a new radical change in the supervisory system, more 
technical guidance seems to be needed in order to facilitate and accelerate the 
adoption process of the directives.    
 
Finally, as the most important shortcoming, some provisions of the 
Transparency Directive were out of date. In particular, there were some gaps in the 
Transparency Directive regarding the disclosure of control of voting rights due to the 
widespread use of the new complex financial instruments. The cash-settled 
derivatives, options or swaps for example, were one example of these sophisticated 
financial instruments and there were no disclosure requirements for these kinds of 
instruments in the Transparency Directive. The lack of transparency in these 
instruments caused a notification gap in holding certain types of the new financial 
instruments and led to ‘hidden ownership’ for companies. In many cases, such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Committee of European Securities Regulators, `CESR Report on the Mapping of Supervisory 
Powers, Administrative and Criminal Sanctioning Regimes of Member States in relation to the 
Transparency Directive (TD)`, [Paris 2009], at p.5 and Directive (2004/109/EC), Article 24-4-h  
487 Ibid at pp.5-7 and Directive (2004/109/EC), article 25-4 
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‘Porsche/Volkswagen or SGL Carbon’, hidden ownership is accepted as a real threat 
to shareholders’ rights. According to the corporate governance research of Credit 
Agricole Group, hidden ownership occurs when outside investors or institutional 
investors hold more economic rights than legal rights (voting rights) in the company, 
which leads to negative effects on ‘shareholders` rights and their long-term 
interest’.488 This group highlights that economic ownership which is granted by cash-
settled derivatives can be converted into voting rights, which is also known as 
‘morphable voting rights’ in the literature.489 Therefore, hidden ownership can be 
described as a mixture of unrevealed economic rights and ‘probable informal voting 
powers’.490  
 
Moreover, these complex financial tools may also lead to the problem of 
‘empty voting’ for listed companies. According to the European Corporate 
Governance Forum, empty voting is defined as the use of the voting right by one of 
the shareholders without any bearing on the results of the decision.491 It refers to 
someone, who uses the voting rights in the company but who is not subject to the 
positive or negative results of the decision.492 Empty voting may have some negative 
effects on the other investors or even on the company. In the literature, a great deal of 
cases can be seen regarding the harsh consequences of empty voting practices, such as 
the Perry/Mylan case in the US493 or the Laxey Partners case in the UK494; therefore, 
it should be settled in the EU.   Additionally, these complex financial tools may be 
given as one of the main reasons for Lehman Brothers in the US and the 2008 
economic crisis in the EU.495  Therefore, in order to prevent hidden ownership, empty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Ibid, p.5 and European Commission (n 448), p.23 
489 Credit Agricole Group, `Corporate Governance`, [2010] CGRE, p.5 
490 Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, `Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, 
Implications, and Reforms`, (2006) 61BL pp. 1011-1070, at p.3  
491 European Corporate Governance Forum, `Statement of the European Corporate Governance Forum 
on Empty Voting and Transparency of Shareholder Positions`, [2010], 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf_empty_voting_en.pdf, accessed 
01/07/2014, at p.1 
492 Fabrica Demarigny and Christophe Clerc (n 479), executive summary of possible improvements, 
p.13 
493 For details see Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, (2006) 61 The Business Lawyer 3 pp.1011-1070, 
p.1015	  
494 For details see Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, (2006) 79 Southern California Law Review 4 pp.811-908, p.834  
495 For details see 2.2 above 
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voting and their negative effects in financial markets, requiring a minimum 
notification threshold for the unregulated financial tools would also be useful. 
 
To sum up, it is argued that the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) played 
a key role in creating a high level of transparency in EU legislative framework. It 
enhanced the disclosure of periodic information and hence, increased the effective 
flow of information throughout the EU financial markets. However, due to its old 
structure, it was unable to keep pace with the changing needs of financial markets. 
Thus, on the grounds of the abovementioned shortcomings, some further reforms 
were needed in EU transparency laws. In this respect, a reform was proposed in 2011 
by the Commission to update and enhance the rules of the existing Directive. These 
amendments were adopted by the European Council and Parliament on 12 June 
2013.496 In the following part, the revised Transparency Directive will be analysed 
and evaluated. 
3.2.2.2 The Amended Transparency Directive 2013/50/EU as Compared to the 
Original Directive 2004/109/EC 	   According to Article 33 of the original Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC), the Commission published a report in 2010 with regard to the 
operation of the directive in terms of the areas that need to be improved.497  In this 
report, the main shortcomings and the emerging issues were determined and the 
essentiality of the modification of the Transparency Directive was highlighted.498 
Consequently, on 25 October 2011, the European Commission proposed a reform in 
order to improve the effectiveness and the clarity of the existing Transparency 
Directive and these modifications were adopted by the European Council and 
Parliament on 12 June 2013.499 In this part, the main requirements of the revised 
Transparency Directive will be examined in terms of the disclosure of periodic 
information, the notification of major shareholdings, the dissemination and the 
storage of the regulated information and the supervision by comparing it with the old 
requirements.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 European Parliament (n 470) and Melih Sonmez, (n 470), p.142  
497 Directive (2004/109/EC), Article 33, and European Parliament (n 470)  
498 European Commission, ‘Report From the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, COM 
(2010), 243 Final  
499 European Parliament (n 470) 
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3.2.3	  The	  Disclosure	  of	  Periodic	  Information	  
Periodic information consists of the annual report, half-yearly report, quarterly 
financial report or interim management statement. Periodic information may be 
highlighted as the anchor of information transparency in financial markets, because 
the information users may only access the essential key information regarding the 
listed companies with these financial reports. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 1, 
the key information on the decision-making progress of the investors, such as the 
summary of historical results, the key non-financial statistics, forward-looking 
information and management discussion and analysis are made available to the public 
via the periodic information. Therefore, in creating the effective transparency 
requirements, the disclosure of periodic information should be comprehensively 
considered in terms of the contents, terminology and deadlines by keeping pace with 
innovations in the legislative frameworks. In this respect, it is claimed that, to some 
extent, the Transparency Directive managed to improve the requirements of regular 
reporting in the EU.  
 
In the previous directive, the disclosure of periodic information was adopted 
under Articles 4 to 6. According to these Articles, the annual financial reports, the 
half-yearly financial reports and the preparation of the quarterly financial reports or 
interim management statements were covered respectively and the compulsory 
information to be published in these reports was highlighted.500 The deadline for 
publishing this periodic information was determined as follows: 
 
• Annual financial reports have to be completed within four months of the end of 
the financial year and audited financial statements; a management report and a 
responsibility statement should be covered in it.501 
 
• Half-yearly financial reports have to be published within two months of the end of 
the half year and a condensed set of the financial statements which are prepared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Directive (2004/109/EC), Article 4-5-6 
501 Directive (2004/109/EC), Article 4-(1)(2), Annual Financial Reports, pp.7-8  
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consistent with IFRS, an interim management report and responsibility statements 
should be included in the half-yearly reports.502  
 
• Quarterly financial reports and interim management statements should be 
prepared in both the first six-month period and the second six-month period of the 
financial year and they have to be published between ten weeks after the 
beginning and six weeks before the abovementioned six-month periods.503 
 
Amendments: 
However, with the revised Directive 2013/50/EU, the requirements for the 
disclosure of periodic information were modified. The first major step was the 
abolishment of the mandatory requirement for quarterly financial reports.504 The 
issuer is no longer required to prepare and publish quarterly financial reports or 
interim management statements.  
 
Secondly, the deadline to publish half yearly reports was also revised. As a 
result of the revised Directive, the issuer shall publish the half yearly reports as soon 
as possible after the end of the six-month period, until the latest three-month 
period.505 In other words, the half yearly reports shall be published between 1st of July 
and 1st of October. Additionally, annual reports and half yearly reports shall remain 
available to the public for at least ten years.506 Hence, it seems that one of the main 
problems for SMEs was solved with these modifications in the revised directive. 
 
Thirdly, the preparation of annual reports in a single electronic format was 
also modified in the revised Directive. This requirement will become mandatory with 
effect from 1st of January 2020 after the cost-benefit analysis of the electronic format 
is undertaken by ESMA. Additionally, ESMA shall develop ‘draft regulatory 
standards’ for the electronic reporting format by referencing the current technological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 ibid, Article 5-(1)(2), Half-yearly Financial Reports, p.8 
503 ibid, Article 6-(1)(2), Interim Management Statements, p.9 
504 European Parliament, (n 470) 
505 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 5 
506 ibid, Article 4-5 
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innovations, such as ‘Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBLR)’ in the 
financial market.507  
3.2.4	  The	  Notification	  of	  Major	  Shareholdings	  
Requiring information about the ownership structure of the company is 
accepted as a fundamental right of investors in the market and provides many 
advantages, such as increasing market efficiency, reducing agency cost and making 
necessary information available to the public to estimate the value of company shares 
and the financial position of the company.508 Therefore, in order to strengthen cross-
border operations and to increase the level of transparency, a single and lower initial 
threshold regime would be beneficial for both investors and issuers. 
 
However, as mentioned before, there were some problems with regard to the 
information about major holdings in the original Directive (2004/109/EC). This 
requirement was addressed under Article 9, and according to that Article, any voting 
right that is held by the shareholder as a result of the acquisition or disposal where 
that proportion reaches, exceeds, or falls below the thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%’ should be made available to the public.509 Thus, the 
initial threshold for the notification of major shareholdings was determined as 5%; 
however, the problem is that this Article did not provide a single regime in EU 
financial markets. Hence, due to this legal loophole in the original Directive, some 
Member States, i.e. Germany and the UK, preferred to impose a lower initial 
threshold (3%), which caused confusion between the Member States (gold-plating).510  
 
Secondly, due to the extensive use of the new, complex and unregulated 
financial tools, the notification of major shareholdings was negatively affected as 
well. In the original Transparency Directive, these new financial tools were not 
adopted as the traditional financial instruments with the same economic impact in the 
financial markets and so the disclosure requirements were not applied for those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Directive 2013/50/EU, paragraph 21 and Article 4 
508 Michael C. Schouten and Mathias M. Siems, `The Evolution of Ownership Disclosure Rules Across 
Countries`, (2010) 10 JCLS pp.451-483 Part 2, at p.452   
509 Directive (2004/109/EC), Article 9 
510 Holger Fleischer and Klaus Ulrich Schmolke (n 484), p.126 and Fabrica Demarigny and Christophe 
Clerc (n 478), p.97 
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financial tools. However, it was an important problem that needed to be considered 
because it led to the lack of transparency in EU financial markets.  
 
Amendments: 
 These above-mentioned problems regarding the notification of major 
shareholdings were realised by the EU and some radical modifications have been 
made so far in the revised Transparency Directive to increase clarity throughout the 
EU, to facilitate the cross-border investments, to increase the level of transparency 
and to reduce the additional costs in the EU financial markets.511     
    
In terms of creating a uniform regime regarding the calculation of the initial 
threshold, the Parliament and the Council proposed a single information notification 
for major shareholdings and highlighted that ‘Member States should therefore not be 
allowed to adopt more stringent rules than those provided in Directive 
2004/109/EC’.512 On the other hand, the Parliament did not change Article 9 of the 
Directive, and considering the differences throughout the EU, left room for some of 
the Member States to implement different or singular initial thresholds for the 
notification of major shareholdings.513 In other words, due to the differences in 
ownership concentration or the number of shares and the number of voting rights for 
some issuers, the Member States may still imply stricter rules than those adopted in 
Directive 2004/109/EC in terms of notification of major shareholdings. From this 
point of view, it seems that ‘the gold plating’ is still a problematic issue for the EU. 
 
A major step forward in the revised Directive may be observed in the 
modification of adopting the new financial tools in financial markets. According to 
Article 13 of Directive 2013/50/EU; ‘transferable securities, options, futures, swaps, 
forward rate agreements, contracts for differences and any other financial instruments 
that have a similar economic impact in the financial markets shall also be considered 
to be financial instruments.514  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Melih Sonmez (n 470), p.143  
512 European Parliament (n 470), paragraph 10 
513 ibid, paragraph (10) and Melih Sonmez (n 470), p.143 
514 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 13-(1b)  
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This amendment may be underlined as the most important modification to the 
Transparency Directive because these abovementioned unregulated financial 
instruments negatively affected the level of transparency in financial markets and also 
played a key role in the 2008-banking crisis. Additionally, the absence of this 
requirement increased the problem of ‘hidden ownership and empty voting’ for listed 
companies. Hence, with this modification, a high level of information transparency 
and more investor protection may be expected in EU financial markets.   
 
3.2.5	  The	  Dissemination	  and	  Storage	  of	  Regulated	  Information	  	  
The original Transparency Directive only required the Member States to 
ensure that the regulated information should be accessed rapidly, on a non-
discriminatory principle and freely by investors.515 However, it did not include any 
obligation about establishing a central storage mechanism at the EU. Hence, in order 
to keep up with the new market developments and provide a high level of 
transparency, it was suggested that a European central storage mechanism should be 
included on the agenda by the EU.   
The absence of a central access point for the storage of disclosed information 
may be seen as a burdensome shortcoming for the EU because without a European 
storage mechanism, investors or market participants have to examine twenty-eight 
different national databases to understand the real performance of listed companies in 
the EU. 
Amendments: 
So as to solve this problem, the Commission demanded that ESMA prepares 
‘draft regulatory technical standards’ for a central storage mechanism in the EU.516 
Additionally, with the revised Directive, Article 21 of the former Directive was 
amended as follows: According to amended Article 21 of Directive 2013/50/EU, ‘a 
central European electronic access point’ shall be established and its development and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 Directive (2004/109/EC) Article 21 and the Financial Services Authority, `Implementing of 
Transparency Directive: Investment Entities Listing Review`, [London 2006] Consultation Paper, at 
p.45   
516 European Parliament (n 470), paragraph 13 
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operation shall be carried out by ESMA until the 1st of January 2018.517  
In facilitating cross-border operations, increasing the reliability and the 
accessibility of the regulated information and helping investors’ decision-making 
progress, a central access point in the EU could play a significant role. It would give 
investors the chance to analyse and compare all financial reports throughout the EU. 
Hence, with these recent reforms, the EU financial markets will be more attractive to 
international investors.   
However, with the abolishment of quarterly financial reports, the frequency 
level of information transparency may be reduced in financial markets. Therefore, it 
seems to be essential to create an ad hoc notification section on the central access 
point in order to disclose very important information518 that may have an impact on 
the decision-making process of investors. Hence, more transparency and advanced 
information disclosure could be provided in financial markets. In this respect, it 
would be better to create this central electronic access point as soon as possible.     
3.2.6	  Supervision	  	   The	   supervision of listed companies by the competent authorities and the 
impositions of sanctions in the case of provisions of the Directive being breached is 
an important requirement of the Transparency Directive.519 However, in terms of 
supervisory landscape, powers/sanctioning, and enforcement regimes, there were 
some differences between Member States. Additionally, there was also an 
enforcement problem in implementing the requirements of Directive (2004/109/EC) 
in a timely manner due to the strict deadlines for the disclosure of periodic 
information. 	  	   	  
Therefore, the original directive was strengthened and improved with the new 
supervisory authorities (European Securities Authorities (ESAs)) in 2011.520 Hence, 
one of the problems regarding the supervision requirements was solved in the EU. 
However, due to the differences between the Member States, some problems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 21 
518 For details see 3.2.9 below 
519 European Commission (n 406), pp.21-22 
520 For details see 3.1 above 
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remained in the market, such as the need for technical guidance or a single 
supervision approach.  
  
In the light of these shortcomings, the Parliament and the Council accepted 
that the sanctioning powers of the competent authorities should be enhanced and a 
more uniform approach or criteria for the application of sanctions in the revised 
Directive should be created. As the main aim of these reforms, increasing the 
effectiveness of the provisions and providing the confidence between the market 
participants may be underlined.  
 
 Amendments: 
 With the revised Directive 2013/50/EU, the EU seems to have concentrated on 
increasing the sanctioning powers of the competent authorities. With this regards, 
Articles 24, 25, 28 and 29 were amended as follows in the revised Directive: 
 
According to Article 24, the competent authorities shall be granted with all-
essential investigation powers to carry out their functions in accordance with the 
national law. Furthermore, ways of exercising sanctioning powers (‘directly, in 
collaboration with other authorities, under their responsibility by delegation to such 
authorities and by application to the competent judicial authorities’) have also been 
determined and listed in Article 24.521  
  
Pursuant to Article 25, in dealing with the cross-border activities, the 
competent authorities shall ensure the expected results of the appropriate fines and 
punishments by coordinating with their colleagues in the EU financial markets.522   
  
Article 28 covers administrative measures and sanctions. This Article gives a 
chance to the Member States to determine effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal sanctions and to take all necessary measures to impose them in the case of 
national provisions being breached. In other words, Article 28 creates the minimum 
standards for the Member States. Moreover, this Article allows administrative 
measures and sanctions, considering the differences between the natural and legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 24 (4a-4b) 
522 ibid, Article 25 (2) 
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person. For example, in case of breaches, the competent authorities may impose at 
least the following administrative measures and sanctions:523 
 
For the legal entity: 
a) Up to EUR 10 000 000 or up to 5 % of the total annual turnover 
b) According to the last available accounts approved by the 
management body; where the legal entity is a parent 
undertaking or a subsidiary of a parent undertaking which has 
to prepare consolidated financial accounts according to 
Directive 83/349/EEC, the relevant total turnover shall be the 
total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income 
according to the relevant accounting Directives according to 
the last available consolidated account approved by the 
management body of the ultimate parent undertaking ; or 
c) Up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided 
because of the breach, where those can be determined; 
whichever is higher; 
 
For the natural person: 
a) Up to EUR 2 000 000; or 
b) Up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided 
because of the breach, where those can be determined; 
whichever is higher. 
Article 29 deals with the publication of decisions on the sanctions and 
measures. According to this Article, the competent authorities shall make any 
decisions on sanctions and measures that are imposed for a breach of this Directive 
available to the public without any delay by clearly identifying the type and the nature 
of the breach and also identify those responsible.524 However, Article 29 also provides 
some exemptions from this requirement in the following circumstances: a) In the case 
of a sanction that is imposed on a natural person; if the publication of data is evaluated 
as disproportionate by an obligatory prior assessment; b) if the publication has a 
negative impact either on the financial markets, or on the on-going investigation; c) if 
the publication leads to disproportionate negative impact or causes serious damage to 
the institutions or the natural persons, the competent authorities may delay the 
publication.525 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 ibid, Article 28 (a-b) 
524 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 29 (1) 
525 Ibid, Article 29 (1a, 1b, 1c) 
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Finally, in the original Directive 2004/109/EC, due to the inadequate 
regulations of the home/host Member State principles, there were some difficulties in 
recognising ‘the relevant supervisor for each issuer’ in the EU.526  In the revised 
Directive 2013/50/EU, this problem was considered and solved within the amended 
Article 2 as follows: According to the new Article 2, the issuers have to choose their 
home Member States within three months to indicate the relevant competent 
authorities. If the issuers have not disclosed their choice within the determined time 
period, then the home Member State is accepted where the issuers’ securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market. However, if the securities are admitted to 
trading in more than one Member States, all those Member States are accepted as a 
home Member States, until the issuer discloses its’ single home Member State.527 
Hence, the relevant supervisors will be clear and the issuer will no longer avoid being 
monitored by the competent authorities.    
     
3.2.7	  Analysis	  and	  Discussion	  	  	   The results of this investigation show that the Transparency Directive is the 
anchor for transparency requirements in EU legislative framework. It was enacted in 
2004 and revised and updated with Directive 2013/50/EU on 12 June 2013 by the 
European Parliament and the Council.  
  
The original Directive 2004/109/EC covered a significant number of issues to 
enhance transparency in EU financial market, such as disclosing of the content and 
language formats of information, dissemination of this information throughout the 
Community, storage of information by the official appointed authorities, 
responsibilities of issuers with regard to published information, supervision of listed 
companies by the competent and supervisory authorities, and penalties for breaching 
the requirements of the Directive.528 However, due to the rapidly changing structure 
of the financial markets, today’s very effective transparency rules may be ineffective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 Fabrica Demarigny and Christophe Clerc (n 479), executive summary and possible improvements, 
p.16 
527 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 2  
528 Commission of the European Communities, `Report on More Stringent National Measures 
Concerning Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in relation to 
Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market`, 
[Brussels 2008] Commission Staff Working Document, at p.17 
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in the future. Therefore, policymakers should always consider the main condition of 
having successful transparency laws: ‘Transparency is a journey, not a destination’. 
  
Directive 2004/109/EC was accepted as a ‘stable text’ in the literature.529 
Since the regulation of the Transparency Directive, not many outstanding changes 
were carried out in it; however, the original directive was not perfect.  
 
In this chapter, the main shortcomings of Directive 2004/109/EC have been 
examined and can be summarised as follows: (i) The strict deadlines for the periodic 
information, unnecessary mandatory requirements for quarterly financial reports and 
hence, ‘the invisibility problem of SMEs’; (ii) the different implementations in 
imposing the information notification of major shareholdings, the out-of-date 
requirements for innovations in the financial markets and thus, ‘the problem of gold 
plating, hidden ownership and empty voting’; (iii) the absence of a central access 
point in the EU; and (iv) the lack of rules on supervision, such as complexities in 
understanding the competent authorities. Therefore, due to these deficiencies, it was 
time to make some radical changes and reforms in the original Transparency 
Directive to enhance the effective flow of information throughout the EU. 
  
With the revised Directive 2013/50/EU, the EU managed to solve most of the 
above-mentioned problems with the new requirements. The most significant 
innovations in the revised Directive can be listed as follows: (i) The abolishment of 
the mandatory requirement of quarterly financial reports; (ii) extended deadlines for 
the periodic information; (iii) adopting, defining and accepting the new financial tools 
as the existing financial instruments in financial markets; (iv) the confirmation of 
creating a central access point until 2018 by preparing the draft technical standards in 
the EU; and (v) increasing the sanctioning powers of the competent authorities by 
confirming a uniform approach between the Member States.   
 
However, some issues remained problematic in the EU. For example, firstly, 
the revised Directive did not change the different implementation problem of the 
initial threshold for the notification of major shareholdings. Although the initial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529 European Commission (n 406), p.24 
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threshold was determined as 5% in the Transparency Directive, the Commission left 
some room for the Member States to implement individual national thresholds for the 
notification of major shareholdings due to the differences in ownership 
concentration.530  It was a problematic issue in the original directive because a vast 
majority of financial analysts in the Mazars Report claimed to be negatively affected 
due to the imposing of lower initial thresholds in some Member States (such as 
Germany, the UK and France).531 Therefore, it would be useful to adopt a uniform 
regime for the notification of major shareholdings or to reduce the initial threshold to 
3% from 5% to increase the level of transparency and prevent ‘gold plating’ in the 
market. 
 
Secondly, with the revised directive, quarterly financial reports were abolished 
and the deadlines for the existing periodic information were extended. These 
innovations play a key role in the financial markets, in particular, for SMEs. 
However, it may be argued that such innovations could also have a negative impact 
on the level of transparency because due to the extended deadlines and the 
abolishment of quarterly financial reports, the frequency of financial reporting may be 
reduced. In the rapidly changing financial markets, the low-level frequency of 
financial reporting may lead to information asymmetries and to an increase in ‘the 
devil side’ of corporations. Therefore, the requirement for immediate information 
may play a key role in effective transparency laws. However, there are some other 
elements of EU Laws in the market, such as the Market Abuse Directive. The main 
aim of the Market Abuse Directive is to reduce the disadvantages that investors may 
directly or indirectly face in financial markets due to lack of information. For 
example, Article 6 of the Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC could play a key role in 
the decision-making process of investors by requiring essential information from 
issuers. Therefore, it could be claimed that the frequency level of information 
transparency has been protected by other elements of EU laws in the market.   
 
In this respect, the creation of a central access point for EU financial markets 
could help to solve these problems in the EU. A single EU access regime for financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 9, and Melih Sonmez (n 470), p.143 
531 Fabrica Demarigny and Christophe Clerc (n 479), executive summary of possible improvements, 
p.9 
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information would be quite useful for information users in many respects. Firstly, it 
would facilitate and accelerate the accessibility of data; secondly, it would provide a 
wide perspective to examine and evaluate all listed companies in the markets, which 
would also help the decision-making process of the investors; and thirdly, this single 
access point would be used as an ‘adhoc notification’ for immediate changes in listed 
companies. Hence, some important information, such as bankruptcy, merger, and new 
investments of companies would be immediately disclosed to the public at EU level.  
 
Finally, there are a great number of multinational companies in the EU. In 
globally connected financial markets, it has become very easy to have many 
subsidiaries or establishments in different parts of the world. However, it seems that 
the EU Transparency Directive only deals with the issues of EU financial markets; it 
does not cover same transparency requirements outside of the EU. Only Article 6 of 
the revised Directive 2013/50/EU requires issuers that are just active in the logging 
and the extractive sectors to include a report on the payments made to governments in 
their the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements or related 
reports.532 In the increasingly global financial markets, this shortcoming may have a 
negative impact on the level of transparency, because companies may take advantage 
of the in-transplant countries by increasing their investments in such countries, which 
may trigger the devil side of corporations. In this respect, the same transparency 
requirements may be adopted for the subsidiaries of multinational corporations that 
trade outside of the EU financial markets.   
 
To sum up, with the recent reforms, it seems that the transparency level of the 
European financial market has increased and more effective rules have been provided. 
On the other hand, some further modifications seem necessary. The creation of a 
single access point with a direct link in the EU, for example, would provide a major 
step forward in creating a transparent legislative framework in the EU financial 
markets. Therefore, it would be better to increase the adoption process of the new 
reforms and to decrease the bureaucratic barriers in the EU. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 6 
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3.2.8	  Minimum	  or	  Maximum	  Harmonisation	  of	  the	  Transparency	  Directive	  	  	  
EU Directives play an important role in enhancing securities and corporate 
law in EU legislative framework. They are accepted as ‘the actual laws of the EU’.533 
Thus, the directives may be seen as a binding body of rules in terms of determining 
the minimum or the maximum standards, which represent the structure of the EU 
institutional system; yet, they also leave some room for options to the Member States 
by considering the differences between the states.534 
The Transparency Directive requires the minimum harmonisation of 
obligations from the Member States.535 However, with the recent developments in the 
FSAP, the Lamfalussy Process and the latest modification on the other elements of 
EU Directives, the EU seems to have changed its attitude in favour of the full 
(maximum) harmonisation of the EU requirements.536 
It may be useful to understand which approach, minimum or maximum, would 
be worthwhile for EU directives. A considerable amount of literature has been 
published on this issue in the literature; however, there is no consensus among the 
scholars regarding this problem. 537  In this part, the minimum and maximum 
harmonisation approaches towards EU Directives will be evaluated. 
One question that needs to be asked, however, is what are the pros and cons of 
the maximum harmonisation of the Transparency Directive? The EU consists of 
twenty-eight Member States. This means that due to the differences in cultural or 
economic preferences, it may not be easy to adopt a uniform regime throughout the 
EU. Additionally, due to these differences, EU policy-makers may not be as good as 
the national authorities in dealing with the problems of the internal markets and 
businesses.538 In this respect, in the light of these cultural, economic or other social 
differences, the minimum harmonisation approach, which provides greater flexibility 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 Allen R. Bailey and Melinda C. Bailey, EU Directive Handbook: Understanding the European 
Union Compliance Process and What It Means To You, (St. Lucie Press, Danvers, 1997), p. 27  
534 Pierre-Maria Boury (n 354), p.184 
535  European Commission, `Operation of Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of 
Transparency Requirements in relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to 
Trading on a Regulated Market`, [Brussels 2010] 243 Final, at p.5 
536 Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, ‘United in Diversity: Maximum versus Minimum Harmonisation in EU 
Securities’, (2012), 7 Capital Market Law Journal 3, pp.317-342, p.323   
537 Luca Enriques and Matteo Gatti (n 341) or John Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EU 
Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 58 CLP 369 
538  Carsten Gerner-Beuerle (n 536), p.320 
Improving	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  in	  EU	  Company	  and	  Securities	  Law	  
	   165	  
for those differences, may be more appropriate in EU legislative framework.539 
However, the minimum harmonisation approach of the Transparency Directive leads 
to allowing Member States to impose stricter national rules on their legislations. This 
different implementation of the requirements of the Transparency Directive is known 
as ‘gold-plating’ in the literature.540 Gold plating is a problematic issue in the 
minimum harmonisation approach of the Transparency Directive because it leads to 
certain problems in the market, in particular concerning cross-border activities, and 
negatively affects the transposition of the requirements of the Directive into national 
rules.    
Holger Fleischer and Klaus Ulrich Schmolke evaluate the advantages and 
drawbacks of the full harmonisation of the Transparency Directive in their article by 
considering the maximum harmonisation of the ownership disclosure. They indicate 
that the minimum harmonisation characteristic of the Transparency Directive has 
been changed, as has the maximum harmonisation approach, with the current 
modernisation efforts in the EU.541 According to them, the maximum harmonisation 
of the Transparency Directive provides for the prevention of legal fragmentation 
between the Member States, which would lead to an increase in operating costs, in 
particular for a supplier of goods. In other words, it helps to reduce the legal costs on 
the supply side. In addition to this, the full harmonisation approach reduces the cost of 
information and increases the confidence of market participants. 542  Hence, the 
maximum harmonisation of the Transparency Directive may provide significant cost 
advantages for market participants.  
 
However, the full harmonisation approach also has some negative effects on 
the market. For instance; it decreases the competition in the regulatory systems of the 
Member States at EU level; secondly, maximum harmonisation may increase the 
complexity in implementing the directive rules into the national legal systems and 
thirdly, it can reduce the flexibility in the legal systems.543 Therefore, before adopting 
the full harmonisation approach towards every single requirement of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539  ibid 
540 Commission of the European Communities (n 345), p.5, see also Holger Fleisher and Klaus Ulrich 
Schmolke (n 484) 
541 Holger Fleisher and Klaus Ulrich Schmolke (n 484), p.123 
542 ibid, pp.134-135 
543 ibid, p.135  
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Transparency Directive, it may be more useful to evaluate the precise costs and 
benefits of maximum harmonisation. 
 
In fact, it would be better to examine whether or not it is necessary to fully 
harmonise all obligations of the Transparency Directive. There are some key 
obligations in the Directive, which could be more useful in providing efficiency and 
increasing the level of transparency in the market, if they can be fully harmonised at 
EU level, such as initial threshold of major shareholdings, disclosing of periodic 
information of listed companies or implementing effective and proportionate 
sanctions in the case of any requirements of the Directive being breached. For 
instance, as explained above, full harmonisation of ownership disclosure may provide 
an important cost reduction for institutional investors; increase reliability of 
information for all market participants, which would help to enhance market 
confidence; facilitate overcoming legal fragmentation between Member States; 
provide more flexibility for policy-makers in this area than even the minimum 
harmonisation approach of the Directive; and have a negative impact on the 
regulatory systemic competition.544 
To sum up, full harmonisation through the Transparency Directive could be 
useful to prevent imposing stricter rules and implementing different legal rules into 
national legal systems. Additionally, it would provide a significant cost reduction for 
market participants. However, the drawbacks of the maximum harmonisation 
approach should not be ignored because the benefits of the full harmonisation 
approach cannot be at the same level for all provisions of the Transparency Directive. 
Therefore, some obligations could be more effective using the minimum 
harmonisation approach and some of them might be better using the maximum 
harmonisation approach. Furthermore, it is impossible to regulate ‘one-size fits all 
rules’ in the market because of national differences or rapidly changing needs.545 
Hence, before adopting the maximum harmonisation approach for all requirements in 
the Directive, making a cost/benefit analysis of full harmonisation characteristics of 
every single requirement on a case by case basis may provide more effective, 
consistent and comprehensive rules in the market. 	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545 Carsten Gerner-Beuerle (n 536), p.4 
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3.2.9	  The	  Relationships	  between	  the	  Transparency	  Directive	  and	  Other	  Directives	  
The Transparency Directive is the key to transparency requirements in the EU 
company and securities law.  However, it is not only the Transparency Directive that 
addresses this topic in the EU. In this part, other elements of EU law that have a 
positive effect on transparency requirements will be outlined, without addressing all 
of their details.  
The Prospectus Directive has an impact on transparency requirements in the 
EU. Directive (2003/71/EC) was enacted in 2003. However, it was amended as 
Directive (2010/73/EU) in 2010 and implemented by Member States by 1 July 
2012.546 It may play a key role in general in transparency requirements because it 
adopts the initial disclosure requirements, such as material information with regard to 
the securities of listed companies. The prospectus contains all information with regard 
to assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, issuers and guarantors, 
and the rights that are attached to the securities of listed companies.547 In this respect, 
it addresses the general information regarding the securities of listed companies in 
financial markets, which enables investors to make a detailed, informed assessment in 
their decision-making process.  
The prospectus is published when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading in financial markets. However, before publication, it requires 
approval from the competent authority of the home Member State.548 Hence, when the 
prospectus has been approved, it is stored by the competent authority and disclosed to 
the ESMA. The prospectus should be published, in accordance with the requirements 
of the directive, in a newspaper or on the issuer’s website or on financial markets’ 
website or on the website of the competent authorities.549   
Secondly, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) also helps to improve 
transparency requirements in the EU. The MAD is accepted as a guarantor for 
investor protection in financial markets. It mainly aims to combat market abuse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546 European Commission, The EU Single Market: the Prospectus Directive, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/prospectus/index_en.htm, accessed at 10/06/2014 
547 The Amended Directive (2010/73/EU), Article 5 
548 Europa, ‘Prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading’, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_tran
sactions_in_securities/l24033c_en.htm, accessed at 11/06/2014 
549 ibid 
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issues, such as insider dealing, market manipulation and to some extent, money 
laundering.550 This is important because in creating a genuine financial market, it 
seems to be essential to provide the public confidence before anything else. However, 
market abuse issues may distort confidence in the markets, which will also negatively 
affect integrity.551 Therefore, the MAD is crucial for the smooth functioning of the 
EU financial markets. Directive 2003/6/EC entered into force in 2003 and some of the 
requirements in terms of the powers of the supervisory authorities were amended in 
2010 within Directive 2010/78/EU, which had to be imposed by the Member States 
by 31 December 2011.552  
However, rapidly changing trading techniques and technologies have 
increased the opportunities to manipulate these markets. In particular, due to the new 
trading platforms, such as ‘over the counter (OTC) trading and high frequency trading 
(HFT)’, the original Market Abuse Directive (MAD) has failed to keep pace with the 
recent market abuse issues in cross-border activities. Therefore, in order to combat 
market abuse in a more effective manner, the EP agreed to replace the MAD with a 
Regulation on Market Abuse (MAR) in the EU.553 The MAR will be adopted after a 
final political agreement on the Markets in the Financial Instruments Directive II 
(MIFID II) because the MAR is based on a regulatory framework, which is 
constituted from the new MIFID rules.554 MIFID (2004/39EC) aims to provide greater 
competition and investor protection for investment services. It addresses the ‘home 
state’ principles by providing the MIFID passport to firms in which they can provide 
services to their investors in other EU Member States.555 In addition, it provides new 
trading platforms and facilities, such as multilateral trading facilities and organised 
trading facilities to make financial markets more attractive for a great number of 
investors by simplifying trading between the markets.556 However, on the one hand, 
this expansion of trade between financial markets has provided an opportunity for 
increased market abuse by causing them to monitor the accumulative financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Europa, ‘Market Abuse’, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_tran
sactions_in_securities/l24035_en.htm, accessed at 11/06/2014 
551  The Market Abuse Directive, 2003/6/EC 
552  Europa (n 550) and Directive 2010/78/EU 
553  Europa, European Parliament’s endorsement of the political agreement on Market Abuse 
Regulation, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-774_en.htm, accessed at 11/01/2014  
554 ibid 
555  ibid and MIFID 2004/39/EC, paragraph 1  
556  Europa (n 550) 
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markets. On the other hand, due to these new trading facilities, the existing rules have 
become out-dated, as happened in the original Transparency Directive. Hence, in 
order to deal with these problems, the MAD will be replaced by the MAR in 2015.557   
The Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC prevents the disadvantages that 
investors may directly or indirectly face in the financial markets due to; information, 
which is not available to all in the market; false and misleading information; and the 
incorrect price-setting mechanism that is distorted by others with some financial 
instruments.558 Its purpose is to constitute equal conditions for all investors in 
financial markets. To this aim, the above-mentioned potential crimes that would have 
a negative impact on the maxim of equity have been defined and the Member States 
have been forced to impose effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions within 
Directive 2003/6/EC. 559 Therefore, this directive plays an important role in 
strengthening the enforcement mechanism in EU transparency laws.     
Finally, the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU may be highlighted as yet 
another key element of the effective transparency rules in the EU. The Directive aims 
to require the disclosure of periodic information by facilitating the accounting rules 
for listed companies to improve the clarity and the comprehensiveness of their 
financial statements in regulated markets. Like other directives of the EU, the 
Accounting Directive has also been revised and amended during the modernisation 
history of the EU legislative framework.  
In the history of harmonisation of the accounting directives, the Fourth 
(78/660/EEC) and the Seventh (83/349/EEC) Directives were the initial directives for 
accounting regulations in the EU. Then, the Accounting Directives were improved 
with the Eighth Directive (2006/43/EC) in response to current financial scandals in 
the market at that time, such as Enron.560 Then, the Accounting Directives were 
reviewed and replaced with Directive 2013/34/EU by the EP and the Council in 2013.  
With the new Directive (2013/34/EU), the EU aims to reduce the 
administrative burden for SMEs and to improve disclosure standards and the quality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557  ibid, and IST EIN, Market Abuse Regulation: The Council confirms agreement on with EP, 
http://www.istein.org/dnews/item/14527-market-abuse-regulation.html, accessed at 11/01/2014  
558  Europa (n 550) 
559 Directive 2003/6/EC, Article 1-14 
560 The Eighth Accounting Directive (2006/43/EC) 
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of financial statements.561 As the main modification, the clear distinctions between 
small and large companies may be highlighted. In other words, Directive 2013/34/EU 
defines and indicates certain standards for small companies by categorising the 
undertakings in financial markets.562 Additionally, it adopts the mandatory disclosure 
requirements by considering the size of companies. For example, small companies 
shall only regulate the balance sheet; a profit and loss account; and the notes to the 
financial statements that satisfy the regulatory requirements.563 Furthermore, it also 
settles the disclosure of non-financial information.  
These modifications are important because, as seen in the Transparency 
Directive, SMEs had some problems due to the unnecessary and disproportionate 
administrative burdens in financial markets. However, SMEs may play a key role in 
terms of job creation and the sustainability of economies. From this point of view, the 
advantages of SMEs were realised by the EU and the principle of the ‘Think Small 
First’ was adopted.564 Hence, in order to put into effect the ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’, 
the EU understood the central role of SMEs and took major steps forward to reduce 
the administrative burdens with the revised and amended Directive 2013/34/EU.565     
The relationship between EU Directives may also be evaluated from another 
perspective. For example, it may be thought that the Transparency Directive did not 
add any entirely new topics. It did not go beyond the former requirements and just 
covered areas, which the Member States had already adopted anyway. In this respect, 
EU Directives are harshly criticised in the literature.566 Additionally, the positive 
impact of EU Directives has recently been challenged by some scholars, such as Luca 
Enriques. For example, according to him, EU company law directives have no or very 
little impact on the EU legislative framework.567 He divides his argument into four 
segments: First, the key company law areas, such as ‘fiduciary duties or shareholder 
remedies’ were absent in EU corporate law directives: Second, the existing rules in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 European Commission, Financial Reporting Obligations for Limited Liabilities Companies 
(Accounting Directive)- Frequently Asked Questions, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
540_en.htm, accessed 11/06/2014  
562 Directive (2013/34/EU), Article 3 
563 ibid, Article 4 
564 Directive 2013/34/EU, subparagraph 1 
565 ibid, subparagraph 2 
566 Luca Enriques, `EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They? ` (2006) 
University of Pennsylvania, 27 Journal of International Economic Law 1, pp. 1-78, p.6 
567 ibid, p.2   
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directives are insufficient for problem-solving: Third, due to the irregular 
interventionist approach of the European Court of Justice, Member States tend to 
implement requirements differently in their national framework: Fourth, directives 
just copy each other and include the same rules.       
 
Nevertheless, this argument can be challenged. In particular, with 
modifications to the above-mentioned Directives, the EU has clarified the issue by 
increasing clear terminology and reducing the complexities. Additionally, with the 
new supervisory authorities, such as ESMA, it has also provided more guidelines and 
a better enforcement mechanism. Hence, the EU has taken an important step forward 
to adopt the financial disclosure and transparency throughout the Member States.     
 
3.3.	  CHAPTER	  SUMMARY	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  
 
The findings of this chapter indicate that the EU made some significant efforts 
in modernisation activities of corporate governance between 1999 and 2013. These 
efforts are on going today. A number of reforms have been undertaken in both EU 
company and securities law to increase the level of transparency and to create an 
integrated European market.  
 
Modernisation activities were initiated within the securities law in the EU. The 
FSAP may be accepted as the leader in recent developments in the EU. As a 
programme for action, it helped to accelerate the average speed of the adoption 
process, to enhance the consultation approach between the market participants and to 
provide a quick response to unexpected events, such as financial crises and corporate 
scandals. The main contribution of the FSAP was to determine the essential 
obligations for future arrangements. After the FSAP, the new laws were enhanced 
with the Lamfalussy Process. It is worth noting that both can be considered as 
milestones of recent developments in the EU because both provided for further 
important framework steps towards the modernisation activities in securities law. The 
most significant novelties of the Lamfalussy Process were, firstly that, in order to 
determine the essential legislations in the EU, the current situation of the financial 
market at that time was examined and the harmonised structure of the EU was 
evaluated, and secondly, new four level policy-making procedures were created in the 
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EU. Thus, in addition to the essential requirements for future developments, the way 
in which they should be legalised was solved in the EU.     
 
With regard to the relationships between these activities and transparency in 
the market, first of all, market participants found a chance to make a contribution to 
the entire process before drafting a new legislation and secondly, the Transparency 
Directive was planned in the FSAP and adopted within the four levels of the 
Lamfalussy Process. Hence, as the beginning of the recent developments in the EU, 
their role in increasing the level of transparency should not be ignored.  
 
Furthermore, the efforts to enhance transparency and financial disclosure were 
maintained with measures of company law. Firstly, the HLG Report was prepared. 
Although it was just a recommendation for future developments of Europe, it played 
an important role in modernisation activities in the EU. It provided some key 
disclosure factors and determined the essential information for increasing disclosure 
requirements in the market. Moreover, these recommendations were recognised by 
the EU and, in response to the HLG Report, the Commission published its Action 
Plan on Modernisation of Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance. 
Hence, the theories of the HLG Report were converted into practice in the EC Action 
Plan.  
 
These efforts in the EU indicate that a number of reforms in both company 
and securities law have been made so far in order to increase the level of transparency 
in the market. Interestingly, a strong correlation may be observed between EU laws 
because step by step all of them helped to promote consistent, comprehensive and 
timely transparency rules. Above all, with the adoption of the Transparency Directive 
and other elements of EU laws, many essential disclosure requirements have been 
adopted.  
 
In particular, with the recent modifications to the existing EU directives, the 
main problems in the EU have been dealt with and the effective flow of information 
throughout the Member States has been strengthened. For example, with the post 
FSAP period, greater transparency and market consultation, a new structure for the 
supervisory authorities, more joined up securities market legislations with cost-benefit 
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analysis and lesser legislative interventions were determined as key policies in the 
EU. With the reforms of the Lamfalussy Process, a new European System of 
Financial Supervision, which reflects the recommendations of the De Larosiere 
Report, was created by the proposal of the EC and the policy-making levels of the 
process were modified. With the new Action Plan, the EC has determined and listed 
the future plans for the problematic areas of company law and corporate governance 
and has increased the competitiveness and sustainability of companies by enhancing 
transparency requirements, long-term shareholder engagement, and cross-border 
operations in the EU. Finally, with the revised Transparency Directive, the EU has 
managed to determine the minimum standards for the effective flow of information 
between information users and to rebuild the investor confidence throughout the EU.  
       
However, there are still a number of problematic issues that need to be 
considered. First, the question of whether there should be a minimum or maximum 
harmonisation approach to the Transparency Directive needs to be solved. This 
chapter has shown that due to the minimum harmonisation approach of the 
Transparency Directive, some problems still remain in the EU, such as gold plating. 
However, obligations at EU level or maximum harmonisation approach cannot 
provide perfect rules either. Additionally, cultural differences also play an important 
role. Therefore, it is not always possible to provide the same rule for every nation.  In 
this respect, some rules may be more useful as a secondary legislation and some of 
them may be more effective as a hard law. Hence, it would be better to think about 
these differences between nations and to evaluate the costs and benefits of every 
single requirement before adopting the fully harmonised or the minimum harmonised 
approach.  
 
Second, the EU has not yet established a central European Storage mechanism 
in the market. The US uses such a system in its market (EDGAR).568 In the rapidly 
changing world, such a system would facilitate accessing every kind of information 
easily regarding a company. In this respect, the EU has decided to create such a 
system for regulated information in the EU.569 Therefore, it would be better to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About EDGAR, 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm, accessed at 12/01/2014 
569 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 21 
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accelerate the preparation process for a central access point at EU level by 
determining the technical standards with the supervisory authorities.  
 
Third, due to the complex structure of the EU, the European Supervisory 
Authorities and the national competent authorities of the Member States should take 
more responsibility for providing better guidance for the adoption process of 
modifications to EU laws. In particular, for non-European investors and financial 
information users, the EU may manage to increase general clarity and understanding 
of the provisions of the directives.         
 
The findings of this chapter have demonstrated that it will never be possible to 
create a perfect rule for rapidly changing financial markets. Moreover, adopting such 
a system, which requires a high level of transparency from listed companies can be 
very complicated and entail a high level of guidance from supervisors. This is because 
it is a moving target and the importance of information can change during the period 
of progress or company-to-company or country-to-country. Therefore, new reforms or 
developments should ensure accuracy, speed and balance in disclosure obligations 
and should not add additional regulatory burdens to financial markets. Additionally, 
the availability of useful and attractive information, a good monitoring system and 
dissuasive sanctions should be clearly determined.  
 
The results of this research support the idea that it would be better to ensure a 
disclosure obligations system which is realistic, flexible, well documented, attractive, 
feasible, reliable, deterrent and regularly reviewed. With the new proposals and 
modifications, the EU seems to have solved many of these weaknesses in the financial 
market. Therefore, it would be better to increase the adoption process of such 
novelties in EU legislations.   
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4.	  INNOVATIONS	  FOR	  BETTER	  TRANSPARENCY	  AND	  
DISCLOSURE	  UNDER	  THE	  NEW	  TURKISH	  COMMERCIAL	  AND	  
CAPITAL	  MARKET	  LAW	  	  
INTRODUCTION	  	  
‘Investors in financial markets are best served when they 
can base their decisions on an analysis of data that are 
consistently and transparently presented and have a 
uniform definition of critical financial measures.’570 
 
  In the wake of recent economic crises and scandals, the new global economy 
has started to change its framework with the latest balances or conditions in 
accordance with international commerce standards. Therefore, for nations or 
companies, in particular in emerging or developing countries, the harmonisation of 
rules with global standards seems to be essential in order to survive in this highly 
competitive environment or at least to stand up to the negative impact of the ‘devil 
side’ of corporations. As the main players of the new international economy, corporate 
governance standards, especially, high-quality financial information and transparency 
requirements, which were discussed in Chapter 1, will be reviewed here.571  
 
   Turkey can be given as an example in order to understand the positive 
relationship between a strong legal environment and economic growth, although this 
matter has been subjected to lengthy debate in the literature. For example, during the 
Imar Bank Scandal in 2001, the Turkish economy experienced a considerable crisis. A 
disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey at that time led 
to a negative impact on the financial markets and triggered the crisis.572  After that, a 
great number of funds were withdrawn from the Turkish market; the financial flows 
suddenly stopped; the value of the currency fell; the domestic banks struggled to find 
liquidity and accepted loans with very high interest rates; most workers were laid off 
from their firms; the inflation rate reached 40%-50% and the overnight interest rate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Robert McNatt, A Case for Greater Disclosure, Transparency, And Uniformity in US Banks’ 
Financial Reporting, (2012) The McGraw-Hill Companies, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=124534605320
3, accessed at 18/03/2014   
571 For details see 1.1 above 
572 Simeon Hristov, ‘The Crisis in Turkey’, (2001) IFRAIS, http://www.iris-bg.org/files/Turkey.pdf, 
accessed at 19.03.2014, p.2 
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astronomically skyrocketed to 6200%.573 In addition, in order to recover the economy, 
Turkey applied for IMF credits by accepting extravagant interest rates. Hence, the 
Turkish economy was subjected to the worst economic turmoil in modern history.  
 
  However, after this disaster, Turkey managed to take some lessons from the 
crisis and between 2003 and 2013, an economic transformation process was initiated. 
Tighter rules and legislations were introduced by the regulatory authorities. With the 
political stability of the new government: the negotiations process with the EU was 
accelerated in 2005; the Turkish currency was strengthened; public expenditure 
improved; privatisation was increased; and so, confidence in the financial market 
recovered. Thus, Turkey was able to see an average 6% GDP growth rate during the 
period 2002-2012 and became ‘the 17th largest economy in the world with a GDP of 
about 800 billion dollars in 2012’.574  
 
  Turkey, as a developing country, understood the importance of a strong legal 
environment and efficient governance systems to survive in the modernisation race. 
For this purpose, it aimed to create an effective legislative framework in its financial 
market. The previous Turkish Commercial Code was enacted in 1956 and between 
1956 and 2011, numerous amendments were made to keep it up to date.  
 
  However, although several amendments were carried out to the previous code, 
it was unable to provide the expected modernisation activities and keep pace with the 
latest innovations in the global competitive market. Therefore, a new Turkish 
Commercial Code was prepared and came into force in 2012. The new law provided a 
modern approach by redefining the rules in business and commercial life, which could 
help raise Turkey to a competitive level in the global market in terms of transparency, 
accountability, and reliability. Most importantly, the new law harmonised most EU 
standards into its legislation; so, it aimed to remove an important obstacle to the 
accession of Turkey to the EU.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 Ercan Uygur, “Krizden Krize Türkiye: 2000 Kasım ve 2001 Subat Krizleri (Turkey from crisis to 
crisis: Crises of 2000 November and 2001 February-translated by myself)”, (Turkey Economy 
Institution, 2001) http://www.tek.org.tr/dosyalar/KRIZ-2000-20013.pdf, accessed at 13.03.2014, p.23 
574 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Outlook of Turkey, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/prospects-and-recent-developments-in-the-turkish-economy.en.mfa, accessed at 
19.03.2014 
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  In the new law, more rules regarding the corporate governance issues can be 
observed. Interestingly, these rules not only cover publicly listed companies, but also 
apply to SMEs in the Turkish market. The law aims to ensure investor confidence and 
sustainable development in the financial markets by offering substantial provisions in 
terms of good management, adequate transparency rules and effective audit practices. 
The new code consists of six chapters: ‘Commercial Business; Trading Companies; 
Commercial Documents; Transport Operation; Maritime Trade and Insurance Law’. 
In this chapter, in order to understand the transparency developments in the legislative 
framework, Commercial Business and Trading Companies will be examined and 
evaluated.   
 
  In the previous chapters, the positive effects of transparency laws in the 
corporate governance structures were examined and the elements which are essential 
for effective transparency laws in the financial markets were analysed by providing 
clear definitions and highlighting possible problems.575 In the light of this information, 
this chapter will be structured as follows:  
   
  Section 1 examines Turkey’s corporate governance structure. Section 2 
evaluates the New Commercial Act in terms of innovations in transparency 
requirements by analysing both securities and company law as mentioned in the third 
chapter. Section 3 provides an empirical research, showing to what extent Turkey 
managed to convert the theories into practice in the financial markets. Section 4 gives 
a summary of the chapter by investigating the strengths and the weaknesses of the new 
law and analysing the harmonisation level of EU rules with the new Code.  
 
4.1	  Overview	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Corporate	  Governance	  Structure	  
Recent changes and developments in the field of corporate governance in 
well-functioning financial markets have led to a renewed interest in Turkey. On the 
one hand, Turkish policy-makers have realised the advantages of an effective 
corporate governance structure in the sustainable market developments; on the other 
hand, deficiencies in the Turkish financial market, such as rareness of direct and 
indirect foreign investment, weak banking systems, high inflation rates and political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 For details see 1.1 and 2.1 above 
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uncertainties highlight the necessity of creating an effective corporate governance 
framework. Hence, the corporate governance argument has become an important 
subject, which needs to be strengthened in Turkish commercial legislation.     
 
  In this respect, a modernisation activity during the period between 2003 and 
2013 has been initiated in Turkey, devoted to strengthening the corporate governance 
framework in the financial market. So, international corporate governance standards 
were gained by the Turkish financial market, which help to analyse the relationship 
between institutional parameters and corporate governance. Secondly, the efforts to 
gain EU membership have provided many advantages for Turkey, such as a 
sustainable economic growth and reforms in almost all aspects of life. Thus, in order 
to understand both the positive and the negative impacts of these modernisation 
activities in the financial markets, Turkey can be taken into account as a need-to-
examine country.   	  
According to Ararat and Ugur, due to the corporate scandals and financial 
crises in the developed markets, emerging and developing countries have begun to 
improve their attractiveness in the international arena and emerged on investors’ 
radar.576 Therefore, it is argued that developing countries, including Turkey, have a 
golden opportunity to increase the investment flow to their financial markets by 
improving their corporate governance structures until the US and the European stock 
markets rebalance their economic situations and regain investor confidence in the 
markets. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, corporations’ ownership structures can be 
classified as highly concentrated in Turkey.577 Ultimate owners in listed companies 
are generally individual family members, and they control the companies through a 
complex pyramidal structure.578 Additionally, groups of companies that are owned by 
the same family or well-diversified conglomerates can be seen in the Turkish 
financial market. Although professional managers play an important role in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Ararat M and Ugur M, ‘Corporate governance in Turkey: an overview and some policy 
recommendations’ (2003) [MCB University Press] 3 Corporate Governance: The Int J of Effective 
Board Performance 58, p.60 
577 For details see 1.3.2 above 
578 Sumru Altug and Alpay Filiztekin (189), p.180 
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corporation, family members intensely engage in the strategic decision-making 
process, including its day-to-day running.579    
 
In terms of institutional frameworks, the State was the main actor in Turkish 
business for a long time. State-business relations through large firms in Turkey 
shaped the industry.580 Generally, the government was the major owner in companies 
and resource allocation in the private sector was provided by them. The government 
still plays a role in Turkish business; however, with the recent privatisation 
movements, most governmental organisations, such as Tupras or Telecom were sold 
to both internal and external customers and hence, the role of the government was 
reduced in the financial markets. This is important because it is argued that privately 
owned companies may perform better in the financial markets. For example, 
according to Megginson et al., government-owned companies may have a negative 
impact on the success of the financial markets because of high-level political 
influence and interests.581 Therefore, with an increased number of privately owned 
companies, better performance can be observed in listed companies and so, an 
increased flow of investment in the Turkish market can be expected in the future.   
 
Group structures also play a key role in the Turkish market because business is 
widely organised within those structures.582 Corporations are generally conglomerated 
with each other under a holding company or a family company (business group)583 in 
order to collect the shares of other companies or to control them.584 Therefore, 
holding companies are frequently majority shareholders in a company. In addition to 
these, banks play an important role in the Turkish market. Almost all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Guner Gursoy and Kursat Aydogan, ‘Equity Ownership Structure, Risk Taking, and Performance: 
An Empirical Investigation in Turkish Listed Companies’, (2002) 38 Emerging Markets Finance & 
Trade 6, pp. 6-25, p. 10 
580 B. Burcin Yurtoglu, ‘Ownership, Control and Performance of Turkish Listed Firms’, (2000) 
[Springer] 27 Empirica 2 pp.193-222, p.195 
581 Megginson WL, Nash RC and van Randenborgh M, ‘The Financial and Operating Performance of 
Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis', (1994) 49 Journal of Finance (2), 403-
52  
582 Institute of Directors, ‘The handbook of international corporate governance: a definitive guide’ 
(IOD: Kogan Page, London 2004), p.338 
583 Burcin Yurtoglu, (n 580), p.195 
584 Institute of Directors (n 582), p.338 
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abovementioned groups have a bank, which is owned and controlled by the same 
family.585  
 
As for the board structure of Turkish listed companies, significant changes and 
innovations have been made in the management of corporations by the new law. For 
example, according to the new law, the board of directors can be formed with the 
presence of just one member.586 Hence, the previous requirement that ‘the board must 
have at least three members has been abolished’.587 Any independent person or even 
a legal entity can be appointed as a board member in a company. However, if a legal 
entity is appointed as a member, an actual person should also be registered and named 
alongside him. This registered person should be disclosed on the company’s website 
because only that person can attend meetings and vote for the company’s issues.588 
One other outstanding innovation in the board structure is the requirement that at least 
a quarter of the board members have to be university graduates, with the exemption of 
single board members.589 Yet, this burden in the new code was abolished with an 
amendment in June 2012.   
 
The board is appointed for three years and its special duties that are 
specifically determined under the TCC cannot be transferred to others. According to 
the new law, these duties are: responsibility for the high-level management of the 
company; determination of the management structure; establishing a system in order 
to carry out accounting, financial auditing and planning; appointment and dismissal of 
managers and other personnel that have the same managerial level and binding 
powers; the high-level auditing of persons who engage in management in terms of 
compliance with the law, with the main contract, with the interior directives and 
written orders of the board; recording shares, board resolution and general assembly 
meetings’ books; preparation and presenting of the annual activity report and 
explanation of the corporate governance report to the general assembly; preparing 
general assembly meetings and carrying out the decisions of the general assembly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 ibid 
586 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 359-(1) 
587 Sarp Kalkan, ‘Turkey’s new commercial code to boost investors trust’, (Hurriyet Daily News-
4/July/2012), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/code-to-boost-investor-
trust.aspx?pageID=238&nid=24690, accessed at 7.05.2014 
588 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 359-(2) 
589 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 359-(3) 
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meetings; and finally, notifying the court in the event of the company running into 
debt.590   
 
In terms of the liability of board members some changes can be observed. In 
the previous code, the liability of board members in the event of duties being 
breached was determined by certain circumstances under Article 336. However, there 
were some shortcomings in terms of the personal liability of board members. For 
example, it was impossible to hold any board members personally liable for 
agreements carried out on behalf of the company in the abolished code.591  
 
Thus, the new Law, with the June 2012 amendment, defines the criminal 
liability of board members and clearly sets out the allocation of liability. For example, 
according to Article 206 of the new Code, creditors can sue board members for 
damages or losses, if the board members’ actions lead to these damages or losses. 
However, the June 2012 amendments have provided some flexibility for the liability 
principles of board members. After the June 2012 alterations, the requirement that 
board members should prove whether or not their action led to damages or losses in 
the company was abolished.592 In other words, the burden of proof for board members 
has been eliminated and the requirement, based on the general law principle, that the 
claimant should prove their claim has been adopted.593 Therefore, board members can 
be liable jointly, only if they have a defect or there is a loss in the company while they 
are carrying out their duties. The new TCC stresses that if the books that are prepared 
by the board are inaccurate, faulty, false or do not reflect the actual performance of 
the company, then the board members can be punished with both fines and two-year 
imprisonments.594  
 
As the final discussion in this part, the transparency provisions for the board 
can be underlined. In the new TCC, the right to demand information, the right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 375-(1) 
591 Herguner Bilge Ozeken, ‘Turkey: Board Structure and Liability Concept Under the Revolutionary 
New Commercial Code’, (2012) Mondaq-Corporate/Commercial Law, 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/211092/Shareholders/Board+Structure+And+Liability+Concept+Under+Th
e+Revolutionary+New+Commercial+Code, accessed at 9.05.2014  
592 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 553: The June 2012 Amendments, 
http://www.ticaretkanunu.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/1.5.6102.pdf, accessed at 9.5.2014 
593 Herguner Bilge Ozeken, (n 591) 
594 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 62 
Innovations	  for	  Better	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  under	  the	  New	  Turkish	  Commercial	  and	  Capital	  
Market	  Law	  
	   182	  
examination of the board and also duty of the board to provide information were 
adopted under Article 392. According to Article 392-(1), every member of the board 
can demand information, ask questions or examine the company with regard to 
operations. This right to demand information of the board cannot be denied.595 
Additionally, all board members have a duty to provide information and questions 
that are asked in meetings have to be answered.596 
 
Overall, the new Law seems to increase the reputation of Turkish business in 
the international arena by ensuring international financial standards, increasing 
‘democracy’ or ‘parliamentary model’597 in the corporate governance structures and 
keeping pace with EU legislations. A general professionalism has been provided in 
the capital market. Therefore, the new Law can be emphasised as a turning point for 
Turkey’s transformation process and a lifesaver in the event of the negative impact of 
the financial crises. 
 
4.2	  The	  Principle	  of	  Transparency	  in	  the	  Turkish	  Corporate	  Governance	  
Framework	  
This research has showed that Turkish policy-makers have also realised the 
importance of information transparency in corporate governance structures and 
initiated essential steps for a better legislative framework. The lack of transparency 
was one of the shortcomings of the Turkish capital market, due to highly concentrated 
ownership structures in companies. Information transparency was weak, and this 
weakness allowed managers or major shareholders to indicate their ‘devil sides’ in the 
market, which resulted in some crises, such as Imar Bank. Therefore, efficient 
corporate governance standards, in particular, better transparency legislations, were 
essential in Turkey. 
 
  So as to prevent the fraudulent activities and to improve the financial 
markets, corporate governance principles were accepted and declared by the Capital 
Markets Board on a ‘comply or explain’ basis in 2003.598  Then several other 
amendments were made to bring the commercial code up to date. For example, better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 392(1) 
596 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 392(2) 
597 Mathias M. Siems, (n 86), p. 337 
598 Cuneyt Yuksel (n 51), pp. 103-104  
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auditing standards were announced in 2003 and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) were accepted in 2005. However, the code, which had been enacted 
in 1957, failed to keep pace with the needs of the rapidly changing financial markets. 
Therefore, as a major step forward, the new Commercial Code (TCC) was adopted in 
January 2011 and came to force in July 2012.  
 
With the new code, corporate governance principles were adopted and defined 
under the capital market law, and the level of transparency was improved at all levels 
in companies, in accordance with international standards and EU legislations. For 
example, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were re-introduced and 
became a mandatory principle for Turkey; more appropriate audit standards were 
accepted, more technological developments were encouraged and their use made 
compulsory, such as establishing a website and online meetings.599 The New Code 
seems to have provided many competitive advantages for Turkey in the international 
arena. In the following part, transparency principles in the New Turkish Commercial 
Code will be examined and analysed.  
4.2.1	  Transparency	  Reforms	  and	  Innovations	  in	  the	  New	  Turkish	  Legislative	  
Framework	   
The new commercial code, which was brought into force in July 2012, 
introduced many innovations and new dimensions for companies to take the Turkish 
Capital Markets into the international area. The main objectives of the new law were: 
to keep pace with technological developments; to apply internationally accepted audit, 
reporting and corporate governance standards; and to provide better transparency 
requirements.600   
 
The new code can be seen as part of the Turkish legal system’s integration 
into the EU, as required by the negotiation process. As a candidate country for EU 
membership, Turkey seems to have managed to harmonise EU requirements for its 
legislation. In particular, stricter rules on corporate governance and auditing, a high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 Derya Basaran, ‘Transparency and disclosure within Turkish companies: a new era for corporate 
governance in Turkey’ (2012) (Universiteit van Tilburg. International Business Law, 2012) 
<http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=128371>, p.26 
600 PWC, ‘New Turkish Commercial Code: A Blueprint for the Future’, (2011) pp.2-3, 
http://www.pwc.com.tr/en_TR/TR/publications/ttk-assets/pages/ttk-a_blueprint_for_the_future.pdf, 
accessed at 16/06/2014  
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level of transparency in accessing financial information and adoption of international 
corporate governance standards and financial reporting standards can be observed as 
the main innovations of the new Code. As a matter of fact, the rise of the stock index 
of the Borsa-Istanbul (Turkish Stock Exchange) and high investment ratings of credit 
rating agencies for Turkey, such as Japan Credit Rating Agency or Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P)601 can be seen as a positive reflection of the new Commercial Code in the 
financial market.  
 
In order to analyse transparency requirements in the Turkish legislative 
framework, both securities (capital market law) and company law will be examined 
and evaluated in this part. In this respect, the Table 3 maps the core transparency 
provisions of Turkish law that will be outlined and then evaluated in this section. 
Table	  3:	  Overview	  of	  Transparency	  Provisions	  in	  Turkish	  Law	  
Area of Law Legal Act/Code Main Topics 
 
 
 
 
Securities 
Law 
 
 
Capital Market 
Law No: 6362 
Aim/Scope/Definition (Art 1) 
Principles of the Public Disclosure (Arts 14, 15, 17, 
32) 
Capital Market Institutions/Activities (Arts 62, 63) 
Main Principles of the Stock Exchanges (Arts 70, 87)  
Administrative Fines and the Capital Market Crimes 
(Arts 106, 107, 111, 112) 
 
Declarations and 
Communiqués of 
the CMB  
Principles regarding the Public Disclosure of Special 
Cases 2009 Serial: VIII, No: 54 (Art 5) 
Financial Reporting Standards II-14.1 (Arts 6, 7, 10, 
11) 
Public Disclosure and Transparency II-17.1 (Arts 
2.1, 2.2, 2.3) 
Special Cases II-15.1 (Arts 1, 5, 8, 9) 
 
 
Company 
Law 
 
 
 
Commercial Code 
No: 6102  
Electronic Transactions and the Information Society 
(Arts 149, 353, 562, 1524, 1527) 
Commercial Books (Arts 64, 375) 
Risk Management (Arts 378 (1), 398 (4)) 
Independent Audit System (Arts 399, 400, 402) 
The Rights and Obligations of Shareholders (Arts 
392, 438 to 444) 
The Financial Statements of Companies (Arts 514, 
515, 516) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601 Reuters, Update 2-S&P raises Turkey to just below investment grade, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/27/turkey-ratings-sandp-idUSL2N0CJ1L420130327, accessed 
at 23/05/2014 
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4.2.1.1 Transparency Principles under Capital Market Law 
Turkey’s previous Capital Market Law No: 2499 of Turkey was put into force 
on 30 July 1981 and was amended many times. 602  However, with the new 
Commercial Code, the former capital market law was abolished and the new capital 
market law No: 6362 was published in the Official Gazette. It was enacted on 30 
December 2012 to bring the capital market rules up to date in the international arena. 
Therefore, the new Capital Market Law (CML), like the new commercial code, aims 
to create some rules, which are compatible with EU legislations and international 
standards in the financial market. In addition to the CML, the declarations and the 
communiqués of the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) also help to improve 
the CML legislations and clearly illustrate transparency developments in the financial 
markets.    
 
CML No: 6362 has introduced some innovations to the Turkish Market and 
these can be divided in two main sections: transparency reforms and Borsa-Istanbul 
/Investor Protections. 
  
Improving the progress of the stock exchange under the new name, Borsa-
Istanbul, was an important innovation in the financial market. The main aims of the 
CML in the creation of the Borsa-Istanbul are: to keep pace with EU rules; to make 
the capital market more attractive in the eyes of investors by abiding to the elements 
of the corporate governance principles, such as transparency, accountability, 
reliability and equity; and to provide the integration of the Turkish capital market with 
the global markets by strengthening the competitive power of the markets. 603 
According to CML No: 6362, the Borsa-Istanbul is a legal self-regulatory entity. 
Interestingly, the Borsa-Istanbul has two markets, which trade securities: ‘the Equity 
Market and the Emerging Companies Market (ECM)’.604 If companies are able to 
fulfil all the Borsa Istanbul’s listing requirements, they can trade on the Equity 
Market. Otherwise, they trade on the ECM.605 Thus, the ECM has similarities with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 The Capital Market Law No: 2499, p.4, 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/securities/turkcm.pdf, accessed at 27/05/2014 
603 Borsa Istanbul, ‘Legal Ground’, http://borsaistanbul.com/en/corporate/about-borsa-istanbul/legal-
ground, accessed at 27/05/2014 
604 Borsa Istanbul, ‘Companies’, http://borsaistanbul.com/en/companies/listed-companies, accessed at 
27/05/2014 
605 ibid  
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alternative market or junior market in the UK. Having an alternative market for small 
and medium size enterprises may give policy-makers the chance to create fair rules in 
the market. Hence, small companies can be liberated from the cumbersome 
requirements that are compulsory for listed companies, which may also help to create 
a fair-trade environment in the market.  
 
Currently, the Borsa-Istanbul has 436 listed companies and, in order to stay 
listed in the equity market, companies are periodically evaluated over six month 
periods (between January-June and July-December). 606  These criteria are as 
follows:607 
 
a) ‘The average market capitalization of the free-floating shares for the relevant 
period must be equal to minimum TL 7,800,000 and 
b) The company’s free float rate must be minimum 25%’. 
 
In terms of the flow of information, the Borsa-Istanbul has been improved and 
facilitated by the further financial disclosure standards. Reliability and transparency 
are determined as the sine qua non principles and the way of accessing the disclosed 
information has been enriched by companies’ webpages and the Public Disclosure 
Platform of the Borsa-Istanbul. 608  Therefore, with both individual companies’ 
disclosure and a pan central storage mechanism, the Borsa-Istanbul tries to provide a 
high level of information transparency in the market.   
 
Apart from the Borsa-Istanbul, the CML has also provided some other 
transparency standards in accordance with the relevant EU Directives and 
international standards, such as the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) and the 
OECD corporate governance principles. The main aim of the CML is to make 
Istanbul a credible, accountable, transparent, fair, consistent and competitive global 
finance centre. Thus, well-organised transparency requirements may be seen as the 
major pillar of the CML.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Borsa Istanbul, ‘National Market’, http://borsaistanbul.com/en/companies/listing/equities/equity-
market/national-market, accessed at 28/05/2014 
607 ibid 
608 Borsa Istanbul, ‘Companies’, http://borsaistanbul.com/en/companies/listed-companies, accessed at 
28/05/2014  
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 In the second section of the CML, a specific public disclosure principle has 
been adopted and with CMB’s new declarations the public disclosure principles have 
been improved under the CML’s recent innovations. These innovations will be 
examined in the following part of the recent amendments of the CML.  In addition to 
this, some other rules and the declarations, which are related to transparency 
requirements, will be also examined.609  
	  
 
The first article of the CML explains the aim of the law. According to this 
article, the key target of the CML is to create a reliable, transparent, accountable, 
efficient, fair and consistent capital market that also protects the rights and benefits of 
investors.610 Transparency is one of the main purposes of the CML. In the following 
parts, the extent to which policy-makers have been able to carry out this mission will 
be examined by analysing the main transparency legislations in the CML.  
 
The second section, which looks at the principles relating to public disclosure 
and issuers, may help to highlight the main transparency legislations under the CML. 
Section II of the CML approaches the improvement of transparency requirements 
under two specific codes: ‘Financial Reporting-Independence Auditing and The 
Specific Cases in Public Disclosure’.611      
 
Article 14 of the CML organises the requirements with regard to Financial 
Reporting and Independence Auditing, and consists of five main rules. These rules 
can be listed as follows: (1) Issuers shall prepare and publish their financial tables or 
reports, which will be publicly disclosed or will be required by the board on demand, 
in line with the Turkish Accounting Standards (TAS) in terms of the form and 
substance at the right time, in the right place and in the right format. (2) The board 
and the issuers, in accordance with their fault, shall be responsible for the 
authenticity, reliability, preparation and publication of the financial tables and reports 
as demanded in the first paragraph of this article. The board has to take a separate 
decision in order to approve the financial statements that will be prepared in the 
context of the described requirements in this article. In addition, the declaration of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 For details see Table 3 above 
610 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, ‘Section 1-Article 1: Aim, Scope and Definitions’ 
611 ibid, ‘Section 2: The Principles Relating the Public Disclosure’ 
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company managers and the joint liable members of the board who prepare the 
financial statements with regard to reliability and trust-worthy of the financial tables 
and reports, shall be made available to the public. (3) The issuers shall obtain an 
independent audit report for their financial tables and reports from independent audit 
firms listed in accordance with the law. This independent audit report shall reflect the 
principle of trueness and honesty of the disclosed information in accordance with the 
Turkish Audit Standards. (4) The CMB is entitled to request an independent audit 
report from the partnerships of the related transactions in the event of the public 
offerings, applying for the public listing, the important events and the certain 
developments described in Article 23, and other issues that significantly affect the 
operations and the financial situation. (5) The preparations of the financial statements 
and reports required by the CMB, and the independent audit report shall be made 
available to the public within the framework of the principles and procedures set by 
the Board.612    
 
Article 15 of the CML deals with special cases in public disclosure and 
consists of two main subtitles.613 According to Article 15 (1), any information, 
developments and events that may have an impact on the decision-making process of 
investors or the value and price of capital market instruments shall be made available 
to the public by the issuers or the related parties. Article 15 (2) underlines the reasons 
for exemptions to Article 15 (1). It states that the disclosure of information, events 
and developments indicated in Article 15 (1), the declaration of them to the issuers, 
the delay of explanations for exceptional cases or the description of procedures and 
principles in the event of a statement not being made, shall be determined by the 
CMB of Turkey.   
 
Articles 14 and 15 cover the main disclosure rules specifically adopted by the 
CML. However, some other requirements may have an indirect impact on the 
improvement of transparency legislations. Therefore, in the following section, these 
transparency requirements will be examined. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Article 14 
613 ibid, Article 15 
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It may be worth analysing Article 17 of the CML, which adopts corporate 
governance principles for publicly held corporations. In fact, Turkish Commercial 
Law 6102 already adopts corporate governance principles for open joint stock 
companies.614 As for why corporate governance principles have also been adopted 
under CML 6362, it is claimed that the CML takes corporate governance principles a 
step further by enhancing the power of the CMB for public listed companies.  
 
According to Article 17, in general: (1) the CMB has been granted with the 
authority to fully or partly implement corporate governance principles for listed 
companies; (2) the CMB has also been authorised with the power to fully or partly 
apply corporate governance principles for shares of listed companies treading on the 
stock exchange by taking into account the size of the market, free float rate, financial 
stability of the market and the strategic importance of the sector; (3) in case of these 
mandatory principles not being obeyed, the CMB has the right to determine illegal 
issues in the market or to take appropriate precautions to cancel these activities, and to 
sue or to apply to the court to force companies to comply with the rules.615    
 
Article 32 can be considered as the important legislation in the CML because 
it adopts the responsibilities arising from public disclosure documents. This article 
aims to determine all those responsible in the case of misleading or illegal activities in 
financial statements, right to compensation with regard to these illicit activities and 
the causal connection between the liable. The main transparency requirements can be 
summarised as follows:616 
 
 For example, Article 32 regulates that within the scope of Article 10, issuers, 
board of directors, legal persons or any other natural persons who are signatories on 
any financial disclosure documents shall be jointly liable for any damages resulting 
from false, misleading or incomplete information in these financial statements. 
However, if the person proves that false, misleading or incomplete information, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 The New TCC 6102, Article 1529-Corporate Governance Principles 
615 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Article 17, and The Legislative Intentions of the CML 6362, 
p.94, translated by myself, http://www.spk.gov.tr/apps/Mevzuat/?submenuheader=-1, accessed at 
6/6/2014  
616 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Article 32  
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lack of knowledge in public disclosure documents does not arise from wrongful 
intention or gross negligence, he/she shall not be responsible.  
 
After determining all those responsible in the case of misleading or illegal 
activities in financial statements, Article 32 also legalises right to compensation with 
regard to these illicit activities and the causal connection between the liable. 
According to this Article, if any damage to the assets of investors is incurred during 
the validity period of the prospectus, which contains false, misleading or incomplete 
information; or immediately after the disclosure of other public disclosure documents; 
or after the date of realistic information that occurs in the market with regard to sale 
and purchase of initial public offering or on capital market instruments purchased and 
sold on the stock exchange, a causal link between the damage and the public 
disclosure documents is considered as established for the alleged compensation that 
will be demanded. However, there is also an exemption for this requirement in this 
Article. The demand of compensation arising from false, misleading or incomplete 
public disclosure documents are rejected: (a) if the purchase and sale of capital market 
instruments are not based on the disclosure document; (b) although it is known that 
information with regard to purchase and sale of capital market instruments in the 
disclosure documents are false, misleading or incomplete; the purchase and sale have 
occurred anyway; (c) if the announcement of the adjustments on false, misleading or 
incomplete information in public disclosure documents has been made before the 
investment decision or the action that is based on these documents; (d) if investors 
were going to suffer a loss anyway, even if the information published in public 
disclosure documents had been not false, misleading or incomplete.  
 
Finally, the most important rule of this Article is that any agreements, 
provisions or statements, which decrease or eliminate the liabilities arising from the 
public disclosure documents, shall be invalid.   
 
As mentioned before, a high level of information transparency, in addition to 
the rules, requires a better monitoring system in the market.617 The sixth paragraph of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 For details see 2.1.2 above 
Innovations	  for	  Better	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  under	  the	  New	  Turkish	  Commercial	  and	  Capital	  
Market	  Law	  
	   191	  
the third section in the CML covers general issues regarding independent audit and 
ratings institutions.  
 
Thus, Articles 62 and 63 highlight the main legislations with regard to 
independent audit and ratings institutions. Article 62 delegates the CMB to determine 
the main standards and principles for independent audit and rating institutions. 
Additionally, the CMB has the right to monitor and supervise these institutions in 
accordance with the determined principles. If these institutions fail to carry out these 
principles, then the CMB may remove these institutions from the list. Article 63 
adopts the joint responsibilities of the persons and institutions, such as independent 
audit firms or rating agencies that have a signature on the illegally prepared financial 
reports. According to this Article, independent audit firms and signatories, as limited 
to the scope of their duties, shall be jointly responsible for any damages that may arise 
by virtue of them not supervising the audited financial tables and the reports in 
accordance with the legislation. In addition, independent audit firms, rating and 
valuation firms shall be responsible for the damages that they have caused due to 
false, misleading or incomplete information in financial reports that they have 
prepared as a result of their activities.618  
  
The fourth section of the CML covers the rules regarding the stock exchange, 
Turkish Capital Markets Union and other institutions.  In fact, this section does not 
include transparency rules in general. However, there are some specific Articles that 
simply touch on transparency requirements. For this aim, Articles 70 and 87 will be 
examined in this part.  
 
Article 70 (2) empowers the Stock Exchanges to establish the necessary 
monitoring system in order to provide and to ensure all operations that are carried out 
in the market in a safe, transparent, efficient, stable, fair, honest and competitive 
manner in the market.619 
 
Article 87 sets the rules with regard to the operation of data-storage 
institutions in the financial market. According to this Article, in order to monitor the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Articles 62-63 
619 ibid, Article 70 (2)  
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systemic risks and maintain financial stability, the CMB may require that the 
information related to transactions that are processed in the capital market from 
issuers be provided either directly to itself or to a data-storage institution authorised 
by the CMB in the right format and with the right content.620    
 
The sixth section of the CML is another important legislation in the law 
because it covers criminal sanctions in the case the law being breached, by clearly 
defining illegal behaviour in the financial market. This section deals with all kinds of 
criminal activities in the market; however, in this part only the legal provisions with 
regard to misuse of information disclosure will be examined.  
 
The second part of the sixth section of the CML regulates the rules on capital 
market crimes. In particular, there are some rules, which identify legal enforcement in 
the event of information disclosure being misused.  
 
For example, Article 106 identifies crimes and criminals, and also highlights 
legal sanctions relating to the misuse of information. According to this Article: issuers 
or their major shareholders’ managers; anyone who has information because they 
have a connection to issuers or major shareholders; anyone who has information due 
to the execution of their duties or business; and anyone who obtains this information 
by committing a crime, shall be punished either by two to five years’ imprisonment or 
by a judicial fine.621    
 
Article 107 deals with market fraud issues and settles dissuasive sanctions. For 
instance, Article 107 (2) covers criminal sanctions regarding false information that is 
published in the financial market. With reference to Article 107 (2), anyone, who 
provides dishonest information, publishes false reports, takes an incorrect rumour 
with the purpose of affecting the price and value of the capital market instruments or 
having an impact upon investors’ decision-making progress shall be punished by two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Article 87 
621 ibid, Article 106 
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to five years’ imprisonment and a judicial fine of between five thousand (500000 TL) 
and ten thousand days (1000000TL).622   
 
Article 111 adopts the legal enforcement in case of not giving information or 
documents and preventing audit in the capital market. Pursuant to this Article 111 (1), 
anyone who does not give or fails to give the requested information, documents or 
electronic records to the officials appointed by the CMB as requested shall be 
punished with the imprisonment for up to three years.623  
 
Article 112 covers the legal sanctions regarding irregularities on accounting 
reports, financial statements and reports. It deals with the problem of cooking the 
books on financial reports. According to this Article: Firstly; a) any person, who has 
intentionally failed to keep the legally required books and records in accordance with 
the law; b) any person, who has purposely failed to maintain the legally required 
books and records during the preservation period shall be punished with 
imprisonment for between six months and to two years and with judicial fines of up to 
five thousands days (500000TL): Secondly; anyone who: intentionally provides 
financial statements or reports that do not reflect the truth; has shown an account that 
is country to the truth; has done any kinds of tricks on the accounting records; or has 
prepared a false or misleading independent audit and evaluation report shall be 
punished according to the relevant provisions of Law No: 5237 (Turkish Criminal 
Code).624    
 
  As the final point in the CML, transparency rules regarding the CMB can be 
examined. The CMB is the regulatory and supervisory authority of the Turkish 
Securities Market, which is similar to the ESMA in the EU from this point of view.625 
The CMB can also be accepted as a rule-making entity. For those areas not covered in 
the CML, the CMB plays a supplementary role by publishing its declarations and 
communiqués. The CMB will be analysed in the following parts; therefore, in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 ibid, Article 107 (2), for the calculation of a judicial fine see also 5.2.2 below and The Turkish 
Criminal Code No: 5237, Article 52 
623 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Article 111 (1) 
624 ibid, Article 112 
625 The Capital Markets Board of Turkey, ‘Our Mission’, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=0&submenuheader=-1, 
accessed at 13/06/2014 
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part, the requirements regarding the accountability and transparency principles of the 
CMB will be evaluated.    
 
The Capital Markets Board Communiqué on Principles Regarding Public 
Disclosure of Special Cases 2009 (Serial: VIII, No: 54) deals with the initial 
disclosure of major shareholdings. According to Article 5, if a legal or natural person 
directly or indirectly acquires or disposes of company shares where that proportion 
reaches, exceeds or falls below the thresholds of 5 %, 10 %, 15 %, 20 %, 25 %, 30 %, 
50 % and 75 %, this information should be published by the corporation.626  
 
In addition to this Communiqué, in order to keep pace with innovations in the 
financial markets, the CMB published some new declarations in 2013 and 2014.  
 
For instance, the Declaration of the Capital Markets Board of Turkey with 
regard to Accounting Standards II-14.1 deals with the deadlines for annual reports and 
interim financial reports. In Turkey, in addition to annual reports, three month, six-
month and nine-month interim period financial reports are required as a mandatory 
rule in the Declaration of the CMB of Turkey with regard to accounting standards.627 
According to this Declaration, an annual report, including its independent audit 
report, should be published within ten weeks of the end of the accounting period, in 
the event of having the obligation to prepare consolidated financial statements; 
without the obligation to prepare consolidated financial statements, it should be 
published within 60 days of the end of the accounting period.628 The three month, six 
month and nine month interim period financial reports, including their independent 
audit reports, should be published within 50 days of the end of the each interim 
period, in the event of having the obligation to prepare consolidated financial 
statements; without the obligation to prepare consolidated financial statements, it 
should be published within 40 days of the end of the each interim period.629  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 The Capital Markets Board, the Capital Markets Board Communiqué on Principles Regarding 
Public Disclosure of Material Events 2003 (Serial: VIII, No: 39), Article 5, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/regulations/files/SeriesVIII_No54.pdf, accessed at 17/09/2014 
627 The Capital Markets Board, The Declaration of the Capital Market Board with regard to the 
Accounting Standards II-14.1, Articles 6-7, translated by myself, 
http://www.ticaretkanunu.net/sermaye-piyasasinda-finansal-raporlamaya-iliskin-esaslar-tebligi-ii-14-
1/, accessed 22/1/2014 
628 ibid, Article 10 
629 ibid, Article 11 
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Secondly, transparency rules under the Corporate Governance Declaration of 
the CMB of Turkey II-17.1 also play a key role in increasing the level of transparency 
in the financial markets. As key elements of corporate governance principles, public 
disclosure and transparency have been adopted under this declaration by taking into 
account transparency requirements of the CML. The section on public disclosure and 
transparency consist of two parts: ‘Website and Annual Report’.630 
 
The website section indicates how to use the webpage of a company for public 
disclosure. According to this section, the information that is on the webpage should be 
updated, accurate, comprehensive and reliable. Additionally, this information should 
be published with letterhead stationery on the Internet. Trade registry information, 
latest partnership and management structure, detailed information regarding 
preference shares, the final version of the company’s articles of association, financial 
reports, annual reports, general meetings agendas, list of attendees and minutes of 
meetings, the company's own policy related to the repurchase of shares, dividend 
policy, information policy and so on are the information that should be made 
available to the public on the Internet for at least five years. Additionally, financial 
reports should also be published in English, which should be clear and reflect the 
same meaning as the Turkish.  
 
In annual report section, information to be included and published is 
introduced. According to this section, the Board of Directors and their declarations 
with regard to independency of its members, information about the duties of managers 
outside of the company, information about legislative changes that could significantly 
affect the company’s activities, explanations about the administrative sanctions and 
penalties given to board members, committee members and the frequency of their 
meeting and working principles of their activities, and information about mutual 
participations which exceeds 5%, are some of the examples of the main information 
that should be published in annual report.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 The Corporate Governance Declaration of the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB Serial II-
17.1 No: 28871, Section 2: Public Disclosure and Transparency, 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/apps/teblig/displayteblig.aspx?id=454&ct=f&action=displayfile, translated by 
my self, accessed at 05/07/2014 
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Finally, the Declaration of the CMB regarding Special Cases II-15.1 has a 
positive impact on improving transparency rules in Turkey.631 As highlighted in 
Article 1, the aim of this declaration is to make essential information, events or 
emerging developments that have an impact on the decision-making process of 
investors available to the public in order to create a transparent, reliable and efficient 
financial market.  
 
In this respect, Article 5 deals with the disclosure of internal information. 
According to this Article, if there is a significant change in the activities of the parent 
or the subsidiary company and, as a result, if there is a further change in the issuers’ 
activity and the capital-management relations, then the issuers shall disclose this 
information to the public. 
 
Article 8 settles unusual movements in the price and the quantity of financial 
instruments. With this Article, at the demand of the any stock exchange, the issuers 
shall inform the public about unusual changes in the price or in the trading volume of 
financial instruments.  
 
Article 9 deals with the confirmation of news and rumours regarding a 
company. According to this Article, if there is important information that has a 
positive or negative impact on the decision-making process of information users 
which is different from previously published information, the issuers shall inform the 
public without any demand from information users regarding whether this new 
information is true and sufficiently enough.     
 
 To sum up, with the abovementioned legislations, to some extent, Turkish 
policy-makers have managed to improve transparency requirements in the securities 
law in accordance with the EU. In particular, with the new CMB declarations, Turkey 
seems to provide more accurate and immediate information to the public. However, 
there are still some shortcomings in Turkey’s securities law. The efficiency of 
transparency rules in the securities law will be analysed and evaluated after 
examining transparency rules in the company law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631 The Declaration of the CMB Regarding the Special Cases Serial II-15.1, Articles 1-5-8-9, translated 
by myself, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/01/20140123-5.htm, accessed at 3/4/2014 
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4.2.1.2 Transparency Principles under Company Law 
With the new TCC No: 6102, Turkish company law also met with complete 
reform and innovation. The new TCC aims to create a new business model and to 
provide a new legal framework for economic activities in Turkey. To this aim, the 
new TCC has given priority to Turkish company law by increasing modernisation 
activities. 
 
Through the new TCC: firstly, most of the EU legislations have been 
harmonised. Hence, more compatible standards with the EU have been provided; 
secondly, compatibility with international institutions and rules has been enhanced 
within the Turkish Accounting Standards (TAS) and the Turkish Financial Reporting 
Standards (TFRS), which has helped to increase the competitive power of Turkey in 
the international arena; and thirdly, corporate governance principles, high level 
professional management standards, independent audit principles, financial planning 
and risk management strategies have been adopted. Therefore, it is claimed that these 
innovations will help Turkey to increase its professional outlook in the business 
environment.  
 
In its new form, some important modernisation activities in the transparency 
legislations of company law may also be observed. In this part, only the efforts to 
create better transparency requirements in the new company law will be analysed as 
follows:632 
 
Firstly, as one of the main substantial changes in the new TCC, the website 
requirement from corporations can be examined. Internet technology has been 
determined as an essential tool for transparency rules and the creation of a website for 
each company has been imposed as an obligation in the new code.633 According to 
Article 1524, trading companies that are subjected to supervision, shall set up a 
website within three months of the date of registration on the commercial register in 
order to make the essential information available to the public. In this respect, the 
information that should be published on the websites has been clearly determined in 
Article 6 of the Regulation on the Website that will be Opened by Listed Companies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 For details see Table 3 above 
633 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 1524 
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No: 28663. According to Article 6, the essential information that is useful for 
information users, such as financial reports, audit reports or declaration of the 
founders, public commitments, postponements of bankruptcy or decision texts 
regarding similar issues should be published on the websites.634   
 
Apart from this information, in the event of company mergers or dissolution of 
companies, the new TCC also makes the publishing of some other information on the 
websites compulsory. For example, according to Article 149, merging companies are 
obliged to submit and publish a merger agreement, merger report, annual activity 
reports, annual financial reports for the last three years and balance sheets within 30 
days before the general assembly meeting decision.635 In terms of the dissolution of 
companies, the court decision, registration and announcement in the Trade Gazette 
should also be made available on the website.636       
 
With the introduction of Internet technologies in company law, online general 
assembly meetings, board of directors meetings, shareholder meetings and the usage 
of the electronic signature have been regulated and became possible between listed 
companies.637 This innovation can be emphasised as an important reform that will 
increase the level of transparency in Turkish markets because it will give market 
players a chance to attend all company meetings, which will also help to solve the 
problem of shareholder participations in the market.   
 
In case of not creating a website or misleading information users by 
publishing the wrong information, companies or issuers shall be punished with up to 
sixth-month imprisonment and administrative fines from a hundred days (10000 
Turkish Liras) up to three hundred days (30000 Turkish Liras).638    
 
Secondly, the bookkeeping obligation in the new TCC may be worth 
evaluating. According to Article 64, every trader has to keep clear commercial books, 
which show the economic and financial position of the company and also debit and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 Regulation on the website that will be opened by the listed companies No: 28663, Article 6 
635 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 149 (1) 
636 ibid, Article 353 (1) 
637 ibid, Article 1527 
638 ibid, Article 562 (12), for the calculation of a judicial fine see also 5.2.2 below and The Turkish 
Criminal Code No: 5237, Article 52 
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credit relations that are obtained in each accounting period. Additionally, they have to 
keep these commercial books for at least ten years as a hard copy and an electronic 
copy. The formation and development of the business activities must be clearly 
monitored from these books.639 These books are defined in Article 64 (3-4). In 
addition to these, the board of directors must prepare corporate governance 
statements, which should include the main corporate governance principles that are 
determined by the CMB, and they must also publish it on their websites. This is 
defined as one of the non-transferable duties of issuers in the new TCC.640  
 
Thirdly, the new TCC improves the risk-management system in corporations. 
As explained in the second chapter, in order to reduce the negative effects of financial 
crises, it is essential to detect the potential risks early. In this respect, Articles 378 and 
398 may be considered. For example, according to Article 378 (1), the Board of 
Directors in companies where shares are traded on a regulated market is obliged to set 
up a committee of experts and to operate a system that determines and manages risks, 
implements remedies and maintains the good performance of the company. 641 Article 
398 (4) gives auditors the special duty of monitoring whether or not the Board of 
Directors is able to set up the abovementioned expert committee and to operate the 
system.  
 
Fourthly, a well-functioning audit system is also very important for better 
transparency because without reliable information, published information does not 
mean anything. Thus, it may also be essential to examine the audit system innovations 
in Turkey. The new TCC has provided some innovations in the area of audit. The 
adoption of the Turkish Accounting Standards, which were completely translated and 
harmonised from International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is one of the 
most important reforms.642 In addition, the new code seems to have increased the 
independency of the audit system by abolishing the requirement for internal audit 
committee. According to the new code, it is mandatory for all companies to have an 
agreement with an external audit company that is chosen by the board of directors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 ibid, Article 64 (1) 
640 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 375 (1)  
641 ibid, Article 378 (1) 
642 Derya Basaran (n 599), pp. 28-29 
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before the operating cycle.643 This is reasonable because experience has shown that 
when an audit system is an internal organ of a corporation, it can loss its 
independency and fairness and hence may tolerate, or even participate in illegal 
activities in the company.644 Additionally, in order to increase the independency of 
external auditors, certain principles have also been determined in the new code. For 
example, according to Article 400, auditors shall not have any shares, nor shall they 
be managers or directors or contribute to the arrangement of financial reports in the 
corporation that they audit. Therefore, with these new rules, a more independent audit 
system seems to have been provided in the financial markets. 
 
As the final point regarding the audit system, the duties and responsibilities of 
auditors can be examined. Auditors have a duty to produce an audit report with regard 
to financial tables, which should be simple and use clear terminology. In this report, 
the compatibility of financial reports and tables with the law and the essential 
explanations that are expected by the board of directors shall be pointed out.645 In 
addition to this, auditors must also highlight in the audit report, whether the financial 
reports are set in accordance with the TAS and whether the information reflects the 
truth. If they fail to prepare and publish this report, they shall be subjected to criminal 
and administrative liabilities.  
 
Fifthly, in terms of shareholders’ interest, the new TCC has adopted a number 
of significant transparency innovations to improve shareholder participation. In this 
respect, the right to request information and the right to require an exclusive audit 
may be evaluated.  
 
Article 392 entitles shareholders to request and examine comprehensive 
information in accordance with modern measurements or with the principles of public 
disclosure, accountability and corporate audit.646 The main aim of this right is to 
inspect the books and correspondences related to a company.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 399 
644 For details see 2.2.2 above 
645 The new TCC No: 6102, Article 402 
646 Veliye Yanli and Murat Yusuf Akin, “Yeni Turk Ticaret Kanunu: Dunya Degisiyor. Ya Siz? (The 
New Turkish Commercial Law: The World is Changing and You? Translated by myself)”, (Istanbul 
KPMG 2011), p. 71 and for details see the new TCC No: 6102, Article 392 (1-2-3-4-5-6) 
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The right to request an exclusive audit is a significant innovation in the new 
TCC, which aims to increase the reliability, objectivity and level of transparency in 
corporations. This right has been rearranged as both an individual and a minority right 
in Articles 438-444 of the new TCC. These Articles aim to protect the interests of the 
company and its shareholders, to identify and prevent corruption and illegal 
transactions contrary to the law or the Articles of the Association, to disclose 
evidence for civil and criminal liabilities, and to protect minority interests against 
major shareholders in the company.647 According to the law, each shareholder may 
request a special or exclusive audit to clarify certain events within a company. It is 
important to note that there is no need to have a subject on the agenda in this regard in 
the General Assembly of the shareholders to use this right.  However, in order to be 
able to apply for this right, the right to request and examine the information should be 
applied for in advance by shareholders.648 After the results of the vote in the General 
Assembly, if shareholders’ request is accepted, the court appoints a special auditor. 
For this aim, each shareholder or the company may directly apply to the court within 
thirty days.649  
 
The above-mentioned information is related to individual shareholders right. 
Minorities’ right to request an exclusive audit steps in when the request for a special 
audit is rejected by the General Assembly.650 According to Article 439, if the General 
Assembly rejects the request of the special auditor, only minority shareholders may 
ask the court to appoint a special auditor. The concept of minority shareholders has 
been identified in Article 439 (1) as follows: minority refers to shareholders with a 
nominal value of shares of at least one million Turkish Liras or one-tenth of the 
capital in non-public joint-stock companies, and one-twentieth of the shares in the 
open joint stock companies. These minority shareholders may apply to the 
commercial court in the first instance at the company’s headquarters to appoint a 
special auditor within thirty days. If they satisfy the court about company and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647 Mustafa Yavuz, ‘Yeni Ticaret Kanununa Gore Anonim Sirket Pay Sahiplerinin Ozel Denetim 
Isteme Hakki’ (According to the new TCC, the right to require exclusive audit of shareholders), 
(Cozum-ISMMMO 2012), pp.103-118, p.104, 
http://archive.ismmmo.org.tr/docs/malicozum/111malicozum/8_mustafa_yavuz.pdf, accessed at 
05/07/2014  
648 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 438 (1) 
649 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 438 (2) 
650 ibid, Article 439 (1) and see also Veliye Yanli and Murat Y. Akin (n 646), p.72 
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shareholders’ losses that have occurred due to the illegal activities of owners, the 
judge will appoint a special auditor.651  
 
Sixthly, as the final transparency legislation in company law, the requirements 
regarding the company’s financial statements in the new TCC will be examined. 
Financial statements play a crucial role in increasing the level of transparency in 
corporate structure. In this respect, the lawmakers pay attention to the importance of 
financial statements and determine some essential standards to make these financial 
tables available to the public at the right time, in the right place and in the right 
format.  
 
 For example, Articles 514, 515 and 516 determine the essential criteria for 
companies’ financial statements in terms of time, transparency principles and content. 
According to Article 514, the Board of Directors prepares financial statements as 
prescribed in the Turkish Accounting Standards, and presents their attachments and 
the annual activity report of the Board of Directors, which reflect the previous 
reporting period, to the General Assembly within the first three months of the 
accounting period.652   
 
Article 515 plays a key role in terms of transparency legislation because it 
requires ‘the principle of the honest image’ for financial statements. Pursuant to this 
Article, financial statements of joint stock companies shall be published as accurate, 
understandable, comparable, transparent and reliable, and also in accordance with the 
Turkish Accounting Standards.653 
 
 Article 516 highlights the importance of the annual activity report and defines 
the essential information that needs to be included in financial statements. According 
to this Article, the annual activity report of the Board of Directors reflects the flow of 
activities and the financial position of the company from all aspects in a transparent, 
accurate, reliable, complete and straightforward manner. In this report, the financial 
situation of the company is evaluated pursuant to the financial tables. The report 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 439 (1-2) 
652 ibid, Article 514  
653 ibid, Article 515 
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clearly points out the development process of the company and the potential risks that 
are likely to occur in the future. With regard to these issues, the assessment of the 
Board of Directors is also covered in the report. In addition to these: the important 
events that occur in the company after the end of the activity period; the company’s 
research and development efforts; and the fees, bonuses, travel, accommodation and 
representation expenses, insurance and other guarantees paid to the Board Members 
or Senior Executives should also be included in the activity report of the Board of 
Directors.654  
 
In this and previous sections, the main transparency rules in Turkish law have 
been examined. In the following section, the efficiency of these rules will be analysed 
and evaluated by considering their weaknesses and strengths in the financial markets.        
4.2.1.3 Analysis and Discussion of the Main Transparency Innovations in the New 
Turkish Legislative Framework            
The findings of this study indicate that Turkey seems to be making a 
significant effort in order to create a better legislative framework in the area of 
corporate governance. Turkey has a long-standing commercial law tradition, which 
dates back to 1957. For the last fifty years, it has been updated on several occasions. 
In particular, since banks play an important role in the Turkish economy, the most 
important modernisation activities have been initiated with improvements in the 
Banking Law as a response to the Imar Bank crisis in 2001.  
 
Between 2000 and 2014, Turkey has managed to improve its commercial law 
by taking into account the recent developments in the international arena. For 
example, in order to create a modern legal framework, independent regulatory 
agencies have been enhanced.655 In 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency was established, and in 2003 the Capital Markets Board of Turkey was 
strengthened. In 2003, the Corporate Governance Principles was issued by 
harmonising the OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles. In addition to these, in 
order to increase the level of transparency, better auditing standards were announced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 516 
655 Melsa Ararat,  “Comply or explain” without consequences: the case of Turkey, in Christine A. 
Mallin, (ed.) Handbook on International Corporate Governance, (2011)  (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-
UK, Northampton- USA), pp. 355-370, p.356 
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in 2003 and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were accepted in 
2005.   
 
As outlined above, a great deal of effort was made towards improvement 
during that time. Melsa Ararat divides this period of modernisation into two parts in 
her article. According to her, between 2000 and 2005 is ‘the Reform Period’ and 
between 2005 and 2009 is ‘the Refinement and Implementation Period’.656 However, 
although a number of reforms were adopted in the former code, it failed to keep pace 
with the needs of rapidly changing financial markets. Therefore, a radical solution 
was seen to be essential in order to have better legal structure in the market. 
 
To this aim, the new TCC No: 6102 was enacted in 2011 as a major step 
forward. It is claimed that the new TCC has granted a number of new dimensions for 
companies in order to raise the Turkish Capital Markets to the international level. 
Additionally, as a candidate country for EU Membership, Turkey seems to have 
managed to harmonise most of EU requirements into its legislation with the new 
code. Therefore, the provisions of the new TCC are expected to draw a clear road 
map, in particular for transparency requirements. However, there are still some 
provisions that are not in line with the acquis,657 which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
        
If the new TCC No: 6102 is compared with the previous commercial code in 
terms of transparency legislations, the main innovations can be summarised in general 
as follows: 
 
Firstly, the new code is able to keep pace with the technological development 
in the financial reporting; therefore, it could be defined as web-based, rather than 
paper-based as with the former code; secondly, the new code gives priority to 
information users’ needs to request the disclosure of essential information from 
issuers; thirdly, the new TCC requires continuous reporting as well as periodic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656 ibid 
657 European Commission, ‘Turkey 2012 Progress Report accompanying the document Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council’, (Commission Staff Working 
Document-Brussels, 2012), p.50, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf, accessed at 
05/07/2014    
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reporting and specifically requires forward looking information, historical results and 
performance measures as essential information; and fourthly, the new TCC can be 
accepted as more global-based, rather than national-based.    
 
However, there are still some shortcomings in terms of the transparency 
legislations that need to be considered by policy-makers.  
 
The first problem is the complex structure of the new TCC for transparency 
laws. The new code consists of 1535 Articles. In order to understand the transparency 
rules, it is essential to analyse every single requirement in the new code, which is 
burdensome and time-consuming. In this respect, transparency rules would be clearer 
and comprehensive, if they were agglomerated under one ‘transparency section’ in the 
new code. 
  
Secondly, there is a transparency problem in the ‘comply or explain’ approach 
in Turkey. According to the assessment report of European Banking for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the comply or explain approach needs to 
be reviewed because Turkish companies have failed to publish comprehensive 
information and explanations in case of not complying with the rules.658   
 
Thirdly, the requirement of the initial threshold for major shareholders is not 
clear in the new TCC.  For example, Article 198 regulates the initial thresholds for a 
group of companies. According to this Article, if an entity directly or indirectly 
acquires or disposes of shares in a company where that proportion reaches, exceeds or 
falls below the thresholds of 5 %, 10 %, 15 %, 20 %, 25 %, 30 %, 50 % and 75 %, it 
should inform the equity corporation within ten days.659  However, the notification of 
the acquisition or disposal of major holdings for a shareholder was not adopted under 
the new TCC. Instead, it was enacted under the Capital Markets Board Communiqué 
on Principles Regarding Public Disclosure of Special Cases 2009 (Serial: VIII, No: 
54). This could lead to difficulties in understanding whether the notification of initial 
thresholds for disclosure of major shareholdings is adopted under the new commercial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
658 European Banking for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), ‘Commercial Laws of Turkey 
May 2012 an Assessment by the EBRD’, (Office of the General Council-2012), p.10 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/sector/legal/turkey.pdf, accessed at 23/06/2014 
659 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 198 
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code. Therefore, it would be better to adopt this provision before or after the 
abovementioned Article 198 so as to reduce the complexities in the new code. 
 
Fourthly, there are some inadequacies with regard to the risk-management 
requirements of the new TCC. For example, according to Kucukozmen, Articles of 
the new TCC regarding risk management only adopt the internal audit elements and 
the organisational structure, but do not include any rules, which indicate how it should 
be implemented in corporations.660 In order to improve the risk-management system, 
risks, such as systemic risks, external competition risks, specific risks and information 
risks could be classified in the new TCC. Hence, it would be easy to measure and to 
manage the risks that the company could face in the future.     
 
Fifthly, the capacity of the commercial judiciary and the speed of proceedings 
in a court are still not at an adequate level. The Turkish judicial system has been 
occupied with a large backlog of cases due to the slow speed of proceedings.661 The 
delay in the judicial system cannot be defined as justice. Therefore, in order to 
increase the efficiency of the existing rules, policy-makers have to strengthen the 
capacity of the commercial judiciary.   
 
 Overall, with the new TCC, Turkey seems to have taken a major step forward 
in the area of transparency. The new TCC is deemed to boost business and the 
financial environment in Turkey. With the new modernisation process, the main 
standards for transparency requirements seem to be provided in the financial markets. 
Hence, it would be better to increase the adoption process of the new reforms.  
According to the findings of this study, the new TCC is innovative in a number of 
areas, in particular, in corporate governance, electronic transactions and information 
society. However, in some other areas, such as commercial judiciary or ownership 
disclosure, it is still necessary to undertake some further modernisation activities to 
successfully fulfil the market’s needs. Once the abovementioned problems in the new 
TCC are resolved, the implementing legislations will be better aligned with EU 
acquis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 Coskun Kucukozmen, ‘Yeni Turk Ticaret Kanunu ve Risk Yonetimi (The new TCC and the Risk 
Management)’, (Working Paper-2012), p.2, http://www.coskunkucukozmen.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/yenittkveriskyonetimicoskunkucukozmen.pdf, accessed at 24/06/2014    
661 European Banking for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (n 658), p.17 
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4.2.2	  Legal	  Bodies	  and	  Supervisory	  Authorities	  in	  the	  Turkish	  Financial	  Market	  
Successful transparency legislation consists of effective rules, effective legal 
bodies and an effective enforcement mechanism. After examining transparency 
developments in the Turkish legislative framework, it is also necessary to evaluate 
Turkey’s legal institutions in order to clearly understand the supplementary elements 
of transparency reforms. Thus, legal bodies and business institutions that have a 
positive impact on restructuring the corporate governance standards will be identified.  
 
In terms of realising the importance of having effective legal bodies and 
business institutions in the legislative framework, the 2001 economic crisis can be 
seen as a turning point because it accelerated the restructuring process of business by 
giving priority to corporate governance practices and to the creation of legal bodies 
and institutions.662 In order to clearly understand the legal bodies and authorities in 
Turkey, these institutions will be divided into two types: ‘governmental organisations 
and private business organisations’.   
4.2.2.1 Governmental Organisations and Turkey’s Regulatory Bodies  	   Governmental organisations consist of the Capital Markets Board (CMB), the 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Agency (BRSA), and the Saving Deposit 
Insurance Funds (SDIF). In this part, only the CMB will be examined in depth, as it 
deals with listed companies in the financial markets. 
 
 The Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) is the regulatory and 
supervisory authority of the securities markets and institutions, which was empowered 
by the Capital Markets Law (CML), that was enacted in 1981.663 Its aim is to 
reorganise to the financial markets by regulating the main standards for market 
players. In addition to that, the CMB has a number of duties and responsibilities, 
which are based on the objectives of fairness of the markets and the interest of 
investors.664  It can be claimed that, in the rapidly changing financial markets, the 
priorities may also have changed. However, the main aims of fostering the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
662 Elif Gonencer, (n 50), p.98 
663 The Capital Markets Board of Turkey, ‘Our Mission’, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=0&submenuheader=-1, 
accessed at 24/06/2014 
664 Alparslan Budak and Efsun Ayca Degertekin, “The Handbook of the Turkish Capital Markets 
2012”, (TSPAKB Publication, Istanbul-2012), p.3 
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improvement of the capital markets, ensuring the resource allocation and providing 
the investor protections always remain stable.665 As a regulatory body, the main duties 
of the CMB can be listed as follows:666   
 
 Firstly, it constitutes the legislative framework for the securities markets and 
institutions and carries out supervision operations within the scope of the CML. It 
is useful to mention that the Turkish financial markets consist of three groups; 
‘Primary Markets, Secondary Markets and Financial Intermediation’. Therefore, 
the CMB has different responsibilities and functions in these different markets. 
The institutions to be subject to the supervision of the CMB were determined in 
the CML. According to the CML; ‘corporations offering their securities to the 
public, securities market intermediaries, mutual funds and investment companies, 
including real estate investment companies and venture capital investment 
companies, independent external auditing firms offering services to capital market 
institutions, stock exchanges and the secondary markets in general, precious metal 
exchanges and derivative exchanges, other related institutions operating on the 
capital markets such as rating agencies, clearing and depository institutions’ are 
supervised by the CMB.667 
 Secondly, it regulates, introduces and develops capital market instruments, 
including newly invented financial tools, such as futures and options contracts.   
 
 Thirdly, the CMB audits the abovementioned institutions, detects any 
violations of legislations and enforces the CML rules. 
 
 Fourthly, it regulates, determines and implements corporate governance 
principles in the financial markets. For example, in 2003, corporate governance 
principles were issued by the CMB on a ‘comply or explain’ basis and this was 
revised in 2005 so as to provide harmonisation with OECD principles (2004).668 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665 The Capital Markets Board of Turkey, ‘Our Mission’, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=0&submenuheader=-1, 
accessed at 24/06/2014 
666  ibid, and Alparslan Budak and Efsun Ayca Degertekin (n 664), p.12 
667 The Capital Markets Board of Turkey, ‘Our Mission’, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=0&submenuheader=-1, 
accessed at 25/06/2014 
668 Elif Gonencer, (n 50), p.99 
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Additionally, in 2011, these corporate governance principles were improved and 
renewed by issuing the declaration of the CMB regarding the determination and 
implementation of corporate governance principles serial IV-No: 56. So, new 
corporate governance principles that keep pace with innovations in the financial 
markets have been determined.  
 
 In short, the CMB is the main regulatory body and supervisory authority in the 
Turkish financial markets. Thus, it may have some similarities with other supervisory 
authorities in the EU, such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK, the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) in Germany or to some extent with 
the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) in the EU. 
4.2.2.2 Private Organisations relevant to Corporate Governance and Transparency 
in Turkey 
As well as the abovementioned governmental organisation, there are also 
some private organisations that have a strong impact on the regulatory structure of the 
financial system; in particular, on the implementation of corporate governance 
principles in Turkish financial markets. Their main role is to guide companies, to 
analyse the enacted rules, to improve and accelerate the adoption process and to make 
recommendations for further developments. These organisations are as follows: 
 
Turkish	   Industrialist’	   and	   Businessmen’s	   Association	   (TUSIAD)	   is a 
voluntary organisation, which was established in 1971 to prevent the negative impact 
of the 1970 economic crisis in the US on the Turkish business world and to represent 
Turkey in the international arena. It aims to contribute to the creation of national 
economic policies; to increase the Turkey’s attractiveness in the global environment; 
to carry out studies in terms of political, economic, social and cultural relations and to 
create projects to support the membership process of the EU; and to enhance networks 
between the related parties669 As a representative body of the Turkish business 
environment, it helps to improve competitiveness, social welfare, employment and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), ‘TUSIAD’s Vision’, 
http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/tusiads-vision/, accessed at 28/06/2014    
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productivity, business ethics and public interests of Turkey in the international 
arena.670  
 
It also plays an important role in terms of the implementation of corporate 
governance principles in the financial markets. As the first response to the realisation 
and development of the corporate governance practice, TUSIAD has made some 
significant efforts throughout Turkey’s business world. For example, in 2002, they 
published ‘Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice: Composition and 
Functioning of the Board of Directors’.671  This code was mainly created to improve 
the framework of the Board of Directors. In this respect, only one perspective of the 
corporate governance implementations has been examined with this research. 
However, in terms of emphasising the key principles of corporate governance, such 
as, ‘fairness, accountability, transparency and responsibility’, and proving the 
willingness of the business environment to take actions to improve the corporate 
governance structure, this code can be highlighted as the first initiative or a real step 
towards improving corporate governance practices in Turkey.  
 
Private Industrialists’	   and	   Businessmen’s	   Association	   (MUSIAD)	   is 
another private, voluntary based organisation in Turkey. It was established in 1990 in 
Istanbul to contribute to the development of a social, cultural, economic, politic, 
scientific and technologic harmony between: individuals and institutions; the society 
and the country; and the country and the world.672  In terms of corporate culture, it 
aims to develop a business and operational system for small, medium and large-sized 
enterprises; to provide balance and harmony between the elements of human-money-
resources through a management and administration; and to contribute to overall 
quality standards in the financial markets. It can be seen as a guideline mechanism for 
market players in the financial markets.  
 
Corporate Governance Association of Turkey (CGAT) is an important 
non-profit organisation, the purpose of which is to enhance and accelerate corporate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 ibid 
671 TUSIAD, “The Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice: Composition and Functioning of the 
Board of Directors”, (TUSIAD-Istanbul, 2002), and Elif Gonencer (n 50), p.99 
672 MUSIAD, ‘History’, http://www.musiad.org.tr/syf.asp?altkat=tarihce&kat=musiad, accessed at 
28/06/2014 
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governance developments in Turkey. It was established in 2003. The main aim of this 
Association is to guide and encourage the adoption process of corporate governance 
principles by publishing books, indicating case studies, carrying out academic 
research projects and organising training courses for the corporate bodies.673  
 
Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey (CGFT) is the final organisation 
that will be examined in this part. The CGFT was founded in 2003 by TUSIAD and 
Sabanci University to increase awareness of corporate governance developments in 
Turkey. Like the abovementioned colleagues, it also aims to create a smooth 
corporate governance mechanism by improving reform movements in the financial 
markets. Its most important contribution is that it mainly focuses on scientific or 
academic research regarding corporate governance practices and in this respect, 
organises academic events to facilitate dialogue in order to discuss any essential 
developments in this area.674    
 
4.3.	  Empirical	  Insights	  into	  the	  Transparency	  Practices	  of	  Companies	  
Listed	  on	  the	  Borsa-­‐Istanbul	  
The findings of this chapter indicate that there have been some important 
changes and major steps forward in the Turkish legislative framework in terms of 
effective transparency legislations in recent years. In particular, with the new TCC, 
Turkey seems to have succeeded in bringing international standards to its 
transparency laws. 
 
From this point of view, an empirical research is useful to understand to what 
extent the new TCC manages to increase the level of transparency of companies listed 
on the Borsa-Istanbul. The research will be based on the availability of five types of 
information (summary of historical results, background information, key-non 
financial statistics, forward looking information and management discussion and 
analysis), which have a positive impact on the decision-making process of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673 Corporate Governance Association of Turkey, ‘Mission &Vision’, 
http://www.tkyd.org/en/content.asp?PID={CFA544CC-BB0E-4568-8650-2BC9008715AC}, accessed 
at 28/07/2013  
674  Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey, ‘Background’, 
http://cgft.sabanciuniv.edu/en/about/background, accessed at 28/06/2014 
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information users in listed companies. In this respect, thirty sample companies will be 
selected from firms listed on the Borsa-Istanbul.  
4.3.1	  Structure	  of	  Hypotheses	  	  	   This study intends to explore the transparency level of companies listed on the 
Borsa-Istanbul by examining whether the selected companies succeed in making the 
abovementioned key information675 available to the public on their webpages at the 
right time and in the right format.  
 
Analyses were explained in a tabular form below and indicated with a ‘box 
ticking style’. Symbols, ‘✓’ and ‘✖’ were assigned to the abovementioned key 
information for each of the thirty companies. Here, ‘✖’ refers to ‘no availability’ of 
this information and ‘✓’ refers to ‘availability’ of this information on the companies’ 
webpages.      
4.3.2	  Sample	  Selection	  
The sample size of this study will be constructed by selecting thirty firms from 
among listed companies on the Borsa-Istanbul. The determination of the first fifteen 
corporations, which is shown in Table 4, will be based on the ‘The Most Admired 
Companies of Turkey Survey 2012’ of GfK Turkey.676 GfK Turkey is a research 
agency in Turkey and they conducted a survey with regard to the most admired 
companies in Turkey in 2012. According to the results of this survey, the fifteen most 
admired companies in Turkey will be examined in this research. These companies are 
as follows:677  
 
a) Turkcell; b) Garanti Bank; c) Coca-Cola; d) Arcelik; e) Koc Holding; f) 
Unilever; g) Turkiye Is Bank; h) Procter & Gamble; i) Eczasibasi Toplulugu; j) THY; 
k) Dogus Grubu; l) Sabanci Holding; m) Borusan; n) Ulker; and o) Tupras.   
 
In order to strengthen and to obtain more effective results from this empirical 
research, another fifteen companies listed on the Borsa-Istanbul have been selected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 For details see 1.1.1 above 
676 GfK Turkey, ‘The Most Admired Companies of Turkey Survey 2012’, 
http://www.gfk.com/gfkturkiye/knowledge_platform/surveys_publications/survey_single_sites/010696
/index.tr.html, accessed at 05/07/2014 
677 ibid 
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randomly from different sectors. These corporations have been indicated in Table 5 
and are as follows:  	  
a) Vestel; b) Vakko; c) Pegasus; d) Aselsan; e) Boyner Buyuk Magazacilik 
AS; f) Ford Otomotiv Sanayi AS; g) Nurol Gayrimenkul Yatirim Ortakligi AS; h) 
Pinar Sut Mamulleri AS; i) Acibadem Saglik Hizmetleri ve Ticaret AS; j) Alarko 
Holding AS; k) Goldas Kuyumculuk AS; l) Kent Gida AS; m) Koza Altin Isletmeleri 
AS; n) Kutahya Porselen AS; and o) Aygaz AS.   
 
All information used throughout this study is primary and reflects the 2013 
data of these companies on their webpage.  In this study, these thirty companies have 
been evaluated in the following tables, in terms of whether they have managed to 
publish the abovementioned five types of key information on their webpages. The 
main aim of this research was to understand the transparency level of corporations 
listed on the Borsa-Istanbul by comparing the differences and similarities between the 
most admired companies and the randomly selected companies. 
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Table	  4:	  The	  Availability	  of	  the	  Key	  Information	  on	  the	  Most	  Admired	  
Companies'	  Webpages	  Listed	  on	  the	  Borsa-­‐Istanbul	  
Information	   Background	  
Information	  
Summary	  
Of	  
Historical	  
Results	  
Key	  Non-­‐
Financial	  
Statistics	  
Forward-­‐
Looking	  
Information	  
Management	  
discussion	  
and	  analysis	  
Companies	  
Garanti	  Bank	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	   ✓	  
Coca	  Cola	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Arcelik	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	   ✓	  
Koc	  Holding	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	   ✓	  
Unilever	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	  
Turkcell	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Turkiye	  Is	  
Bank	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Procter	  &	  
Gamble	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Eczacibasi	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
THY	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Dogus	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Sabanci	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	   ✓	  
Borusan	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✖	  
Ulker	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Tupras	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Akbank	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Total	  
Percentage	  of	  
the	  availability	  
of	  the	  
information	  	  
100%	   100%	   73%	   87%	   93%	  
	  
	   	  
Innovations	  for	  Better	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  under	  the	  New	  Turkish	  Commercial	  and	  Capital	  
Market	  Law	  
	   215	  
Table	  5:	  The	  Availability	  of	  the	  Key	  Information	  on	  Randomly	  Selected	  
Companies'	  Webpages	  Listed	  on	  the	  Borsa-­‐Istanbul	  
Information	   Background	  
Information	  
Summary	  
Of	  
Historical	  
Results	  
Key	  Non-­‐
Financial	  
Statistics	   Forward-­‐Looking	  Information	   Management	  discussion	  and	  analysis	  
Companies	  
Aselsan	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Vestel	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Vakko	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	   ✓	  
Pegasus	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	  
Boyner	  AS	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Ford	  Otomotiv	  
Sanayi	  AS	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Nurol	  
Gayrimenkul	  
AS	  
✓	   ✖	   ✖	   ✖	   ✓	  
Information	   Background	  
Information	   Summary	  Of	  
Historical	  
Results	  
Key	  Non-­‐
Financial	  
Statistics	   Forward-­‐Looking	  Information	   Management	  discussion	  and	  analysis	  Companies	  
Pinar	  Sut	  
Mamulleri	  AS	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Acibadem	  
Saglik	  
Hizmeleri	  AS	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Alarko	  Holding	  
AS	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	  
Goldas	  
Kuyumculuk	  
AS	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✓	  
Kent	  Gida	  AS	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✖	   ✖	  
Koza	  Altin	  
Isletmeleri	  AS	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Kutahya	  
Porselen	  AS	  
✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Aygaz	  AS	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	  
Total	  
Percentage	  of	  
the	  availability	  
of	  the	  
information	  
100%	   93%	   87%	   67%	   93%	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4.3.3	  Analysis	  and	  Discussion	  	  	  
These two tables aim to indicate the availability of five types of key 
information: ‘summary of historical results; background information; key-non 
financial statistics; forward looking information and management discussion and 
analysis’, on the webpages of a total of 30 most admired and randomly selected 
companies listed on the Borsa-Istanbul. 
 
The evidence of this research indicates that the transparency level of the 
sample corporations seems to reach an adequate level with the new TCC in terms of 
the availability of the abovementioned information. In other words, as a developing 
country becoming integrated into both global capital markets and EU Membership, 
Turkey appears to be creating effective transparency legislations in general in the 
capital markets.    
 
According to the results of the both tables, the vast majority of the sample 
companies are successful in making background information, summaries of historical 
results and management discussion and analyses available to the public via their 
webpages. This can be taken as a good sign in understanding and analysing the 
transparency levels of corporations listed in the capital markets because these three 
types of information are the essential data that have a role in the decision-making 
process of market players.678   
 
On the other hand, as mentioned before, the key non-financial statistics and 
forward-looking information also play an important role in the decision-making 
process.679 However, it seems that the selected companies have a problem publishing 
or making them available on their webpages. As observed from the tables, the total 
percentage of availability of this information is 73% and 87% respectively for the 
most admired companies; 87% and 63% respectively for randomly selected 
companies. In order to improve the level of transparency in companies listed on 
Borsa-Istanbul, it is essential to take further steps with regards to these types of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
678 For details see 1.1.1 above  
679 ibid 
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information. In terms of forward-looking information, almost all corporations have 
managed to establish a risk management department in their corporate structures. 
Nevertheless, this department’s risk statements only explain and indicate how the 
department deals with risk and how they have been able to keep the risks that the 
company has already faced under control. However, there is not enough information 
about any potential risks the company may face in the future. Only Coca Cola, THY, 
Procter & Gamble, Turkcell and Ulker clearly analyse and explain possible future 
risks. In this respect, it seems that multinational companies in general have higher 
levels of compliance than pure Turkish ones.  
 
In terms of key non-financial statistics, the Turkish listed companies have 
managed to improve it. However, in terms of global markets or the international 
arena, it seems that the importance of the information regarding corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) has not yet been realised. Almost half of the sample corporations 
failed to publish this information on their webpages. Although, this information is not 
a mandatory requirement for listed companies, in order to improve the level of 
transparency and to make the capital markets more attractive for investors, in 
particular for long-term investors, a separate corporate governance or corporate social 
responsibility section should be designed on companies’ webpages. Hence, investors 
or market players would have more information and a clearer picture of the company.   
 
The final problem concerns the disclosure of management discussion and 
analysis. In fact, all the sample corporations were able to publish the information 
regarding management discussion and analysis on their webpages. However, this 
information is only available in the companies’ annual reports. The annual reports 
already consist of a huge amount of other information, such as corporate structures, 
boards meetings and one-year financial performance. It is argued that there is a strong 
correlation between forward-looking information and management discussion and 
analysis. Therefore, it would be appropriate to create a separate section on the 
webpage and to disclose both of these in that section. Thus, it would help the 
decision-making process of investors and provide more effective transparency 
structure for corporations. 
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Overall, the new TCC seems to have increased the transparency level of 
corporations listed on the Borsa-Istanbul by giving priority to information 
technologies in its legislative framework. With the empirical work above, it was 
aimed to indicate to what extent listed companies in Turkey have managed to 
implement mandatory and voluntary transparency requirements in the financial 
markets. It may be argued in the light of Tables 4 and 5 above that the sample 
corporations have been able to publish most of the essential key information on their 
webpages. Although the most admired companies seem to have better transparency 
levels than randomly selected companies, it can be claimed that both groups show 
similar results in terms of availability of this information on their webpages. 
However, the points to take into consideration are the availability of key non-financial 
statistics and forward-looking information because this information seems to remain a 
problematic issue for both sides. Key non-financial statistics and forward-looking 
information may play a key role in increasing the number of long-term investors in 
the financial markets. Hence, policy-makers may also manage to adopt some other 
appropriate requirements in order to disclose these two types of information. Hence, 
the level of transparency in financial markets could be increased and could be more 
operational for market players.  
 
4.4	  Chapter	  Summary	  and	  Conclusion 
Today, in the race to modernise laws, the importance of corporate governance, 
in particular the role of transparency for the well-functioning of the financial markets 
has been understood by both developed and developing countries. Turkey too, as a 
developing candidate country for EU Membership, seems to be involved in this race. 
 
 The Turkish corporate governance system consists of the concentrated 
ownership structure, which is mainly controlled by a small number of families. Due to 
the less developed capital markets the Turkish financial system was a bank-oriented 
one. However, with recent developments, in particular with the new TCC, the capital 
markets have improved and have also started to play an active role in the financial 
system. 
 
This chapter discussed how, between 2003 and 2013 in Turkey, various 
initiatives were introduced which aimed to strengthen the corporate governance 
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framework in the Turkish financial market.  In order to prevent fraudulent activities 
and to improve the effective functioning of the financial market, corporate 
governance principles were introduced and declared by the Capital Markets Board on 
a ‘comply or explain’ basis in 2003. Subsequently, several other amendments were 
made so as to bring the Commercial Code up to date. Better auditing standards were 
provided in 2003 and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were 
adopted in 2005. The old Commercial Code, enacted in 1957, failed to keep pace with 
the needs of rapidly changing financial markets. Therefore, as a major step forward, 
the new Commercial Code (TCC) was adopted in January 2011 and entered into force 
in July 2012. 
 
 The new TCC is a milestone for the Turkish capital system. It has provided a 
number of new tools in order to raise the Turkish capital markets to international 
level. Moreover, as a candidate country for EU Membership, the new Turkish 
Commercial Code aims to achieve harmonisation with EU requirements in its 
legislation. 
 
Transparency requirements have been improved in both the capital market and 
company law. With the new Capital Market Law No: 6362, the principles of public 
disclosure have been determined, the capital market institutions and their activities 
have been improved, the main standards with regard to the stock-exchange have been 
enhanced and the principles of the Capital Market Law have been introduced. With 
the revised company law, electronic transactions and the information society, 
commercial books, independent audit system, the rights and obligations of 
shareholders and financial statements have been adopted and enhanced.  
 
In particular, information technologies have been improved and electronic 
copies of all essential information are required to be made available on companies’ 
webpages. In addition, with the establishment of the ‘public disclosure platform’, a 
pan storage mechanism, all listed companies’ essential information has been 
disseminated and made available to the public at the right time, in the right place and 
in the right format. Hence, the public disclosure platform is the most important 
innovation for improving the level of transparency in the Turkish financial market. It 
was created under ‘The Declaration of the Public Disclosure Platform (VII-128.6), 
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which was published in the Official Gazette No: 28864. Its advantages can be 
evaluated in terms of issuers, investors and regulatory authorities as follows:680 For 
issuers, it creates a secure environment for the collection of data, gives an opportunity 
to disclose information without intermediaries, accelerates the speed of notification of 
information by reducing bureaucratic procedures and improves the quality of 
information. In terms of investors, it facilitates accessing disclosed information, 
provides immediate access for the disclosure of important changes in the financial 
market, and gives a chance to compare past and present performance of companies by 
keeping the essential information in the electronic archives for at least 10 years. With 
respect to regulatory authorities, it simplifies the financial markets’ monitoring 
system by creating a clear picture for legal bodies, which helps to detect illegal 
activities in the financial market.     
 
However, there are still some problematic areas in the transparency provisions 
that need to be considered by the Turkish policy-makers.  For example, the complex 
structure of transparency requirements, the lack of transparency in the comply or 
explain approaches, unclear requirements for the initial threshold of major 
shareholders, some inadequacies with regard to the risk management requirements, 
ineffective capacity of the commercial judiciary and the large backlog of cases due to 
slow proceedings in court still need to be tackled.  
 
To sum up, with the new TCC Turkey seems to be keeping pace with 
innovations in the financial markets and increasing the level of transparency pursuant 
to the market needs. However, more needs to be done. In order to increase the level of 
transparency and to provide effective rules, the abovementioned problems need to be 
addressed. In this regard, some similarities and differences between the EU and 
Turkey can be observed in the legislative frameworks of transparency regulations. In 
the next chapter, this issue will be analysed more closely.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680 Public Disclosure Platform, General Information: Advantages of PDP, 
http://www.kap.gov.tr/en/about-pdp/general-information.aspx, accessed at 7/4/2014 
Comparative	  Lessons	  for	  European	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws	  
	   221	  
5.	  COMPARATIVE	  LESSONS	  FOR	  EUROPEAN	  AND	  TURKISH	  
TRANSPARENCY	  LAWS	  	  
INTRODUCTION	  	  
 
As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the EU and Turkey have made some significant 
efforts to create better transparency laws in their legislative frameworks. 
Modernisation activities in the EU were initiated in 1999 and are still on going today. 
Like in the EU, during the time period between 2003 and 2013, essential 
improvements have been made in Turkey to enhance transparency requirements in the 
financial markets. In this respect, these Chapters indicated how the theory of 
transparency has been converted into practice within both the European and the 
Turkish legislative frameworks.   
 
But how effective transparency requirements can be created for the legislative 
frameworks or whether it is possible to claim that the EU or Turkey has managed to 
create a high level of information transparency with the on-going developments in the 
financial markets. From this point of view, it seems to be essential to determine the 
main conditions for better transparency laws in the market. Thus, according to these 
potential principles, it would be possible to analyse and compare whether or not both 
have managed to meet the core criteria in creating effective transparency laws in the 
financial markets. 
 
So far, however, there has been little discussion regarding the potential 
principles of better transparency rules in the literature. Therefore, in this part, these 
possible elements will be discussed. In determining the potential criteria, the findings 
of the previous Chapters may help our understanding.  
 
To elaborate, the first potential principle concerns the areas of law that will be 
reformed and developed to improve the efficiency of transparency rules. As explained 
in Chapter 3, better transparency rules require modernisation of both company and 
securities law. Therefore, the dual nature of transparency laws is paramount.  
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Secondly, in general, better transparency rules need to cover three essential 
criteria: ‘clarification, protectiveness and dissuasiveness’.681  These three criteria 
could play a key role for policy-makers in creating effective transparency rules 
because they constitute the main standards for what should be created in the 
legislative architecture. Additionally, these three principles could also provide the 
main framework for the rest of the potential criteria in creating better transparency 
rules. Hence, the second element is the right modalities of transparency requirements.   
 
Thirdly, in order to carry out the clarification principle it is essential to 
determine the type of information to be disclosed. Chapter 1 showed that the main 
disadvantage of a high level of transparency is the cost.682 Hence, in order to prevent 
an excess of information and to reduce unnecessary costs, it would be useful to define 
which information should be published for market players. Chapter 1 also indicated 
five types of information that have a positive impact on investors` decision-making; 
the ‘background information, the summary of historical results, key non-financial 
statistics, projected or forward looking information and management discussion and 
analysis’.683 In this part, these five types of information will be analysed. Thus, key 
information is the third element of better transparency requirements.   
 
Fourthly, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a well-organised enforcement 
mechanism plays a supplementary role in the process of carrying out the principles of 
protectiveness and dissuasiveness.684 Therefore, as well as having well-designed 
transparency rules, it is also essential to improve the power of supervisory authorities 
in the legislative frameworks. Thus, effective bodies and institutions are the fourth 
element of better transparency requirements. 
 
Fifthly, perhaps the most important principle is the adaptability of 
transparency laws with innovations. The modernisation efforts on transparency 
requirements are an endless process in the rapidly changing financial markets. 
Therefore, innovations, in particular new financial tools, should be simultaneously 
covered and legally adopted by policy-makers in the legislative frameworks. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 Ayşe Nur Canbaloglu (n 26), p.7 
682 For details see 1.1.3.2 above 
683 Christine A. Botosan (n 70), p.331 and see also 1.1.1 above 
684 For details see 2.1.2 above 
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Therefore, the process of adapting to innovations to existing rules is the final principle 
for better transparency requirements.    
         
In light of this information, the possible elements for better transparency laws 
may be listed as follows: a) The dual nature of transparency laws; b) The right 
modalities of transparency requirements; c) The key information that will be made 
available; d) The effective bodies and institutions; e) The adaptability of the relevant 
legal rules with recent innovations.	  	   	  	   These elements could help to make a good comparative analysis between the 
EU and Turkish transparency laws as a road map. Therefore, in this chapter: firstly, 
these five elements for better transparency laws will be examined and the reasons why 
these are the possible elements will be evaluated; secondly, the level of EU and 
Turkish transparency requirements will be evaluated pursuant to the abovementioned 
elements; and thirdly, the strengths and the weaknesses of EU and Turkish 
transparency laws will be highlighted, and possible remedies will be discussed.  
 
5.1	  Points	  of	  Reference	  for	  Better	  Transparency	  Laws	  	  
‘Responsive regulation is not a clearly defined program or set 
of prescriptions concerning the best way to regulate. On the 
contrary the best strategy is shown to depend on the context, 
regulatory culture, and history.’685 	  
The findings of the Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that creating an operational 
framework for better transparency requirements demands a great effort from policy-
makers because the good or bad results of transparency rules are dependent on the 
operation systems in the financial markets, which are set by policy-makers. However, 
the question that needs to be asked is how can effective transparency be created?  
 
In this respect, ‘the idea of responsive regulation’ in the literature can be 
considered as a starting point for a general framework for creating better transparency 
requirements.686 According to this approach, the main aim seems to be to consider the 
differences between players, such as policy-makers, industry associations and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Oxford Socio-Legal Studies Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
the Deregulation Debate, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992), p.5 
686 ibid, p.4 
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individuals, and to prevent any conflict of interest between these parties by providing 
harmony on their different motivations.687 Accordingly, it is claimed that trust and 
negotiation are the most important factors. Additionally, context, custom and previous 
events also play an important role in this process. According to this theory, the key 
factors of responsive regulation are, ‘tit-for-tat strategy, enforcement pyramid and 
sufficiently high dissuasive sanctions’. 688  In this respect, these key factors of 
responsive regulation may be used in creating better transparency law. 
 
For example, ‘tit for tat strategy’ refers to ‘equivalent retaliation’ as an 
English meaning, which is directly related to trust between the parties. It aims to 
create a regulatory environment, in which the regulatee complies with the law in a 
voluntary manner, and the regulator treats the regulatee fairly by carrying out 
‘procedural justice’.689  In transparency law, in order to build such an environment in 
legislative frameworks, it seems to be essential to persuade listed companies to carry 
out enacted transparency requirements by determining minimum transparency 
standards that are not burdensome for all listed companies in financial markets. This 
is important, because as explained in Table 1, in companies’ dilemma for the 
information disclosure in the financial markets, when all parties collectively cooperate 
with each other, all players win. 690  Therefore, if policymakers can determine 
transparency requirements that are useful for the attractiveness of listed companies by 
considering the different motivations between market players, then listed companies 
may fulfil these requirements in financial markets.  
 
Secondly, as mentioned above, responsive regulation is related to trust; 
therefore, it may have a positive impact on voluntary compliance in legislative 
frameworks. However, Six highlights in his research that ‘trust in regulatory relations 
does not necessarily occur naturally. It needs to be built and maintained.’691 In this 
respect, an enforcement mechanism may play a key role in building and maintaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687 ibid,  
688 Frédérique E. Six, Trust in responsive regulation theory: a critical appraisal from a trust perspective, 
(2012) presented paper at ECPR Standing Group on Regulation & Governance 
Exeter, June 27-29, 2012, p.2, http://regulation.upf.edu/exeter-12-papers/Paper%20044%20-
%20Six%202012%20-%20Trust%20in%20Responsive%20Regulation%20Theory.pdf, accessed at 
24/02/2014 and Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite (n 686)  689	  Frédérique E. Six (n 688), pp.3-4	  690	  For details see Table 1 above 
691 Frédérique E. Six (n 688), p.7 
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trust between the parties. As explained in Section 2.1.2, the absence of adequate 
enforcement mechanisms is one of the fundamental problems for better transparency 
law.692 However, besides having an enforcement mechanism, it is also essential to 
determine how it should react in the case of law is being breached in financial 
markets. Responsive regulation considers this issue under the approach of 
‘enforcement pyramid’. According to Ayres and Braithwaite, an enforcement pyramid 
fosters regulatory intervention when regulatory demands are not carried out by market 
players.693 The main feature of the enforcement pyramid is that it does not directly 
aim to penalise market players when they breach the law. As Ayres and Braithwaite 
emphasise ‘regulators will be more able to speak softly when they carry big sticks’.694 
Therefore, the enforcement pyramid consists of six steps: ‘persuasion, warning letter, 
civil penalty, criminal penalty, licence suspension and licence revocation’.695 In other 
words, the enforcement pyramid improves regulatory relations by following a 
‘hierarchical range of sanctions’.696  
 
In this respect, same strategy or approach can be used by supervisory 
authorities in financial markets due to complex structure of transparency law. 
Sometimes player may fail to comply with demands of transparency law because of 
complexities. Thus, following a ‘hierarchical range of sanctions’ not only helps to 
improve the effective functioning of enforcement mechanisms, but also to reduce 
complex terminology of transparency law by providing a guideline for market 
players. 
 
Thirdly, dissuasive sanctions refer to the ‘stick procedure’ in regulatory 
relations.697 As explained in Table 1, collective cooperation of all market players is 
the expected behaviour in financial markets. However, due to the ‘devil side of 
corporations’, some players may want to break this relation by committing some 
illegal activities.698 In such extreme cases, it is essential to create some dissuasive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 For details see 2.1.2 above 
693 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite (n 685), p.20 
694 ibid, p.19 
695 For further information see Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite (n 685), p.35 and Frédérique E. Six (n 
688), pp.3-4  
696 Frédérique E. Six (n 688), p.3 
697 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite (n 685), p.43 
698 For details see 2.2 above 
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sanctions in order to prevent violations of transparency requirements in financial 
markets.      
 
In creating better transparency rules, ‘the theory of responsive regulation’ may 
draw the main dimensions as the general framework. In addition, the efforts of both 
the EU and Turkey to improve transparency laws may be used to constitute the 
potential elements for successful transparency requirements. In the light of this 
information, the possible elements for effective transparency rules can be highlighted 
as follows: 
 
a) The dual nature of transparency laws: b) The right modalities of 
transparency requirements: c) The key information to be made available: d) Effective 
bodies and institutions: e) The adaptability of the relevant rules with recent 
innovations. 
 
In the following part, the main roles and reasons for these potential elements 
in effective transparency laws will be examined and evaluated.  
5.1.1	  The	  Dual	  Nature	  of	  Transparency	  Laws	  	  
The first step to having better transparency laws is to understand which area of 
law needs to be improved. It may be thought that, as transparency is a key element of 
corporate governance structures, increasing just company law would be enough. 
However, there is also a strong relation between a high level of transparency, 
corporate governance and the financial markets.699 Therefore, optimal transparency 
and financial disclosure require an effort in both company and securities law.  
  
A high level of information transparency not only improves corporate 
governance framework and provides well-organised corporate bodies for listed 
companies, but also helps to create a modern economy and integrated market by 
increasing competition and investor protection in the financial markets.700 Therefore, 
it requires an improvement process in both areas of laws.   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
699 For details see 1.1.3.1 above 
700 ibid 
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In order to have better transparency laws, it is essential to extend transparency 
requirements from two perspectives, ‘the financial markets perspective and listed 
companies’ perspective’. Hence, it is crucial to consider the dual nature of 
transparency laws. It is useful to understand the differences between the company and 
securities law and their roles in improving transparency requirements. This issue was 
explained in Chapter 3: therefore, it will be just touched here as a reminder.  
 
Securities law is a guarantor for the financial markets. It covers and adjusts 
general market issues, such as trading of listed companies` securities, and providing 
collaboration between interested parties in the financial markets. 701  The main 
difference between these two sectors of law is that securities law is more 
comprehensive than company law because it not only deals with listed companies’ 
issues, but also covers some rules for market participants to provide investor 
protection and efficiency in the financial markets.702 In terms of transparency rules, 
securities law aims to inform the entire market with essential information in a timely 
manner. 703  It reduces the cost of information by increasing the disclosure 
requirements to provide a chance to market participants to access, verify and analyse 
information about the situation of the markets.704 
 
Company law addresses the relationships between all the players in the 
company and settles the main standards and measures for listed companies. In terms 
of transparency requirements, it also has some positive effects on the financial 
markets. Compared to securities law, the main aim of company law is to provide 
useful information to interested parties by increasing financial reporting standards in 
order to help their decision-making process regarding the performance of listed 
companies.705   
 
These findings support the idea that there is a strong correlation between these 
two sectors of law in improving transparency requirements. These bilateral 
improvement processes are the supplementary basics of effective transparency laws in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701 Nis Jul Clausen (n 332), at p.173  
702 ibid 
703 Jaap Winter (336), p.105 
704 Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchom Ovsky (n 334), p.737 
705 Jaap Winter (n 336), p.105 
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the financial markets. Therefore, modernisation activities in both are the first element 
in the process of creating better transparency and disclosure obligations. 
5.1.2	  The	  Right	  Modalities	  of	  Transparency	  Requirements	  	  	  
Secondly, in general, transparency requirements should cover three principles: 
‘Clarification, protectiveness and dissuasiveness’.706 It is necessary here to clarify 
exactly what are meant by these principles.  
 
Chapter 1 discussed the large volume of published studies regarding the 
definition of transparency and disclosure in the literature. 707  The clarification 
principle is one of the general results derived from the definition itself. It refers to the 
facilitation in the decision-making progress of information users by making essential 
information available to the public regarding corporations at the right time, in the 
right format and in the right place.  
 
Protectiveness and dissuasiveness mean the protection of market participants 
from the potential tricks and embezzlements, which can be faced in the markets via 
the clarification process, by adopting adequate administrative and criminal fines and 
punishments. As discussed in Chapter 2, due to the ‘devil side of corporations’, 
people commit crime under four conditions: ‘pressing financial need’, ‘opportunity’, 
‘reasonable justification’ and ‘lack of moral principles’.708 Therefore, in order to 
prevent such temptations towards illegal activities, the principles of protectiveness 
and dissuasiveness seem to play a significant role in achieving better transparency 
requirements.  
 
In fact, these three principles can provide the main framework for all criteria 
of better transparency rules because there is a strong correlation between the three and 
all the other potential criteria. For instance, the principles of the dual nature of 
transparency laws, the key information and the adaptability of transparency 
requirements with recent innovations automatically provide clarification principles in 
the financial markets. Also, protectiveness and dissuasiveness cannot be fully carried 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706Ayşe Nur Canbaloglu (n 26), p.7 
707 Richard W. Oliver (n 58), Robert M. Bushman & Abbie J. Smith (n 65) and see also 1.1 above  
708 Zabihollah Rezaee (n 250), p.13, 
http://www.cism.my/upload/article/201107271219240.antifraudrole.pdf, accessed at 19/02/2014 
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out without effective legal bodies and institutions. In other words, the creation of 
supervisory authorities and institutions results from the principles of protectiveness 
and dissuasiveness. Therefore, it is claimed that these right modalities of transparency 
requirements constitute the main framework for better transparency rules and all other 
principles can be regarded as being linked to these requirements.  
5.1.3	  The	  Focus	  on	  the	  Key	  Information	  
Thirdly, a high level of transparency should not be simply understood as 
‘information bombarding’ for information users. It aims to make essential information 
available to the public at the right, in the right place and in the right format.  In fact, 
publishing too much information may lead to some problems from two points of 
view: Firstly, it can lead to ‘the Cassandra effect’ for information users. The 
Cassandra effect refers to difficulties in predicting possible future scenarios in the 
stock markets due to ‘information pollution’.709 Secondly, information disclosure is 
not free. Publishing unnecessary or useless information increases disclosure costs. 
Therefore, to reduce ‘information pollution’ and costs, it may be beneficial to 
determine the key information or the optimum information to be disclosed in the 
financial markets.  
 
The determinations of what information should be published draws a clear 
picture in creating better transparency requirements. In order to answer this question, 
it is essential to know the types of information that are useful for market players. This 
issue was analysed and examined in Chapter 1; therefore, in this part, only the key 
information, ‘background information, summary of historical results, key non-
financial statistic, projected or forward looking information and management 
discussion and analysis’, that has a positive impact on the decision-making process of 
investors will be highlighted.710 
 
5.1.4	  Effective	  Bodies	  and	  Institutions	  	   Fourthly, in addition to transparency rules, effective legal bodies and 
institutions can have a positive impact on improving the efficiency of transparency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
709 B. Allaberdiyev, L. Buccolieri, A. Pellegrini, N. Rezgui, I. Romano, ‘Cassandra Effect: A 
Retrospective Analysis of 1960s and 1970 Forecasts’, (2012) Eni Corporate University, p.1, 
http://www.iaasm.net/%5CUserFiles%5Cattach%5C20127583724Cassandra%20Effect.pdf, accessed 
at 18/06/2014  
710 Christine A. Botosan (n 70), p.331 and see also 1.1.1 above 
Comparative	  Lessons	  for	  European	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws	  
	   230	  
requirements. As explained in Chapter 2, the absence of well-organised legal bodies 
and institutions is an obstacle to better transparency requirements.711 Therefore, in 
order to deal with this increased responsibility, policy-makers should improve the 
legal systems as well as legal bodies and institutions.  
 
 Legal bodies and institutions can increase the effectiveness of transparency 
rules from two points of view: Firstly, official legal bodies, such as supervisory 
authorities, check and control whether listed companies manage to fulfil the required 
transparency rules and prepare the technical standards for further requirements. As 
well as this, although their implementations are different from country to country, 
they may also take some essential measures for uncovered areas in case of the 
emergency situations. Secondly, with ‘second order institutions’, such as investment 
bankers, financial analyst or lawyers, more guidance is provided for complex rules 
and disclosed information in the financial markets.712  
 
Legal bodies and institutions play the supplementary role for enacted rules. 
They not only monitor the financial markets pursuant to the legal requirements, but 
also guide market participants regarding unclear or complex issues. Additionally, they 
have the right to take some necessary measures for uncovered areas. Hence, they 
seem to have an important duty in providing a transparent environment in the 
financial markets.      
 
5.1.5	  The	  Adaptability	  of	  Relevant	  Legal	  Rules	  with	  Recent	  Innovations	  
 ‘Law has to be able to respond to new or 
changing circumstances.’713 
 
Fifthly, in the rapidly changing financial markets, effective transparency 
legislation always requires improvement and to be kept up to date. It should keep pace 
with any innovations in the rapidly changing financial markets; otherwise, out-of-date 
rules fail to provide a high level of transparency in the markets. 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711 For details see 2.1.2 above 
712 ibid and Fiemmetta Borgia (n 15), p.16 
713 Mathias M. Siems, Legal Adaptability in Elbonia, (2006) 2 International Journal of Law in Context 
4, pp.393-408, p.393 
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 Due to new technologies, there has been a rapid revolution in the financial 
markets. However, when we consider the adaptability process of transparency 
requirements with current innovations, the rate of adaptability of the rules is not at the 
same level as the rate of change of financial technologies. As explained in Chapter 2, 
policy-makers have failed to respond to the new changes in the financial markets and 
were unable to prevent the banking crisis in the financial markets in 2008.714  This 
problem led to a decrease in the effectiveness of the existing transparency rules. 
Therefore, by creating better transparency rules, the adaptability process with recent 
innovations should be improved and accelerated by policy-makers.  
 
 This issue is defined as ‘legal adaptability’ in the literature and a considerable 
number of studies have been published on it.715 According to Mathias Siems, for 
example, five types of criteria relating to the ‘legislature and administration, courts, 
advocates, legal academics and general public’ play a key role in fostering 
adaptability in legislative frameworks.716 In order to be able to respond quickly to 
changing circumstances: firstly, a well-organised structure should be created, 
bureaucratic barriers should be reduced and so, the length of the law-making process 
should be shortened; secondly, legislations should support courts to react to 
innovations in a rapidly manner by increasing the independence of the judiciary, 
providing a simple, low-cost and rapid working environment and inviting institutions 
or experts to actively participate in the proceedings; thirdly, there should be a 
sufficient number of lawyers who are open to the new ideas; fourthly, legal bodies, 
academics or think tanks should take a more active role in analysing foreign laws or 
recent changes around the world and so, they should provide more innovative 
ideas;717 fifthly, societies, in general should be granted with freedom of speech and 
encouraged to attend cultural amalgamation and intellectual debates.718 Thus, policy-
makers will be able to quickly respond to innovations in the financial markets and 
take essential measures in a timely manner.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 For details see 2.2 above 
715 Mathias Siems (n 713) and see also Katharina Pistor et al, ‘Innovation in Corporate Law’, (2003) 31 
Journal of Comparative Economics  
716 Mathias Siems (n 713), p.398 
717 For details see 5.1.4 above 
718 Mathias Siems (n 713), pp.395-398  
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 These findings suggest that in general, these five elements can play a key role 
for optimal transparency in financial markets. One implication of this study is the 
possibility that these potential principles could be used as a roadmap to make a good 
comparative analysis between different legislations. Hence, in the following part, in 
order to make for a comparison between European and Turkish transparency laws, the 
existing transparency rules will be compared to establish whether policy-makers have 
managed to include the abovementioned five elements in their legislative frameworks.  
 
5.2	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  EU	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws	  
Pursuant	  to	  the	  Core	  Elements	  of	  Better	  Transparency	  Requirements	  	  	  
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the fact that in the wake of recent financial 
scandals and crises, both the EU and Turkey realised the importance of effective 
transparency rules in the financial markets and took some major steps forward to 
create an effective legislative framework.  
 
As a candidate country for membership of the EU, Turkey has made a great 
effort to improve its transparency rules. In particular, with the new Turkish 
Commercial Act No: 6102, it seems to have harmonised most of the EU transparency 
laws into its legislation. The EU, like Turkey, also improved its transparency rules 
with recent modifications. In particular, with the revised Transparency Directive 
2013/50/EU, it managed to keep pace with innovations and provided some solutions 
for the problems, which existed in the original directive.  
 
The question that needs to be asked is, although there are a great number of 
transparency rules in both financial markets, have they managed to have the optimal 
transparency requirements for listed companies? In this part, this question will be 
assessed and evaluated by comparing the existing transparency rules of the EU and 
Turkey step by step pursuant to the abovementioned potential elements of better 
transparency requirements.  
5.2.1	  The	  Dual	  Nature	  of	  EU	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws:	  
 When the modernisation efforts of the EU to improve transparency rules in the 
financial markets are considered, it can be seen that the EU has constantly improved 
these two sectors of law. The EU initiated the modernisation activities in securities 
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law as a first step and during the modernisation history of EU securities law, several 
important measurements were prepared and adopted, such as the Financial Service 
Action Plan (the FSAP) and the Lamfalussy Report. And then, the EU maintained the 
improvement process with company law. The Report of the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts (HLG Report) and the Commission Action Plan are 
paramount in the modernisation activities of transparency innovations in the EU. 
Therefore, the EU seems to have provided the first element of better transparency 
requirements. EU transparency laws can be indicated in the following tables:719 
	  
Table	  6:	  EU	  Transparency	  Laws	   
In order to compete with the modernisation race in the financial markets, 
Turkey also seems to have improved transparency laws in these two sectors of law. In 
terms of securities law, Capital Market Law No: 6362, the Declarations and the 
Communiqués of the Capital Market Board of Turkey play a key role in improving 
transparency laws in Turkey. In terms of company law, transparency principles have 
been strengthened with the new Turkish Commercial Code (TCC) No: 6102. The 
main framework of Turkish transparency laws can be indicated as follows:       
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 For details see 3.1 and 3.2 above 
EU	  Securities	  Law	  
The	  Financial	  Service	  Action	  Plan	  (The	  FSAP)	  
The Transparency Directive, 
The  Market Abuse Directive, 
The Prospectus Directive,    
The   Accounting Directive 
The	  Lamfalussy	  Process	  
Four-Level Policy Making 
Strategy 
EU	  Company	  Law	  
The	  High	  Level	  Group	  of	  Company	  Law	  Experts	  Report	  
The	  EU	  Action	  Plan	  
Directive 2006/46/EC 
Directive 2007/36/EC 
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Table	  7:	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws 
 
As seen above, both have managed to improve transparency requirements in 
two sectors of law. In EU securities law, directives play a key role in improving 
transparency requirements. In particular, with the Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC-as amended by 2013/50/EU), essential transparency rules were 
aggregated and a general framework or minimum standards for transparency 
requirements could be provided throughout the Member States. In addition to the 
Transparency Directive, with other directives720 , the level of transparency was 
improved by adopting specific transparency rules within those directives. In light of 
this information, in terms of drawing the general framework for Member States, the 
EU seems to include essential transparency rules in the financial markets.    
 
In Turkish securities law, the CML is the main actor. In the second section of 
the CML (the principles of the public disclosure), essential transparency requirements 
were created. In addition, transparency requirements were also supported within other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 For details see 3.2.9 above 
Securities	  Law	  
The Capital Market Law No: 
6362 
The Capital Markets Board 
Communiqué on Principles 
Regarding Public Disclosure of 
Special Cases 2009 serial: VIII, 
No: 54  
The Declaration of the CMB 
with regard to the Financial 
Reporting Standards II-14.1 
The Corporate Governance 
Declaration of the Capital 
Market Board of Turkey II-17.1 
The Declaration of the CMB 
regarding the Special Cases 
II-15.1 
 
Company	  Law	  
The	  New	  Turkish	  Commercial	  Code	  (TCC)	  No:	  6102	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sections of the CML.721 In addition to the CML, the Capital Markets Board of Turkey 
also plays a key role in improving the transparency framework of securities law. With 
its Declarations and Communiqués, it aims to cover the unregulated transparency 
rules in the market.  
 
When both are compared in terms of transparency requirements, it can be 
argued that transparency requirements in the EU and Turkey are complicated. 
Similarly, due to the dispersed structure of transparency laws in both legislations, it is 
essential to examine more than one piece of legislation in the judicial frameworks as 
seen in Tables 6 and 7. Therefore, it is not easy to understand the main transparency 
rules in the two legislations. 
 
However, as compared to Turkey, the EU seems to have managed to create 
more organised transparency rules. It seems to be easier to analyse and understand 
transparency requirements in EU securities law. In particular, combining the essential 
transparency rules in a single piece of legislation, ‘in the Transparency Directive’, 
indicates to what extent the role and importance of a high level transparency are 
understood by policy-makers. In this respect, it is claimed that Turkish transparency 
rules under securities law are more complicated. The main problem is the essential 
transparency requirements, such as the initial thresholds of major shareholdings or the 
disclosing the periodic information, are not structured in a single legislation. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse all legislation separately under the securities law, 
which is time-consuming and onerous. Hence, creating a uniform transparency law or 
at least classifying the similar transparency requirements in the single piece of 
legislations would be helpful in improving transparency requirements under securities 
law for Turkey. 
 
In terms of company law, however, Turkey seems to have created more 
organised transparency rules. In this respect, more inclusive transparency rules can be 
observed in Turkish company law. In particular, with the new TCC No: 6102, Turkey 
has managed to create an innovative legislation for economic activities. Within this 
code, transparency requirements were adopted under six subsections: ‘Electronic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
721 For details see 4.2.1.1 above 
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transactions and information society; commercial books; risk management; 
independent audit system; rights and obligations of shareholders; and financial 
statements.722 Therefore, it seems that Turkey has managed to improve transparency 
requirements under company law in a more comprehensive and systematic manner.  
 
In the EU, transparency rules under company law are not very comprehensive 
compared to EU securities law or Turkish company law. As mentioned before, the EU 
does not follow an interventionist policy in the area of company law.723 However, this 
finding must be interpreted with caution because the EU only draws or constitutes the 
main standards for the Member States. On the other hand, they have the right to create 
more strict rules than the EU in their own national laws. In this respect, this analysis 
may provide only a partial picture. Further studies are therefore recommended.   
 
To sum up, the EU and Turkey have managed to improve transparency 
requirements in both company and securities law. Therefore, the first element of 
better transparency requirements exists in both. It may be useful to highlight the fact 
that the EU has better transparency rules under securities law, whereas Turkey has 
been more successful in creating transparency requirements under company law.    
 
5.2.2	  The	  Right	  Modalities	  of	  Transparency	  Requirements	  in	  EU	  and	  Turkish	  
Transparency	  Laws	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
As mentioned before, ‘clarification’ implies the high level of information 
transparency in financial markets by making essential information available to the 
public at the right time, in the right place and in the right format.724 Chapter 3 
indicated that in EU transparency laws, the Transparency Directive draws a clear 
picture for the general framework of transparency requirements. In particular, with 
Directive 2013/50/EU, the EU seems to improve the clarification principle of 
transparency requirements by considering the problems of the original Transparency 
Directive 2004/109/EC.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722 ibid 
723 Niamh Moloney (n 435), p.1010 
724 For details see 5.1.2 above 
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For example, with Articles 4 and 5 of the original Directive 2004/109/EC, the 
periodic information (the annual reports and the half yearly reports) was designated 
and which information was to be included within these reports was identified.725 With 
the revised Directive 2013/50/EU, the deadlines of these reports were modified and 
extended.726 Additionally, in the original Directive 2004/109/EC, in Article 4 (2-c) 
and in Article 5 (2-c), the format was clearly explained. According to these Articles, 
those financial statements (the annual report and half yearly report) must disclose 
‘true and fair’ information about the assets, responsibilities, profit or loss and 
financial position of the issuer and be prepared in accordance with international 
accounting standards.727 Moreover, with the revised Directive 2013/50/EU, disclosing 
the annual financial reports in a single electronic format, which will take effect from 1 
January 2020, will be developed by ESMA after analysing its cost and benefit in the 
financial markets.728 These requirements can be accepted as evidence that the EU has 
managed to include ‘clarification’ in its transparency laws.   
 
In Turkish transparency laws, the clarification principle seems to be provided 
by both company and securities law. In terms of securities law, the Declaration of the 
CMB with regard to the Accounting Standards II-14.1 plays a key role because it 
covers the disclosure of periodic information, such as annual reports and interim 
period financial reports, and designates the deadlines of those reports in the financial 
market. 729  The Corporate Governance Declaration of the CMB II-17.1 also 
determines the information policies in terms of the format, content and structure to 
make essential information available when required. Additionally, the information to 
be disclosed in the financial reports was elaborated with Article 15 of the CML 6362 
and Article 64 of the new TCC 6102.730 In addition, the Public Disclosure Platform 
(PDP) has had a significant impact on the effective flow of information in the 
financial market of Turkey. The PDP is the dissemination and storage mechanism of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 Directive 2004/109/EC, Articles 4/5 
726 Directive 2013/50/EU, Articles 4/5 
727 Directive 2004/109/EC, Articles 4 (2-c) and 5 (2-c) 
728 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 4 (b) 
729 The Capital Markets Board, The Declaration of the Capital Markets Board with regard to the 
Accounting Standards II-14.1, Articles 6, 7, 10 and 11, translated by myself, 
http://www.ticaretkanunu.net/sermaye-piyasasinda-finansal-raporlamaya-iliskin-esaslar-tebligi-ii-14-
1/, accessed 22/1/2014, see also 4.2.1.1 above 
730 For details see 4.2.1 above 
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the Turkish stock exchange (Borsa-Istanbul).731 The main aim of this platform is to 
provide true and fair information at the right time, place, format and at a low cost 
online. Therefore, with effective transparency laws and the PDP, Turkey has managed 
to include the ‘clarification principle’ into its legislative framework.   
 
It is observed that both follow the clarification principle in their transparency 
laws. However, there are a number of important differences between them. First of 
all, the main transparency rules are coordinated in the EU with the Transparency 
Directive unlike Turkey. In addition to the Transparency Directive, the Market Abuse 
Directive and the Accounting Directive may help to draw a general idea of the main 
framework of EU transparency requirements and to understand the key transparency 
rules in a wider perspective. However, transparency rules are complicated in the 
Turkish legislative framework, due to the dispersed structure and the lack of uniform 
legislations. The absence of transparency rules as a piece of single legislation in 
Turkey has led to an increase in complexities in understanding. In order to understand 
the main transparency requirements, it is essential to examine all the CML No: 6362, 
the new TCC No: 6102, and the declaration and communiqué of the CMB with regard 
to corporate governance principles, accounting standards and disclosure of material 
events. Therefore, so as to create a well-organised transparency law or to strengthen 
the clarification principle, it would be better to combine them in a single legislation.  
 
On the other hand, by creating the PDP in the financial market, Turkey has 
made a major improvement in the development of the transparency process. In short, 
Turkey has created an information-sharing network in a secure and rapid 
environment. Hence, it has facilitated accessing and disclosing any kinds of regulated 
information in the financial markets. The EU has not yet built such a storage and 
dissemination mechanism. With Directive 2013/50/EU, the EU has indicated an effort 
to deal with this problem within future strategies. According to Article 21 of the 
revised Directive, ESMA shall establish a central European access point on 1th 
January 2018.732 In order for the EU to improve the clarification principle in its 
transparency laws, it would be better to shorten the adoption process of this plan.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 Public Disclosure Platform, About Public Disclosure Platform, http://www.kap.gov.tr/en/about-
pdp/general-information.aspx, accessed at 23/01/2014  
732 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 21 
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Protectiveness and dissuasiveness are other essential principals that need to be 
included when creating better transparency rules. In fact, there is a strong correlation 
between these two principles because dissuasiveness already contains protectiveness 
in itself. In other words, protectiveness can only be provided with dissuasive 
sanctions. Therefore, in this part, these two principles will be jointly evaluated in EU 
and Turkish transparency laws. 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, mankind has ‘a devil side’. Therefore, in order to 
prevent or at least to reduce the negative impact of illicit activities, potential crimes, 
such as fraud or embezzlement should be clearly defined, and dissuasive sanctions 
should be adopted in transparency rules. It is claimed that protectiveness and 
dissuasiveness are linked to ‘the accountability principle’ of corporate governance.  
 
The EU seems to have taken some lessons from past financial scandals. In 
particular, with Directive 2013/50/EU, the EU has improved the sanctioning powers 
of the competent authorities. Apart from the Transparency Directive, the EU has also 
aimed to deal with the potential market abuse issues by creating the Market Abuse 
Directive and revising it as the Market Abuse Regulation No 596/2014 and the 
Directive on criminal sanctions (2014/57/EU).733 In this perspective, Articles 24, 25 
and 28 of the revised Directive (2013/50/EU) can be given as an example. With these 
Articles, the investigation powers of the competent authorities have been strengthened 
to ensure the expected results of fines and punishments in cross-border activities. 
Additionally, in the case of law being breached, minimum standards for 
administrative measures and sanctions were clearly determined by considering the 
difference between the natural and the legal person.734  
 
Moreover, as a major step forward in preventing market abuse issues, the 
Market Abuse Directive (MAD) plays an important role in EU financial markets. The 
MAD aims to prohibit any disadvantages in the financial markets that may occur due 
to insider dealing, false or misleading information and distorted price-setting 
mechanisms of financial instruments. Therefore, it is accepted as a guarantor for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733 The EU Single Market, Market Abuse, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/abuse/index_en.htm, accessed at 1/07/2014 
734 For details see 3.2.6 above 
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investor confidence. 735  However, in the light of new trading techniques and 
technologies, the effectiveness of the MAD has decreased in its fight against the 
recent market abuse issues in cross-border activities. Hence, to combat with these 
illegal behaviour in a more effective manner, the EP agreed to replace the MAD with 
a Regulation on Market Abuse (MAR) and Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal 
sanctions in the EU next year.736    
  
It is claimed that the EU has managed to create an effective legislative 
framework for protectiveness and dissuasiveness of the financial markets. In 
particular, creating the MAD and modernising it by keeping pace with innovations in 
the financial markets (MAR No 596/2014 and Directive 2014/57/EU) is good 
evidence of the EU’s approach to these principles. As well as the rules, the EU also 
improved the enforcement mechanism via the supervisory authorities by granting 
them investigation power in the financial markets. This issue will be evaluated in the 
following parts of this chapter.  
 
In Turkish transparency laws, some major step forwards have also been taken 
with the recent modernisation activities in Turkish commercial law, to include or 
improve the protectiveness and dissuasiveness principles of transparency rules. 
However, Turkey does not have a single piece of legislation for market abuse issues 
like the EU. Therefore, Turkish securities and company law will be examined 
separately to understand the main rules in dealing with these problems. Section six of 
CML No: 6362 covers administrative fines and capital market crimes to prevent the 
misbehaviour of market participants, such as market abuse and false or misleading 
information in the financial market. In this respect, Articles 106, 107, 111 and 112 are 
driving factors with regard to the general framework of market abuse issues. With 
these Articles, crimes and criminals were identified, market abuse issues, such as 
fraud, false or misleading information and false reporting were covered, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 Europa, Market Abuse, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_tran
sactions_in_securities/l24035_en.htm, accessed at 24/01/2014 and see also 3.2.9 above and The Market 
Abuse Directive, 2003/6/EC, MIFID 2004/39/EC  
736 Europa, European Parliament’s endorsement of the political agreement on Market Abuse 
Regulation, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-774_en.htm, accessed at 24/01/2014 and 
also see The EU Single Market, Market Abuse, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/abuse/index_en.htm, accessed at 1/07/2014  
Comparative	  Lessons	  for	  European	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws	  
	   241	  
enforcement mechanism, in case of breaching, was strengthened with dissuasive 
sanctions.737 In terms of company law, criminal liabilities in the case of misleading 
information on the companies’ websites or not creating a website were adopted under 
Article 562 of the new TCC No: 6102. Hence, with both company and securities law, 
Turkey seems to include protectiveness and dissuasiveness in its transparency law.  
 
To sum up, both in some way include protectiveness and dissuasiveness in 
their legislative frameworks. However, EU transparency laws differ from Turkey’s in 
a number of ways.  
 
First of all, the EU tends to be more concerned with market abuse issues, 
whereas Turkey has just a general framework or definite rules for market abuse 
problems. The EU presents a wider picture with the MAD –MAR for market abuse 
unlike Turkish transparency laws. The absence of a single legislation for market abuse 
in Turkey makes it difficult to create more comprehensive and accurate rules. With 
the MAD, the EU has managed to adopt a broad set of provisions in the financial 
markets and to provide better guidance throughout the Member States by determining 
optimum standards.  Therefore, it would be helpful for Turkey to create a single piece 
of legislation or to combine all market abuse rules into a single section in its capital 
market law.  
 
Secondly, a distinct difference can be observed between the EU and Turkey in 
terms of dissuasive sanctions. The EU seems to have more deterrent rules than Turkey. 
For example, according to Article 28 of Directive 2013/50/EU, in the case of the 
Transparency Directive being breached, the legal entity will receive administrative 
fines of ‘up to EUR 10, 000, 000 or up to 5 % of the total annual turnover’, and the 
natural person will receive administrative fines of ‘up to EUR 2, 000, 000; or up to 
twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach, where 
those can be determined; whichever is higher’.738 In terms of market abuse cases, new 
administrative measure and sanctions were proposed within the MAR. According to 
the proposed administrative fines and measures in the Market Abuse Regulation, the 
natural person will be fined at least €5 million for the offence of insider dealing and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 For details see 4.2 above 
738 Directive 2013/50/EU, Article 28 and see also 3.2 above 
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market manipulation, and €1 million and €500,000 for other offences; the legal person 
will be fined at least €15 million or 15% of annual turnover for the offence of insider 
dealing and market manipulation, and €2.5 million or 2% of its total annual turnover 
for the remaining issues.739  In addition, with Directive 2014/57/EU, the EU aims to 
ensure minimum criminal sanctions, which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, 
for market abuse by keeping pace with market developments. In other words, 
Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions determines the minimum standards for the 
complex financial scandals by drawing a clear framework for market abuse in EU 
financial markets.740    
On the other hand, the administrative fines and measures seem to be too weak 
and lack the deterrent impact in Turkey compared with the EU. In this respect, 
Articles 107, 111 and 112 of CML No: 6362 can be examined. For instance, 
according to Article 107, market abuse issues will be sanctioned with imprisonment 
of between two years and five years and a judicial fine of between five thousand days 
(TL500,000 or €163,762.61) up to ten thousand days (TL1,000,000 or 
€327,525.219).741 It would be useful to highlight that according to the Turkish 
Criminal Code Article 52, a daily judicial fine refers to the maximum amount of 100 
Turkish Liras.742 In terms of breaching the disclosure requirements of the officials 
appointed by the Board as desired, they will be punished with imprisonment for up to 
three years.743 In case of cooking the books on financial reports, any person or issuers 
will be punished with imprisonment for between six months and two years and with 
judicial fines of up to five thousands days (TL500,000 or €163,762.61). Additionally, 
they will be also exposed to the relevant provisions of Law No: 5237 (the Turkish 
Criminal Code).744 In terms of infringing the website requirements of Article 1524 of 
the new TCC NO: 6102, the companies or issuers will be punished with up to six-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
739 European Commission, European Parliament’s Endorsement of the political agreement on Market 
Abuse Regulation, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-774_en.htm?locale=en, accessed at 
27/01/2014   
740 Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions, Mathias Siems and Matthijs Nelemans, The Reform of 
the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or Evolution?, (2012) 19 The Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law	  pp.195-205, p.198 
741 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Article 107 (2) and for the exchange rate see the Central Bank 
of Turkey Exchange Rates, http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/kurlar/today.html, accessed at 3/3/2014  
742 The Turkish Criminal Code No: 5237, Article 52  
743 The Capital Market Law No: 6362, Article 111 (1) 
744 ibid, Article 112 
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months imprisonment and administrative fines of between a hundred days (TL10,000 
or €3,275.25219) and three hundred days (TL30,000 or €9,825.75658).745    
 
The results of this investigation show that administrative fines under Turkish 
transparency laws are lower than those of the EU. Due to the lack of deterrent effects 
of these legal sanctions in the financial market, the protectiveness and the 
dissuasiveness principle may lose its preventive power against illicit activities in the 
financial market, which may also have a negative impact on the effectiveness of 
transparency rules. Although imprisonment sanctions may have a positive effect on 
the dissuasiveness principle, it would also be better to increase the amount of the 
administrative fines for potential cases.    
 
5.2.3	  The	  Focus	  on	  Key	  Information	  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Botosan points out five types of information746 
that may play a key role in the decision-making process of information users. Hence, 
in this part, whether these types of information could be included by policy-makers in 
both EU and Turkish transparency laws will be examined separately.  
 
 Firstly, background information should be made available to the public to 
understand the general outlook of listed companies in terms of mission, vision or 
objectives. In the EU, it is mandatory for all listed companies to have their own 
website to disclose financial or non-financial information in the financial markets. 
With EU Directives, such as Directive 2003/58/EC Article 4, Directive 2004/109/EC 
Article 2 (L), Directive 2006/46/EC Article 7 (2), and Directive 2007/14/EC 
paragraph 17, the main information to be published on companies’ websites was 
determined, whereas how it should be done was largely left to the Member States. In 
other words, EU transparency laws do not include a minimum standard for the general 
framework of companies’ websites. In this respect, there are no requirements in EU 
laws with regard to disclosing of vision, mission or objectives. On the other hand, all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 562 (12) and see also 4.2 above 
746 Christine A. Botosan (n 70), p.331 and see also 1.1.1 above 
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listed companies in any stock exchange, such as the London stock exchange747, 
generally make this background information available to the public voluntarily on 
their websites. This can be seen as a weakness of EU transparency laws because there 
are no comprehensive rules about background information. Hence, it would be better 
to create an inclusive single section either in the Transparency Directive or in the EU 
Action Plan with regard to the website requirement of EU listed companies.  
 
In Turkey, with the new TCC No: 6102, the change in information 
technologies has been considered and the establishment of a website for each listed 
company has been adopted as an obligation in the new code.748 In more detail, 
according to Article 1524 of the new TCC No: 6102, every listed company must open 
a webpage within three months from the date of its registration on the commercial 
register to make essential information available to the public. Additionally, the 
content of the information to be published on the companies’ websites was 
comprehensively identified in a single piece of legislation in Turkey749. On the other 
hand, although this regulation covers certain content of information to be published 
on companies’ websites, it does not include any requirements with regard to 
background information. Like EU listed companies, as can be seen in the empirical 
work of Chapter 4, all publish background information voluntarily. Turkey, unlike the 
EU, has managed to create a single legislation for the website requirements of listed 
companies. Hence, the requirement of background information could be covered in 
Regulation No: 28663.  
 
It could be thought from this investigation neither requires background 
information as mandatory. However, this information is already made available to the 
public in specific sub-sections of the annual reports. Therefore, both have managed to 
include background information in their legislative architectures.  
 
Secondly, the summary of historical results should be disclosed by listed 
companies in the financial markets. In EU transparency laws, the Transparency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747 London Stock Exchange, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-
markets/stocks/summary/company-summary.html?fourWayKey=GB00B70FPS60GBGBXSET1, 
accessed at 28/01/2014 
748 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 1524 
749 Regulation on the website that will be opened by the listed companies No: 28663, Article 6 
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Directive, the Prospectus Directive and the EU Action Plan Directives, such as 
Directive 2006/46/EC are the main actors in requiring a summary of historical results. 
For example, Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2013/50/EU impose the disclosure of 
periodic information (annual reports and half-yearly reports) in financial markets. The 
Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC, which was revised within Directive 2010/73/EU, 
requires a prospectus that includes all essential information about the profits and 
losses, the financial position and the assets and liabilities of a company. 750 
Furthermore, the EU Action Plan settles the preparation and the publication of the 
annual corporate governance statement in the annual reports. Directive 2006/46/EC 
Article 10 determines the content of the annual corporate governance statement.751 
This information illustrates that EU transparency laws cover the summary of 
historical results by requiring financial reports from listed companies. 
 
Like the EU, the summary of historical results was covered by a number of 
transparency requirements in Turkish legislative framework. For example, Article 14 
of CML No: 6362 determines the main criteria on financial reporting. Article 15 of 
CML No: 6362 states that any information, event or development that has a positive 
or negative impact on the decision-making process must be made available to the 
public. Articles 6 and 7 of the Declaration of the CMB with regard to Accounting 
Standards (II-14.1) cover the disclosure of periodic information, such as annual 
reports, half yearly reports and quarterly reports in the financial markets. Apart from 
financial reports, some other financial statements or commercial books were adopted 
under Turkish company law. For instance, Article 64 sets out the bookkeeping 
obligations of listed companies and clearly identifies the books to be prepared and 
published.752 Additionally, Articles 514, 515 and 516 deal with the requirement and 
publication of some other financial statements of the corporations, such as annual 
activity reports. 
 
Overall, these results indicate that both have managed to include the 
requirement of the summary of historical results in the great number of financial 
statements in their transparency laws. However, unlike the EU, Turkish transparency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750 Europa, Proposed Directive on Prospectuses Frequently Asked Question, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-01-204_en.htm?locale=en, accessed at 28/01/2014  
751 Directive 2006/46/EC, Article 10 
752 The New TCC No: 6102, Article 64, and see 4.2.1.2 above 
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laws still require quarterly financial reports from listed companies.753 As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the mandatory requirement of the disclosure of quarterly financial reports 
is unnecessary and may also have a negative impact on the financial markets. It is 
unnecessary because the information that is published in quarterly financial reports is 
already disclosed in annual and half-yearly reports in the financial markets. 
Additionally, the information regarding listed companies that has a negative or 
positive impact on the decision-making process of information users is immediately 
disclosed on the PDP of Turkey.754 Thus, it prevents a delay in accessing essential 
information in the financial markets. It may also have a negative impact because it 
increases the cost, which leads to increasing the invisibility problem of SMEs.755 
Therefore, like the EU, Turkey may decide on the abolishment of the mandatory 
requirement for quarterly financial reports.      
 
 Thirdly, key non-financial statistics should be required within transparency 
laws. As mentioned before, it may be useful to reiterate that this thesis examines and 
evaluates the role and the importance of transparency requirements based on the 
disclosure of the financial information. Therefore, the current study is limited by the 
lack of information on the mission of non-financial information in transparency 
requirements as the main argument of this thesis. However, as explained with the 
abovementioned information and in Chapter 1756, in order to prevent ‘short termism’ 
and to increase the number of long-term investors in the financial markets, the 
disclosure of non-financial information also has a key role in improving the level of 
transparency. Thus, in this part, as a potential element of better transparency rules, to 
what extent both the EU and Turkey has managed to include the disclosure of non-
financial information in their legislative frameworks will be assessed. Further studies 
on non-financial information disclosure are therefore recommended.   
Key non-financial statistics give detailed information regarding the workforce 
and the products of a company, such as the number of employees, average 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 The Capital Markets Board, The Declaration of the Capital Market Board with regard to the 
Accounting Standards II-14.1, Article 7, translated by myself, http://www.ticaretkanunu.net/sermaye-
piyasasinda-finansal-raporlamaya-iliskin-esaslar-tebligi-ii-14-1/, accessed 29/1/2014 
754 The Declaration of the Capital Markets Board Regarding the Principles for the Information, 
Documents and Explanations that are sent to the Public Disclosure Platform Serial VIII No: 61 and the 
Declaration of the Capital Markets Board Regarding the Special Events Serial II No: 15.1 
755 For details see 3.1 and 3.2 above 
756 For details see 1.1.1 above 
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compensation for employees or growth in units sold. Additionally, it covers the 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility projects (CSR) in listed companies. There 
is a large volume of published studies, which describe the role of the CSR in 
companies.757 In short, it is a concept of building a relationship between a company 
and the society by not only caring for the company itself, but also serving and helping 
the society via economic, legal or moral social projects.758  Apart from financial 
information, non-financial information also plays a key role in the decision-making 
process of information users. A great number of researches have tried to prove the 
positive relationship between the disclosure of non-financial information and 
corporate performance in the literature. For example, Waddock and Graves indicate 
the positive impact of the CSR on the long-term performance measures of listed 
companies in their research.759 Additionally, the European Commission also claims 
that the disclosure of non-financial information may positively affect the long-term 
investment goals of companies by increasing the attractiveness of the financial 
markets for long-term investors.760 Hence, it can be useful to include the disclosure of 
non-financial information in transparency laws.  
The EU has realised the importance of the disclosure of non-financial 
information for information users and has taken some major steps in order to improve 
the disclosure of non-financial information. In this respect, Accounting Directive 
2013/34/EU was modernised to deal with the requirements of non-financial 
information.761      
Directive 2013/34/EU generally determines the content of financial 
statements by considering the size of companies and also focuses on the disclosure of 
non-financial information. For example, Article 16 (h) requires information with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
757Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel, Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial 
Performance: Correlation or Misspecification, (2000) 21 Strategic Management Journal pp.601-609 or 
Jean B. McGuire, Alison Sundgren and Thomas Schneeweis, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm 
Financial Performance, (1988) 31 Academy of Management Journal 4 pp.854-872    
758 David Crowther and Guler Aras, Corporate Social Responsibility, (Ventus Publishing, 2008), p.10 
759 Waddock, S. and S. Graves, The corporate social performance – financial performance link, (1997) 
Strategic Management Journal, 18(4), pp. 303–319 cited in Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel (n 
748), p.604 
760 European Commission, CSR – Reporting and Disclosure, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/reporting-
disclosure/index_en.htm, accessed at 29/01/2014 
761 European Commission, Non-Financial Reporting, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/non-financial_reporting/index_en.htm, accessed at 
30/01/2014 
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regard to ‘the average number of employees during the financial year’ from listed 
companies regardless of their size.762 Additionally, within the management report, it 
requires companies to disclose information regarding social and environmental 
matters.763 This study has shown that the EU has managed to require the disclosure 
of non-financial information with Directive 2013/34/EU.  
In Turkey, this issue is considered under the Corporate Governance 
Declaration of the CMB serial: II-17.1 No: 28871. According to this declaration, 
non-financial information, such as information with regard to employees and 
corporate social responsibilities must be published within listed companies’ annual 
reports.764  
The results of this investigation support the idea that both include the 
disclosure of non-financial information in their transparency laws. In this respect, 
annual reports play an important role because both in the EU and Turkey, non-
financial information is generally made available within these reports. However, 
there is no requirement to publish this information on the website of listed companies 
as a separate section from annual reports. If the role of non-financial information in 
the attractiveness of long-term investments is considered, it may be useful to require 
a separate section on listed companies’ websites for non-financial information.  
Fourthly, forward-looking information and management discussion and 
analysis are important for the decision-making process of information users. 
Forward-looking information refers to the risks listed companies face on the financial 
markets.765 This information is generally disclosed within management reports and 
management discussion and analysis indicates an evaluation of the general 
performance of companies pursuant to the indicators on their financial reports. In this 
section, the disclosure requirements of these two types of information will be 
examined together due to the direct link between them. 
In the EU, the content of the management report was determined by Directive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762 Directive 2013/34/EU, Article 16 (h) 
763 ibid, Article 19 
764 The Corporate Governance Declaration of the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB Serial II-
17.1 No: 28871, Section 2: Public Disclosure and Transparency, 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/apps/teblig/displayteblig.aspx?id=454&ct=f&action=displayfile, translated by 
my self, accessed at 30/01/2014 
765 For details see 1.1.1 above 
Comparative	  Lessons	  for	  European	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws	  
	   249	  
2013/34/EU. For example, according to Article 19 of Directive 2013/34/EU, the 
management report must explain the main risks and uncertainties that companies face 
during the financial year-period.766 Additionally, in terms of the assessment of their 
financial position, expected risks, such as ‘the price risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and 
cash flow risk’ to which the company is exposed, must also be made available within 
management report.767  Apart from the risks, the management discussion and analysis 
is also presented in the management report. In the report, managers give review the 
general performance and financial position of companies, and comment on the main 
complexities in the business sector.768        
In Turkey, the disclosure of forward-looking information and management 
discussion and analysis are carried out in the annual activity report of the Board of 
Directors. This issue was adopted under Article 516 of the new TCC No: 6102. 
According to this Article, the annual activity report of the Board of Directors must 
indicate any expected risks and uncertainties that have a negative impact on the 
development of a company. Apart from the risks, it must also reflect a general 
examination of the Board regarding the company’s financial position and the future 
expectations of the business sector in a true, fair and comprehensive manner.769  
 
These findings indicate that the disclosure of key information is the most 
important element in having better transparency rules in the financial markets. It seems 
that in general, both have successfully included key information in their transparency 
laws.  However, there are some shortcomings in the transparency laws of both. For 
example, in the EU, there is no rule for the minimum standards of website 
requirements. It would be better to create an inclusive single section either in the 
Transparency Directive or in the EU Action Plan with regard to the website 
requirement of EU listed companies.  In Turkey, the disclosure of quarterly financial 
reports is still mandatory. As mentioned before, it has some negative effects on the 
financial markets. Hence, it would be helpful, in particular for SMEs, to abolish the 
mandatory requirements for quarterly financial reports. Finally, both have managed to 
require non-financial information from listed companies. However, there is still no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 Directive 2013/34/EU, Article 19 (1) 
767 Ibid, Article 19 (2-e) 
768 Directive 2013/34/EU, Article 19 
769 The New TCC 6102, Article 516 
Comparative	  Lessons	  for	  European	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws	  
	   250	  
requirement to publish this information on companies’ websites. Thus, to increase the 
level of information transparency, it would be better to require it on the website as 
mandatory.  
5.2.4	  Effective	  Bodies	  and	  Institutions	  
Chapter 2 showed that legal bodies or institutions could be created in two 
ways: ‘The formal legal institutions and second-order institutions’.770 In this part, 
whether both the EU and Turkey have managed to build these kinds of institutions in 
their legislative frameworks will be examined. 
 
The EU seems to have understood the importance the legal institutions in the 
financial markets by creating the new European System of Financial Supervision 
recently. With the latest reforms to supervisory authorities, new supervisors, 
European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), European Banking Authority, 
and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority have replaced the 
former supervisory authorities. In this part, only ESMA will be analysed due to its 
role in the financial markets.  
 
ESMA replaced the former Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) in 2011.771 ESMA aims to guarantee the effective functioning of securities 
markets throughout the Member States by ensuring transparency, efficiency and 
integrity in the financial markets.772   Furthermore, it improves the supervisory 
structure of the financial systems by collaborating with other supervisory and 
competent authorities in the national authorities.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, ESMA plays a key role at each level of the policy-
making process of the EU.773 Therefore, in terms of creating transparency rules, it not 
only provides technical advice by developing non-binding regulatory and 
implementing technical standards in accordance with Articles 290 and 291 of TFEU, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 For details see 2.1.2 
771 The European Commission, ‘The EU Single Market: Overview’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm#package, accessed at 3/2/2014, 
and see also Pierre Schammo, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the veil on the 
allocation of powers’  (2011) (London; South Hackensack, N.J.) [Stevens; F.B. Rothman & Co.] 48 
Common market law review pp.1879-1914, p.1879 and for further information, see also 3.1.1.4 above 
772 ESMA, About: ESMA in short, http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/esma-short, accessed at 3/2/2014 
773 For details see 3.1.1.4 
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which are based on ‘the comply or explain approach’, but it also checks and controls 
the Member States as to whether transparency rules are implemented throughout the 
EU in accordance with the transparency directive or other elements of EU 
Directives. 774  Furthermore, ‘in very specific circumstances’, such as financial 
scandals or crises, to prevent or to immediately reduce the negative impact of these 
unpredicted problems, ESMA may adopt legally binding emergency measures in the 
financial markets in accordance with Article 114 of TFEU by acting as a policy-
making entity in the EU.775 In this respect, as one of the official legal institutions in 
the EU, ESMA has a positive effect on creating better transparency rules in the 
financial markets.       
             
In addition to this, it is useful to mention the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) as another official legal institution in the EU. The ESRB was established 
under Regulation No: 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council on 24 
November 2010 for the macro prudential oversight of the financial system.776 The 
main purpose of the ESRB is to fight the systemic risks in the financial markets. In 
order to deal with this problem: Firstly, it defines and accumulates the essential 
information; secondly, it determines risks and puts them in an order according to their 
levels; thirdly, it warns the essential authorities, such as the EU, the European 
supervisory authorities or the national supervisory authorities; and finally, it makes 
recommendations with regard to the measures to be taken.777 In terms of transparency, 
it does not have a direct impact on the financial markets, but by monitoring, 
identifying and preventing risks, it highlights any potential threats regarding the real 
performance of the financial markets; hence, it presents some useful information to 
market players.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774 ESMA (n 772), for further information about the ‘comply or explain approach’, see also Directive 
2006/46/EC, Article 46a 
775 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release, The power of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority to adopt emergency measures on the financial markets of the Member States in 
order to regulate or prohibit short selling is compatible with EU law, (2014) No: 7/14, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-01/cp140007en.pdf, accessed at 
22/01/2014 
776 Europa, European Systemic Risk Board, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_gen
eral_framework/mi0068_en.htm, accessed at 3/2/2014 
777 ibid 
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Apart from these official institutions, there are also some second-order 
institutions in the EU. The Expert Advisory Group (EAG) is one example of these 
institutions. It was created by the European Commission in order to make technical 
recommendations on corporate governance and company law measures.778 However, 
it seems that since 2009, it has not been very active in the financial markets.779  
Secondly, the European Corporate Governance Forum (ECGF) also helps to improve 
the level of transparency in the financial markets. It was established in 2004 to ensure 
the completeness between national codes of the Member States by advising the 
European Commission.780 It generally publishes an annual report with regard to its 
activities every year; however, the last report was published in 2011, because the 
mandatory disclosure of the annual reports of the ECGF expired in June 2011.781   
 
The EU has managed to support transparency rules with legal bodies and 
institutions. In particular, with recent reforms to the supervisory structure, it improved 
the power and efficiency of the legal bodies in the financial markets. Hence, both with 
official bodies, such as ESMA and second-order institutions, such as the EAG or the 
ECGF, it created an efficient environment for transparency requirements by providing 
a direct link between policy-makers, supervisors, guides and financial analysts. 
Besides these legal bodies and institutions, every Member State has also created their 
own supervisory authorities that are the core enforcement institutions for their 
financial markets, such the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK.  
 
Turkey has also realised the main function of these legal bodies and 
institutions in creating effective transparency rules in the financial markets and to 
some extent, has managed to establish official institutions and second-order 
institutions in its legislative architecture. 
 
In terms of the official bodies, the Capital Markets Board (CMB), the Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Agency (BRSA), and the Saving Deposit Insurance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 European Commission, The EU Single Market-Advisory Group, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/advisory/index_en.htm, accessed at 3/2/2014 
779 ibid 
780 European Commission, the EU Single Market, European Corporate Governance Forum, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm, accessed at 3/2/2014 
781 ibid 
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Funds (SDIF) take the leading positions in Turkey. In this part, only the CMB will be 
examined due to its role in the financial market.  
 
Chapter 4 showed that the CMB is the supervisory authority of the Turkish 
financial market that is empowered by the Capital Markets Law.782 It aims to enhance 
the effective functioning of the financial market by creating a well-organised business 
environment for market participants. Like ESMA, the CMB plays a key role in the 
financial market. It determines certain policies for the financial market by publishing 
its declarations and also supervises listed companies in the market.783 In this respect, 
it is different from ESMA because ESMA can only make legally binding measures for 
emergency situations or ‘specific circumstances’784, whereas the CMB may act as a 
regulatory body or a policy-making entity in the Turkish legislative framework in 
terms of determining corporate governance principles or introducing newly invented 
financial tools.785 In addition to these, it also monitors listed companies and in the 
case of rules being breached, it imposes the CML provisions.786 Therefore, the CMB 
is the main regulatory body and supervisory authority in the financial market.  
 
Apart from the official bodies, there are some private organisations that can be 
categorised as second-order institutions in Turkey. The Turkish Industrialists’ 
Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), the Private Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association (MUSIAD), the Corporate Governance Association of Turkey and the 
Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey can be given as some of the examples of 
second-order institutions in Turkey. 787  Unlike the EU, Turkish second-order 
institutions seem to be more active than their counterparts in the EU. This is because 
2014 reports of the Turkish second-order institutions are available on their websites, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
782 For details see 4.2.2.1 above 
783 Capital Markets Board of Turkey, ‘Our Mission’, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=0&submenuheader=-1, 
accessed at 4/2/2014 
784 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release, The power of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority to adopt emergency measures on the financial markets of the Member States in 
order to regulate or prohibit short selling is compatible with EU law, (2014) No: 7/14, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-01/cp140007en.pdf, accessed at 
4/02/2014 
785 Capital Markets Board of Turkey (n 783) 
786 ibid 
787 For details see 4.2.2.2 above 
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whereas in the EU, since 2011 these institutions have not prepared and published their 
reports. 
 
This study has found that both the EU and Turkey seem to have built legal 
institutions and private organisations in their financial markets in order to improve the 
efficiency of the adopted rules. In the EU, ESMA draws a clear picture with regard to 
the effective functioning of transparency requirements. In particular, with recent 
reforms to the supervisory structure of the EU, it can monitor listed companies, adopt 
legally binding measures for emergency situations, take a legal decision in the case of 
the law being breached and make recommendations for market participants. However, 
second-order institutions have not been very active for a long-time. Although ESMA 
provides the essential guidelines in EU financial markets, it would also be beneficial 
to receive some additional comments about recent issues from second-order 
institutions.  
 
In Turkey, like ESMA, the CMB plays a key role in the financial market. It 
not only adopts essential measures, but also monitors companies and enacts legal 
provisions. As well as the CMB, private organisations and institutions also support 
and examine the adopted rules, and underline the strengths and weaknesses of the 
financial market by publishing their annual reports regarding the on-going 
performance of the country. Hence, it can be claimed that both have managed to 
improve their transparency rules via the effective bodies and institutions. 
5.2.5	  The	  Adaptability	  of	  Relevant	  Rules	  with	  Recent	  Innovations	  	  
The adaptability of transparency requirements with recent innovations plays 
the most important role. This is because the existence of out-of-date requirements 
does not have any positive impact in the financial markets and reduces the efficiency 
of existing rules. Improving transparency rules is an endless process. Therefore, it 
always requires an improvement procedure and being up-to-date in order to keep pace 
with innovations in the financial markets. 
 
This principle can be observed in EU legislative framework. For example, the 
original Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC was revised and amended as the revised 
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Directive 2013/50/EU in 2013. 788  Like the Transparency Directive, Prospectus 
Directive 2003/71/EC was amended as Directive 2010/73/EU in order to improve the 
protections of investors against new technologies in the financial markets. 789 
Additionally, the Market Abuse Directive was also revised with the new reform 
activities in the EU. With recent improvements, in order to combat with the market 
abuse in a more effective manner, the EP agreed to replace the Market Abuse 
Directive 2003/6/EC with the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) in the EU.790 Apart 
from these, the Accounting Directives, the Fourth (78/660/EEC) and the Seventh 
(83/349/EEC) Directives, were improved with the Eighth Directive (2006/43/EC) as a 
response to financial scandals in the market at that time, such as Enron.791 Then, the 
Accounting Directives were reviewed and replaced with Directive 2013/34/EU by the 
EP and the Council in 2013.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned directives, the Financial Services Action 
Plan, the Lamfalussy Process, and the EU Action Plan have also been updated due to 
the rapidly changing conditions in the financial markets.792 
 
In Turkey, the same improvements of transparency legislations can be 
observed. Turkey, with the new commercial code made a major step forward to carry 
the Turkish Capital Markets into the international area by providing new dimensions 
after more than 50 years. In 2011, the new Turkish Commercial Code No: 6102 
replaced the old Turkish Commercial Code No: 6772 that entered into force in 1956. 
With the new code, more modern requirements pursuant to the technological 
developments in the finance and business sector, the audit, the reporting and the 
corporate governance standards that are in accordance with international standards, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788 For details see 3.1 and 3.2 above 
789 European Commission, The EU Single Market: the Prospectus Directive, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/prospectus/index_en.htm, accessed at 5/2/2014 
790 Europa, European Parliament’s endorsement of the political agreement on Market Abuse 
Regulation, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-774_en.htm, accessed at 5/2/2014  
791 The Eighth Accounting Directive (2006/43/EC) 
792 For details see 3.1 and 3.2 above, and also European Commission, ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan: European Company and Corporate Governance- a 
modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies’, COM (2012) 740 
final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0740:FIN:EN:PDF, 
accessed at 3/3/2014, pp.4-5 
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and better transparency rules were aimed for Turkey’s well-organised financial 
market.  
 
Apart from the new commercial code, the Capital Markets Law of Turkey has 
also been revised and amended. The new Capital Markets Law No: 6362 was enacted 
in 2012. Hence, the former code No: 2499 that entered into force in 1981 was 
abolished and replaced by the new CML. Like the new commercial code, the new 
capital markets law also aims to create rules, which are compatible with EU and 
international standards in the market.793     
 
In light of this investigation, it can be claimed that both have included the 
principle of the adaptability of transparency requirements with recent innovations. 
However, besides what should be created, when should be adopted is also important. 
In other words, it is essential to update the legislative frameworks with recent 
innovations in the financial markets, but it should be done in a timely manner. 
Otherwise, the delay in modernisation efforts may not have any positive impact in the 
rapidly changing financial markets. For example, as explained before, lack of 
transparency played a key role in the EU financial crisis in 2008;794 however, the 
transparency directive was revised in 2013, five years after the crisis. Like the EU, 
Turkey managed to strength its legislations in 2011. Therefore, it would be better for 
both to reduce the time wasted on red tape issues in the policy-making process. In this 
respect, policy-makers should be able to increase the adoption process of new 
proposals in a timely manner.  
 
5.3	  Analysis	  and	  Discussion	  
It is argued that in creating better transparency rules, these abovementioned 
core elements can be accepted as a guide for policy-makers. In this respect, the results 
of this investigation show that both the EU and Turkey have managed to improve the 
level of transparency by including these elements in their legislative architectures. In 
order to understand to what extent both have been successful in implementing these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793 For details see 4.2.1 above 
794 For details see 2.2 above and also Orkun Akseli, Was securitisation the culprit? Explanation of legal 
process behind creation of mortgage-backed sub-prime securities published in Joanna Grey and Orkun 
Akseli, Financial Regulation in Crisis? The Role of Law and the Failure of Northern Rock, (Elgar 
Financial Law, Glos-2011), pp.6-7  
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elements, the strengths and weaknesses of both transparency laws are indicated in 
Tables 8 and 9 on the following pages:  
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Table	   8:	   The	   Core	   Elements	   of	   Better	   Transparency	   Rules	   in	   the	   Existing	   EU	  
Transparency	  Requirements	  
	   	    
The	  Core	  Elements	   Weaknesses	   Strengths	   Recommendations	  
	  
	  
The	  dual	  nature	  of	  
Transparency	  Laws	  
Gold	  Plating:	  i.e.:	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  uniform	  legislation	  for	  the	  initial	  threshold	  of	  major	  shareholdings	  and	  complexities	  due	  to	  the	  dispersed	  structure	  of	  transparency	  rules	  
• 	  More	  organised	  with	  a	  single	  piece	  of	  legislation	  	  
• 	  Comprehensive	  
• 	  Guiding	  
More	  uniform	  rules	  for	  cross	  border	  operations	  and	  more	  legally	  binding	  rules	  in	  company	  law	  
	  
Clarification	  
	  
	  
	  
Protectiveness	  and	  
Dissuasiveness	  
The	  absence	  of	  a	  central	  European	  access	  point	  	   • 	  Coordinated	  • 	  Understandable	  • 	  Extensive	   The	  acceleration	  in	  the	  adoption	  process	  of	  creating	  a	  central	  European	  access	  point	  	  	  
-­‐	   • 	  Well-­‐ordered	  and	  uniform	  rules	  for	  the	  illicit	  activities	  • 	  More	  deterrent	  rules	   	  	  -­‐	  
Key	  Information	  
	  
Background	  
Information	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Summary	  of	  Historical	  
Results	  
	  
	  
	  
Non-­‐financial	  
statistics	  
• 	   	  
	  
Forward-­‐Looking	  
Information	  and	  
Management	  
Discussion	  and	  
Analysis	  
	  The	  lack	  of	  requirements	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  general	  framework	  of	  companies’	  websites	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  mandatory	  disclosure	  requirements	  for	  background	  information	  	  
	  
-­‐	   The	  creation	  of	  an	  inclusive	  single	  section	  regarding	  the	  website	  and	  more	  legally	  binding	  requirements	  for	  background	  information	  
• The	  Revised	  Transparency	  Directive	  2013/50/E	  
-­‐	   The	  abolishment	  of	  the	  mandatory	  requirement	  to	  the	  disclosure	  of	  quarterly	  financial	  reports	   	  -­‐	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  mandatory	  requirement	  to	  publish	  it	  on	  the	  website	  as	  a	  separate	  section	   -­‐	   It	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  require	  a	  disclosure	  obligation	  for	  the	  CSR	  on	  the	  website	  of	  companies	  as	  a	  separate	  section	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
Effective	  Bodies	  and	  
Institutions	   The	  lack	  of	  role	  of	  second	  order	  institutions	  in	  the	  financial	  markets	   Independence	  and	  power	  of	  the	  formal	  institutions	   It	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  improve	  the	  role	  of	  second-­‐order	  institutions	  in	  the	  financial	  markets	  
The	  Adaptability	  of	  
Transparency	  
Requirements	  with	  
Recent	  Innovations	  
Red	  tape	  and	  delay	  in	  the	  improvement	  process	  of	  the	  existing	  legislations	   Keeping	  pace	  with	  innovations	  in	  the	  financial	  markets	   It	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  expand	  and	  accelerate	  the	  creation	  process	  of	  the	  new	  requirements	  and	  to	  prevent	  or	  reduce	  bureaucratic	  issues	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Table	   9:	   The	   Core	   Elements	   of	   Better	   Transparency	   Rules	   in	   the	   Existing	   Turkish	  
Transparency	  Rules	  
The	  Core	  Elements	   Weaknesses	   Strengths	   Recommendations	  
	  
The	  dual	  nature	  of	  
Transparency	  Laws	  
Complicated	  and	  not	  structured	  as	  a	  single	  piece	  of	  legislation	   More	  legally	  binding,	  inclusive	  and	  accurate	  transparency	  rules	  in	  the	  area	  of	  company	  law	  
It	  would	  be	  better	  to	  create	  a	  single	  and	  uniform	  transparency	  section	  in	  the	  legislative	  architecture	  
	  
Clarification	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Protectiveness	  and	  
Dissuasiveness	  
Complexities	  due	  to	  the	  dispersed	  structure	  of	  transparency	  requirements	  	  
	  
A	  central	  access	  point	  to	  disclosed	  information	  (the	  PDP)	  
	  
It	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  combine	  all	  the	  requirements	  in	  the	  same	  sections	  under	  a	  single	  legislation	  The	  lack	  of	  well-­‐organised	  requirements	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  the	  dissuasive	  sanctions	  	  
	  
Imprisonment	  sanctions	   It	  seems	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  adopt	  more	  dissuasive	  sanctions	  in	  terms	  of	  administrative	  and	  criminal	  fines	  
Key	  Information	  
	  
Background	  
Information	  
	  
	  
Summary	  of	  
Historical	  Results	  
	  
	  
Non-­‐financial	  
statistics	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Forward-­‐Looking	  
Information	  and	  
Management	  
Discussion	  and	  
Analysis	  
The	  absence	  of	  mandatory	  disclosure	  requirements	  for	  background	  information	  in	  the	  transparency	  laws	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
It	  could	  be	  adopted	  under	  Regulation	  28663	  as	  a	  legally	  binding	  requirement	  The	  mandatory	  requirement	  for	  quarterly	  financial	  reports	   	  
-­‐	  
It	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  abolish	  mandatory	  requirement	  to	  quarterly	  financial	  reports	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  mandatory	  requirement	  to	  publish	  it	  on	  the	  website	  as	  a	  separate	  section	   	  -­‐	  
It	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  require	  a	  disclosure	  obligation	  for	  the	  CSR	  on	  companies’	  websites	  as	  a	  separate	  section	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
Effective	  Bodies	  and	  
Institutions	  
The	  lack	  of	  independence	  of	  the	  supervisory	  authorities	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  last	  resort	  supervisory	  mechanism	  
The	  more	  active	  role	  of	  second-­‐order	  institutions	  in	  the	  financial	  markets	   Apart	  from	  formal	  institutions,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  create	  an	  independent	  supervisory	  mechanism	  to	  monitor	  legal	  bodies	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  market	  
The	  Adaptability	  of	  
Transparency	  
Requirements	  with	  
Recent	  Innovations	  
Red	  tape	  and	  delay	  in	  the	  adaptation	  process	  of	  new	  requirements	   Keeping	  pace	  with	  most	  of	  the	  innovations	  in	  the	  financial	  markets	   It	  seems	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  financial	  markets	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	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 As shown in the above tables, to some extent both units seem to include the 
core elements of better transparency rules in their legal systems. However, in terms of 
the mode of administration, some differences can be observed between them. These 
differences between the EU and Turkey that can be identified as follows:   
 
Firstly, in terms of the dual nature of transparency laws, both have improved 
transparency requirements in their company and securities laws. However, it can be 
claimed for both that the main transparency requirements have been adopted under 
securities law. For company law, Turkey seems to follow a more interventionist 
policy in general, but in terms of transparency requirements both have managed to 
create legally binding rules in their judicial systems. 795 Nevertheless, some 
shortcomings can be observed in both legislations. For example, due to the large 
number of nations in the EU, it is difficult to create a uniform rule for cross-border 
operations, such as the initial threshold for major shareholdings in the Transparency 
Directive. ‘Gold plating’, for instance, is one of the weaknesses of the EU.796 For 
Turkey, due to the absence of a single piece of legislation for transparency rules, the 
structure of transparency laws is more complicated and complex. In this respect, it 
would be useful to create more uniform rules for cross-border operations in the EU by 
considering the differences between the Member States in terms of the volumes of the 
financial markets or the level of the economic developments. For Turkey, it would be 
useful to combine all transparency rules in a single piece of legislation to provide a 
well-organised structure for transparency requirements.   
 
Secondly, both have managed to include the clarification, protectiveness and 
dissuasiveness principles in their legislative frameworks. However, their strengths and 
weaknesses in these principles are different. For example, the clarification principle 
has been adopted under Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2013/50/EU. Therefore, it is 
well coordinated and understandable in the financial markets. Yet, the absence of a 
central European access point may have a negative impact on the implementation of 
the clarification principle in a timely manner. In Turkey, this principle has been 
adopted under a number of legislations, such as the Declarations of the CMB, the 
CML 6362 and the new TCC 6102. Hence, it seems to be complex due to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
795 For details see 3.1.2.2 and 4.2.1.2 above 
796 For details see 3.2.4 above 
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dispersed structure of transparency requirements. However, Turkey has managed to 
create a single access point in the financial market (the Public Disclosure Platform). 
Thus, it facilitates the use of this principle throughout market players. From this point 
of view, the evidence from this study suggests that the EU needs to increase the 
adoption process of creating a central access point in the financial markets. It would 
be useful for Turkey to bring these transparency requirements together under the same 
sections of transparency laws.   
  
The protectiveness and dissuasiveness principles are provided with the 
Transparency and Market Abuse Directive in the EU. With Articles 24, 25 and 28 of 
Directive 2013/50/EU, the EU ensured dissuasive sanctions by increasing 
administrative and criminal fines. In addition, with the Market Abuse Directive 
2003/6/EC-2010/78/EU, the potential crimes were defined. In Turkey, these 
principles are provided under the CML 6362 and the new TCC 6102. However, in 
terms of the level of dissuasiveness, Turkish administrative and criminal fines do not 
seem to be at the expected level. Therefore, in order to ensure investor protection in 
Turkey, it is essential to adopt more dissuasive sanctions. Additionally, the recent 
massive scandal in Turkey has indicated that there is an accountability problem in the 
Turkish judicial system. As mentioned before, the devil side of corporations or 
players is inevitable in the financial markets. However, in order to regain trust and 
confidence in the markets, it is essential to take legal action against illegal activities in 
a fair and timely manner. Recently, the Turkish economy has been seen as one the 
world’s fragile economies.797 In order to protect and to improve its past reputation 
that being ‘the 17th largest economy in the world with a GDP of about 800 billion 
dollars in 2012’798, Turkey should behave in a responsible manner. Otherwise, the 
market will lose its attractiveness for foreign and domestic investors.    
 
 Thirdly, the key information plays the most important role in creating better 
transparency rules and both the EU and Turkey have managed to include most of the 
key information in their transparency laws. The disclosure of a summary of historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 The Guardian, Fragile economies under pressure as recovery prompts capital flight, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/feb/02/emerging-markets-brazil-indonesia-south-africa, 
accessed at 5/3/2014  
798 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Outlook of Turkey, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/prospects-and-recent-developments-in-the-turkish-economy.en.mfa, accessed at 
19/03/2014 
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results, forward-looking information and management discussion and analysis are 
clearly designated under EU transparency laws. However, in terms of disclosure of 
background information and non-financial statistics, some shortcomings have 
emerged. For example, there is no mandatory requirement to disclose background 
information in EU transparency laws. Due to its importance, it is disclosed voluntarily 
by listed companies. Although this information is already available in the markets, it 
would be helpful to create a legally binding rule for the disclosure of background 
information. The disclosure of non-financial statistics was adopted under the 
Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU).799 However, there is no requirement to disclose 
it on companies’ webpages as a separate section. Hence, it would also be reasonable 
to require a disclosure obligation for the CSR on companies’ websites as a separate 
section.  
 
 Like the EU, the same problem exists for Turkey. The disclosure of a 
summary of historical results, forward-looking information and management 
discussion and analysis are adopted under Turkish transparency laws. Yet, the 
disclosure requirements of background information and non-financial statistics are 
problematic. In Turkey, there is no mandatory requirement to disclose background 
information in the financial market. It could be included under Regulation 28663 as a 
legally binding requirement. The disclosure of non-financial statistics has been 
adopted under the Corporate Governance Declaration of the CMB II-17.1 No: 28871. 
However, there is not any separate section to require the disclosure of the CRS on the 
companies’ webpages. This information are published on the all listed companies’ 
websites in a voluntarily manner. Nevertheless, in this information age, it could be 
helpful requiring a disclosure obligation for the CSR on the website of companies as a 
separate section as well. In this respect, the central storage and dissemination 
mechanisms may play the key role. Therefore, it may be useful creating or improving 
the structure of such mechanisms in the financial markets.  
 
 Fourthly, the legal bodies and institutions have the supplementary role for 
transparency laws, and both have managed to include these institutes in their financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 European Commission, Non-Financial Reporting, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/non-financial_reporting/index_en.htm, accessed at 
30/06/2014 
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markets. For example, in the EU, ESMA, EBA, EIOPA and ESRB are the formal 
institutions. They supervise and monitor the financial markets according to adopted 
laws, take legal action in when laws are breached, make legally binding measures for 
emergency issues and guide market players regarding existing problems with their 
consultation papers.800 The EAG and ECGF are second-order institutions that make 
technical recommendations on corporate governance and company law measures, and 
ensure the completeness between national codes of Member States by making 
suggestions to the European Commission. With formal institutions, the EU has 
managed to strengthen the level of transparency in the financial markets throughout 
the Member States. In particular, with the recent reforms to the supervisory structure 
in 2011, the power of the supervisory authority was improved to ensure transparency, 
efficiency and integrity of the financial markets. Second-order institutions were 
established with the purpose of making recommendations on corporate governance 
and company law measures by publishing their annual reports. Yet, they have not 
been very active since the mandatory discourse on the annual reports of these 
institutions expired in 2011. It is claimed that their absence is not very problematic for 
the EU because the main supervisory authorities, such as ESMA, already play a very 
active role as independent bodies in the financial markets. However, in developing 
countries, such as Turkey, it may be helpful to have some active second-order 
institutions to provide independent points of view for the existing performance of the 
markets.   
 
 In Turkey, the formal institutions like the CMB, the BRSA and the SDIF take 
the leading positions. Like their EU counterparts, these institutions are supervisory 
authorities in the Turkish financial market. They monitor and supervise listed 
companies, take legal action against illicit activities and take the essential measures 
for areas not covered by commercial law. However, the independence of these 
institutions is questionable because, for example, all the members and the president of 
the CMB are chosen by the council of ministers.801 If we consider the possibility of 
having a listed company of any Member of Parliament, then it may be claimed that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 ESMA, Corporate Reporting Policy-Consultation Paper, 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/esma-2014-175_cp_on_the_draft_guidelines_on_apms.pdf, 
accessed at 4/3/2014 
801 The Capital Markets Board of Turkey, About Us: Our Mission, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=0&submenuheader=-1, 
accessed at 12/02/2014 
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these institutions could be used against their main aims on the financial market. 
Therefore, in order to prevent these kinds of possibilities, it may be recommended that 
a high supervisory authority be created, like ESMA, that monitors the decisions of the 
formal institutions until achieving EU membership. In terms of second-order 
institutions, TUSIAD, MUSIAD, CGAT and CGFT play an important role in 
analysing and commenting on the recent performance of the financial market. Unlike 
their counterparts in the EU, they actively participate in current issues by presenting 
their annual reports.  
 
 Fifthly, the adaptability of transparency requirements with recent innovations 
is another important element in creating better transparency rules, and both seem to 
have managed to update their transparency laws with recent reforms. For example, in 
the EU, the Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC with Directive 2013/50/EU, the 
Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC with Directive 2010/73/EU, the Market Abuse 
Directive 2003/6/EC with Directive 2010/78/EU and the forthcoming Market Abuse 
Regulations, the Accounting Directives 78/660/EEC-89/349/EEC with Directives 
2006/43/EC-2013/34EU were updated in accordance with the recent needs of the 
financial markets. Also, in Turkey, the former Commercial Code No: 6772 with the 
new TCC No: 6102 and the former CML No: 2499 with the new CML No: 6362 were 
revised and amended.  
 
With the new transparency laws in both the EU and Turkey, most of the 
existing problems were solved.802 However, in terms of carrying out this principle in a 
timely manner, neither was very successful. For instance, the original Transparency 
Directive 2004/109/EC was updated with Directive 2013/50/EU five years after the 
latest financial crisis occurred in 2008 to deal with the existing problems.803 This 
problem is worse for Turkey. After more than fifty years, Turkey managed to take 
real action by replacing the former code 6772 with the new TCC 6102 in 2012. It is 
important to state that any delay regarding unpredictable events in the financial 
markets will increase their negative impact on the financial markets and make it more 
difficult to take the essential measures. Hence, the legislative frameworks should 
allow rapid intervention by reducing bureaucratic issues.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 For details see 3.2.7 and 4.2.1.3 above  
803 For details see 3.1 and 3.2 above 
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5.4	  Chapter	  Summary	  and	  Conclusion	  	  	  	  
In this investigation, the aim was to understand how better transparency rules 
could be created in the legislative architectures and to assess the efforts of the EU and 
Turkey in building a sound transparency environment in the financial markets with a 
comparative analysis that is carried out pursuant to the potential key factors.  
 
So far, however, there has been little discussion about the main elements of 
better transparency rules in the literature. Therefore, one of the most significant 
findings to emerge from this study is that it has shown the promising elements of 
better transparency requirements in the financial markets. According to the findings 
of this chapter, better transparency laws consist of five potential elements as follows: 
 
     a) The dual nature of transparency laws, b) The right modalities of 
transparency requirements, c) The key information to be made available, d) Effective 
bodies and institutions, e) The adaptability of relevant legal rules with recent 
innovations. 
  
These elements can also be seen as a road map for this chapter because the 
comparative analysis between EU and Turkish transparency laws has been carried out 
to determine whether these elements are available in these two units.  
   
In general, both have managed to introduce the five principles of effective 
transparency laws; however, their success in each element is not at the same level. In 
other words, the strengths and weaknesses of their transparency laws are different. 
 
In the EU, transparency laws are complex and complicated due to the 
dispersed structures of transparency rules in different sectors of law. However, 
compared to Turkey, the EU seems to have reduced these complexities with the well-
organised and comprehensive EU laws. In this respect, EU directives, such as the 
Transparency Directive, the Market Abuse Directive and the Accounting Directive 
have helped to create a better legislative environment for market players. Therefore, it 
is claimed that the EU has taken the modernisation process of transparency 
requirements more seriously than Turkey.   
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The results of this study indicate that the EU has improved the modernisation 
activities in two sectors of law. However, generally, the main transparency rules were 
adopted under securities law, whereas transparency requirements under company law 
seem to play a supplementary role in the financial markets. Additionally, in order to 
improve the applicability of rules, it also supports transparency laws with dissuasive 
sanctions and powerful supervisory authorities by creating a general framework for 
the Member States.    	   	  	   However, in terms of keeping pace with innovations in information 
technologies, it is not at the desired level. For instance, there is no European central 
access point in the financial markets. There is no requirement, which determines the 
main standards for listed companies’ webpages. Additionally, some essential 
information, such as background information and non-financial statistics, is disclosed 
on listed companies’ webpages voluntarily. Therefore, in order to deal with these 
problems, the adoption of a central access point in the EU would be recommended. 
Furthermore, the EU has managed to improve its formal institutions, such as ESMA, 
EBA or EIOPA with its recent reforms,804 but second-order institutions, EAG and 
ECGF, for example, do not seem to have been very active since 2011 due to the 
expiration of mandatory disclosure in their annual reports. Although ESMA fills this 
gap with its consultation papers, it would be useful to improve their participation in 
order to gain different perspectives for the EU financial markets.  
 
 Turkish transparency laws, like those of the EU, are complicated. However, 
compared to the EU, due to the dispersed structure of transparency requirements in 
two sectors of law and the lack of a single piece of legislation for different problems, 
it is claimed that they are even more complex than those of the EU. Therefore, it 
would be better to create a uniform piece of legislation for special requirements in 
Turkey. However, Turkey has managed to create a single access point in the market. 
Hence, although it has a complex structure for its transparency laws, it makes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 Julia Lemonia Raptis, European Financial Regulation: ESMA and the Lamfalussy Process, the 
Renewed European Legislative Process in the Field of Securities Regulation, (2012) 18 Colombia 
Journal of European Law Online, pp.61-68, see also, Jacques de Larosiere, The High Level Group on 
Financial Supervision in the EU-Report, (2009), pp.39-41, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf, accessed 21/06/2014, or 
Pierre Schammo, EU Prospectus Law: New Perspectives on Regulatory Competition in Securities 
Market, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011), pp21-27 
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essential information available to the public at the right time, in the right place and in 
the right format with its electronic dissemination and storage mechanism.  
 
In terms of the dual nature of transparency laws, Turkey has also adopted the 
main transparency rules under securities law. However, some legally bindings, 
inclusive and accurate rules can also be observed in company law.  	  	  
Turkish formal and second order institutions carry out their role in an effective 
manner. Like their EU colleagues, the formal institutions monitor and supervise the 
financial markets, take the legal action when laws are violated and take the essential 
measures for areas, which are not covered by commercial law. However, due to the 
role of government in delegating supervisory authorities’ members and president, 
their independence is open to discussion, in particular, for those companies that are 
indirectly owned by the Members of Parliament. Therefore, until EU Membership is 
obtained, it would be useful to establish an independent supervisory authority in 
Turkey. Unlike the EU, second-order institutions in Turkey actively participate in 
current issues in the financial markets by publishing their annual reports.  
 
Turkey has also adopted some dissuasive sanctions to prevent illegal activities 
in the market. However, when these rules are compared with the EU, the 
dissuasiveness of transparency requirements is not at the expected level. According to 
Transparency International, which is a global coalition against corruption, Turkey’s 
corruption score is fairly high (50%), in particular, after the corruption scandal.805 
Therefore, it seems to be essential to improve administrative and criminal fines in 
Turkey.  
 
One of the common weaknesses for both that emerges from these findings is 
the delay in the adaptability process of transparency requirements with recent 
innovations. Financial crises or scandals are inevitable problems for the financial 
markets. Therefore, it is not possible to prevent these unexpected issues completely. 
However, it is at least possible to reduce the negative effects of the ‘devil side of 
corporations’ with better policies that intervene in the markets at the right time and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805 Transparency International, Corruption by Country/Territory-Turkey, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#TUR, accessed at 13/02/2014  
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the right place. The investigation of this study has shown that both the EU and Turkey 
have achieved to update their transparency rules according to the recent needs of the 
financial markets, but in terms of timing, they have failed. In today’s rapidly changing 
world, every delay will have a destructive impact on the financial market and so make 
it more difficult to regain confidence. Hence, in improving the level of transparency, 
keeping pace with innovations in a timely manner plays a very important role.  
 
To sum up, it can be claimed, ‘clarity promotes effectiveness.’806	  However, it is 
not an easy process and requires a great deal of effort from policy-makers. Taken 
together, these results suggest that the abovementioned five promising elements may 
play a key role in creating better transparency rules and may also be used as a guide in 
measuring the power of transparency laws. In this respect, a comparative analysis 
between EU and Turkish transparency laws has been carried out to understand the 
availability level of these elements in their legislations. The results of this 
investigation show that both units have managed to include these five elements in 
their transparency laws. However, as explained in this chapter, some further reforms 
need to be carried out in certain areas. Therefore, both the EU and Turkey should 
maintain their modernisation activities in order to solve the existing problems and to 
reduce the negative impact of unpredictable events in the future.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 Eric M. Eisenberg, Strategic Ambiguities, (2007, Sage Publication, London), p.104 
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CONCLUSION	  	  
‘Transparency is not remotely the final remedy for the 
ills of the world-but it is a first step’.807   	  
1.	  Summary	  of	  Main	  Findings	  
1.1.	  The	  Theoretical	  Findings	  
This thesis has given an account of, and the reasons for, the importance of 
better corporate governance in the business environment by considering the general 
role of transparency in financial markets. It has explained how the discussion about a 
good corporate governance framework has been converted into one of the main issues 
in both the business and the legal literature. This is because better corporate 
governance may play a key role in the performance of companies. In this respect, a 
clear definition of corporate governance has been seen to be essential. A considerable 
amount of literature has been published on the definition of corporate governance. 
However, this research has consistently shown that these definitions fail to provide 
the common standards for the financial markets.808 Therefore, the evidence from this 
study suggests that, to make a clear definition the legal and economic essences of 
corporations should be considered, and the common concepts of corporate governance 
for all should be highlighted in the definition.809 
 
So, how can corporate governance be improved? Chapter 1 argued that 
transparency, as the most important pillar of corporate governance, helps to draw a 
clear picture in creating a better corporate governance framework for financial 
markets. This is important because the other three pillars ‘fairness, accountability and 
responsibility’810 depend on a high level of information disclosure, which cannot be 
effectively provided where there is a lack of transparency. Therefore, transparency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807 Adrian Henriques, Corporate Truth: The Limits to Transparency, (London, Earthscan 2007), p.3  
808 Sir Adrian Cadbury, in: “Global Corporate Governance Forum”, Worldbank (2000) cited in Elif 
Gonencer (n 50), p.3, Cuneyt Yuksel (n 51), p.1, OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
(Steering Group on Corporate, Paris 2004), p.11  
809 This and the following two paragraphs refer to the research questions (see Introduction at 3. Aims, 
Objectives and Research Questions) ‘(i) what defines good corporate governance, what are the roles of 
financial disclosure and transparency in corporate governance, and why is the transparency principle 
important among other corporate governance principles?’ 
810 For the pillars of corporate governance, please see V. Balachandran and V. Chandrasekaran, 
Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, (New Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited 2009), 
p.88 
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can be accepted as a container for each corporate governance pillar, and hence it plays 
a key role in the success of both corporate governance and financial markets.    
 
The results of Chapter 1 indicated that better transparency would be accepted 
in many ways as key in the success of corporations because it seeks to remedy the 
problems of financial markets and corporate governance by creating an effective 
operating environment and a harmony between all the players in corporations. The 
present research has explained the main advantages of transparency from two points 
of view: for financial markets and for the fundamental problems of corporate 
governance.  
 
In terms of financial markets, Chapters 1 and 2 highlighted that better 
transparency, with its ‘x-ray effect’811, plays a preventive role in ‘the devil side of 
corporations’ by strengthening the confidence between market players. In this respect, 
the main advantages of transparency for financial markets have been demonstrated to 
be: increased management credibility and accountability, better monitoring 
mechanisms, more long term investors, high trading volume, increased liquidity and 
decreased volatility, better options to access securities, decreased adverse selection by 
reducing information asymmetries, and good relations with the investment 
community and advanced institutional investors.812 
 
In terms of corporate governance, the findings from this study make several 
contributions to the relations between corporate bodies and a high level of 
transparency.813  
 
First, the present study has investigated the correlation between the board and 
the level of transparency and indicated that better transparency allows the board to 
make worldwide strategic decisions concerning the management of a company in an 
effective way by increasing the active participations of the board members in the main 
issues of corporations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811 John Elkington (n 2) 
812 This and the following seven paragraphs refer to the research questions (see Introduction at 3. Aims, 
Objectives and Research Questions) ‘(ii) what are the advantages of a high level of transparency, and 
what possible side effects may it have for financial markets?’ 
813 For details see 1.1.2 above 
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Second, it has examined the role of transparency for shareholders and 
highlighted its three advantages. According to the findings of this research: (i) better 
transparency prevents misbehaviour among shareholders by improving internal 
monitoring systems; (ii) transparency, in particular ownership disclosure, increases 
market efficiency, reduces agency cost and makes the necessary information available 
to the public so as to help in estimating the value of company; (iii) it increases 
shareholders` participation and the decision-making powers in corporations by 
providing useful information to shareholders with regard to buying, selling and 
holding securities in the market.  
 
 Third, it has evaluated the main impact of transparency for stakeholders by 
focusing on employees and creditors. The results of the research imply a relation 
between a high level of transparency and employees, in particular for companies of 
the German model of corporate governance structure. This study has shown that for 
such systems, accessing the relevant information in a timely manner helps employees 
and their representatives to make an effective contribution to the decision-making 
process of the supervisory board. Additionally, greater transparency provides them 
with better protection. For creditors, the reliability of financial reports also plays an 
important role. Creditors, as the risk bearers, want to access reliable, comprehensive, 
accurate and up-to-date information with regard to corporate performance in order to 
analyse the potential risks. Therefore, greater transparency provides them with the 
access to external sources when it is needed. 
  
 Furthermore, this study has argued that a high level of transparency has a 
positive impact on the fundamental problems of corporate governance. 814  For 
instance, it has shown that better transparency may reduce the agency problem by 
providing essential information to principals in order to help their understanding in 
evaluating whether or not agents are working for the wealth maximisation of 
shareholders and creating an automatic monitoring system in the company. In terms of 
stakeholder theory, this thesis has investigated whether a high level of transparency 
improves trust and indicates behaviour of a corporation towards customers, 
shareholders and stakeholders by providing a top-down analysis and whether doing so 	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creates an effective working environment that increases companies’ quality and 
productivity. 
 
 However, the present research has also examined the potential disadvantages 
of transparency and highlighted some side effects of it for financial markets. Three 
main disadvantages of transparency for financial markets can thus be listed: the costs 
of transparency, the reliability problem of transparency, and complexity and 
inadequacy of transparency.815  
  
 To elaborate, this study has examined two types transparency costs: direct cost 
and competitive cost. Direct cost occurs when information is disclosed to the public 
via transparency tools, such as the Internet, newspapers, financial reports or letters. 
Competitive cost refers to the competitive disadvantages of a firm that come about 
due to disclosing useful information to potential rivals in financial markets.  
 
The reliability problem of transparency has been explained by indicating 
negative behaviour of principals (CEOs and other top executives) in corporations. In 
fact, the research has clarified that the reason for this problem is the main argument of 
corporate governance: the principal-agent problem. This thesis has shown how agents 
may take advantage of information asymmetries in financial markets for their own 
benefits and in doing so, has highlighted how low quality of reporting and the 
problem of reliability of transparency occur in financial markets.   
 
 The complexity and inadequacy of transparency have been examined by 
focusing on the possibility that market players have a lack of knowledge due to the 
complex terminology of disclosed information. In this respect, the main argument of 
this investigation was that adopting a number of transparency rules might not work if 
market participants or information users do not understand them. 
 
 As well as the disadvantages of transparency, the present research has also 
focused on the potential difficulties involved in creating better transparency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 This and the following four paragraphs refer to the research questions (see Introduction at 3. Aims, 
Objectives and Research Questions) ‘(iv) what are the main obstacles and limitations in building well-
organised transparency legislations?)’ And see also 1.1.3.2 above 
Conclusion	  
	   273	  
jurisdictions, such as the potential problems in the definition of transparency, the 
absence of effective rules, legal bodies and institutions and adequate enforcement 
mechanism, privacy of information and the problem of measuring transparency.816 
The question that needs to be asked is why, despite these disadvantages and 
difficulties, is a high level of transparency essential for the effective functioning of 
financial markets?  
 
 In this respect, three financial scandals - the Imar Bank (Turkey), Parmalat, 
(Italy) and Lehman Brothers (the US) - have been examined as case studies to indicate 
the negative impacts of intransparent financial markets. 817  This research has 
investigated the costs of the devil side of corporations for financial markets and 
highlighted that the Imar Bank led to more than US$20 billion, Parmalat cost €14.2 
billion and Lehman Brothers cost $11.9 trillion. The aim of this investigation was to 
assess the destructive impacts of a lack of transparency in financial markets and to 
explain why the cost of opacity is higher than the cost of transparency for financial 
markets.818   
 
1.2.	  The	  Comparative	  Analysis:	  EU	  and	  Turkish	  Transparency	  Laws	  	  
 This study was undertaken to design a theoretical framework for the 
importance of transparency both in corporate governance and financial markets, and 
to evaluate how the theory of transparency has been converted into practice within 
both European and Turkish legislative frameworks. 
  
 The findings of Chapter 3 show that between 1999 and 2014, the EU, as a 
pioneer in recent modernisation activities, has taken some major steps towards 
building better transparency laws in its financial markets. Additionally, the presence 
of twenty-eight Member States has provided the EU with a chance to create standards 
for effective transparency laws in globally connected financial markets. Thus, it not 
only draws up a framework for itself, but also provides guidance as a model for all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816 For details see 2.1 above 
817 For details see 2.2 above 
818 This paragraph refers to the research question (see Introduction at 3. Aims, Objectives and Research 
Questions) ‘(iii) is the cost of opacity is higher than the cost of transparency in financial markets and if 
so why?’ 
Conclusion	  
	   274	  
legislative frameworks, in particular for developing countries, to improve 
transparency requirements in their financial markets.819  
 
 In this investigation, the aim was to draw a clear picture of recent 
modernisation activities in EU transparency laws. In this respect, the leading reforms 
between 1999 and 2013 have been examined and evaluated. One of the main findings 
of the present study is that better legal rules on financial transparency require a 
modernisation effort both in the securities market and company law (‘dual nature of 
transparency law’). Therefore, the research has focused on both of these areas.  
 
 According to the findings of this study, recent reforms were introduced within 
the securities law in the EU as the first step.820 In this respect, the FSAP and the 
Lamfalussy Process have taken the lead. This research has shown that in 1999 the 
FSAP, as a programme of action, determined the key obligations for future 
arrangements. Hence, it also helped to accelerate the average speed of the adoption 
process, to enhance consultation between market participants, and (at least in 
principle) to achieve a quick response to unexpected events, such as financial crises 
and corporate scandals, by providing a well-structured list of priorities for the 
financial markets. The Lamfalussy Process took the reform activities further in 
procedural terms. In particular, it created a new four-level policy-making strategy in 
EU financial law.   
 
 However, this investigation has also shown that neither was perfect and both 
suffered from several major deficiencies, in particular in matters of financial 
transparency; thus, both were enhanced with further European activities. For example, 
the FSAP was modernised in the post-FSAP period (the White Paper). Hence, greater 
transparency and market consultation, a new structure for the supervisory authorities, 
more joined-up securities market legislations with cost-benefit analysis and lesser 
legislative interventions were planned as key policies in the EU. Like the FSAP, the 
Lamfalussy Process was also enhanced by the new reforms (the De Larosiere Report 
and the subsequent reports). Hence, more guidance was provided to financial markets, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 This and the following thirteen paragraphs refer to the research questions (see Introduction at 3. 
Aims, Objectives and Research Questions) ‘(v) what are the recent reforms in EU transparency laws 
and what did trigger these modernisation activities?’ 
820 For details see 3.1 above 
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the level of transparency was increased, the level of host country barriers was 
decreased and a new European System of Financial Supervision was created. Hence, 
the present research, as its second major finding, has also highlighted that creating 
better transparency rules, in addition to the dual nature of transparency laws, requires 
an on-going process and remaining up-to-date with policy innovations.  
  
 In essence, this research has indicated that the Transparency Directive is the 
most important element of both of these activities in order to improve the level of 
transparency in the EU.  
 
 The main transparency requirements of Directive 2004/109/EC have been 
examined in terms of the disclosure of periodic information, the notification of major 
shareholdings, the dissemination and the storage of the regulated information and 
supervision.821 The findings of the research have shown that it covered a significant 
number of issues to create an effective flow of information in EU financial markets, 
such as publishing financial reports, disclosing the content and language formats of 
information, dissemination of this information throughout the Community, storage of 
information by the officially appointed authorities, responsibilities of issuers with 
regard to published information, supervision of listed companies by the competent and 
supervisory authorities, and penalties for breaching the requirements of the Directive. 
However, due to the rapidly changing needs of the financial markets, it needed to be 
revised. 
 
 Thus, this research has examined the reasons to address the following 
problems of the original Directive 2004/109/EC: the strict deadlines for the periodic 
information, excessive mandatory requirements for quarterly financial reports and 
hence, ‘the invisibility problem of SMEs’ 822 , the different implementations in 
imposing the information notification of major shareholdings, the out-of-date 
requirements for innovations in the financial markets and thus, ‘the problem of gold 
plating, hidden ownership and empty voting’, the absence of a central storage 
mechanism (EU access point), and the complexities in understanding the competent 
authorities.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821 For details see 3.2 above 
822 For the ‘invisibility problem of SMEs’: see 3.2.2.1 above  
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 In order to improve the effectiveness and the clarity of the existing Directive 
2004/109/EC, it was modified by Directive 2013/50/EU. In this investigation, the aim 
was to evaluate to what extent the EU has managed to deal with the abovementioned 
problems within the revised Directive. According to the findings of this investigation, 
the 2013 reform provided the following innovations: the abolishment of the 
mandatory requirement of quarterly financial reports, extended deadlines for periodic 
information, adopting, defining and accepting the new financial tools as the existing 
financial instruments in financial markets, the confirmation of creating a central 
access point until 2018 by preparing the draft technical standards in the EU, and 
increasing the sanctioning powers of the competent authorities by confirming a 
uniform approach between the Member States.   
 
 The results of this investigation have explained that Directive 2013/50/EU 
managed to solve most of the existing problems of Directive 2004/109/EC. However, 
it was also shown that some issues still remained problematic. For example, the 
different implementation problems of the initial threshold for the notification of major 
shareholdings (‘gold-plating’), the absence of a central access point for EU financial 
markets (i.e., the lack of an electronic access point), and the lack of transparency 
requirements for the subsidiaries of multinational corporations that trade on the 
outside of the EU financial markets are some of the further modifications that seem to 
be essential for better transparency laws in EU legislative frameworks.  
 
The research has also examined other elements of EU law that have a positive 
effect on transparency requirements because it is not only the Transparency Directive 
that addresses this topic in the EU. In this respect, relevant provisions of the 
Prospectus Directive and the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) have been outlined in 
order to identify further transparency requirements. Hence, the present research was 
designed to determine the main transparency requirements in EU securities law.823   
As better transparency laws have a dual nature (securities law and company 
law), the study has therefore also focused on recent transparency requirements in EU 
company law. However, as seen above, the main transparency rules have been 
adopted in securities law.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 For details see 3.2.9 above 
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The findings of this research have indicated that the HLG Report and the 
Commission Action Plan on Modernisation of Company Law and Enhancing 
Corporate Governance address the issue of improving transparency requirements in 
EU company law. The study has shown that the HLG Report (the Winter Report) was 
‘just a report’: it did not provide any legally binding rules for EU financial markets. 
However, as a recommendation, it played a key role because its theories have been 
converted into practices in the Commission Action Plan. With the Action Plan, in 
order to improve the financial reporting standards, Directive 78/660/EEC on 
accounting was amended by Directive 2006/46/EC. Thus, the annual reports of listed 
companies have been improved in terms of content and scope. In addition, Directive 
2007/36/EC regarding certain rights of shareholders in listed companies was adopted. 
Hence, shareholders’ rights were enhanced by keeping pace with the new electronic 
technologies.  
The Commission Action Plan, as a programme for action similar to the FSAP, 
helped to improve the level of transparency for listed companies in the EU. However, 
like other EU initiatives, it was not perfect and suffered from several deficiencies. 
Thus, the Commission proposed and adopted a new Action Plan for European 
Company Law and Corporate Governance to modernise and enhance the company 
law and the corporate governance structures in the EU by dealing with the existing 
shortcomings in these areas. This Action Plan aims to improve board diversity, 
quality standards of reporting in the case of choosing the ‘comply or explain 
approach’, the invisibility problem of shareholders in listed companies and the 
effective flow of information to institutional investors in companies.  
 The main goal of the present research was to assess the practicability of 
transparency laws in a real environment by considering the EU as a case study. In this 
respect, in order to present a better understanding, the research also examined Turkish 
transparency laws. Hence, it not only examined the practicability of transparency 
requirements in developed countries, but it also assessed the achievability of this 
jurisdiction in a developing country.824  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824 This and the following seven paragraphs refer to the research questions (see Introduction at 3. Aims, 
Objectives and Research Questions) ‘(v) what are the recent reforms in Turkish transparency laws and 
what did trigger these modernisation activities?’ 
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 Turkey, as a developing country and a candidate for the EU, is a good case 
study to indicate the practicability and harmonised structure of existing EU 
transparency law into national frameworks and its impacts on financial markets.  In 
Chapter 4, like the preceding European chapter, both the securities and company laws 
of Turkey were examined in terms of transparency requirements.825  
 
 This research found that Turkey made numerous amendments in response to 
the Imar Bank scandal in its Commercial Code between 2003 and 2011. However, 
these amendments could not create the expected modernisation activities and failed to 
keep pace with the latest innovations in financial markets. Thus, Turkey, in a major 
step forward, enacted a new commercial and securities law in 2012 with the aim of 
creating a modern business environment that is, to a large extent, in accordance with 
EU and international standards.    
             
 Thus, in the subsequent investigation, the modernisation activities between 
2003 and 2014 in Turkey were examined. This research has identified innovations of 
the new Commercial Code as follows: first, independent regulatory agencies have 
been enhanced (the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and the Capital 
Markets Board of Turkey); second, the Corporate Governance Principles was issued 
by harmonising the OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles; and third, 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been accepted.  
 
 This study has indicated that in securities law, the new Capital Market Law 
No: 6362 played a key role in improving the level of transparency in the financial 
markets. According to the findings of the present research, the main reforms of the 
new Capital Market Law No: 6362 with relation to transparency requirements can be 
summarised as follows: the principles of public disclosure have been clarified, the 
capital market institutions and their activities have been improved, the main standards 
with regard to the Borsa-Istanbul (the Turkish stock-exchange) have been enhanced 
and the principles of the new Capital Market Law have been introduced.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825 For details see 4.2 above 
Conclusion	  
	   279	  
 As well as the Capital Market Law No: 6362, the Capital Markets Board of 
Turkey has also improved its transparency requirements with its legally binding 
declarations and communiqués for the areas that are not covered in the CML No: 
6362. It has also updated the changing needs of the financial markets with its latest 
declarations.  
 
 In terms of company law, this study examined transparency developments in 
the new TCC No: 6102. The results of this investigation indicate that in terms of 
transparency requirements, the company law has improved the electronic transactions 
and information society, enhanced the commercial books, independent audit system 
and the financial statements, and clarified the rights and obligations of shareholders. 
In this respect, the main features of the new TCC 6102 were defined as web-based, 
information user friendly, continuous reporting and global based. 
 
 However, Turkish transparency laws have also suffered from some 
deficiencies. The study has found that: first, Turkish transparency laws are complex 
due to the absence of a comprehensive transparency section in the new TCC 6102; 
second, the ‘comply or explain approach’ is problematic because listed companies in 
Turkey have failed to disclose comprehensive information when not complying with 
the rules; third, the requirement of the initial threshold for major shareholders is not 
very clear in the new TCC because it was enacted under the Capital Markets Board 
Communiqué on Principles Regarding Public Disclosure of the Special Cases 2009 
Serial: VIII, No: 54 (the supplementary law of the CML) instead of the main CML 
No: 6362; fourth, due to the absence of a specific classification for potential risks, the 
risk-management requirements are fairly complex; and fifth, the capacity of the 
commercial judiciary is limited and the speed of proceedings in a court is very slow. 
Thus, further modernisation activities to deal with these problems have been 
recommended in this investigation.   
 
 The aim of Chapter 5 was to enhance our understanding of the success of 
enacted transparency rules in the EU and Turkey with a comparative approach. Thus, 
this research contributes the existing knowledge transparency by determining the 
potential criteria for better transparency laws and provides a road map for the 
comparative analysis. Hence, the weaknesses and strengths of EU and Turkish 
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transparency laws were examined and the possible remedies for the main 
shortcomings in their legislative architectures were discussed.  
 
The results of this study indicate that in creating better transparency laws, the 
following themes need to be considered by policy-makers: (a) The dual nature of 
transparency laws; (b) The right modalities of transparency requirements; (c) The key 
information to be made available; (d) Effective bodies and institutions; (e) The 
adaptability of the relevant legal rules with recent innovations. In light of these 
potential principles, whether or not the EU and Turkey could achieve the creation of 
effective transparency laws in their legislative architectures have been examined in 
the present investigation.826   
 
The findings of this research have shown that both have managed to include 
five promising principles of effective transparency laws; however, in terms of the 
mode of administration, there are some differences between them.827  
 
For example, in terms of the segments of law, the main transparency rules are 
adopted under securities law, whereas transparency requirements under company law 
seem to play a supplementary role in EU financial markets. Turkey also adopts the 
main transparency rules under securities law. However, some legally binding, 
inclusive and accurate rules can also be observed in company law.   
 
With regard to the right modalities of transparency requirements, transparency 
laws in both legal systems are complex due to the diverse structures of the 
transparency jurisdictions. However, the EU seems to have created more clear 
transparency laws than Turkey. In particular with single directives, including the 
Transparency Directive, the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse Directive and the 
Accounting Directives, it seems to have reduced these complexities in EU financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 This paragraph refers to the research question (see Introduction at 3. Aims, Objectives and Research 
Questions) ‘(iv) what are the key principles for creating better transparency legislations in financial 
markets?’ 
827 This and the following five paragraphs refer to the research questions (see Introduction at 3. Aims, 
Objectives and Research Questions) ‘(vi) what are the strengths and weaknesses of both EU and 
Turkish transparency legislations and how could Turkey and the EU manage to create better 
transparency laws in their legislative frameworks?’ 
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markets.828 In addition to this, in order to improve the applicability of the rules, the 
EU has supported transparency laws with dissuasive sanctions and powerful 
supervisory authorities by creating a general framework for the Member States. 
Turkey has also adopted some dissuasive sanctions to prevent the illegal activities in 
the market, yet their implementation is often not sufficient.  
      	   In terms of the key information to be made available, the results of this 
investigation show that in general, both are successful in creating key information in 
their transparency laws. However, there is no rule for the minimum standards of 
website requirements to disclose key information online in the EU. Additionally, the 
absence of a ‘central access point’ makes it difficult to access this key information 
throughout the twenty-eight Member States. In Turkey, the disclosure of quarterly 
financial reports is still mandatory. It is suggested that it would be useful to abolish 
the mandatory requirements for quarterly financial reports, in particular, for the 
SMEs.  
 
 With relation to effective bodies and institutions, the EU has managed to 
improve its formal institutions, such as ESMA, EBA or EIOPA with the recent 
reforms; however, the second-order institutions, such as EAG and ECGF, have not 
been very active since 2011 due to the expiration of mandatory disclosure of their 
annual reports. In Turkey, formal (the Capital Markets Board), and second order 
institutions (TUSIAD and MUSIAD) carry out their role in an effective manner. 
However, the independence of the formal authorities is open to discussion due to the 
role of government in delegating the supervisory authorities’ members and the 
president. 
 
 In terms of the adaptability of transparency requirements with recent 
innovations, the present research has shown that both legal systems have managed to 
update their transparency laws with the recent reforms. For example, Directive 
2004/109/EC was revised with Directive 2013/50/EU in order to deal with the 
existing problems of EU financial markets. Turkey has also revised and updated its 
former Commercial Code No: 6772 and CML No: 2499 with the new TCC No: 6102 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
828 For details see 3.2.9 above 
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and CML No: 6362. Additionally, the CMB has also completed the missing 
legislations with its latest declarations and communiqués.  
 
 Taken together, the following recommendations have been suggested for the 
EU and Turkey. For the EU: more uniform rules for cross border operations and more 
legally binding rules regarding the quality standards of financial reporting; a single 
notification for major shareholders and better transparency for institutional investors 
in company law; an acceleration of the adoption process of creating a central 
European access point; an inclusive single section regarding the website and more 
legally binding requirements for background information; a disclosure obligation for 
the CSR on the website of companies as a separate section; an improvement in the 
role of second-order institutions; an acceleration in the creation process of new 
requirements; and a reduction in bureaucratic issues. For Turkey: a single and uniform 
transparency section in the legislative architecture; more dissuasive sanctions in terms 
of administrative and criminal fines; abolishment of the mandatory requirement for 
quarterly financial reports; a disclosure obligation for the CSR on companies’ 
websites as a separate section; an independent supervisory mechanism to monitor 
legal bodies and institutions; and a reduction in bureaucratic issues and keeping pace 
with innovations in a timely manner in the financial markets.829  
 
 In summary, this research has critically examined the main role of a high level 
of transparency in corporate governance and financial markets. It has evaluated the 
advantages and disadvantages of transparency and in the light of the ‘devil side of 
corporations’, this research has highlighted why the side effects of transparency 
should not be overemphasised. In doing so, it has built the theoretical framework for 
the importance of transparency in financial markets. In addition, in order to indicate 
the practicability of transparency in legislative frameworks, this research has 
examined EU and Turkish transparency laws in a comparative perspective. One of the 
more significant findings emerge from this study is that this research has investigated 
the key elements of better transparency law in order to provide a well-organised 
comparative analysis. In this respect, EU and Turkish transparency laws have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
829 This paragraph refers to the research question (see Introduction at 3. Aims, Objectives and Research 
Questions) ‘(vi) how could Turkey and the EU manage to create better transparency laws in their 
legislative frameworks?’  
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analysed according to the availability of these key factors in their legislative 
frameworks and thus, further recommendations have been suggested by considering 
their shortcomings. 
 
      The general finding of this study is that there is a need for transparency in 
financial markets. As a pillar of corporate governance, it not only creates an effective 
working environment in corporations, but also helps to provide an ethical and honest 
business atmosphere in financial markets. Although a high level of transparency 
cannot completely prevent financial scandals or economic crises in the future, as an 
early warning system it helps to see potential scenarios in financial markets. Hence, as 
‘an invisible guard’, it plays a preventative role against unexpected events. However, 
as seen in this investigation, designing the right transparency laws is not an easy 
process. It is an endless procedure and requires a great deal of effort from policy-
makers because there is always a need for further modernisation activities in the 
rapidly changing financial markets. Therefore, it should be an on-going target for 
policy-makers. Additionally, it should not just be an imitation of law that is copied 
from apparently better legislative frameworks. As explained in the final chapter, the 
promising elements should be included as the minimum standards in the respective 
legislative frameworks.830   
 
2.	  Main	  Contributions	  to	  Relevant	  Literature	  	  	   The findings from this research make several contributions to the current 
literature. It explained the essential nature of transparency in corporate governance 
and financial markets by analysing a considerable amount of published literature.831 
Thus, the work contributes to the existing knowledge about corporate governance and 
transparency by discussing the key arguments in the literature and in doing so it 
developed its own position.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
830 For details see 5.1 above 
831 Representative examples are: Charlotte Villiers, Corporate Reporting and Company Law, 
(Cambridge University Press 2006), Sir Adrian Cadbury (n 48), Cuneyt Yuksel (n 51), The OECD (n 
54), Borgia F, ‘Corporate governance & Transparency: The role of disclosure in preventing new 
financial scandals and crimes’ (Editoriale scientifica 2007), Benjamin E Hermalin and Michael S 
Weisbach, Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance, (2012) 67 The Journal of Finance 
pp.195-233, Caroline Bradley, ‘Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation 
after the Crisis’, (2011), 1 American University Business Law Review and B. R. Cheffins, `Did 
Corporate Governance Fail During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500`, 
(2009) 65 Business Lawyer  
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For example, in the theoretical context, it aimed to provide a clear definition 
for corporate governance. The main definitions of pioneer scholars, including Sir 
Adrian Cadbury, the OECD and Cuneyt Yuksel in the literature were also critically 
examined.832 This examination, however, indicated that these definitions are unable to 
provide common standards for financial markets and thus, this study suggested that in 
devising a clear definition, the legal and economic essences of corporations should be 
considered and the common concepts of corporate governance for all should be 
highlighted. Additionally, this study has examined some of the key points made by 
Villiers. For instance, she identifies the concept of transparency and disclosure as the 
main requirement of company law.833 However, this investigation has demonstrated 
that, contrary to this view, effective transparency legislations require a modernisation 
effort both in company and securities laws by defining it as the dual nature of 
transparency laws. Moreover, this study has discussed the main disadvantage of 
transparency, its cost, by analysing why the cost of opacity is higher than the cost of 
transparency in financial markets. This has been demonstrated through three financial 
scandals, the Imar Bank, Parmalat and Lehman Brothers, to challenge some of the 
main arguments made by Hermalin, Weisbach, and von Furstenberg.834  
 
Subsequently, the thesis analysed the importance of transparency by 
highlighting its advantages for both the fundamental problems of corporate 
governance and financial markets. Thus, it aimed to explain why transparency is an 
important element of success for the effective functioning of financial markets.835  
Moreover, it highlighted the main disadvantages and potential difficulties of a high 
level of transparency in order to determine the possible remedies for creating better 
transparency rules.836 All of this also contributes to the discussion in the literature.  
 
Finally, this thesis examined the practicability of these theories in the 
legislative architectures by assessing those of the EU and Turkey. This is different 
from the previous literature, which mainly focuses on transparency laws in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
832 Sir Adrian Cadbury (n 50), Cuneyt Yuksel (n 51), and The OECD (n 54), 
833 Charlotte Villiers (n 23), pp.1-13 
834 Benjamin E Hermalin and Michael S Weisbach (n 6), G. M. von Furstenberg, `Hopes and delusions 
of transparency`, (2001) 12 North American Journal of Economics and Finance pp.105-120 and see 2.2 
above 
835 For details see 1.1.3.1 above 
836 For details see 2.1 above 
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developed world.837 Thus, this study has provided a broad perspective for the existing 
transparency laws of the EU and Turkey by including the latest modernisation 
activities on this segment of law. In this investigation, the aim was to assess the 
transparency levels of financial markets in the legislative frameworks by considering 
the EU and Turkey, to create promising elements of better transparency laws by 
considering the theoretical and practical approaches of the present work and to 
include the potential framework in the comparative analysis.838  
 
One of the main aspects of this investigation, the promising elements of better 
transparency, aimed to fill a gap in the literature, in particular its comparative 
analysis. By doing so, instead of the view that ‘more is always better’839, it highlights 
the importance of optimal transparency in financial markets. Thus, this research 
extends our knowledge with regard to the main strategy in creating more effective 
transparency rules. It not only provides a general framework for the essential elements 
of better transparency laws, but also creates minimum standards for comparative 
analysis to evaluate the availability of the required standards in the selected legislative 
frameworks. This is important because there has been little discussion about the 
principles of better transparency rules in the literature. Thus, this is the first time that 
the most promising elements of better transparency rules have been identified and 
used to explore the efficiency of existing transparency rules in the legislative 
architectures. Consequently, EU and Turkish transparency laws were compared to 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of the existing rules by checking the 
availability of the determined elements, the existing shortcomings in both legislations 
were indicated and further recommendations to improve transparency laws in these 
financial markets were suggested.  
 
 Moreover, while there has been a growing interest in Turkey in the relevant 
laws on financial transparency840, there is a lack of empirical information on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
837 For example: Charlotte Villiers (n 23) only examines transparency laws in the UK 
838 For details see 3.1, 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2 above 
839 For details see 5.1.3 above 
840 For details see 4.3 above, and also PWC, ‘New Turkish Commercial Code: A Blueprint for the 
Future’, (2011) http://www.pwc.com.tr/en_TR/TR/publications/ttk-assets/pages/ttk-
a_blueprint_for_the_future.pdf, accessed at 20/05/2014, Melsa Ararat,  “Comply or explain” without 
consequences: the case of Turkey, in Christine A. Mallin, (ed.) Handbook on International Corporate 
Governance and European Commission, ‘Turkey 2012 Progress Report accompanying the document 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council’, (Commission Staff 
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application of the law. Thus, this research has also assessed the transparency levels of 
the thirty sample listed companies in Turkey with an empirical insight. The aim of 
this empirical study was to examine the availability of five types of key information 
on the webpages of thirty companies listed on the Borsa-Istanbul. In this respect, the 
study has indicated whether Turkish listed companies have managed to implement 
new transparency laws in the financial market.  
 
 Overall, this research will serve as a base for future studies. The main findings 
of this research will indicate the essential nature of transparency laws by providing a 
theoretical and practical framework to the literature. In addition, the promising 
elements of better transparency laws may be applied to other comparative analysis in 
the world.  
 
3.	  Limitations	  of	  the	  Current	  Study	  	  
The present research aimed to explain the main role of transparency in 
financial markets and corporate governance by reflecting its theoretical and practical 
aspects in the literature. However, a number of important limitations need to be 
considered. 
 
First, the research only covered the role of transparency for listed companies 
(joint stock companies) in financial markets. Therefore, it did not attempt to analyse 
the impact of transparency for all corporations, such as SMEs or limited liability 
companies and ignored the practicability of transparency laws for such companies.  
 
Second, this study focused on on-going financial disclosure requirements for 
listed companies. In this respect, some important requirements, such as disclosure for 
corporate social responsibility projects, environmental issues and initial public 
offerings, were not the main focus of this study.841  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Working Document-Brussels, 2012) (2011)  (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-UK, Northampton- USA), 
pp. 355-370   
841 See Introduction at 3. Aims, Objectives and Research Question, and 1.1.1 above 
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Third, in order to create better transparency laws, the present study only 
analysed the legal and to lesser extent economic perspectives of transparency.842 
However, this investigation has also shown that transparency touches on numerous 
other disciplines, such as philosophy, ethics and politics.843  
 
Fourth, the current research has only examined and assessed EU and Turkish 
transparency laws in order to show the practicability of determined principles in the 
legislative frameworks; therefore, it provides a EU-based transparency system in the 
literature. Thus, other countries, such as the US (or one or more of the BRIC 
countries), could also be examined.   
 
Fifth, in this investigation, as an empirical insight, only the transparency level 
of Turkish listed companies has been examined. The aim was to indicate to what 
extent Turkey, as a developing country, has managed to implement the new 
transparency laws in the financial market. In addition to Turkey, in order to 
understand the transparency level of the Member States, more empirical work could 
be conducted by analysing individual European countries, such as Germany or the 
UK. Hence, further empirical investigations would be useful to indicate the reflections 
of the enacted transparency rules on EU listed companies. 
 
Sixth, as a promising element of better transparency law, effective legal bodies 
and institutions have been examined at national and EU level. However, this 
investigation has also indicated that due to the existence of a number of multi-national 
companies in financial markets, a global supervisory authority seems to be essential to 
provide and protect a high level of transparency in an international aspect. This could 
also be explored in further research.   
   
4.	  Recommendations	  for	  Further	  Research	  Work	  	  	   In light of the abovementioned limitations, this research has indicated that 
there are many questions in need of further investigation. In this respect, it is 
suggested that the relation of these factors is investigated in future studies.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
842 For details see 1.1.3.1, 2.2 and 4.2 above  
843 For details see 1.2.2.2 above and also Jill F. Solomon and Aris Solomon (n 161), p.23 
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 For example, as explained in Chapter 3, SMEs may play a key role in financial 
markets, in particular, in terms of job creation and the sustainability of economies. 
Therefore, further studies on transparency laws of SMEs could be carried out to 
improve this aspect of transparency in the literature.   
  
More information on non-financial disclosure would help us to establish a 
greater degree of accuracy on this matter. In particular, more transparency for 
corporate social responsibility projects and environmental issues seems to have a 
positive impact not only on the social problems of societies, but also on the 
desirability level of corporations for long-term investors. In this respect, in order to 
understand the positive influences of a high level of transparency, a further study 
investigating non-financial disclosure would be very revealing.  
 
 It would also be interesting to assess the effects of a philosophical approach, 
in particular ethical aspects, on creating better transparency laws in financial markets. 
The findings of this investigation have highlighted that law can only be effective as 
long as it identifies and monitors actual negative behaviour. However, in the virtual 
electronic financial markets, it is not possible to provide an active twenty-four hour 
monitoring system. In this respect, further research regarding the role of ethical 
approach in this field would be worthwhile.   
 
 Additionally, further research could investigate the practicability of 
transparency laws in the US by considering its laws in this field. The US, with one of 
the strongest capital markets in the world, is also a pioneer in creating well-organised 
transparency laws. Further research should therefore concentrate on the investigation 
of US transparency laws.  
  
Lastly, as mentioned before, in order to maintain a high level of transparency, 
all listed companies should cooperate with each other in disclosing information.844 In 
the global financial markets, in order to deal with the transparency problem of 
multinational companies in less developed countries, the creation of a global 
supervisory authority seems to be essential. In this respect, a further study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
844 For details see 1.1.3.3 above 
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investigating the main impact of such an authority in financial markets could be 
conducted. 
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